It should not be too hard to figure out where
these women came from by the way they are dressed
an Ashkenazi women without the hair covering
kinds of hats – could they have come from Egypt?
who were never present in the past
This study has been prepared by the Division for Palestinian Rights of the United Nations Secretariat for, and under the guidance of, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B of 2 December 1977. The study was published in keeping with the following guiding principles suggested by the Committee:
“The study should place the problem in its historical perspective, emphasizing the national identity and rights of the Palestinian people. It should survey the course of the problem during the period of the League of Nations Mandate and show how it came before the United Nations. It should also cover the period of United Nations involvement in the problem.”
The study is in five parts covering the period 1917 to December 2000.
Part I, published in 1978, offers historical background of the question of Palestine reaching as far back as 1915. This part surveys in detail the period 1917 to 1947, during most of which Palestine was governed under a mandate granted by the League of Nations.
Part II, published in 1979, covers the evolution of the Palestine problem from the time it was taken up in the United Nations to the late 1970s, i.e. 1947 to 1977.
Part III, published in 1984, deals with further development of the question of Palestine into the 1980s and covers the period 1978 to 1983.
Part IV, added in 1990 to the three previously published parts, covers the period 1984 to 1988, during which a series of landmark events took place. These developments signified a qualitatively new phase in the evolution of this long-standing political, socio-economic, humanitarian and moral problem, still awaiting its resolution.
Part V, published in 2014, deals with further development of the question of Palestine into the 1990s and covers the period 1989 to 2000.
Note should be made that the present study consists of the four parts, published in different years, and consolidated in one volume for the convenience of the reader.
https://www.un.org/unispal/history/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/
| Introduction |
Table of Content
INTRODUCTION
I. THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND RELATED ISSUES BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
B. The right to self-determination, including to a State, as an inalienable right
C. Palestine’s expanded rights of participation at the United Nations
D. Proposed international peace conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations
E. Bethlehem 2000
II. THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIANS UNDER OCCUPATION
A. First intifada
B. Outbreak of violence in Jerusalem and related Security Council action
C. Deportations of Palestinian civilians
D. Massacre of Palestinian worshippers in Hebron
E. Extrajudicial killings
F. Arbitrary detention and imprisonment
G. Closures and curfews
H. Settlement activities, including at Jabal Abu Ghneim
I. Human rights situation
J. Second intifada
III. THE PEACE PROCESS OF THE 1990S
A. Madrid Peace Conference
1. Bilateral track
2. Multilateral track
B. Declaration of Principles (Oslo agreement)
C. Gaza-Jericho Agreement and related bilateral agreements
D. Interim Agreement (Oslo II)
E. Hebron Protocol
F. Wye River Memorandum
G. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
H. Camp David Summit
IV. LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY AND ASSISTANCE
A. Living conditions
B. Assistance to the Palestinian People
C. Palestinian women
D. East Jerusalem
E. Palestine refugees
V. CONCLUSION
Annex I List of documents related to the peace process
Annex II
Timeline attached to the Wye River Memorandum (1998)
Annex III Principal entities related to the peace process
Annex IV Principal entities of the Palestinian Authority
Annex V Troop redeployments under the peace process (Estimates for the Occupied Palestinian Territory)
Introduction
This publication was prepared for, and under the guidance of, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Covering the years 1989 through 2000, it updates the publication “The origins and evolution of the Palestine problem” previously prepared for the Committee.
During the 1990s intense diplomatic efforts to solve the Palestine problem took place in unprecedented bilateral and multilateral peace negotiations as well as at the United Nations and elsewhere. The Middle East peace conference that was convened in Madrid in 1991 brought together for the first time all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the core of which is the question of Palestine, to seek a comprehensive negotiated settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and predicated on the principle of “land for peace”.
At the beginning, progress in what was soon termed the “peace process” was extremely slow for the Palestinians, who were compelled to negotiate without the presence of a Palestinian representative at the table. Only the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and their agreement reached at Oslo in 1993, the Declaration of Principles, sustained hope that a permanent settlement of the Palestine problem may for the first time be within reach to end decades of hostilities, occupation and violation of the rights of the Palestinian people. In December 1994, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, shared, together with the Foreign Minister of Israel, Shimon Peres, the Nobel Peace Prize.
Under the peace process of the 1990s, an entirely new, complex peacemaking framework was created to guide and encourage peace efforts without prejudging details of the envisaged results under negotiation, especially with regard to the various “multilateral” issues that would have required the sustained participation of all the important countries in the region, and the resolution of the Israeli and Palestinian “permanent status” issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, and water. For various reasons, the peace process of the 1990s was subject to unilateral suspensions of the negotiations, undermining peacemaking efforts.
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and successive bilateral agreements between Israel and PLO, tangible progress was made on the ground, including the redeployment of Israeli forces from some Palestinian areas occupied since 1967, commonly known as the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem; the establishment of Palestinian self-government, the Palestinian National Authority; the holding of democratic elections for the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority and for the Palestinian Legislative Council; the release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners; the opening of a Palestinian international airport and a land corridor connecting the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Furthermore, unwavering international assistance and foreign investment, reflecting increased confidence in efforts towards a final peace settlement, benefited the living conditions of the Palestinian civilian population.
Since 1992, the United Nations participated in the multilateral negotiations as a “full extraregional participant”. In support of the peace process, the United Nations established the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) in 1994 to coordinate the assistance to the Palestinian people. It also continued to seek actively a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through the good offices of the Secretary-General. In 1999, building on the existing mandate of the Special Coordinator, the Secretary-General appointed the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority.
The occupation by Israel of the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, continued, however. In violation of applicable international law, specifically humanitarian and customary law, Israel, the occupying Power, expanded the settler population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including through the construction of numerous new settlements and the expansion of the already established settlements. Strict closure policies widely regarded as collective punishment were implemented by Israel, the occupying Power, in the 1990s, along with other harsh measures against the Palestinian civilian population, which were taken in the context of maintaining the occupation, many in clear violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.
The plight of the Palestine refugees, who in the 1990s numbered more than 3.7 million people, also continued. The refugee issue was addressed in intermittent multilateral negotiations, until these thoroughly stalled in 2000. It was also broached in the bilateral permanent status talks between Israel and the Palestinians at the end of the same year. On its part, each year, the General Assembly continued to recall the refugees’ right of return and compensation in accordance with the General Assembly resolution 194 (III). As mandated by the General Assembly, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) remained the largest provider of crucial humanitarian and emergency assistance to the Palestine refugees. This period also witnessed certain milestones for UNRWA, such as its commemoration of 50 years of operation and the return of its headquarters to the region, for the first time located in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in Gaza City.
Around these and other issues, deep differences and a vast asymmetry of power persisted between Israel and the Palestinians, hampering progress in their negotiations and slowing down the implementation of the various bilateral agreements reached. As a result, outstanding commitments under the agreements signed, particularly by the occupying Power, accumulated during the second half of the 1990s, and themselves became the focus of negotiations.
Frequently, the bilateral negotiations ground to a halt, resuscitated only by third-party mediation that would ensure their continuation and yield further negotiated results. At a time when the political will for painful compromises and a “peace of the brave” was needed, mutual distrust and recriminations began to set in, which contributed to a growing crisis of confidence between Israel and the Palestinians. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 by an Israeli extremist also negatively impacted the peace process.
By the end of 2000, the search for a peaceful settlement had come full circle, from hopeful exhilaration in the early 1990s to near despair, hamstrung by the aforementioned and numerous other factors. Many of the positive developments on the ground had stalled, if not actually been undone and reversed, in particular as a result of the reoccupation of Palestinian population centres by Israel in September 2000 with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. The lack of progress in the peace negotiations, notably on the permanent status issues, was epitomized by the inconclusive Camp David Summit held in July 2000 between the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, and the Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat, mediated by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton. Subsequently, the deadline passed to achieve a permanent status agreement not later than 13 September 2000 and the Declaration of Principles, and interim transitional agreement remained unfulfilled.
In the midst of an already precarious and volatile atmosphere, the demonstrative visit on 28 September 2000 by Israel’s opposition party leader to the Al-Haram Al-Sharif, a sanctuary in the occupied East Jerusalem housing the Al-Aqsa Mosque, provoked an outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians that escalated into what came to be known as the “Al-Aqsa intifada” or second intifada. Israel’s response to the second Palestinian uprising in less than a decade (the first intifada was launched in December 1987), in particular the excessive use of force, led to growing loss of Palestinian life, including many casualties among Palestinian children. The international community, the Palestinian Authority and others immediately urged Israel, the occupying Power, without success, to provide protection for the Palestinian civilian population. Instead, a cycle of violence and political entrenchment ensued that was soon to put any hope of peace further out of reach for years to come, sinking the Occupied Palestinian Territory into yet another period of confrontation and aggravating the plight, sense of insecurity and despair of the Palestinian people. In the years to come, Israel’s policies during the second intifada would result in a sharp deterioration of the Palestinian humanitarian and economic situation.
From 1989 to 2000, the evolution of the Palestine question at the United Nations was a delicate balancing act of supporting the Middle East peace process, while upholding the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return and to self-determination, national independence and statehood. The General Assembly determined in annual resolutions since 1992 that the United Nations had a permanent responsibility with respect to the Palestine question in all its aspects until its satisfactory resolution in accordance with international law. The principal organs of the United Nations, as well as the Main Committees of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women and human rights treaty bodies continued to address aspects of the Palestine question in their respective areas of competence.
From 1989 to 2000, resolutions concerning the Palestine problem received at the General Assembly a solid majority of support from Member States. From 1993 onward, a resolution entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine” reaffirmed the requirements of parameters for a just peace settlement, annually expressed the support of the Assembly for the peace process. The same year, Norway, together with the Russian Federation and the United States, and on behalf of more than 100 additional sponsors, introduced a resolution entitled “Middle East peace process”, which was adopted annually by a large, almost unanimous majority, until it was withdrawn by the co-sponsors in 1997. Since 1993, successive resolutions on assistance to the Palestinian people were adopted by consensus, as were the resolutions regarding the millennium celebrations in 2000 in the Palestinian city of Bethlehem.
Furthermore, since 1994, in an annual resolution under the item entitled “Situation in the Middle East”, the General Assembly has annually reiterated that the decision by Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the holy city of Jerusalem was illegal and therefore null, void and without validity. The Assembly also deplored the transfer by some States of their diplomatic missions to Jerusalem in violation of Security Council resolution 478 (1980) and called upon those States to abide by the provisions of the resolution.
In view of the inability of the Security Council to act on certain important developments in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which were regarded as being in contravention of international law and as violations of Palestinian rights, the General Assembly, under its “uniting for peace” mechanism, convened in 1997 the tenth emergency special session to address “Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, the first such session in 15 years. In 1999, the first conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, was convened pursuant to the relevant recommendation made by the tenth emergency special session.
At the same time, the United Nations responded repeatedly to violations by Israel, the occupying Power, of applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, notably the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and relevant United Nations resolutions. Information on such violations was annually recorded in the report prepared by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (Special Committee on Israeli Practices), which was established by the General Assembly in 1968. On its part, in 1993, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, who annually has examined the human rights situation of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.
Starting in the 1990s, the Economic and Social Council considered, under annual resolutions, the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation, particularly that of the Israeli settlements, on the Palestinian people as well as the situation of and assistance to Palestinian women in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as did the Commission on the Status of Women. Furthermore, the General Assembly adopted annually a resolution reaffirming the permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, over their natural resources, including land and water, and recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or depletion of their natural resources.
This publication reflects the position of the United Nations that a negotiated solution to the Palestine question must be based on the principles embodied in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), and 338 (1973), reflecting the longstanding position of the international community and the basis for the Middle East peace process. A solution, as annually set forth in the General Assembly resolution entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, would comprise the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since June 1967, including East Jerusalem; the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily their right to self-determination and statehood; a just settlement of the Palestine refugee problem that has remained unresolved since 1948, and the respect for the right of all States in the region to live in peace within secure and internationally recognized boundaries.
I. The question of Palestine and related issues
before the General Assembly
A. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian PeopleThe Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the only body within the United Nations exclusively devoted to the question of Palestine, continued to make important contributions in support of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the right to self-determination, and of a just negotiated solution to the question of Palestine.
The Committee supported the goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Palestine question in accordance with international legitimacy and United Nations resolutions. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Committee continued to endorse and promote the General Assembly’s previous calls for an international peace conference on the Middle East under United Nations auspices and, later on, the Middle East peace process launched in Madrid in 1991, as well as the bilateral initiative that began in Oslo in 1993. The Committee welcomed the various bilateral agreements in implementation of the Declaration of Principles (1993) and other positive developments, such as the redeployment of Israeli forces from Palestinian population centres and the Palestinian elections for the Legislative Council and the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority. It also reaffirmed the widely held position that, until final status negotiations succeed and their results are fully implemented, Israel must recognize and respect its obligations as the occupying Power under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Remaining firm on its position of principle, the Committee expressed its readiness to make adjustments in its approach and programme of work in order to take into account the new realities and to make a concrete contribution to ongoing international efforts in support of the peace process and the Palestinian Authority. It was in this light that the Committee decided to contribute to the “Bethlehem 2000” initiative of the Palestinian Authority.
By the late 1990s, the Committee had started to voice increasing concern at the stalemate in the peace negotiations and the growing tension and violence in the region. It had been participating actively in meetings of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, including the tenth emergency special session of the Assembly, convened to deal with the deteriorating situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and begun periodically to exchange views with the European Union.
While condemning all acts of violence against civilians, the Committee expressed its alarm at the position and illegal actions of the Government of Israel with regard to Jerusalem, the construction of settlements, land confiscation and punitive collective measures, which had a devastating effect on the Palestinian people and their living conditions and seriously undermined the peace efforts.
These concerns were further heightened following the outbreak of the second, or Al-Aqsa, intifada in late September 2000. The Committee stressed time and again, and reminded the Government of Israel of the need to fulfil its legal obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. At the same time the Committee supported all international efforts directed at stopping the violence and resuming the peace negotiations, with a view to ending the occupation and resolving the question of Palestine in all its aspects.1/
Novel activities supported by the Committee from 1989 to 2000 included holding seminars on assistance to the Palestinian people to underline the growing importance of various socio-economic and peace-building requirements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; organizing an annual training programme to familiarize staff of the Palestinian Authority with the work of United Nations at Headquarters and contribute to Palestinian capacity building; and establishing the web-based United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. Furthermore, in 1996, General Assembly resolution 51/129 requested the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps in consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to protect Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel and to preserve and modernize the existing records. This project was supported by the Committee, and completed in 2000.2/ Moreover, in June 1997, the Committee convened a special meeting in observance of the thirtieth anniversary of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Secretary-General, the President of the Security Council, and a Vice-President of the General Assembly attended the event.
B. The right to self-determination, including to a State, as an inalienable right
Since 1974, the United Nations has reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty, in various ways (see General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX). During the period from 1989 to 2000, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People continued to be a strong supporter and advocate of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, in particular their right to their independent State of Palestine. Interim, quasi-governmental institutions were established in the Occupied Palestinian Territory on the basis of bilateral agreements negotiated by Israel and PLO under the Middle East peace process of the 1990s; the five-year transitional period under the Interim Agreement expired on 4 May 1999 without final status negotiations having begun in substantive terms. That year, the Palestinians held back from unilaterally declaring an independent State and the European Union reaffirmed “the continued and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination, including the option of a State”3/ (see chap. III below).
At the United Nations, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the General Assembly continued to reaffirm the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and all peoples under
foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference (see General Assembly resolution 43/106).
In its resolution 44/79, entitled “Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights,” the General Assembly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle. The Assembly also reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign occupation and colonial domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference. With particular reference to the Palestine question, the Assembly strongly condemned the constant and deliberate violations of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, as well as the expansionist activities of Israel in the Middle East, which constituted an obstacle to the achievement of self-determination and independence by the Palestinian people and a threat to peace and stability in the region. From 1990 to 1993, the General Assembly adopted similar resolutions on the importance of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence.4/
Moreover, in its resolution 46/130, entitled “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes,” the General Assembly, on 17 December 1991, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of all peoples under colonial and foreign domination, particularly the Palestinian people, for the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and national independence, to enable them to determine their political, economic and social system without interference.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, under the agenda item “Situation in the Middle East” (see resolutions 44/40, 45/83 and 46/82), the General Assembly maintained that the solution of the Middle East problem, under the auspices of the United Nations and based on its relevant resolutions, must enable the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights, including the right to return and the right to self-determination, national independence and sovereign statehood in Palestine (see resolution 43/54 A). Until 1991, the General Assembly explicitly reaffirmed its conviction that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights (see resolution 46/82 A).
On 20 December 1993, in its last resolution on the importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination that contained a specific reference to the Palestinian people, the General Assembly took note of the recent positive evolution in the Middle East peace process, in particular the signing on 13 September 1993 of the Declaration of Principles, and reaffirmed, the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and all peoples to self-determination, independence and sovereignty; and, called upon Israel to refrain from violating the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and from denying their right to self-determination (see resolution 48/94).
The same day, in its resolution 48/158, entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, under the agenda item “Question of Palestine” the General Assembly reaffirmed six principles for the achievement of comprehensive peace in the Middle East, the first of which is “the realization of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination”. In subsequent resolutions under the item “Question of Palestine”, the General Assembly has also maintained that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is among the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
The following year, on 23 December 1994, the General Assembly for the first time adopted a resolution devoted exclusively to the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (resolution 49/149). With growing support, including from the European Union, these resolutions gradually reaffirmed that the right of the Palestinians to self-determination included their right to a State. During the period under review, the most recent and most strongly worded in this series, resolution 55/87, was adopted by a recorded vote of 170 in favour to 2 against (Israel, United States), with 5 abstentions (Canada, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Palau, Tonga) (see A/55/PV.81).
In the second half of the decade, from 1996 until 2000, the General Assembly annually adopted resolutions on the permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, over their natural resources” (see resolutions 51/190, 52/207, 53/196, 54/230 and 55/209). On its part, in resolution 1989/34, the Economic and Social Council, under the agenda item entitled “The situation of Palestinian women”, declared that Palestinian women, as an integral part of a nation whose people were prevented from exercising their basic human and political rights, could not fully attain the objectives of the Forward-looking Strategies − equality, development and peace − without realizing their inalienable rights of return, self-determination and establishment of an independent State in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Similar statements can be found in Economic and Social Council resolutions 1990/11 and 1991/19 5/ (see chap. IV below).
The Secretary-General has maintained consistently that a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, should be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and take fully into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination. In November 1991, in his report on the situation in the Middle East, the Secretary-General observed:
“I have always maintained that no effort should be spared in the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the issue that lies at its core: the yearning of the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate political rights, including self-determination” (see A/46/652-S/23225, para. 27; see also A/48/607-S/26769).
On 23 March 1998, Kofi Annan, as the first Secretary-General to visit the Occupied Palestinian Territory following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, in an address before the Palestinian Legislative Council, stated:
“At every juncture and every passage, with every challenge and every success, the United Nations has stood by the proponents of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people … Your cause − genuine self-determination for the Palestinian people − is our cause. It is the expression of the most sacred, most enduring and universal principles of our Charter” (see SG/SM/6501).
In 1996, the Secretary-General had stated, on the occasion of the historic elections for the Palestinian Authority and the Legislative Council on 20 January that the widespread participation in them by Palestinian voters in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem constituted an important step toward the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and provided a solid base toward their self-determination (see SG/SM/5879; see also chap. III below, the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement).
C. Palestine’s expanded rights of participation at the United Nations
During the period under consideration, the United Nations conferred additional rights and privileges upon Palestine in its capacity as observer. Since 1976, the Security Council has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part in its deliberations on the situation of the Middle East and the question of Palestine. By January 1989, the Council had accepted Palestine’s request to speak directly to the Council on other issues, on the same basis as Member States. For instance, in February and September 1999, Palestine participated in the Security Council debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, a debate which, according to Palestine, was clearly congruent with the numerous appeals made by it and others for the respect and enforcement of instruments of international law, international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions (see S/PVs.3890 and 4046).
On its part, the General Assembly conferred upon Palestine some of the rights and privileges hitherto reserved for Member States. 6/ On 28 November 1990, the General Assembly adopted resolution 45/37, in which it called upon Member States to accord to the delegations of the national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States and accorded observer status by international organizations, “the facilities, privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character”.
On 10 December 1993, the General Assembly, on the proposal of the Chairman of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), agreed to the understanding that the Advisory Commission of UNRWA would establish a working relationship with PLO (see decision 48/417); a PLO representative subsequently began attending meetings of the Advisory Commission.
In its resolution 49/12 B, the General Assembly decided that the same arrangements made for Member States or observer States with regard to participation in the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations would be applicable to Palestine, in its capacity as observer (see also A/49/48). As a result, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization and President of the Palestinian Authority, fully participated in the commemorative event.
On 7 July 1998, the General Assembly adopted resolution 52/250, entitled “Participation of Palestine in the work of the United Nations,” in which it conferred upon Palestine additional rights and privileges of participation. In his note of 4 August 1998 (A/52/1002 and Corr.1), the Secretary-General indicated his understanding of the additional rights and privileges granted to Palestine, in accordance with the modalities contained in the annex to resolution 52/250:
“1. The right to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly.
“2. Without prejudice to the priority of Member States, Palestine shall have the right of inscription on the list of speakers under agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues at any plenary meeting of the General Assembly, after the last Member State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
Focus: organizational issues highlighting the importance of the Palestine question
A procedural decision taken by the Security Council to simplify the list of items of which it is seized was noted in 1996 (see S/1996/603 and Corr.1 and S/1996/667). Since then, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has repeatedly conveyed the objection of the Committee to the decision to delete from the list items related to the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the Palestine question and the Middle East problem. The Committee believed that pending a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East in accordance with international legitimacy, those items should remain on the list of matters of which the Council is seized, as they continue to engage its responsibility with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Later in the decade and in his letters addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/667, S/1998/134 and S/2000/253), the Chairman stressed in addition that any decision to delete these items, especially at a critical point in the peace process, would go well beyond procedural reform and would have far-reaching negative political implications (see S/2000/253).
In addition to these developments, the importance and visibility of the Palestine question at the United Nations were enhanced as the result of the General Assembly decisions requesting the Secretary-General to continue to use the term “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” when appropriate (see decision 53/424), and changing the name of its “Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories” to “Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories” (see resolution 44/48 A). In this context, it should also be noted that, for the first time, the United Nations has published official population statistics on the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see ESA/P/WP.165, available from
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/htm).
“3. The right of reply.
“4. The right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues, provided that the right to raise such a point of order shall not include the right to challenge the decision of the presiding officer.
“5. The right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Such draft resolutions and decisions shall only be put to a vote upon request from a Member State.
“6. The right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant General Assembly resolutions being made only once by the President of the General Assembly at the start of each session of the Assembly.
“7. Seating for Palestine shall be arranged immediately after non-Member States and before the other observers; and with the allocation of six seats in the General Assembly Hall.”
The note by the Secretary-General also included the following restriction on the participation of Palestine:
“8. Palestine shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates.”
Based on those arrangements, on 28 September 1998, Palestine for the first time participated in the general debate of the General Assembly when Palestinian President Arafat addressed the plenary of the fifty-third session of the Assembly. During the same session, in accordance with the additional rights and privileges conferred upon it by the United Nations, Palestine commenced to co-sponsor General Assembly draft resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and the Middle East.
Focus: the issue of the territorial aspects of Israel’s credentials at the United Nations
Regarding Israel’s credentials at the United Nations, in 1990 an amendment to the resolution on the report of the Credentials Committee was proposed that would have indicated that the credentials of the delegation of Israel did not relate to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including East Jerusalem. Following a compromise reached at the time by the President of the General Assembly, no vote was taken on the report of the Credentials Committee of the General Assembly. Although in later years the report of the Credentials Committee was adopted according to established practice, the aforementioned issue pertaining to Israel’s credentials remained unresolved. These and related subsequent developments contributed to initiatives that in May 2004 led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 58/292 on the status of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.
D. Proposed international peace conference on the Middle East under theauspices of the United Nations
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, against the backdrop of the first Palestinian intifada and certain regional and global developments, the General Assembly garnered unprecedented, almost unanimous, support for the call to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East under United Nations auspices. The idea for such a conference initially had gained momentum at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held at Geneva in 1983. Separate proposals made by Member States, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also recognized the need for such a conference. During the same period, however, Israel and the United States continued to reject the convening of the proposed peace conference under United Nations auspices.7/ It is important to note that from late 1988 to the mid-1990s, the United States and PLO engaged in first ever direct negotiations at Tunis.8/
The support for convening an international peace conference under United Nations auspices reached its peak in 1989. It will be recalled that in 1988 the General Assembly, meeting at Geneva to permit PLO Chairman Arafat to attend (see resolution 43/49 and document A/43/909), had expressed overwhelming support for convening the proposed peace conference when it adopted resolution 43/176 by a vote of 138 in favour to 2 against, with 2 abstentions, and set forth the five principles for the achievement of comprehensive peace. These principles would be reaffirmed several times and expanded over the next couple of years, until they were included in a concise elaboration of requirements for a solution stressed by the General Assembly from 1994 onwards, beyond 2000, in its resolutions on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine.
One year later, on 6 December 1989, an unprecedented majority of 151 Member States voted in favour of resolution 44/42, entitled “Question of Palestine”,9/ in which the Assembly reaffirmed its call for an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and the five permanent members of the Security Council, on the basis of Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) as well as the following principles for the achievement of comprehensive peace:
“
(a)
The withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and from the other occupied Arab territories;
(b)
Guaranteeing arrangements for security of all States in the region, including those named in resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries;
(c)
Resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, and subsequent relevant resolutions;
(d)
Dismantling the Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967;
(e)
Guaranteeing freedom of access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites”.
At the same time, the General Assembly again noted the expressed desire to place the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a limited period, as part of the peace process, and would note this again in its resolution 45/68 adopted the following year. Until 1990, the General Assembly also endorsed the establishment of a preparatory committee, within the framework of the Security Council and with the participation of the permanent members of the Council, to take the necessary steps to convene the international peace conference called for under its resolutions. However, the proposed preparatory committee was never established.
The call for an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations based on the aforementioned principles was repeated by the General Assembly in its resolutions 45/68 and 46/75 entitled “International Peace Conference on the Middle East”. In its resolution 47/64 D, entitled “Question of Palestine”, the Assembly considered that the convening of the Conference “at a certain stage” would contribute to the promotion of peace in the region.
In tandem with these resolutions on the question of Palestine, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the situation in the Middle East that also reaffirmed its call for convening an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations (resolutions 44/40 A and 45/83 B). Following the launch of the Madrid Peace Conference on 30 October 1991, the call for a conference under the auspices of the United Nations was no longer found in the General Assembly resolutions on the situation in the Middle East. On 16 December 1991, using its customary language in resolution 46/82 A, the Assembly declared “once more that peace in the Middle East is indivisible and must be based on a comprehensive, just and lasting solution of the Middle East problem under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of its relevant resolutions” (see also A/46/623-S/23204). In the resolution, the Assembly was silent on the subject of the Madrid Peace Conference, unlike in resolution 46/75 entitled “International Peace Conference on the Middle East,” in which it had welcomed the Peace Conference (see chap. III below).
Earlier, as the result of difficult negotiations among the members of the Security Council prompted by a major outbreak of violence in East Jerusalem, the President of the Council, on 20 December 1990, made the following statement reflecting agreement among the members of the Council regarding the “method and approach” for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict:
“The members of the Security Council reaffirm their determination to support an active negotiating process in which all relevant parties would participate leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations which should be based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council and which should take into account the right to security of all States in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.
“In this context they agree that an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
“However, the members of the Council are of the view that there is not unanimity as to when would be the appropriate time for such a conference.
“In the view of the members of the Council, the Arab-Israeli conflict is important and unique and must be addressed independently, on its own merits” (S/22027).
In a letter to the Security Council dated 22 March 1991 (S/22385), the Secretary-General officially informed the Council of his decision to appoint Ambassador Edouard Brunner of Switzerland as Special Representative to the Middle East, succeeding the retiring Ambassador, Gunnar Jarring. The appointment of Mr. Brunner was in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The same year, Mr. Brunner would represent the United Nations at the Madrid Peace Conference on the Middle East as an observer (A/46/652-S/23225; chap. III below).The call by the General Assembly for convening an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations ceased after the mutual recognition between the Government of Israel and PLO and the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993. As the United Nations began to focus on assisting the parties in their efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, at the General Assembly, two series of resolutions evolved. One, on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, replacing the earlier annual calls for a conference under the auspices of the United Nations 10/ and another, until 1996, on the Middle East peace process, starting with resolution 48/58 of 14 December 1993 (see the chap. III below).
On its part, from 1989 to 1993, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed the call for convening an international peace conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, in view of the violent events unfolding in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in connection with the intifada, the Committee urged the Governments of Israel and the United States to reconsider their respective positions and join the virtually unanimous world community represented in the General Assembly to promote peace in the Middle East through the convening of the proposed international peace conference. 11/ In its annual report dated 18 November 1993, the Committee continued to endorse the idea of an international peace conference, commenting on General Assembly resolution 47/64 D as follows:
“The Committee, in adopting its programme of work for 1993, decided to continue to give priority to the promotion of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the core of which is the question of Palestine, including the convening, at a certain stage, of an international peace conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations” (see A/48/35, para. 40).
In view of the novel peace efforts from 1991 onwards, the Committee expressed support for the bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations within the context of the Madrid peace process and welcomed the signing by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, as an important first step towards a just and comprehensive peace in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions (ibid., paras. 41 and 42).
E. Bethlehem 2000
In the late 1990s, the beginning of the new millennium was regarded as a major upcoming event for the Palestinian city of Bethlehem. Organizing and preparing for the occasion required active engagement by the international community, including financial and technical contributions to the preparations and actual participation in the commemorative events and activities. Approximately 2 million visitors were expected to visit Bethlehem to celebrate the historic occasion. In 1997, the Palestinian Authority launched the Bethlehem 2000 Project to restore the many religious and historical sites in the city as well as to rebuild Bethlehem’s infrastructure in preparation for the planned millennial celebrations. Years of military occupation had left their mark, making the task of rehabilitating Bethlehem an extremely challenging one.
In order to help the Palestinian people carry out the Bethlehem 2000 Project, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People promoted the project and raised international awareness of its many needs. The Bethlehem 2000 Participants Conference, held in Brussels on 11 and 12 May 1998, was an initial step towards increasing the engagement and participation of the international community in the project. The Conference was convened by the Bethlehem 2000 Project, in association with the European Commission, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank. The Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People also attended the event. The Conference provided an opportunity for some 600 representatives of Governments, intergovernmental organizations, the private sector, the international financial community, religious and cultural institutions and the media to contribute towards the success of the Bethlehem 2000 Project through financial contributions, investment, expertise and promotion (see A/53/141 and E/1998/SR.40).
The same year, the Committee authorized its Chairman and the Members of its Bureau to request the inclusion of a new item, entitled “Bethlehem 2000,” in the provisional agenda of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly (see A/53/141). General Assembly resolution 53/27, adopted unanimously, was a tribute to the importance attached to the forthcoming Bethlehem 2000 commemorations and its concomitant events, which were to be held from Christmas 1999 to Easter 2001. At the request of the Committee and in recognition of the universal significance of the project, the General Assembly included the item entitled “Bethlehem 2000” in the agenda of its fifty-third, fifty-fourth and fifty-fifth sessions, and adopted without a vote its resolutions 53/27, 54/22 and 55/18, respectively. In these resolutions, the Assembly, among other things, expressed support for the Bethlehem 2000 project and called for increased assistance and engagement by the international community as a whole to ensure its success.
In its resolution 55/18, against the backdrop of turmoil of the second intifada in late September 2000, the General Assembly stressed the need for ensuring free and unhindered access to the holy places in Bethlehem for the faithful of all religions and the citizens of all nationalities, and expressed the renewed hope for a successful outcome of the Middle East peace process and the achievement of a final settlement between Palestine and Israel so that the millennium might be celebrated in an atmosphere of peace and reconciliation. In the same resolution, the Assembly decided to conclude the consideration of the item entitled “Bethlehem 2000”.
Heeding the calls of the General Assembly at its fifty-third to fifty-fifth sessions, the Committee has consistently reserved a special place for the Bethlehem 2000 Project in its various activities, including its meetings programme. The importance of heightening awareness of and promoting support for the Project was highlighted, among other things, at the Bethlehem 2000 International Conference, convened by the Committee from 18 to 19 February 1999 at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome, and at the United Nations Seminar on Prospects for Palestinian Economic Development and the Middle East Peace Process, held in Cairo on 20 and 21 June 2000.
The Bureau of the Committee also discussed the issue with representatives of intergovernmental organizations, such as the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, as well as NGOs. In addition, the Committee guided the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat to continue to disseminate information about the project through the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) (see http://unispal.un.org). Also, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 54/41, the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat established a separate website on the subject (see A/55/370).
II. The need for protection of the Palestinians under occupation
Throughout the period under consideration, the international community recognized the urgent need for international protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation in accordance with the applicable rules and principles of international law and human rights instruments, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention. The period began and concluded with a major Palestinian uprising, or intifada, in protest of Israel’s military occupation of the Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. These two uprisings were widely regarded as powerful expressions of the Palestinians’ long-frustrated national aspirations and rejection of their legitimate demands, together with their oppression under Israeli occupation. Against the backdrop of the uprising, often violent confrontations and Israel’s excessive use of force as well as violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, numerous efforts were made to provide for the protection and security of the Palestinian civilian population (see also chap. IV below).
A. First intifadaFrom the beginning of the Palestinian uprising that erupted on 9 December 1987 and lasted until the middle of 1993, now known as the first intifada, the day-to-day life of the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was characterized by confrontation and severe measures and harsh repression by Israel, the occupying Power. 12. These developments, on full display in the media worldwide, continued to raise awareness within the international community of the plight of the Palestinians living under occupation.
As a result of the excessive use of force by Israel, the total number of Palestinian deaths by shooting, beating or tear gas rose to approximately 1,240 by August 1993, and the total number injured to an estimated 130,000. Approximately one fourth of the fatalities were children under the age of 16 years (see A/48/35, para. 22). Thousands of Palestinians were also detained by the Israeli occupying forces and, in violation of international law, hundreds transferred to prisons in Israel or deported from the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Scores of homes were destroyed or sealed with concrete. The educational system came to a halt when schools and universities were closed for extended periods and informal teaching arrangements prohibited. Villages and whole areas were placed under curfew; retail, utility, health, financial and commercial services were curtailed and media and civic organizations outlawed. Tens of thousands of productive trees were uprooted and crops destroyed as collective punishment by the occupying Power. 13/
On the basis of information and evidence put before it, in 1989 the Special Committee on Israeli Practices noted that the dangerous level of violence and repression in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unprecedented in over 22 years of military occupation. The Special Committee’s reports through 1993 continued to reflect the high level of violence engendered by the uprising and by the attempts by Israel to suppress it by disproportionately harsh and violent military force, as well as collective punishment, including mass deportations of Palestinians.
The increasing violence, specifically the killing of an Israeli in the “Nissanit” settlement in the Gaza Strip and of two Israeli policemen in Israel at the end of March 1993, led the Israeli authorities to impose on 30 March a complete closure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.14/ The closure effectively divided the Occupied Palestinian Territory into four distinct areas, namely, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, the northern West Bank and the southern West Bank, and created unprecedented hardship for the Palestinian population, the majority of which already lived below the poverty line. 15/ Later findings of the Special Committee showed that, although the overall level of violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory somewhat declined after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, sporadic confrontations were met with harsh repressive measures against the population. 16/
From the beginning of the first intifada in December 1987, the United Nations, together with numerous intergovernmental organizations, including the European Economic Community, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and numerous NGOs, expressed concern regarding the grave situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the lack of protection for the Palestinian people.
The Security Council, however, remained paralyzed. The draft resolution of 9 June 1989 concerning the deportation of Palestinian civilians (S/20677), was vetoed by the United States, as was the draft resolution of 16 February 1989, in which the Council sought to strongly deplore Israel’s persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially the violation of human rights (S/20463); and a similar draft resolution of 6 November 1989 (S/20945/Rev.1), in which the Council strongly deplored Israeli policies and practices that violated the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory.
On 20 May 1990, an Israeli gunman killed 7 Palestinian workers and wounded 11 others at Oyoun Qarra (Rishon LeZion) in Israel; another 17 Palestinians were killed and more than 1,000 wounded by Israeli security forces in the subsequent demonstrations throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory in protests against the incident. 17/ This incident prompted the Security Council to address the issue of protection. During the debates in the Council that were held in Geneva on 25 and 26 May and in New York on 31 May 1990, nearly every delegation that spoke, including Members of the Council, emphasized the urgent need for protection of Palestinian civilians. On 25 May 1990, PLO Chairman Arafat made a statement before the Council calling for urgent action to provide international protection to the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, a draft resolution (S/21236) that would have established a commission consisting of three Members of the Council to examine the situation on the ground and recommend ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation was vetoed on 31 May 1990 by the United States 18/ (see S/PV.2926).
In a presidential statement of 19 June 1990, the members of the Security Council strongly deplored an incident that had occurred on 12 June 1990, in which several innocent Palestinian women and children were wounded when an Israeli officer threw a tear gas grenade into an UNRWA clinic near Shati camp in the Gaza Strip. Expressing dismay that the penalty imposed on that officer had been commuted, the members reaffirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, requested the High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for the Convention and called upon Israel to abide by its obligations under the Convention. 19/
A personal representative of the Secretary-General visited Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory from 22 June through 1 July 1990. According to a statement by the Secretary-General issued to the press at Geneva on 4 July, the principal concern conveyed by the Palestinians to the personal representative was their profound feeling of vulnerability resulting from the lack of protection; this fear was expressed by those living in refugee camps and by the residents of towns and villages. The Palestinians were also deeply concerned about their basic human and economic rights. Their grievances were conveyed to Israel, which, as the occupying Power, was urged to take the necessary steps to address them in accordance with its international legal obligations. 20/
On 20 December 1990, the Security Council, prompted by an outbreak of confrontations and bloodshed in East Jerusalem, adopted resolution 681 (1990) (see also chap. II.B below). That resolution represented a new step by the Council because it entrusted, for the first time, ongoing responsibilities to the Secretary-General with respect to the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, requesting him to monitor and observe their situation. At the same time, the Council underlined the obligations of the parties chiefly responsible under the Fourth Geneva Convention for ensuring the protection of the Palestinians, namely Israel, the occupying Power, and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention (see S/22472).
The Security Council met in January, March and May of 1991 to discuss the situation in the occupied Arab territories. On 4 January 1991, in a presidential statement (S/22406), the members of the Council expressed deep concern about and deplored recent acts of violence in the Gaza Strip, especially actions by Israeli security forces against Palestinians, which had led to scores of Palestinian civilian casualties; reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to all the Occupied Palestinian Territory; requested that Israel, as the occupying Power, fully comply with the provisions of the Convention; reaffirmed its resolution 681 (1990) and supported the work of the Secretary-General in implementing that resolution; and, further urged intensified efforts by all who could contribute to reducing conflict and tension in order to achieve peace in the area. On 27 March 1991, in a presidential statement (S/22408), the members of the Council again expressed grave concern about the continued deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, and especially about the serious situation resulting from the imposition of curfews by Israel, and deplored the expulsion of four Palestinians (see also A/46/652-S/23225). In May, the Council adopted resolution 694 (1991), in which it deplored the deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territories (see also chap. II.C below).
As discussed in chapter III below, a major Middle East peace effort began at Madrid in October 1991, in the format of a conference, which for the first time brought together all parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory continued to deteriorate, and in January and April 1992, the Security Council was again called upon to address the situation. In January 1992, the Council adopted resolution 726 (1992) on the deportation of Palestinians, and, in April, it expressed its concern over an incident in Rafah in the Gaza Strip in which several Palestinians had been killed and many more injured by Israeli forces. In a presidential statement drafted by Palestine with the support of the non-aligned members of the Council (S/23783), the Council again urged Israel to abide at all times by its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to respect and to act in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council; and expressed concern that any escalation of violence would have serious implications for the peace process, especially at a time when negotiations to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace were under way in Madrid. Moreover, in accordance with resolution 681 (1990), the members of the Council requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices to address the problems of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation. 21/
On 25 January 1993, in connection with the deportation of a large number of Palestinians, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 17 of his report submitted in accordance with resolution 799 (1992) (S/25149), observed:
“The question of the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation has repeatedly been addressed by the Security Council since December 1987. For this reason and in the light of requests conveyed by Palestinian leaders to me as well as to Mr. Jonah and Mr. Gharekhan during their missions to the region, I intend to initiate discussions with the Israeli authorities regarding the establishment of a United Nations monitoring mechanism in the occupied territories, as suggested in resolution 681 (1990). This should have the effect of reassuring Palestinians under Israeli occupation that the international community is not neglecting their need for safety and protection, a need, which must be met regardless of progress in the peace talks.”
Throughout 1993, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations and the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People communicated to the Secretary-General their concerns about the escalation of Israeli repression that resulted in many Palestinian casualties and a dangerously deteriorating security situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and appealed urgently and repeatedly to the Council to ensure the protection of Palestinians in accordance with resolution 681(1990). 22/
The General Assembly had first addressed the grave circumstances in the Occupied Palestinian Territory connected with the first intifada on 3 November 1988, when it adopted resolution 43/21, condemning Israel’s persistent violation of Palestinian human rights. As stated above, the Security Council remained unable to address the violent repression by Israel during the first intifada, 23/ although the Assembly repeatedly requested the Council to examine the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to consider taking measures to protect Palestinian civilians (see resolutions 43/233, 44/2, 45/69, 46/76 and 47/64 E. In its resolution 44/2, the Assembly expressed deep concern at the alarming situation resulting from the continued occupation and persistent policies and practices of Israel against the Palestinian people, and expressed its profound shock at the continued killing and wounding of Palestinian civilians and the ransacking of houses of defenceless civilians in the Palestinian town of Beit Sahour.
In its resolution 45/69, the General Assembly expressed its profound shock at the Israeli violence of 8 October 1990 at the Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem, which resulted in the killing and wounding of Palestinian civilians. The Assembly stressed the need to promote international protection to the Palestinian civilians in the occupied Palestinian territory, and the need for increased support to, aid for and solidarity with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation (see chap. II.B below). Also, Guido de Marco, the President of the General Assembly, visited the Palestine refugees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Jordan from 2 to 7 January 1991, the first such visit of its kind. 24/ The President briefed the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People at its 176th meeting, held on 22 February 1991, regarding his visit (see A/45/1000). In paragraph 6 of its resolution 47/64 D, the General Assembly also proposed “to place the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period or, alternatively, to provide international protection for the Palestinian people there, as part of the peace process”. This proposal, originating in an Arab plan of the early 1980s, was repeatedly reiterated by the Assembly through 1994 (see A/37/696-S/15510, annex; and General Assembly resolutions 43/176, 44/40, 45/68 and 46/75). In February and March 1994, the need for protection of the Palestinian people came into an even starker focus, following the massacre of Palestinian worshipers by an extremist Israeli settler in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. In March, the Security Council adopted resolution 904 (1994), strongly condemning the massacre in Hebron and its aftermath, and calling for the establishment of a temporary international or foreign presence, which was later established as the Temporary International Presence in Hebron.
Thereafter, from 1994 to December 2000, in its resolutions on Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, the General Assembly has expressed its appreciation for the positive contribution made by the countries that participated in the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (resolutions 49/36 C; 50/29 C; 51/134; 52/67; 53/56; 54/79 and 55/133, preambular para. 14).
In 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/64 E, in which it condemned the policies and practices of Israel that violated the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; demanded that Israel abide by the Geneva Convention and that the High Contracting Parties to the Convention ensure Israel’s compliance; deplored Israel’s disregard of Security Council resolutions; reaffirmed that Israel’s occupation of Arab territories in no way changes the legal status of those territories; and, requested that the Security Council consider measures to provide protection to Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories.
In view of developments on the ground, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People consistently stressed, over the period under review, in its meetings, reports and communications the need for providing effective protection to Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, focusing, among other things, on the imperative need to end human rights violations and ensure the safety and international protection of Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 681 (1990) (see A/44/35, A/47/35 and A/48/35).
B. Outbreak of violence in Jerusalem and related Security Council action
On 12 October 1990, in its resolution 672 (1990), the Security Council unanimously expressed alarm at the violence which had occurred on 8 October at the Al-Haram Al-Sharif and other Holy Places in East Jerusalem occupied and expanded in June 1967, 25/ resulting in over 20 Palestinian deaths and more than 150 injuries among civilians and innocent worshippers. In the resolution, the Council condemned especially the violence committed by Israeli security forces. To enhance the protection of the Palestinians, the Council called upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Council welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the region and requested that he submit a report containing his findings and conclusions before the end of October 1990. Later in the year, in its resolution 681 (1990), the Security Council for the first time gave ongoing responsibilities to the Secretary-General with respect to the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation and underlined the importance of the obligations of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention with regard to ensuring their protection. This was a further extension of a similar request made by the Council to the Secretary-General earlier in its resolution 605 (1987), in which it requested him, inter alia, to submit recommendations to the Council on ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilian population under occupation.
Over the decade, various other acute situations in or near East Jerusalem, including the opening of a tunnel under the Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1996, the establishment of a settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim in 1997 and the bloody events in the Al-Haram Al-Sharif area in 2000 that would lead to the second intifada were addressed by the international community (see chap. II.H and J below).
On 14 October 1990, the Israeli Cabinet rejected Security Council resolution 672 (1990) and declared that Israel would not receive the Secretary-General’s delegation. The Secretary-General sought clarification from the Government of Israel as to whether his delegation would not be received by the Government, or would be barred from entry. In a meeting with the Secretary-General on 18 October, the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel repeated that his Government did not wish the mission to come and was prepared to provide the Secretary-General with a copy of a report on the events of 8 October 1990 prepared by the Commission of Investigation, appointed by the Prime Minister of Israel. On 19 October, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council in informal consultations that, in the light of Israel’s opposition, he was not in a position to dispatch a mission to the area; members of the Council encouraged him to continue efforts to send a mission. On 24 October, in its resolution 673 (1990), the Security Council unanimously deplored the refusal of the Government of Israel to receive the Secretary-General’s mission, urged the Government to reconsider its decision and insisted that it comply fully with resolution 672 (1990) awaiting implementation.
On 31 October 1990, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report in accordance with resolution 672 (1990), along with three addenda (S/21919 and Corr.1 and Adds. 1-3): a report prepared by B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; a report by Al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man; and a summary of the report of the Commission of Investigation appointed by Israel. A separate Security Council document contained a letter in which Palestine transmitted the findings of the Higher Islamic Council regarding the events of 8 October 1990 at Al-Haram Al-Sharif (A/45/703-S/21926).
In his report, the Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar noted that although he had been unable to secure independent, first-hand information regarding the events of 8 October 1990, widespread coverage by the international press indicated that some 17 to 21 Palestinians were killed and more than 150 wounded by Israeli security forces, with more than 20 Israeli civilians and policemen wounded by Palestinians. While there were conflicting opinions as to what provoked the clashes, observers on the spot, including personnel of ICRC, stated that live ammunition was used against Palestinian civilians. On 9 November 1990, the Security Council watched a bystander’s videotape of the violent clashes that took place in Jerusalem on 8 October, submitted by the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations as evidence that the shooting of Arab worshippers by Israeli forces at the Al-Aqsa Mosque had been unprovoked.
The Secretary-General recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 605 (1987), adopted in the earliest days of the first intifada, had requested him to examine the situation in the occupied territories and to submit a report containing recommendations on ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under occupation. On the basis of that mandate, and with the concurrence of the Government of Israel, he had been able to send a mission to the region to prepare the report. The Secretary-General also noted that each of the Security Council resolutions and presidential statements addressing the question of the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories adopted since January 1988 had reaffirmed the applicability to the occupied territories of the Fourth Geneva Convention and had called upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by its obligations under that Convention. Moreover, the Secretary-General pointed out that article 1 of the Convention called upon “The High Contracting Parties [to] undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” The Secretary-General added that Israel’s position that it did not accept the de jure applicability of the Convention was neither accepted by ICRC, the guardian of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, nor endorsed by the other High Contracting Parties to the Convention.
The Secretary-General concluded his report with the following observation:
“The issue before us today is what practical steps can, in fact, be taken by the international community to ensure the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians living under Israeli occupation. Clearly, the numerous appeals – whether by the Security Council, by myself as Secretary-General, by individual Member States or by ICRC, which is the guardian of the Geneva Conventions – to the Israeli authorities to abide by their obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention have been ineffective. It is evident that for any measure of protection to be ensured, the cooperation of the Israeli authorities is, under the present circumstances, absolutely essential. Nevertheless, given the special responsibility of the High Contracting Parties for ensuring respect for the Convention, the Security Council might wish to call for a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention.
“It would be misleading to conclude this report – which has focused essentially on the need to ensure the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians living under Israeli occupation – without underlining that it is a political conflict that lies at the heart of the tragic events that led to the adoption of Security Council resolutions 672 (1990) and 673 (1990). The determination of the Palestinians to persevere with the intifada, is evidence of their rejection of the occupation and their commitment to exercise their legitimate political rights, including self-determination.”
On 20 December 1990, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 681 (1990), after weeks of consultations and agreement by the members of the Council that an international conference, at an appropriate time and properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution reads in part as follows:
“The Security Council,
“
Taking into consideration
the statement by the President of the Security Council on 20 December 1990 concerning the method and approach for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict, …
“4.
Urges
the Government of Israel to accept de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said Convention; …
“6.
Requests
the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to develop further the idea expressed in his report [S/21919 and Corr.1] of convening a meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention …
“7.
Also requests
the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, making new efforts in this regard on an urgent basis, and to utilize and designate or draw upon the United Nations and other personnel and resources present there, in the area and elsewhere, needed to accomplish this task and to keep the Security Council regularly informed.”
As stated above in connection with the first intifada, the resolution entrusted, in that clarity for the first time, ongoing responsibilities to the Secretary-General with respect to the situation of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation and underlined the obligations of the parties chiefly responsible under the Fourth Geneva Convention for ensuring their protection, namely Israel, the occupying Power, and the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. 26/ Later in the decade, prompted by the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, a large majority of the High Contracting Parties would meet for the first time in the history of the Convention, in order to address the matter of ensuring the enforcement of the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (see chap. II.H and chap. III below).
C. Deportations of Palestinian civilians
From 1988 to 1993, United Nations bodies, including the Security Council, addressed with urgency Israel’s policy of deporting Palestinian civilians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in violation of international law and with often direct onerous effects on peace efforts such as the bilateral negotiations under way in Washington, D.C., in December 1992 in the context of the Madrid peace conference. 27/ Israel’s expulsion policy continued after that period in a much attenuated form (see A/50/463, paras. 376 and 377; see also chap. II.I and chap. III below).
In 1988, the Security Council adopted two resolutions on the issue of deportations of Palestinians from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (resolutions 607 (1988) and 608 (1988)). Also, in the presidential statement adopted on 26 August 1988 (S/20156), the members of the Council expressed profound concern over Israel’s ongoing policy of deporting Palestinian civilians in contravention of Council resolutions and the Fourth Geneva Convention, as demonstrated on 17 August 1988, when Israel expelled four Palestinian civilians to Lebanon and declared its decision to expel 40 more. The members of the Council had requested Israel to desist immediately from deporting any Palestinian civilians and to ensure immediately the safe return of those already deported.
On 9 June 1989, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by seven members (S/20677), which would have strongly deplored Israel’s deportation policies and would have demanded that Israel desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the Occupied Territory and ensure the safe and immediate return of those already deported. The draft resolution was vetoed by the United States.
After Israel had once again, in defiance of United Nations resolutions, deported Palestinian civilians in the summer of 1989, the Security Council, in its resolutions 636 (1989) and 641 (1989), once more called upon Israel to desist from deportations, to ensure the safe and immediate return of those Palestinians it had deported, and to desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians. Again, in its resolution 681 (1990), the Council deplored the decision by Israel to resume the deportation of Palestinian civilians. Continued Israeli deportations, in defiance of the Council, led to further statements and resolutions: on 27 March 1991, the members of the Council deplored Israel’s decision of 24 March 1991 to expel four Palestinian civilians (S/22408); on 24 May, the Council adopted resolution 694 (1991), deploring the deportation by Israel of four Palestinians on 18 May 1991.
Since the beginning of the intifada, Israel had deported at least 66 Palestinians, not including the 12 men mentioned above, in violation of article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, and several resolutions of the Security Council. This was documented in a letter dated 6 January 1992, from the Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General (A/46/837-S/23374). Following statements made by five speakers, including the Observer for Palestine, the Council adopted resolution 726 (1992) in which it unanimously strongly condemned the decision of Israel, the occupying Power, to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians, the first such condemnation by the Security Council of the occupying Power on the question of deportations, in the context of the fledgling Madrid peace process 21/ (see also chap. III below).
This was followed months later by the largest deportation by Israel since the 1967 war. On 17 December 1992, Israel deported 415 Palestinian civilians suspected of involvement with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 28/ which had claimed responsibility for causing the death of nearly a dozen Israeli soldiers and policemen in the preceding weeks. 29/ The Palestinians were deported from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, mostly the Gaza Strip, to an area in southern Lebanon between the so-called security zone maintained by Israel and the rest of Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon refused to grant the deportees entry and, as a result, a tent camp was established (see A/48/278). This was the largest deportation since the 1967 war. 29/ The very next day, the Security Council adopted resolution 799 (1992), in which the Council, reaffirming previous resolutions concerning Israeli deportations, strongly condemned the actions of Israel, demanded the safe and immediate return of deportees, and requested the Secretary-General “to consider dispatching a representative to the area to follow up with the Government of Israel”.
In his subsequent report to the Council, dated 25 January 1993 (S/25149), the Secretary-General noted the continued refusal of Israel to comply with resolution 799 (1992); the Secretary-General elaborated as follows:
The refusal by Israel to ensure the safe and immediate return of deportees as demanded in resolution 799 (1992), in my view, challenges the authority of the Security Council. Additionally, there is a growing perception, throughout the international community, that the Council, by not pressing for Israeli compliance with its resolutions, of which resolution 799 (1992) is only the latest, does not attach equal importance to the implementation of all of its decisions. In these circumstances, I would be failing in my duty if I did not recommend to the Security Council that it should take whatever measures are required to ensure that its unanimous decision, as set out in resolution 799 (1992), is respected.
On its part, from 1989 to 1992, the General Assembly, in its annual resolutions on the Palestinian uprising, continued to condemn the violations by Israel of the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, and in particular the deportation of Palestinian civilians (see resolutions 44/2, 45/69, 46/76 and 47/64 E). In its resolution 45/130, on the importance of the universal right of peoples to self-determination and of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the Assembly called upon Israel to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied Palestinian territories and to release immediately all Palestinian detainees.
Similarly, in its resolutions on the report of the Special Committee on Israeli Practices (see, e.g., resolutions 44/48 A and 48/41 C), the General Assembly from 1989 to 1993 continued to express grave concern over the deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Palestinians and other Arabs from the occupied territories and demanded that Israel facilitate the return of all Palestinians deported from the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 1967.
In its annual reports to the General Assembly and in other communications during the period from 1989 to 1993, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People consistently protested against, and called for an immediate end to, Israel’s deportation policy. In a statement adopted on 21 January 1993 (A/47/874-S/25136), the Committee strongly condemned the mass deportation of 17 December 1992 by the occupying Power as a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions.
Furthermore, in view of the lack of action by the Security Council on the Secretary-General’s report of 25 January 1993, submitted in accordance with resolution 799 (1992), and delays in the implementation of the agreement reached in February 1993 between the United States and Israel on the gradual repatriation of the deportees, 30/ the Bureau of the Committee registered its concern in a meeting with the President of the Security Council on 24 March 1993. The Committee noted that the Group of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, among others, had also condemned and expressed serious concern over repeated Israel’s deportation policy (see A/48/35).
According to a list compiled by PLO, in 1993 there were around 1,800 Palestinians who had been deported by Israel since 1967 (see A/49/67, para. 199). During the years under consideration, the Committee has consistently supported the right of return of all those Palestinians deported since 1967.
D. Massacre of Palestinian worshippers in Hebron
On 25 February 1994, an armed Israeli settler killed 29 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi) in Hebron (Al-Khalil). An outraged international community condemned the massacre in the strongest terms (see A/49/35, para. 23).
In his statement before the Security Council on 2 March 1994, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People strongly condemned the massacre in Hebron and reminded the international community that Israel, as the occupying Power, bore full responsibility for the protection of Palestinians in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Committee fully supported the Palestinian request for an international presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and urged the Council to take measures to disarm the settlers and limit their presence and activities in Palestinian towns and villages.
On 18 March 1994, following a paragraph-by-paragraph voting procedure, the Security Council adopted resolution 904 (1994) in its entirety, without a vote. The Council, inter alia, strongly condemned the massacre in Hebron and its aftermath; called upon Israel to continue to take and implement measures, including, inter alia, the confiscation of arms, with the aim of preventing acts of violence by Israeli settlers; called for measures to guarantee the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians throughout the Occupied Territory, including, inter alia, a temporary international or foreign presence, as provided for in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed by the Government of Israel and PLO in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993.
Following the adoption of resolution 904 (1994), on 2 May 1994, the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a temporary international presence in Hebron, established the Temporary International Presence in Hebron, under the provisions of the agreement reached between Israel and PLO on security arrangements for Hebron on 31 March 1994. At Copenhagen, the Memorandum was signed by representatives of Denmark, Italy and Norway, the contributing countries at the time, and agreed upon by Israel and PLO. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron was set up officially on 8 May, and its main mandate was to assist in promoting stability and restoring normal life in the city of Hebron. As there was no agreement on the extension of the three-month mandate, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron withdrew from the Palestinian city on 8 August 1994 and resumed its work only on 12 May 1996, in accordance with agreements reached under the peace process (see A/49/35, para. 23; CERD/C/282; and http://www.tiph.org). Despite the positive contribution made by the Temporary International Presence in Hebron − annually acknowledged by the General Assembly − the situation in Hebron remained particularly tense and volatile, with Palestinian civilians repeatedly subjected to Israeli settler violence, intimidation and harassment (see A/50/35, para. 23).
E. Extrajudicial killings
Israel’s practice of extrajudicial killings of individual Palestinians was brought to the attention of the international community numerous times during the period under consideration, principally during the two Palestinian uprisings. According to annual United Nations reports, the activity of Israel’s undercover units continued in the Occupied Palestinian Territory after the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, if generally in a less virulent form (see, e.g., A/49/511, para. 713; and A/50/463, para. 763; see also chap. II.I below). The United Nations, individual Governments, intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union, and NGOs condemned the use of such units and the practice of extrajudicial killings.
The General Assembly condemned the use of undercover units as death squads (see resolution 47/70 A). In its resolution 1992/2, the Commission on Human Rights specifically expressed its deep concern at the contents of the report by the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1991/36), regarding Israel’s practice of summary or arbitrary executions. In a letter to the Secretary-General of 13 July 1993 (A/48/263-S/26078), the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations stated:
“Following up on my letter, dated 6 July 1993 (A/48/253-S/26045), concerning the report by the human rights group Middle East Watch, which affirmed that the Israeli army, through the use of undercover units, is pursuing a policy of summary executions of Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory, I should like to bring to your attention the findings of Amnesty International in its 1993 annual report on human rights. Amnesty International reported that, among the many human rights violations committed by Israel, “at least 120 Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli forces, often in circumstances suggesting extrajudicial executions or other unjustifiable killings”. The figure of 120 for the total amount of those killed by undercover units represents one of the more conservative tallies prepared by human rights organizations. Some groups, such as Al-Haq and Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC), have arrived at figures as high as 160 killings, with many of the victims 16 years of age or younger.”
From 1990 to 1993, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed this issue repeatedly (see A/45/35, para. 21). In 1993, the Committee reiterated its call upon the Israeli occupying forces to end the shooting of unarmed demonstrators and its undercover activities, which had resulted in summary executions (see A/48/35, para. 6).
This unlawful Israeli practice continued to be used in the mid-1990s, fuelling despair, lawlessness and brinkmanship among Palestinians. Together with the acts of violence against innocent civilians and other terrorist attacks carried out by them, such as those in early 1996 addressed below, Israel’s practice of extrajudicial killings contributed to heightening tension in the Occupied Palestinian Territory instead of reducing the level of violence. 31/ The issue was again urgently addressed by the international community in the context of the second intifada. According to Israel Radio, broadcasting towards the end of December 2000, Israel’s army had adopted a new tactic for quelling the Palestinian uprising: tracking down and killing Palestinian militants. Quoting a senior Israeli army officer, the broadcast appeared to confirm what Palestinian leaders called a “policy of assassination,” as a result of which at least 19 activists reportedly had been killed by that date. 32/ In a letter dated 10 January 2001, addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33), the Permanent Observer of Palestine stated, in part, the following:
“Although the Government of Israel maintains that its occupying forces do not shoot at Palestinian civilians unless the lives of soldiers are threatened, the killings of … Palestinians, as well as many other Palestinian martyrs, prove that this assertion is completely false. Moreover, as noted in my previous letters, Israel, the occupying Power, clearly pursues a policy of assassination of identified Palestinian civilians, a fact stated by several high-ranking Israeli officials. As such, the occupying Power is obviously engaged, inter alia, in the wilful killing of civilians, in grave violation of international law and international humanitarian law.”
F. Arbitrary detention and imprisonment
From 1989 to 1992, the General Assembly, in its resolutions under the Special Committee on Israeli Practices, deplored the arbitrary detention or imprisonment by Israel of thousands of Palestinians as a result of their resistance against occupation, and called for their release (see, e.g., resolution 44/48 D). During the period under review, the Assembly repeatedly called upon Israel to accelerate the release of all remaining Palestinians arbitrarily detained or imprisoned, in compliance with existing peace agreements (see resolution 48/41 C and 55/133; see also chaps. III.E and IV.C below).
The issue of Palestinian prisoners was of special concern to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In 1994 and 1995, the Committee expressed concern that Israel, the occupying Power, continued to hold thousands of Palestinian prisoners inside Israel, in violation of international law. While noting that a number of Palestinian prisoners had been released in accordance with the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, the Committee also noted that this release was partial and conditional. It called upon Israel to implement the planned releases speedily and to work to ameliorate conditions of detention. The Committee was particularly alarmed by continued reports of systematic ill-treatment and torture of Palestinian detainees by Israeli interrogators (see A/49/35, para. 24; and A/50/35, para. 25).
In 1996, the Committee noted that some 3,100 Palestinians remained in Israeli prisons, and that their relatives and ICRC had experienced serious difficulties in visiting them owing to the prolonged closure of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Committee recalled that the bilateral peace agreements provided for the phased release of Palestinian prisoners as an important confidence-building measure, and called upon Israel to release the prisoners in accordance with the agreements. The Committee further reaffirmed that detaining prisoners in the territory of the occupying Power was a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and called upon Israel to respect its obligations under the Convention (see A/51/35, para. 25).
The Committee welcomed the release of 30 Palestinian women prisoners in February 1997, as well as 350 prisoners in October 1999, in accordance with the provisions of the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum. Israel, however, continued to hold hundreds Palestinian prisoners, including children, under administrative detention or in facilities run by the Israeli occupying forces, and through 2000 the Committee continued to call upon Israel to release all Palestinian prisoners, pursuant to the bilateral agreements, and to abide by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Committee was especially alarmed by reports of: detention of Palestinians without charge or trial; torture; overcrowded confinement conditions; solitary confinement as a means of punishment; inadequate medical care, resulting in some instances in the death of prisoners; deprivation of basic facilities, such as a place to practice religion or to study; restricted access to legal counsel; the lack of privacy during legal consultations; and restrictions placed on family visits, which were arbitrarily granted by the prison administration despite the intensive efforts of ICRC to facilitate and arrange such visits (see A/52/35, paras. 4 and 23; A/53/35, paras. 16 and 21; and A/55/35, para. 22).
Moreover, on the basis of information that the Israeli authorities continued to use psychological and physical torture against Palestinian detainees, resulting in a considerable deterioration of their health, the Committee called upon Israel to respect its obligations under the relevant human rights treaties and the Fourth Geneva Convention (see A/53/35, paras. 16 and 21). In 1999, the Committee noted with satisfaction the decision adopted by the High Court of Justice of Israel in September 1999 stipulating that the General Security Service of Israel was not authorized to employ certain investigation and interrogation methods that involved the use of physical pressure against detainees (see A/54/35, para. 25).
G. Closures and curfews
Since 1993, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Special Committee on Israeli Practices and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, addressed with concern the use of collective punishment against Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, comprising the use of external closures of the Territory; and internal closures through the encirclement or blockade of Palestinian towns and villages; checkpoints and curfews, serving no apparent security purpose. On numerous occasions, Israel was called upon to lift such closures and curfews that would at times fragment the Occupied Palestinian Territory into more than 60 enclaves (see S/1996/235 and General Assembly resolutions 48/41 C and 55/133). 33/
Israel’s closure policy, which was widely regarded as violating the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, became institutionalized during the period under consideration. This policy intensified in January 1991, during the Gulf War, when Israel cancelled general exit permits for Palestinians. This became established as a policy on 30 March 1993, following attacks by Palestinians against civilians in Israel and settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 34/ It was furthered by the fragmentation of the areas under Palestinian Authority control, established as a result of the Oslo agreements. 35/ Despite the massive human rights violations being committed, Israel maintained, including before the Security Council, that its closure policy was not a form of collective punishment against the Palestinian population, but rather a preventive measure to enhance security in Israel (see S/PV.3652).
Over the years, numerous reports have provided information on the punitive and debilitating aspects of this policy, in particular the detrimental impact on Palestinian workers and nearly 120,000 families. 36/ According to media and expert reports in that period, Israel’s blockade, when fully in place, cost the Occupied Palestinian Territory an estimated $7-11 million in lost GDP per day. Internal closures, which restricted mobility through hundreds of checkpoints and curfews, contributed to increased unemployment and other material losses; limited access to urgently needed public services; and, caused tremendous personal hardship for the Palestinian population. Israel’s border closure policy resulted in an average loss of about 20 per cent of Palestinians’ working days in Israel for the period from 1993 to 2000, with peaks in 1995, 1996 and the last quarter of 2000, as well as significant losses in Palestinian external trade and foreign investment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 37/
The Security Council, at an urgent meeting held on 15 April 1996 to consider the serious situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from Israel’s closure policies, concluded its general debate the same day without deciding on any specific measures (see S/PV.3652). Prior to the Security Council meeting, Palestinian Authority President Arafat, in his letter of 29 March 1996 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/50/916-S/1996/233), stated:
“The general security blockade the Israeli Government has imposed on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its reoccupation of areas from which Israeli forces had previously been withdrawn and its failure to withdraw from the city of Hebron in accordance with the timetable agreed upon at Taba and Washington are in flagrant violation of all international covenants, conventions and customs. We consider such blockade and closure as tantamount to the declaration of a state of war against the Palestinian people, a people that have chosen the road of peace but that for more than a month have been subjected to the worst and most unjust form of collective punishment, to say nothing of the starvation of children, women and the elderly and contempt for basic rights that should be respected in the same manner as human rights in all countries of the world.”
The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in its reports and communications, spearheaded efforts to draw attention to the debilitating effects of closures on the Palestinian people. For instance, in his letter of 28 May 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/47/959-S/25862), the Chairman of the Committee drew attention to the deteriorating situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a result of the prolonged closure and isolation of the Territory by Israel in the following terms:
“According to a report published recently by the Jerusalem-based Palestine Human Rights Information Centre, Israel’s prolonged and indefinite closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the isolation of East Jerusalem since 30 March has been ‘the most damaging and disruptive policy of the occupying Power on the daily lives of the Palestinian people under occupation’. This policy of collective punishment has, according to the same report, ‘restricted the movement of millions of Palestinians and deprived them of access to health-care facilities, food and medical supplies, employment and education and places of worship in Jerusalem.’
“On 21 April, the New York-based human rights organization Middle East Watch expressed deep concern at the hardships caused by the closure of the territories, which include the abrupt loss of income for some 100,000 Palestinians who were employed in Israel and East Jerusalem; the lack of access to hospitals, mosques, churches, schools, banks and so on; and the fragmentation of the occupied territories into four sectors that are inaccessible to one another without permits that are hard to obtain.”
The following year, the Committee noted with concern that the continuation by the Government of Israel of its policy of closures of the city of Jerusalem and of the Gaza Strip had caused a dramatic increase in tensions (see A/49/35, para. 25). In 1994/1995, the Committee again reported on the devastating effect of the closures on the overall livelihood of the Palestinian population in an economy much intertwined with that of Israel, as well as on Palestinian education and health. The closures also negatively affected the internal movement of goods and services between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in particular agricultural products, which are a main source of income for thousands of Palestinian households, negatively impacting the Palestinian economy (see A/50/35, para. 24).
In 1996, the Committee noted with grave concern the exacerbation of the situation on the ground as a result of Israeli measures in the wake of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians in February and March. The prolonged and at times complete closure of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem further stifled the Palestinian economy and caused immense suffering and hardship for the civilian population. Moreover, according to a report prepared by UNSCO, the Palestinian economy had lost $6 billion from 1992 to 1996, mostly owing to Israeli closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which prevented Palestinian workers from reaching jobs in Israel; some 51,000 Palestinians had been licensed to work in Israel each day until 30 July 1997. The closures resulted in a 36 per cent drop in per capita gross national product, from $2,700 in 1992 to $1,700 in 1996 (see A/52/35, paras. 26 and 27).
The imposition on 25 February 1996 of the closure of areas under Palestinian jurisdiction fragmented the territory into many small enclaves isolated from each other and from the outside world. It was reported that this closure was the strictest ever since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 (see A/51/35, paras. 23, 26, 43 and 44). During 1996/1997, the Committee found that Israel continued arbitrarily to impose closures in response to its alleged security needs.
The Committee expressed grave concern at the imposition by Israel of a blockade of the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the suicide bombing in West Jerusalem on 30 July 1997. The Bureau of the Committee unreservedly condemned all acts of violence against defenceless civilians. The Bureau, in a statement issued to the press on 6 August 1997 (GA/PAL/766), also stated that harsh retaliatory measures on the part of the Israeli Government would dangerously exacerbate the state of the Palestinian economy and result in greater hardship and despair among the Palestinian population. The Committee also reiterated its position that the practice of closures was in direct contravention to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see A/52/35, para. 28). Nevertheless, Israel reimposed a closure following another suicide operation in West Jerusalem on 4 September 1997. The following year, the Committee observed with great concern that the Palestinian economy continued to suffer owing to the prolonged closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the resulting fragmentation of the Territory (see A/53/35, para. 22).
According to the Secretary-General’s report on assistance to the Palestinian people, in 1998 fewer comprehensive closures were imposed on the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Such closures still affected 5.2 per cent of working days in 1998 (see A/54/134-S/1998/85, para. 11; and A/54/325, para. 89).
In September 2000, with the outbreak of the second intifada, Israel reverted to an intensified comprehensive closure policy. As a result, the total loss in Palestinian gross national income for the first 15 months of the intifada was estimated by the World Bank at $2.4 billion. 38/ According to the UNSCO report of 17 February 2001, during the 123-day period from 1 October 2000 to 31 January 2001, the Israeli-Palestinian border used by Palestinian labourers to work in Israel and trade flows was closed for 93 days or 75.6 per cent of the time. Internal movement restrictions and internal closures, partial or severe, were in place 100 per cent of the time in the West Bank and 89 per cent of the time in the Gaza Strip. The international border crossings to Jordan (from the West Bank) and to Egypt (from the Gaza Strip) were closed for 29 per cent and 50 per cent of the time, respectively.
H
.
Settlement activities, including at Jabal Abu GhneimThroughout the period under consideration, Israel accelerated its illegal settlement activities, construction of bypass road networks and expropriation of Palestinian land. This further hemmed in the Palestinian civilian population and related infrastructure and caused serious concern within the international community at a time when peace efforts were expected to resolve such major issues as the settlements, considered illegal under international law. 39/ Israel’s settlement activities throughout the 1990s resulted in the doubling of the number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; a one-third increase in Israeli settlers in expanded East Jerusalem; the establishment of new settlements and expansion of existing settlements; and, the creation of so-called “settlement outposts”. 40/ By the end of 2000, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had exceeded 200,000 persons, with an additional 200,000 Israeli settlers in Occupied East Jerusalem. 41/
By the mid-1990s, it had become evident that land confiscation and settlement expansion were taking place at a much accelerated pace, in particular in and around occupied East Jerusalem (see A/50/35, paras. 22 and 32; and A/49/831-S/1995/50). The General Assembly reiterated numerous times its long-standing position that Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, were illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace. In its resolution 51/133, the Assembly expressed grave concern over the decision of the Government of Israel to resume settlement activities in violation of international humanitarian law, relevant United Nations resolutions and the agreements reached between the parties. Similarly, in the context of the peace process negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum in 1999, concern over increased settlement activity was clearly expressed by the United States and the European Union. 42/ Both the Security Council and the General Assembly also called upon Israel effectively to prevent acts of violence by Israeli settlers. By the mid-1990s, it had become evident that land confiscation and settlement expansion were taking place at a much accelerated pace, in particular in and around occupied East Jerusalem (ibid.). On 15 March 1990, in response to a request by the Soviet Union, the Security Council considered “unlawful Israeli moves to settle the occupied territories.” The request, contained in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 12 February 1990 (S/21139), stated that Israeli settlement activities ran counter to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which precluded any changes in the demographic composition of the occupied territories, and obstructed the Middle East peace efforts. 43/ During March and May 1990, the Council held six meetings on the settlements issue, but adjourned on 3 May without taking any action. 44/
The Council again discussed Israeli settlements at an urgent meeting on 28 February 1995. In his statement on behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Chairman stated that Israel’s continued policy of establishing settlements in Occupied Palestinian Territory was a direct and serious contravention of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and a violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 446 (1979), 452 (1979) and 465 (1980). The Chairman noted that these developments
came at a time when the implementation of the second stage of the Declaration of Principles, including the redeployment of the Israeli forces from populated areas in the West Bank and the election of the Palestinian Council, had been delayed for seven months. The Security Council concluded its debate the same day without adopting any specific measures (see A/50/35, paras. 22 and 30-40).
Between 12 and 17 May 1995, the Council again met to discuss the issue, particularly Israeli plans to confiscate Palestinian land in the area of East Jerusalem. On 17 May 1995, a draft resolution (S/1995/394) was submitted to the Council, calling upon Israel to rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such actions in the future, and expressing full support for the Middle East peace process and its achievements, including the Declaration of Principles and subsequent implementation agreements. The resolution was vetoed by the United States (see S/PV.3538).
The following year, on 26 September 1996, the Committee noted with alarm that the Israeli authorities, in violation of Israel’s obligations under international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, had opened an entrance to a tunnel in the vicinity of Al-Haram Al-Sharif in occupied East Jerusalem. This action triggered unrest and demonstrations among the Palestinians. In accordance with the signed agreements, questions centring on Jerusalem were considered to be part of the final status negotiation issues. The Committee expressed grave concern over the shooting of Palestinians demonstrating against the Israeli action and the resulting escalation of violence, resulting in the deaths of 40 Palestinians and 11 Israelis (see A/51/418-S/1996/795). An Israeli expert analyst referred to the three days of protests, clashes and bloodshed as the “tunnel uprising”. In his view, the uprising together with a “broad national consensus” in the Knesset clearly favouring the continuation of the peace efforts under way as well as the active involvement by the United States at the highest level, led the Government of Prime Minister Netanyahu to yield some ground to the Palestinians in negotiations on Hebron, if only to adopt subsequently a “confrontational line on Jerusalem” 45/ (see chap. III.E below).
For its part, the Security Council met on 27 and 28 September 1996 to address recent developments, in particular the opening by Israel of a tunnel under the Western Wall of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem and subsequent unrest and bloodshed (see S/1996/790). Some 50 high-level speakers addressed the Council. At the end of the debate, the Council adopted resolution 1073 on 28 September 1996, with 14 votes in favour, none against and 1 abstention (United States). The resolution called for the immediate cessation and reversal of all acts that had aggravated the situation and had negative implications for the Middle East peace process, and for the immediate resumption of negotiations on the agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements. Expressing its deep concern about the tragic events in Jerusalem and the areas of Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and the Gaza Strip, which resulted in a high number of deaths and injuries among Palestinian civilians, the Security Council also called for “the safety and protection of Palestinian civilians to be ensured” (see focus and chap. III below).
Focus: Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of thePalestinian People alarmed over the opening of a tunnel under the Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1996
On 26 September, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, expressed great anxiety at the violence that resulted from Israel’s decision to open a new entrance to an archaeological tunnel in East Jerusalem, which runs under Arab property along the western wall of the Al-Haram Al-Sharif, the third most important site of Islam (A/51/418-S/1996/795; see also A/51/35, para. 33; A/51/416-S/1996/793; and A/51/400-S/1996/779). He continued:
“According to reports in the media, protest demonstrations by Palestinians were met with live ammunition, rubber bullets and tear gas by Israeli troops. Clashes have taken place in the West Bank towns of Ramallah, Bethlehem, Halhoul near Hebron, Jenin, and Qalqilya, as well as in the Gaza Strip. There have been reports that Israeli troops entered areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, and that gunfire was exchanged with Palestinian policemen. The latest press dispatches indicate that 40 Palestinians and 11 Israelis have been killed, and several hundred have been injured, the highest toll since the intifada. ”
In response to Israel’s decision in February 1997 to begin construction of the “Har Homa” settlement in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area south of occupied East Jerusalem on the road to Bethlehem, the Council met, on 5 March 1997, to consider “the situation in the occupied Arab territories”, in particular Israel’s decision of 26 February to begin construction of a settlement in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area south of occupied East Jerusalem. In a letter dated 28 February addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, the Chairman of the Committee deplored Israel’s decision to build the new settlement, in contravention of international law, the Fourth Geneva Convention and numerous resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly (A/51/812-S/1997/172). The letter continued:
“The Committee reaffirms that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980 and other resolutions, all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and must be rescinded. The Council also called upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories.
“The Committee considers that the growing expansion and consolidation of settlements create facts on the ground inconsistent with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, which the current peace process seeks to implement. They seriously undermine the agreements reached between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and jeopardize the much-needed process of confidence building between the parties.”
The Chairman of the Committee participated in the Security Council debate on this issue on 5 March 1997, seeking to annul Israel’s decision (see S/PV.3745).
After the debate on 7 March 1997, the Security Council failed to adopt the draft resolution (see S/1997/199) sponsored by France, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom, by a vote of 14 in favour to 1 against (United States). Under the draft resolution, had it been adopted, the Council would have called upon Israel to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which altered the facts on the ground, pre-empted final status negotiations, and had negative implications for the Middle East peace process, and to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention. It also would have called upon all parties to continue, in the interests of peace and security, their negotiations within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached.
After the urgent meeting of the General Assembly held on 12 March 1997, the Security Council reconvened to address again the crisis in Jabal Abu Ghneim on 21 March 1997 (S/PV.3756). The resulting draft resolution (S/1997/241), if adopted, would have demanded that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The United States again exercised its veto power. Thirteen members of the Council voted in favour, with one abstention (Costa Rica).
In view of two consecutive negative votes by the United States, which prevented the Security Council from acting, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations stated that he would take the issue before an emergency meeting of the General Assembly (see S/PV.3747). Thus, following the required procedural measures, the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly convened in April 1997 to address “illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.
The Security Council also held two meetings on 30 June 1998 following Israel’s decision to expand the boundaries of Jerusalem westwards and create an umbrella municipality that would include a number of settlements in the West Bank (see SC/6626). In the debate, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People expressed the hope that the Council would take timely measures, with the support of the sponsors of the peace process, to put an end to the unilateral decisions concerning control over the Holy City of Jerusalem, which should remain the living symbol of peaceful coexistence among religions and peoples that are different yet complementary (see S/PV.3900 (resumption)).
In a statement issued by its President on 13 July 1998 (S/PRST/1998/21), the Security Council recognized the importance and sensitivity of the issue of Jerusalem to all parties; expressed its support for the decision of PLO and the Government of Israel, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles, to cover the issue of Jerusalem in permanent status negotiations; and, called upon the parties to avoid actions which might prejudice the outcome of those negotiations. The Council also stated that it considered Israel’s decision to broaden the jurisdiction and planning boundaries of Jerusalem a serious and damaging development, and called upon Israel not to proceed with that decision, not to take any other steps which would prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations, and to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Meanwhile, in view of the situation on the ground and the inability of the Security Council to act on 7 March 1997, the General Assembly held an urgent meeting on 12 March, at the request of the Group of Arab States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. On 13 March 1997, the Assembly adopted, by 130 votes in favour to 2 against, with 2 abstentions, resolution 51/223 entitled “Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular in occupied East Jerusalem.” In the resolution, based on the aforementioned Security Council draft resolution vetoed on 7 March, the Assembly expressed deep concern at Israel’s decision to initiate new settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem; called upon Israel to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which altered the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations and had negative implications for the Middle East peace process; and, to abide scrupulously by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Furthermore, the Assembly called upon all parties to continue their negotiations within the Middle East peace process.
Following the aforementioned veto in the Security Council on 21 March 1997, the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly – the first in 15 years –convened on 24 and 25 April 1997 to consider the item entitled “Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” in accordance with the provisions of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (General Assembly resolution 377(V) A). During the debate, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People condemned any resort to violence, in particular against civilians, and recalled that the peace process had made progress because both parties accepted the principles of land for peace and a negotiated solution, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) (see A/ES-10/PV.1). On 25 April, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/2, by a recorded vote of 134 votes in favour to 3 against, with 11 abstentions.
In the resolution, the Assembly condemned the construction by Israel of a new settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim; reaffirmed that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel that had altered the character, legal status and demographic composition of Jerusalem are null and void and have no validity whatsoever; reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 were illegal and an obstacle to peace; demanded immediate and full cessation of the construction in Jabal Abu Ghneim and of all other Israeli settlement activities, as well as of all illegal measures and actions in Jerusalem; and called for the cessation of all forms of assistance and support for illegal Israeli activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, in particular settlement activities.
The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, who subsequently had intended to dispatch a special envoy to the area, to report on the implementation of this resolution within two months of its adoption. Owing to the restrictions imposed by Israel on the scope of the envisaged mission, which were not acceptable to the United Nations, it had not been possible to dispatch the Special Envoy in conditions under which he could discharge the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Assembly in a fully satisfactory manner. Therefore, he based the substantive portion of his report on reliable sources available to the United Nations at Headquarters and in the field (see A/ES-10/6-S/1997/494, paras. 1-14).
Following the submission by the Secretary-General of the report requested under General Assembly resolution ES-10/2, the tenth emergency special session resumed for the first time on 15 July 1997. At the end of the debate the same day, the Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/3, by a recorded vote of 131 votes in favour to 3 against, with 14 abstentions. In the resolution, the Assembly reiterated its demand for the immediate and full cessation of the construction of a new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim, and demanded that Israel cease and reverse all actions taken illegally, in contravention of international law, against Palestinian Jerusalemites. It demanded that Israel make available to Member States the necessary information about goods produced or manufactured in the settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. It also recommended that the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to ensure its respect, in accordance with common article 1, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the matter within three months.
Following the issuance of the reports of the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/3 (A/ES-10/16-S/1997/798 and Add.1), the emergency special session was reconvened for the second time on 13 November 1997. 46/ During the debate, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People made a statement in which he called upon the Assembly to express the position and will of the international community in a clear and forthright manner (A/ES-10/PV.6). The Permanent representative of the Russian Federation said that his country deeply regretted that Israel was not implementing the decisions, made in April and July at earlier stages of the emergency special session, on putting an end to the settlement activities in East Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories. The Russian Federation opposed any unilateral actions negatively affecting the negotiating process. The representative once again called upon Israel to halt the construction of new settlements and immediately to start a full-scale practical implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements. Israeli security concerns should, of course, be duly taken into account.
The representative of South Africa stated that Israel’s flagrant violation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions could not be allowed to continue with impunity. South Africa would vote in favour of the resolution because it sent a clear message to the Government of Israel that the international community was determined to put the peace process firmly back on track and usher in a new era free of conflict, tensions and violence in the Middle East.
The representative of Canada remarked that with regard to operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the draft resolution, Canadian policy was that the Fourth Geneva Convention did apply to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem. As a High Contracting Party, Canada’s decision about the merits of convening the conference called for in operative paragraph 4 would be made after a full examination of the necessity, possible outcome and impact on the peace process of such a conference. On 13 November 1997, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/4, by a recorded vote of 139 to 3, with 13 abstentions.
In the resolution, the Assembly condemned the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with the provisions of the two previous resolutions; reiterated its recommendation for the convening of a conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention; recommended to the Government of Switzerland, in its capacity as the depositary of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to undertake the necessary steps, including the convening of a meeting of experts, as soon as possible and with a target date not later than the end of February 1998; and called for renewing momentum into the stalled Middle East peace process by implementing the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and upholding the principle of land for peace.
The tenth emergency special session was reconvened for the third time, on 17 March 1998. 47/ The Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People took part in the debate among over 120 other delegations and made a statement in which he called upon the Government of Israel to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the recommendations of the General Assembly, and to cooperate fully in the preparatory work for the meeting of experts and the proposed conference of High Contracting Parties (see A/ES-10/PV.8).
At the end of the debate, on 17 March, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/5, by a recorded vote of 120 to 3, with 5 abstentions, in which it reiterated its condemnation of Israel’s failure to comply with the provisions of previous resolutions; reiterated all of the demands made in those resolutions; reiterated once again its recommendation concerning the convening of a conference on measures to enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its recommendation to the Government of Switzerland to undertake the necessary preparatory steps for such a conference; and extended the target date for the convening of the meeting of experts until the end of April 1998.
The emergency special session was resumed on 5 February 1999, for the fourth time. The Chairman of the Committee made a statement in which he reviewed the situation on the ground, as well as in the peace process. He expressed support for, and stressed the crucial importance of, convening a conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention (see A/ES-10/PV.10). On 9 February 1999, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/6, by a recorded vote of 115 to 2, with 5 abstentions. In the resolution, the Assembly condemned Israel’s refusal to comply with the provisions of earlier resolutions, and reiterated those provisions; expressed grave concern at the adoption by the Knesset of the law dated 26 January 1999 and the legislation dated 27 January 1999, which extended Israeli law over settlements in the West Bank and Gaza; and, recommended that the High Contracting Parties convene a conference on 15 July 1999 at the United Nations Office at Geneva on measures to enforce the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Assembly expressed confidence that Palestine, as a party directly concerned, would participate in the conference.
The Conference of the High Contracting Parties, the first of its kind in the history of the Convention, was held at Geneva on 15 July 1999, as recommended by the General Assembly at its tenth emergency special session and was attended by 103 countries. The participants reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and reiterated the need for full respect there for the provisions of the Convention. In the statement issued by the Conference at its adjournment, the participating High Contracting Parties stated that it would convene again in the light of consultations on the development of the humanitarian situation in the field. Reconvening the Conference remained under consideration in 2000, as the situation on the ground did not improve.
Provocations and illegal actions by Israel, the occupying Power, continued and intensified. On the heels of the Conference, Israel announced that it would allow 27 of 31 settler hilltops encampments, or “outposts”, which were placed near existing settlements since the signing of the Wye River Memorandum, to remain intact (see A/53/1032-S/1999/854). According to a press report, an Israeli security establishment study had concluded that at least 10 of 40 settlement “outposts” established in the West Bank after the signing of the Memorandum were “clearly illegal”. 48/ In other worrisome developments on the ground, Israeli militant settlers, on 6 October 1998, laid the cornerstone for a new housing project in the settlement of “Tel Rumeida” situated in the heart of Hebron, where the Government of Israel had agreed to build permanent structures to replace trailer homes. On the same day, Prime Minister Netanyahu attended a ceremony to mark the official redesignation of the West Bank settlement of “Ariel” into a city. 49/
The fifth resumption of the tenth emergency special session took place after the onset of the second intifada that had erupted in September 2000. On 20 October 2000, the General Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/7, which will be more fully addressed below. In the resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, called upon the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure respect for the Convention, in accordance with the statement adopted in Geneva on 15 July 1999.
The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People reiterated over the years its concern over the provocative and often violent actions of extremist settlers occupying Palestinian land, erecting makeshift houses and other structures aiming to colonize the Occupied Palestinian Territory, engaging in violent confrontations with Palestinians, and to express their opposition to the peace process. During 1999 and 2000, settlers reportedly were collecting considerable donations in Israel and abroad to purchase special military and rescue equipment. According to the “Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza”, the equipment was purchased in full coordination with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including the Regional Defence Officer in the IDF Central Command. In this regard, the Committee was alarmed by reports of increased settler activity, especially since the Camp David peace summit held earlier in 2000, including a noticeable increase in the number of settlers with IDF-issued weapons and settlement fortification works in the vicinity of Hebron and Nablus, in particular (see A/55/35, para. 20).
Moreover, in its annual report issued in 2000, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People reaffirmed that the policy of confiscation of Palestinian land, demolition of houses and other Palestinian property, and construction of settlements constituted a serious violation of international law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Committee was particularly appalled by the intensified construction at the Jabal Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem (ibid., para. 19).
I
.
Human rights situation
During the period under consideration, the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory seriously deteriorated as a result of the increasingly repressive measures taken by Israel against the Palestinian civilian population. Steadily, a climate of diminishing trust, growing Israeli military operations, including reoccupation of Palestinian areas previously redeployed from, and acts of violence against civilians such as indiscriminate bombings emerged. Human rights violations were particularly egregious during the two major Palestinian uprisings that, respectively, were under way at the beginning of the period under consideration, until 1993, and the end, starting on 28 September 2000. In its “Country reports on human rights practices – 2000”, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour in February 2001, the United States Department of State concluded that Israel’s overall human rights record in the occupied territories was poor.
United Nations resolutions and reports continued to reflect the view that occupation itself was a violation of human rights, impeding the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and obstructing efforts to achieve sustainable development and a sound economic environment. 50/ The Assembly repeatedly determined that Israel’s violations constituted a serious obstacle to the efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East (see resolutions 44/48 A and C, 47/70 C and 55/133). As mentioned above, since December 1996, the General Assembly also has expressed in annual resolutions entitled “Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories” grave concern over Israel’s continuation of settlement activities in violation of international humanitarian law, relevant United Nations resolutions and the agreements reached between the parties (see resolutions 51/133, 52/66, 53/55, 54/78 and 55/132).
Over the years, the Security Council and the General Assembly have each responded to particularly grave violations of human rights of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, in particular deportations, settler violence such as the massacre at Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi in Hebron and accelerated settlement activity, as well as Israeli actions against Palestinian civilians and civilian property during the two Palestinian uprisings.
Despite tangible progress on the ground following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, Israel’s human rights violations persisted in many ways, and were detailed in reports prepared by the United Nations, Governments and human rights groups. 51/ Reported violations included: the killing and wounding of Palestinians; ill treatment and torture, including of children and minors; deportation and denial of the right to return; detention without trial; collective punishment and mass arrests; interference with the right to peaceful assembly and association, of the right to a fair trial, of the freedoms of speech, the press, expression and worship, and of the right not to be subjected to discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion, political opinion or other status; demolition and sealing of houses; uprooting of trees; transformation of the Palestinian landscape and pillage of historical, cultural and religious sites, especially in Jerusalem; interference with the system of education and the economic and social development of the Palestinian people; as well as the confiscation of land, construction of “bypass roads” 52/ for illegal construction and expansion of settlements and related infrastructure.
At the United Nations, responsibility for examining the human rights situation in the territory occupied by Israel since 1967 continued to rest primarily with the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, established by the General Assembly in 1968 for this purpose. Whereas the General Assembly continued to demand that Israel cooperate with the Special Committee, Israel refused to recognize the mandate of the Special Committee and extend any cooperation. It refused to give the Special Committee access to any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, not even the Gaza Strip or Jericho, where the Special Committee had hoped to visit in 1994, following the signing of the agreement between PLO and Israel on these areas (see, e.g., A/49/511, paras. 687 and 688). Since 1993, for much of the period under review, the Special Committee has issued annual as well as periodic reports and continued to make recommendations to help safeguard the basic human rights of the Palestinian people.
The General Assembly consistently requested the Special Committee to continue its work and expressed the hope that, in the light of the positive political developments that began in 1993, Israel’s policies and practices, which violated the human rights of Palestinians and other Arabs, would be brought to an immediate end (see resolution 48/41 A). In its most recent resolution on the work of the Special Committee during the period under consideration, in 2000, the Assembly commended the Committee for its efforts, demanded that Israel cooperate with it, and requested the Special Committee to continue its work “pending complete termination of the Israeli occupation” (see resolution 55/130).
The Special Committee concluded repeatedly during the period under consideration that Israel was violating the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Hague Conventions and relevant United Nations resolutions. Until the early 1990s, in the view of the Special Committee, the persistent violation of human rights derived from the very fact of military occupation and Israel’s policies of colonization and annexation (see A/44/559, A/45/576 and resolution 47/70 A). Even after the historic developments in the peace process, the Special Committee concluded that the general situation of human rights in Occupied Palestinian Territory remained very serious and had actually deteriorated in many respects, in particular as a result of Israel’s settlement policies (see A/49/511, paras. 689 and 690; A/50/463, para. 712; A/51/99/Add.2, para. 782; and A/52/131/Add.2, paras. 580 and 581).
Since 1994, the Special Committee found that the situation has deteriorated even further as a result of Israel’s closure policy; expropriation of land; settler violence; the large number of Palestinian prisoners remaining in Israeli detention and the deterioration of the conditions of their detention; and the increasingly harsh methods, amounting to torture, used by Israeli interrogators of persons suspected of having committed security offences (see A/50/463, para. 712).
Moreover, from 1998 to 2000, the Special Committee determined that Israel had instituted a comprehensive and elaborate system of laws, regulations and administrative measures affecting all aspects of the lives of the Palestinian people under occupation. This system was regarded as vesting in Israeli officials a broad degree of authority over the lives of the people of the occupied territories. Combined with the sense of great tension in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly during periods of crisis, the rigorous implementation of this Israeli system of laws, regulations and administrative measures created a sense of fear and despondency among Palestinians. The Special Committee repeatedly found that the Palestinians’ bitterness at their treatment by the occupying Power and their sense of dispossession, hopelessness and despair − caused to a large extent by lack of progress in and tangible benefits from the peace process − created a situation of greatest urgency on the ground (see A/53/661, paras. 176-180; and A/55/453, paras. 33 and 131-133).
Focus: Israel’s obligations under ratified international human rights instruments
In the early 1990s, five international human rights instruments ratified by Israel entered into force: the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, on 2 November 1991; as well as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 3 January 1992. Whereas Israel’s reporting obligations gradually began to be fulfilled under the instruments, on the ground human rights violations against the Palestinians continued. For instance, the Committee against Torture concluded that certain interrogation methods used by Israel amounted to torture and called for an immediate cessation of these practices (see CAT/C/SR.297/Add.1 and A/49/511, para. 750). This issue was also addressed by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the question of torture and by the Commission itself. 53/ On the subject of jurisdiction, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reaffirmed its position of principle that, since Israel was a party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Committee was competent to examine the manner in which Israel was fulfilling its obligations under the Convention with respect to everyone falling under the jurisdiction of Israel including all persons living in the territories occupied by Israel” (see A/49/18, para. 83).
As a result of outbreak of violence in September 2000, the General Assembly, in its resolution 55/133, entitled “Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem” called for a temporary international or foreign presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for the safety and protection of the Palestinian people; condemned Israel’s excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians and demanded that Israel cease all actions that violate Palestinian human rights; stressed the need to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods within the Palestinian territory, including the removal of restrictions on movement into and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world; and, called upon Israel to release the remaining Palestinian prisoners.
On its part, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolutions condemning Israeli violations of human rights. During the first intifada, the Commission considered that many of Israel’s violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention were “war crimes under international law” and condemned Israel for these gross violations (see, e.g., Commission on Human Rights resolution 1989/2 A. The Commission reaffirmed that the systematic and persistent practices of Israel, the occupying Power, as reflected in the killing of Palestinians, including children; the breaking of bones; the subjection of towns, villages and refugee camps to living conditions intended to destroy their inhabitants through the imposition of curfews and military siege; the throwing of gas bombs into houses, mosques and hospitals; and the savage beatings and maltreatment of pregnant women constituted serious violations of the principles of international law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission, in its resolutions 1989/2 A-B, also condemned Israel for the obstruction of the education of thousands of students and pupils; the use of collective punishment; the ill-treatment and torture of large numbers of Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons; and the deportation and expulsion of Palestinians. 54/
Although the peace process arrangements made in the 1990s brought palatable relief to Palestinians under occupation by freeing them from direct, day-to-day contact with Israeli soldiers, the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory continued to suffer from serious human rights violations by Israel and Israeli settlers, even prior to the uprising of September 2000. The Commission on Human Rights consistently condemned these violations. In its resolution 2000/6, entitled “Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine,” the Commission condemned the continuation of acts of wounding and killing perpetrated by Israeli soldiers and settlers against Palestinians, the detention of thousands of Palestinians without trial, the continuation of the confiscation of Palestinian lands, the extension and the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon, the confiscation of Palestinian property and expropriation of their land, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the uprooting of fruit trees, and called upon Israel to cease immediately these acts, which constituted grave violations of human rights and of the principles of international law and also constituted a major obstacle in the way of the peace process. The Commission also condemned the expropriation of Palestinian homes in Jerusalem, the revocation of identity cards of the citizens of the Palestinian city of Jerusalem, the imposition of fabricated and exorbitant taxes with the aim of forcing the Palestinians out of Jerusalem, and called upon the Government of Israel to put an end immediately to these practices. The Commission also singled out and condemned the use of torture against Palestinians during interrogation, as it constituted a grave breach of the principles of international humanitarian law and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and called upon the Government of Israel to put an end immediately to the use of such practices (see E/CN.4/RES/2000/6).
In its resolution 1993/2 A of 19 February 1993, the Commission on Human Rights mandated a Special Rapporteur to investigate Israel’s violations of international law, international humanitarian law and the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to report to the Commission until the Israeli occupation of those territories ended. On 13 September 1993, the Chairman of the Commission appointed the first Special Rapporteur, who presented the initial report examining the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in February 1994 (E/CN.4/1994/14). Several additional such reports would follow (e.g., E/CN.4/2000/25); Israel did not always cooperate with these efforts.
In response to the acute situation that developed in September 2000 into the second intifada, addressed below, from 11 to 15 October 2000 the Special Rapporteur undertook a mission to the region. At the subsequent special session of the Commission, the Special Rapporteur presented his findings. In general, instances of the full range of human rights violations reported in the Special Rapporteur’s previous report continued (ibid.). Some of these violations showed a dramatic upsurge since late September 2000 (see E/CN.4/S-5/3, paras. 1-5). The Special Rapporteur offered several recommendations for urgent action: (a) the establishment of an ombudsman-type mechanism to process complaints; (b) the establishment of an observer and/or guarantor body that, by its very presence and neutrality, would serve to build up a sense of security and confidence on both sides; and (c) the establishment of a mechanism for a speedy and objective inquiry into the ongoing crisis, the importance of which was stressed by the Security Council in its resolution 1322 (2000) (ibid., para. 35).
The Commission on Human Rights held its fifth special session from 17 to 19 October 2000. After failing to agree on a consensual text, on 19 October, the Commission adopted resolution S-5/1, by a vote of 19 in favour to 16 against, with 17 abstentions. In the resolution, the Commission condemned the grave and massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel; called for the establishment of a human rights inquiry commission to look into the violence; and called upon the High Commissioner to undertake urgently a visit to the region. In addition, the Commission requested the special rapporteurs concerned with such issues as extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, torture, violence against women, religious intolerance and racism, to carry out immediate missions to the occupied Palestinian territories and to report their findings to the Commission at its next session and, on an interim basis, to the General Assembly at its current session. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Representative of the Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons were also among those requested to carry out missions to the Occupied Territory. 55/
Heeding the Commission’s call, from 8 to 16 November 2000 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, undertook an urgent visit to assess the violations of the human rights of the Palestinians by Israel. On 29 November 2000, the High Commissioner reported on her visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel, Egypt and Jordan. 56/ In the report, the High Commissioner states the following with respect to the question of protection of Palestinian civilians:
“Mindful of the urgent and widespread calls for international protection made to her during her visit to the occupied territories, the High Commissioner believes that every effort should be made to explore the feasibility of establishing an international monitoring presence.”
On 19 December 2000, the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights appointed three eminent persons to the human rights inquiry commission established pursuant to resolution S-5/1, endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in its decision 2000/311 on 22 November. The inquiry commission was expected to complement the various efforts being undertaken towards establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East by contributing to the cause of promotion and protection of human rights. The commission, having visited the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel from 10 to 18 February 2001, called for the immediate establishment of an “adequate and effective” international presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, saying it was beyond dispute that Israeli security forces had used “excessive and disproportionate force” (see E/CN.4/2001/121).
J.Second intifadaConfrontations between Israeli occupying forces and Palestinians in East Jerusalem following a visit to the Al-Haram Al-Sharif by the then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, accompanied by a group of Likud Knesset members and hundreds of Israeli soldiers and police, led to bloodshed at the end of September 2000. Violence quickly engulfed the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and, for the first time since the late 1940s, emerged in towns in Israel, with over a dozen Palestinians shot dead there in the first days of the uprising. 57/ According to Palestinian sources, by the end of 2000, over 320 Palestinians had lost their lives (see A/ES-10/54-S/2001/17). This second uprising in less than 10 years was soon known as the Al-Aqsa intifada or second intifada. The international community, including the Security Council, condemned Israel’s excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians.
On 13 February 2001, the United Nations Special Coordinator, Terje Rød-Larsen, summarized findings in a report on the social and economic impact of the increasingly violent conflict. Based on the report, the Palestinian economy had lost an estimated $900 million in gross domestic product (GDP) since the onset of the crisis, and labour income losses of more than $240 million. The total loss was estimated at $1,150 million, or 20 per cent of the projected GDP for 2000, each day involving an additional $8.6 million in losses. Moreover, infrastructure damage, the cost of caring for over 11,000 injured Palestinians, fiscal losses and other effects of the closures, caused losses of additional hundreds of millions of United States dollars. 58/
The economic decline was exacerbated by the decision of the Government of Israeli to stop the transfer of tax and customs revenues it collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority under the Paris Protocol of 1994 (see A/49/180-S/1994/727). These revenues were equivalent to almost two thirds of the total revenue of the Palestinian Authority in 1999 and 2000. The loss of revenue was offset partially by increased assistance by the Arab countries and the European Union (see also chap. IV.B below). 59/
Focus: Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People emergency assistanceIn response to the deteriorating situation on the ground in late 2000, the Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People of UNDP shifted focus to emergency projects, while trying also to maintain its ongoing development activities. The Programme’s initial allocation of UNDP resources in the region of $1.2 million was increased in the following weeks by contributions from Japan, Sweden and Norway, so that a total of $6.6 million was mobilized and partially disbursed during the three months from October to December. Approximately $1.3 million was allocated for emergency support to the health sector, which was facing the enormous challenge of caring for the thousands of physically and psychologically wounded. The remaining $5.3 million was used for emergency job creation projects designed to ameliorate the disastrous economic consequences of job and income losses resulting from Israel’s various restrictions on the movement of Palestinian workers. 60/
From the very beginning of the second intifada, in September 2000, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People appealed for the protection of the Palestinian people suffering under Israeli occupation. In his letter of 2 October 2000 addressed to the Secretary-General (A/55/440-S/2000/936), the Chairman of the Committee, appealed to all parties concerned to compel Israel to abide by its commitments under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to ensure international protection of the Palestinian people. He continued:
“The Committee is of the view that the events of the past several days are a direct result of the policies and practices of the Israeli occupation. To this day, Israel has continued to violate its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 (the Fourth Geneva Convention), and the provisions of dozens of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Our Committee has warned on a number of occasions that Israel’s failure to live up to those principles, as well as the continued lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, would allow despair and frustration to set in, putting the peace process in considerable jeopardy and leading to increased volatility on the ground.”
Moreover, as reflected in its annual report issued in 2000 (A/55/35, para. 18), the Committee was greatly disturbed by the excessive force used by Israel against the Palestinian protesters, including rubber-coated metal bullets, live ammunition, tanks and armoured personnel carriers, combat helicopters, anti-tank rockets and grenades. The Committee was shocked by the tragic loss of life as a result of these confrontations, in particular by the deaths of Palestinian children. It reiterated that these events were a direct result of the Israeli occupation and the failure of Israel to respect its obligations under international law. The Committee firmly believed that Israel’s continued refusal to live up to those principles, as well as the continued lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, would allow despair and frustration to set in, put the peace process in considerable jeopardy and lead to increased volatility on the ground.
On its part, the Security Council was convened in October, November and December 2000 to take action on the critical situation. On 7 October, the Council, following three days of debate in which more than 40 speakers addressed it, adopted resolution 1322 (2000) by 14 votes in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (United States) in which the Council condemned violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians, resulting in injury and loss of human life. In the resolution, the Council deplored the provocation carried out at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, and subsequent violence there and throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and stressed the importance of establishing a mechanism for a speedy and objective inquiry into the tragic events.
Subsequently, in response to a question asked during a press conference on 7 November 2000, the Secretary-General stated that the consent and cooperation of both parties were required for the successful deployment of an international protection force. As the Government of Israel had made it clear that it would not cooperate, he did not see how such a force could be deployed (see SG/SM/7617). The same day, the Secretary-General warmly welcomed the appointment by President Clinton of a fact-finding committee, established in accordance with the understandings reached at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in September 1999. 61/ As agreed, the Secretary-General was closely involved in the consultations on the composition of the committee that was to be chaired by former United States Senator George J. Mitchell.
On 22 November 2000, during a meeting of the Security Council, Palestine called for specific measures to end Israeli violations against the Palestinian people, and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries called upon the Council to seriously consider the immediate deployment of a protection force to the region. The European Union supported the Secretary-General’s endeavours to explore with the parties the terms and conditions of the deployment of an observer mission, in accordance with the mandate given to him by the Security Council a few days earlier (see S/PV.4231).
On 18 December 2000, the Security Council met to consider a draft resolution (S/2000/1171) on establishing a United Nations force in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the draft resolution, the Council stressed the need for measures to ensure the protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation and expressed the Council’s determination to dispatch a United Nations force of military and police observers throughout the occupied territories to contribute to the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements, the cessation of violence and the safety and security of Palestinian civilians. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to consult both sides on the composition, modalities of deployment and functioning of such a force. However, the draft resolution did not receive the necessary majority of nine votes: 8 votes were cast in favour to none against, with 7 abstentions.
Meanwhile, the General Assembly had expressed deep concern about the provocative visit to Al-Haram Al-Sharif in East Jerusalem and the ensuing violence. The Assembly resumed its tenth emergency special session and was briefed by the Secretary-General on the latest developments and his personal peace efforts leading up to the Middle East Peace Summit held at Sharm el-Sheikh a few days earlier. On 20 October 2000, the Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/7 entitled “Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. The resolution stated, in part:
“The General Assembly
,
“1.
Condemns
the violence that took place on 28 September 2000 and the following days at Al-Haram Al-Sharif and other Holy Places in Jerusalem as well as other areas in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, resulting in the deaths of over 100 people, the vast majority of whom were Palestinian civilians, and many other casualties;
“7.
Strongly supports
the establishment of a mechanism of inquiry into the recent tragic events, with the aim of establishing all the precise facts and preventing the repetition of these events, and in this regard strongly supports also the understanding reached at Sharm el-Sheikh about a committee of fact-finding, and calls for its establishment without delay;”
62
/
In its resolution 55/55 on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine, the General Assembly expressed its deep concern over the serious deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 28 September 2000, and called upon all concerned parties to take steps to reverse immediately all measures taken on the ground since 28 September 2000, in implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh understandings and in order to ensure a successful and speedy conclusion of the peace process.
Furthermore, in its resolution 55/130 of 8 December 2000 on the work of the Special Committee on Israeli Practices, the Assembly expressed its grave concern about the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a result of Israeli practices and measures, and condemned especially the excessive use of force in the past few weeks which had resulted in more than 160 Palestinian deaths and thousands of injuries. Also, in its resolution 55/132 on Israeli settlements, the Assembly expressed grave concern about the dangerous situation resulting from actions taken by the armed Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory during recent weeks.
Despite some partially successful initial efforts by the parties and others to reverse the dire developments on the ground at the end of 2000, soon these developments were to grow into an ever more devastating cycle of violence, precipitating one of the worst humanitarian, socioeconomic and political crises since the occupation began in 1967 and the all but complete destruction of the hope for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
III. The peace process of the 1990s
The convening of the peace conference on the Middle East at Madrid in October 1991 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, followed by several bilateral implementation agreements, were considered major turning points in the diplomatic history of the Middle East conflict. All the parties to the conflict agreed to undertake peace negotiations on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), premised on the principle of “land for peace.” 63/ The participation of the Palestinians was regarded as a diplomatic breakthrough. Moreover, on the ground, assisted by the United Nations and the international community at large, the Palestinians took concrete practical steps towards State-building and peacebuilding and the exercise of their inalienable rights.
With a Palestinian popular uprising against the occupation and important regional and global developments under way, numerous efforts and proposals had been made since 1989 to reach a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These efforts had followed the meeting of the Palestine National Council 64/ held in 1988 in Algiers, that accepted Security Council resolution 242 (1967) 65/ offering the historic compromise of the two-State solution on the basis of the pre-1967 borders. Whereas the General Assembly had called since 1983 for the convening of a conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council was only able to reach agreement by the end of 1990 that an international conference should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, widely acknowledged as the core of the larger conflict.
At Madrid, for the first time all the parties to the conflict sat down at the negotiating table and embarked on a series of complex talks based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) that would become known in the 1990s as the “peace process”. In the case of Israel and Jordan, the negotiations led to the signing of a peace treaty in October 1994. Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon as well as those between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic formally began in Madrid in November 1991 and were suspended in February 1994 and January 2000 respectively. 66/ In May 2000, more than 22 years after Security Council resolution 425 (1978) was passed, Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon (see S/PRST/2000/21).
The co-sponsors of the Madrid peace conference, the Soviet Union and the United States, had a pivotal role in supporting the peace process, with much of its successes and failures being attributed to the effectiveness with which a co-sponsor could function as “honest broker”. 67/
In terms of the question of Palestine, important outcomes of the peace process of the 1990s were generally considered to include the mutual recognition by the two sides, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization; 68/ redeployment of Israeli troops from Palestinian population centres, gradually reversed towards the end of 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada; establishment of the quasi-governmental Palestinian Authority, providing the Palestinians with an interim form of self-government; and return of the Palestinian leadership to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
At the regional level, multilateral talks on the permanent status issues were convened under the Madrid Conference intermittently from 1992 to 2000 to sustain the foundations of peace to be forged in the bilateral talks. Also, on 2 February 1995, the first ever summit involving the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and PLO took place in Cairo. 69/
Under the bilateral agreements reached between Israel and PLO, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were gradually divided into areas controlled fully by the Palestinian Authority, except for external security matters over which Israel kept control, also referred to as area “A”; areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, except for internal security, where it shared control with Israel, and external security matters over which Israel kept control, also referred to as area “B”; and areas controlled fully by Israel, referred to as area “C”. Areas under Palestinian Authority control included almost all of the Gaza Strip, approximately 80 per cent; a portion of the Northern West Bank, as well as Jericho and Palestinian population centres, including most of Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Bethlehem, Tulkarm and other towns, excluding occupied and expanded East Jerusalem, none of which was ever placed under Palestinian control. 70/Taken together, the highly fragmented areas under some degree of control of the Palestinian Authority were estimated to cover eventually 40 per cent of the West Bank, 71/ or some 42 per cent of the Palestinian Territory occupied by Israel in June 1967.
Important groundbreaking developments took place in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in this period. Free, internationally observed elections to the Palestinian legislature and Presidency took place in 1996, in which the Arab residents of East Jerusalem also participated to a degree, subject to Israeli restrictions. Institution-building continued apace, with the inauguration in 1994 of the quasi-governmental Palestinian Authority and its various institutions, including the Palestinian police and other security apparatuses. The Palestinian Authority developed its own revenue base and also became a conduit for massive foreign assistance to the Palestinians. Important symbols of the emerging Palestinian statehood appeared – a Palestinian passport, a postage stamp, the inauguration of the Gaza International Airport in 1998, and a national air carrier, the beginning of work on the Gaza Seaport, and a Palestinian Internet domain name. Gaza and the West Bank were linked by a land-based “safe passage” route allowing the travel of Palestinians between the two areas. Even though these changes often came in an agonizingly slow and piecemeal fashion, and many were subsequently reversed with the outbreak of the second intifada, they were nevertheless important in their own right, and also constituted vital stepping stones towards Palestinian statehood. The period under consideration saw at the same time intensification and institutionalization of restrictive Israeli closures and curfews policies directed at the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which severely disrupted the daily lives of the Palestinians and had a major negative effect on the Palestinian economy, which was offset only partially by foreign assistance inflow (see chap. IV below).
In view of the complexity of the peace negotiations and the thematic focus of the present publication on the evolution of the Palestine problem, the present chapter sets out in broad outline the Palestinian participation in, and United Nations response to, the Middle East peace process.
A. Madrid Peace Conference
By 1991, international and regional developments such as the end of the Cold War and the start of the Gulf War had affected the Middle East situation, while on the ground the first intifada, which had started in 1987, continued in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. These developments increased international concern regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for a solution, and were seen as contributing to the convening of the peace conference on the Middle East held in Madrid from 30 October to 1 November 1991.
The Madrid Peace Conference was sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union and aimed at achieving – in the words of the letter of invitation to the conference – “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through direct negotiations on two tracks, between Israel and the Arab States, and between Israel and the Palestinians.” 72/ In addition, the letter of invitation stated:
“The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.”
“With respect to the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed the interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, will take place on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338.”
The provisions contained in the letter of invitation would later on often be referred to as the “terms of reference of the Madrid peace process” or simply the “Madrid principles”, including the principle of land for peace, reflected in resolution 242 (1967). The various bilateral negotiations became known as “the bilateral track”, whereas the negotiations on region-wide issues would be known as “the multilateral track”, each addressed below.
In addition, the United States issued separate “letters of assurances” to the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, which clarified its various positions regarding the modalities and final outcomes of the negotiations. The letters stated, among other things, that the United States would seek to avoid any prolongation and stalling by any party. The Palestinians should quickly gain control over political, economic and other decisions that affect them. The United States opposed the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, supported the right of Palestinians to raise any issue, including East Jerusalem, and reiterated its opposition to settlement activity in the territories occupied in 1967 which remained an obstacle to peace. Although the United States was not prepared to support an independent Palestinian State, a confederation was not excluded. The United States opposed the continuation of the Israeli rule or annexation of the Occupied Territories. 73/
Although the Madrid Conference was not held under the auspices of the United Nations, the negotiations were explicitly based on Security Council resolutions and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, Ambassador Brunner, attended as observer (see A/46/652-S/23225).
The United Nations gradually welcomed the peace process launched at Madrid. The Secretary-General stated that he had “always supported bilateral initiatives in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” and that, to this end, any step undertaken by Ambassador Brunner or himself would be aimed at assisting such efforts (ibid., para. 30). The following year, the Secretary-General observed that he had closely followed the Middle East peace conference, maintained contact with its co-sponsors and the parties concerned, and underlined that the United Nations was ready to assist the process in any way useful, in view of its wide experience in the region (see A/47/672-S/24819).
Since its adoption of resolution 46/75, the General Assembly welcomed the convening of the Madrid Conference, and later the peace process, in one form or another, then as “a significant step towards the establishment of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region”. As discussed above, the Assembly initially continued to call for the convening of an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations and reaffirmed the five principles for the achievement of a comprehensive peace. In the second half of the decade, the annual resolutions on the question of Palestine entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine”, proved to be the General Assembly’s principal, steadfast expression of support for the ongoing peace process. 74/
The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People welcomed the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference, while reiterating, as shown through mid-November 1993, its support for the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing. 75/ One of the problems that would beset the efficacy of the negotiations under the Madrid process from the start was a cumbersome arrangement restricting full Palestinian participation in the peace process, in particular PLO and Palestinians from East Jerusalem.
1. Bilateral trackThe opening of the Madrid Peace Conference took place during three days, with the parties being represented by delegations consisting of 14 members. The specifically formed joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives each. Moreover, the Palestinians had an advisory team that, even if it had no official standing, coordinated policy with PLO. 76/ The Conference involved official, direct and bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), providing the parties with a new negotiating structure and timeline.
Bilateral negotiations began on 3 November 1991. Israel met with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and, separately, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in a first round of bilateral talks. The talks adjourned without agreement about where or when to reconvene. After much work on procedural and other matters, Israel and each of its interlocutors, initially except for the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, met for a second round at Washington, D.C., on 11 December 1991. 77/ The Israelis were scheduled to meet with the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation on 10 December; however, owing to procedural issues, the official meeting did not start until a day later. That meeting was followed by similar encounters in January 1992 and February 1992 and subsequent rounds of bilateral talks. 78/
After the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations had resolved certain procedural differences that allowed the third round of bilateral talks to take place, from 7 to 16 January 1992 Israeli representatives met separately with the Jordanian-Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian delegations. In the fourth round of bilateral talks, held from 24 February to 4 March 1992, the Palestinians proposed to hold elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territory for an interim self-governing authority. However, Israel rejected this proposal in view of its counterproposal entailing interim self-government arrangements; irreconcilable positions on the nature and purpose of interim self-government have consequently emerged between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations. 79/ At the same time, meetings for the working groups created under the multilateral track were set up.
The fifth round of bilateral talks was held from 26 to 30 April 1992. The Israeli delegation proposed pilot municipal election in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which, according to the Israelis, were “meant to be a catalyst, not a substitute” for the interim self-government arrangement negotiations. Israel also proposed to delegate public health to the Palestinians as a first step (see http://www.mfa.gov.il).
The first five rounds of Israeli and Palestinian bilateral talks, held under the Government of Prime Minister Shamir, became caught up in procedural matters, “sloganeering” and mutual recrimination, instead of addressing substantive issues. 80/ An Israeli expert analyst concluded that the Prime Minister was “defiant” throughout his remaining tenure and determined to “perpetuate the territorial status quo”, effectively “stonewalling” the fledgling peace process. 81/ Nevertheless, after his electoral success on 23 June 1992, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin indirectly acknowledged that the previous Government had created the tools to achieve peace, as he had inherited from it the framework of the Madrid Conference. 82/
The sixth round, held from 24 August to 14 September 1992, with the Government of Prime Minister Rabin and certain confidence-building measures in place, 83/ reportedly began to see “real dialogue”; it was followed by a seventh round in October, and resumed in November. The conceptual gap between Israel and the Palestinians was no longer obscured: the Palestinians insisted on ending the occupation and a “meaningful transfer of authority” to lay the groundwork for their sovereign state. 84/
The eighth round began on 7 December 1992, with talks “virtually at a dead end”, and “ended abruptly” on 16 December, when Prime Minister Rabin announced the decision to deport 416 Hamas activists to Lebanon, following the killing of an Israeli border policeman. No date for a resumption of negotiations could be agreed upon 85/ (see also chap. II.C above).
The bilateral talks had begun seriously to flounder over a multitude of issues. Expert observers found that Israel continued to focus on interim issues, while the Palestinians were focused on longer-term issues of self-government and ending the occupation and achieving self-determination. Neither the Palestinians and the outgoing administration of President George H. W. Bush, nor the international community could persuade the occupying Power that interim self-government had to lead to full self-government and ultimately independence. 86/
In 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian talks could not be salvaged despite initial hope at the opening of the ninth round (27 April-13 May), after Israel revoked earlier objections to the participation of Faisal Husseini, the PLO Executive Committee Member in Charge of Jerusalem Affairs (and future Palestinian Authority Minister for Jerusalem Affairs), as leader of the Palestinian delegation; agreed in principle to a Palestinian police force; and affirmed that final status negotiations would in fact be based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). 87/ Israel also permitted a number of Palestinians expelled between 1967 and 1987 to return to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The “non-papers” provided by the incoming administration of President Clinton to bridge the gap between the positions of the two parties raised additional issues, such as the occupation status of East Jerusalem, and were not considered helpful 88/ The tenth round (15 June-1 July) revisited the idea of direct talks with PLO, without effecting even a procedural breakthrough. It ended in failure, signalling to many the end of the usefulness of the Madrid formula. 89/ The eleventh round of bilateral negotiations opened on 31 August 1993, after the Oslo talks had been made public, and ushered in an entirely new phase of the Middle East peace process.
As the peace negotiations under the Madrid formula began to stall, developments on the ground continued to deteriorate, increasing tensions that, in the diplomatic arena, would distract attention from actively seeking a negotiated settlement and leave its onerous mark on the peace process negotiations. In April 1992, a renewed cycle of violence broke out in the Gaza Strip, in which several Palestinians were killed and many more injured. In this connection, the members of the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices, in accordance with resolution 681 (1990), regarding the protection of Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation (see S/23783, and A/47/672-S/24819, para.12). In light of the worsening situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, attention was once more focused on the Secretary-General’s recommendations on ways to ensure the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, as contained in his reports of 1988, 1990 and 1991, than securing an end to occupation and the conflict. From December 1992 to February 1993, the crisis surrounding the deportation by Israel of Palestinian civilians to Lebanon created additional difficulties for the peace process (see chap. II.C above).
Meanwhile, on 11 December 1992, owing to the deteriorating situation on the ground, Indonesia and other Member States introduced a draft resolution on the situation in the Middle East, embodying the text of the resolution traditionally adopted on the issue. 90/ In view of the ongoing Madrid Peace Conference, the sponsors withdrew the draft. 91/ In the adopted resolution 47/63 A, which was a modified version of the draft, the Assembly expressed satisfaction with the convening of the Madrid Conference, but regretted that the desired substantial results had not been achieved. This gesture was welcomed by several Member States as a positive contribution to the peace process launched at Madrid. 92/
2. Multilateral track
The multilateral negotiations commenced on 28 and 29 January 1992 at Moscow, and constituted an integral part of the peace process. In practice, these negotiations centred around working groups addressing the aforementioned “region-wide” issues spelled out in the letter of invitation to Madrid, namely arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development. Their goal was twofold: to find solutions for key cross-cutting regional problems, while providing the international community with a confidence building measure to promote the development of normalized relations among all the countries of the Middle East and lay a material foundation for peace to flourish. Invitations to the Moscow meeting were issued to Algeria, Bahrain, Canada, China, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the Palestinians (under the aegis of a joint Palestinian/Jordanian delegation) and the European Union. These proceedings were boycotted by the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon, who argued that the Arab world should not engage in discussions with Israel about regional cooperation before a political settlement at the bilateral level had been reached. 93/ Some 50 countries from around the world, including West Asia and North Africa, participated in the various working groups set up under the multilateral track. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic decided not to participate in the multilateral talks pending progress on the bilateral track. The Palestinian side was excluded from the working group on arms control. Progress was slow, hindered by various boycotts of the talks by delegations and procedural issues, and ultimately subject to the ups and downs of the bilateral talks and other political developments.
The multilateral working groups dealing with the five areas of common regional concern were set up on 4 March 1992 on arms control and regional security (Russian Federation and United States), water resources 94/ (United States), the environment (Japan), regional economic development (European Union), and refugees 95/ (Canada), each featuring the so-called gavel holder indicated in brackets. In October, the United Nations was invited by the co-sponsors to take part in the multilateral negotiations as a “full extraregional participant”. On 20 November, the Secretary-General appointed Chinmaya Gharekhan of India as his Special Representative to the multilateral talks. The Special Representative’s task was to coordinate the role of the United Nations in the working groups. 96/
Focus: the status of Palestinian water resources at the outset of the multilateral peace efforts“The international community continued to express its long-standing concern regarding the permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories which, in the past, had been reflected for instance in General Assembly resolutions 3005 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and 32/161 of 19 December 1977. The United Nations Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in 1977, in its resolution X entitled “Water policies in the occupied territories” referring explicitly to Palestine, affirmed the inalienable right of the people of the countries under colonial and alien domination in their struggle to regain effective control over their natural resources, including water resources. In resolution 37/135 of 17 December 1982, the General Assembly emphasized specifically the right of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples whose territories are under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities. In its resolution 38/144 of 19 December 1983, the General Assembly condemned Israel for its exploitation of the natural resources of the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to restitution and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion, loss of or damage to its resources. Throughout the 1980s and beyond, the General Assembly has “strongly condemned the illegal exploitation of the natural wealth and resources” of the occupied territories and called upon Israel to desist immediately from such activities.”
Source: United Nations, “Water resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, 1992.
Moreover, a Multilateral Steering Group of the Middle East Peace Process was established, spawning, together with the aforementioned working groups, various expert groups, follow-up projects and outreach efforts. At its 7th meeting, held in Montreux in May 1995, the Group designated Switzerland as “shepherd” in the fields of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights as well as in that of intercultural understanding, responsible for human-dimension issues within the five multilateral working groups. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General, in his November 1992 report on the situation in the Middle East (S/24819), noted the following on the multilateral track:
“The multilateral talks are themselves a recognition of the need not only to reach a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict but to secure the foundations upon which peace can be sustained. Economic and social development is a fundamental aspect of international peace and security, and this is no less true in the Middle East than in other regions of the world. The United Nations will spare no effort in helping to achieve these objectives.”
Within the framework of the multilateral talks, regional and extraregional experts engaged in developing joint projects and studies. For example, Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian water experts succeeded in producing a detailed plan for the upgrading and standardization of water data collection in the region. Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian teams produced a joint plan for dealing with oil spills in the Gulf of Aqaba. Other issues tackled by experts included the problem of desertification and control of natural resource degradation, Middle East transport and regional trade. The Working Group on the Environment drew up the Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East. The multilateral talks also laid the foundations for a new set of regional institutions, such as the desalinization research centre in Oman, and environmental training centres in Jordan and Bahrain. 93/
Following setbacks in the peace process, and more specifically the breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations during the tenure of Prime Minister Netanyahu, the multilateral track negotiations were formally suspended in November 1996. 93/ From 31 January to 1 February 2000, the multilateral talks resumed at Moscow, in the form of a plenary meeting of the multilateral Steering Group. The meeting was co-chaired by the ministers for foreign affairs of the Russian Federation and the United States, and was also attended by the ministers for foreign affairs of Canada, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, senior Palestinian delegates and the European Union. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic did not attend. For the first time, the co-sponsors invited the United Nations Special Coordinator to participate in the Steering Group (earlier, the United Nations participated only at the working group level). The working groups that were to meet later in 2000 in four countries were subsequently called off: the water group was to convene in Muscat, on 11 and 12 April; the economic group in Amman, from 8 to 11 May; the refugee group in Ottawa, from 16 to 18 May; and the environment group in Tunis, on 31 May and 1 June. There had been no agreement on a meeting of the Working Group on arms control and regional security.
Following the postponement of Israeli and Syrian talks held at Shepherdstown, West Virginia, and unsuccessful efforts at the highest level to revive them, 97/ and in view of the utter lack of progress in the Israel and Palestinian talks, the Arab States, in October 2000, decided to suspend their participation in the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process pending progress on all tracks (see A/55/513-S/2000/1010).
Although technically not part of the multilateral track, the first Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit, held at Casablanca, Morocco, in November 1994, constituted a concerted international effort in the region to strengthen an environment that was supportive of the peace process. It adopted the Casablanca Declaration, which stressed that cooperation between Governments and business communities should be strengthened, the achievements made in the peace negotiations needed to be reinforced by solid economic growth and palpable improvement of the life and security of the peoples in the region, the peace process must be accelerated and there must be an ongoing process to translate the deliberations of the Summit into concrete steps to advance the twin goals of peace and economic development. The main results of this Summit were that the participants noted favourably the decision of the Council for Cooperation of the Gulf States regarding the lifting of the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott against Israel, and approved the establishment of four regional organizations: Middle East and North Africa Development Bank, a regional tourist board, a regional chamber of commerce and a business council (see A/49/645, annex).
The second Summit was held from 29 to 31 October 1995 in Amman. During the Summit, additional agreements were signed on the Middle East and North Africa Development Bank, the tourist and industrial boards and on activating the executive secretariat of the Summit.
The Middle East and North Africa process was not, however, immune to the ups and downs of the Middle East peace process. At a time when the original optimism was giving way to apprehension, the Third Middle East and North Africa Conference was held, with a reduced level of representation, from 12 to 14 November 1996 in Cairo. The Conference underscored the importance of the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa and encouraged States to sign the relevant agreement and complete their funding and ratification procedures promptly in order to enable the Bank to begin operations. Work on establishing a regional business council was also reviewed, and the relevant parties recommitted themselves to moving this important initiative forward. The Fourth Middle East and North Africa Conference was convened from 16 to 18 November 1997 in Doha, at a time when the Middle East peace process was suffering serious setbacks. As a result, such key regional countries as Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia stayed away (the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon had boycotted the process from the start).
B. Declaration of Principles (Oslo agreement)
By mid-1993, the bilateral talks under the Madrid Conference had stalled as a result of a variety of procedural and political problems and security issues on the ground. There seemed to be no hope for progress in solving any of the significant questions between Israel and, respectively, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestinian side. Unknown to all but a handful of individuals, parallel and unprecedented private talks between the Israelis and PLO were taking place in Norway and elsewhere, 98/ which culminated in September 1993 in the signing in Washington D.C., of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, also known as the Oslo agreement or the Oslo accords. 99/
For years to come, this initial diplomatic success underlay the search for a peaceful resolution of the question of Palestine between the two parties directly involved in the conflict. Tangible, negotiated building blocks comprising interim arrangements, for a period not to exceed two years, were expected to lead to a final settlement of all outstanding issues, which were to be resolved by a process of bilateral negotiations and based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). A substantial majority of the Palestinians under occupation approved of the Oslo accords. 100/
The “Oslo channel” was facilitated in 1992 by the social scientist, Terje Rød-Larsen of Norway, twice the future United Nations envoy to the region, primarily with a senior official of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala), a future Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Palestinian Authority Prime Minister (2003-2006), and an Israeli academic standing in for Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, Yair Hirschfeld. 101/ The private Oslo talks began in earnest on 20 January 1993, progressed under the guidance of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, the late Johan Jørgen Holst, and were brought to a successful conclusion in late August 1993. 102/ With an indirect contact between Israel and PLO established at the highest level, the two parties agreed on the “Gaza and Jericho first” approach to troop redeployment from the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to initiate between them official negotiations. 103/
On 10 September 1993, the parties exchanged letters of mutual recognition (see http://unispal.un.org). The PLO, in a letter signed by Executive Committee Chairman Arafat on 9 September, confirmed its commitment to recognize the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, accept Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), renounce the use of terrorism and other acts of violence, and change the parts of the Palestine National Charter inconsistent with these commitments. Israel, in a letter prepared the day before and signed by Prime Minister Rabin on 10 September, decided to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence with it Middle East peace negotiations. 104/
Three days later, on 13 September 1993, at the White House in Washington, D.C., Israel and PLO signed the Declaration of Principles. 105/ The Declaration consisted of 17 articles, 4 annexes and agreed minutes (see A/48/486-S/26560).
Article I of the Declaration of Principles stated the aim of the bilateral negotiations to be embarked upon as follows:
“The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).”
The Declaration was to enter into force one month after its signing, on 13 October 1993. In addition to the aforementioned aim of the future bilateral negotiations, the Declaration addressed in several articles such issues as the framework for the interim period (art. II); elections (art. III); jurisdiction (art. IV); the transitional period and permanent status negotiations (art. V); 106/ the preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities (art. VI); an interim agreement (art. VII); public order and security (art. VIII); laws and military orders (art. IX); a joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee (art. X); Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields (art. XI); liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt (art. XII); the redeployment of Israeli forces (art. XIII); Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area (art. XIV); the resolution of disputes (art. XV); Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional programmes (art. XVI); and miscellaneous provisions (art. XVII).
Attached to the Declaration were protocols on the mode and conditions of elections, on withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic and development programmes (art. III), and on Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional development programmes (art. IV). There were also various letters, for instance on Jerusalem and security matters (see the letters of Holst and Arafat below).
Focus: Jerusalem as a permanent status issue under the peace efforts of the 1990sWhile supporting the agreements concluded by the parties since September 1993, which provide for negotiations over Jerusalem as part of the negotiations for a final settlement, the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations have repeatedly reaffirmed the particular status of Jerusalem, as well as their position that Israel’s occupation is illegal and its actions invalid under international law, and that withdrawal from all occupied territories is indispensable for the achievement of a just peace. They have also expressed increasing concern at measures taken by the Israeli authorities to strengthen control over Jerusalem prior to the beginning of the final status talks, particularly with regard to settlements, the isolation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank, measures against Palestinian residency status and Palestinian institutions, as well as the archaeological excavations. They have reaffirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and have called upon the Government of Israel to refrain from establishing a fait accompli on the ground, which might predetermine the outcome of the final status talks.
Source: United Nations, The Status of Jerusalem, 1997.
Direct, free and general political elections for the Palestinian Council were to be held not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, under agreed supervision and international observation, with the Palestinian police ensuring public order. The Council’s jurisdiction would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the exception of issues to be negotiated in the aforementioned permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity was to be preserved during the interim period. The five-year transitional or interim period would begin upon Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and Jericho areas. Permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian representatives were to commence as soon as possible, but not later than the third year of the interim period. 107/ This period would later be extended and, after several postponements, 108/ the deadline for permanent status negotiations set in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was 13 September 2000. 109/
The issues to be covered in these negotiations were enumerated in the Declaration of Principles (art. V, para. 3), and included: Jerusalem; refugees; settlements; security arrangements; borders; relations and cooperation with other neighbours; and other issues of common concern. The same list of issues would be reaffirmed in the Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed in 1995 (art. XXXI, final clauses). The Protocol concerning Civil Affairs in the Interim Agreement (para. 1 (Principles), art. 40 (Water and Sewage) of annex III), added the question of water resources to the list of issues to be discussed in the permanent status negotiations. 110/ (see sect. III.D and chap. IV below).
Moreover, the Declaration provided that upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles and after Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza and Jericho areas, the Israeli military Government and its Civil Administration would transfer authority to the Palestinians authorized for that task until the inauguration of the Palestinian Council (see art. VI, para. 1). With a view to promoting economic development, authority in the spheres of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism would also be transferred to the Palestinians, who also would begin to build a Palestinian police force (see art. VI, para. 2). Not later than the eve of elections for the Council, Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be redeployed outside populated areas, in addition to the military withdrawal (see art. XIII).
Under the aforementioned interim agreement, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, the transfer of powers to it from Israel, its executive and legislative authority and independent Palestinian judicial organs were to be specified.
In order to promote economic growth, the Council would establish a Palestinian electricity authority, a Gaza sea port authority, a Palestinian development bank, a Palestinian export promotion board, a Palestinian environmental authority, a Palestinian land authority, a Palestinian water administration authority, and any other authorities agreed upon. After the inauguration of the Council, the Israeli Civil Administration would be dissolved and its military Government withdrawn. The Council was to be charged with establishing a “strong” police force to guarantee public order and internal security for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while Israel was to continue to bear the responsibility of defending against external threats as well as for the overall security of Israelis (see art. VIII).
To ensure the smooth implementation of the Declaration and subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee was to be established to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes. Any disputes not settled through conciliation would be addressed by an arbitration committee to be established by the parties. The parties agreed to invite Egypt and Jordan to participate in establishing a continuing committee, which would decide on the modalities of admitting persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. In addition, an Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation committee was envisaged to develop and implement economic and regional development programmes as provided for in annexes III and IV to the Declaration.
The Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections, contained in annex I of the Declaration of Principles, provided Palestinians living in Jerusalem with the right to participate in the election process, without prejudice to the future status of those registered as displaced on 4 June 1967, as a result of their being unable to participate in elections owing to practical considerations. In accordance with the Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, contained in annex II of the Declaration of Principles, the two sides would conclude and sign an agreement on such withdrawal within two months of the entry into force of the Declaration.
In addition, letters exchanged before and after the signing of the Declaration of Principles spelled out important supplementary commitments by the parties. The letter from Foreign Minister Peres of Israel to Foreign Minister Holst of Norway read:
“I wish to confirm that the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem and the interests and well-being of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are of great importance and will be preserved. Therefore, all the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem, including the economic, social, educational, cultural, and the holy Christian and Moslem places, are performing an essential task for the Palestinian population. Needless to say, we will not hamper their activity; on the contrary, the fulfilment of this important mission is to be encouraged.”
The letter dated 9 September 1993 to Foreign Minister Holst from PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat read:
“I would like to confirm to you that, upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation” (see
http://www.palestine-un.org).
The Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programmes, contained in annex III of the Declaration of Principles, set out terms of reference for establishing an Israeli-Palestinian continuing committee for economic cooperation, focusing on water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications, trade, industry, labour relations and social welfare issues, human resource development and cooperation, environmental protection, and communications and media.
Addressing the question of Palestine before the General Assembly in November 1993, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People stated that the Declaration of Principles had opened a new chapter in the long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, symbolized by the handshake between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat on 13 September. The Committee supported those developments and strongly urged the parties to continue their efforts to achieve a definitive peace, especially since many sensitive aspects relating to implementing the Declaration−such as the withdrawal of Israel, permanent status arrangements regarding Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and other issues−remained to be negotiated. He stressed once again the need for full United Nations engagement in the peace process and in building the national Palestinian institutions as well as in providing g broad assistance, and he welcomed the Secretary-General’s efforts to develop a concerted United Nations response to support implementation of the Declaration (see A/48/35).
At the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the traditional resolution on an international peace conference for resolving the question of Palestine under United Nations auspices was now replaced by one entitled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” which expressed support for the Declaration of Principles and stated a number of principles to guide a final settlement (see resolution 48/158 D). The resolution reaffirmed the permanent responsibility of the United Nations for the question of Palestine and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts with the parties, in consultation with the Security Council, for the promotion of peace in the region. It was adopted with 92 votes in favour, 5 against and 51 abstentions.
In subsequent annual resolutions, including resolution 55/55, the General Assembly spelled out, among other things, these principles as follows:
“5.
Stresses
the need for:
“(
a
) The realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination;
“(
b
) The withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967;
“6.
Also stresses
the need for resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.”
Moreover, a second series of resolutions addressing the ongoing peace efforts began in 1993, entitled “Middle East peace process”. 111/ The first was resolution 48/58, which expressed its full support for the achievements of the peace process thus far, in particular the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by the State of Israel and PLO. It was sponsored by 110 Member States and adopted by an unprecedented majority of 155 votes in favour. Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic voted against the resolution owing to its lack of reference to Security Council resolution 425 (1978).
At the same time, the resolution on the first intifada, which the Assembly had adopted every year since 1988, was deferred. 112/
All of this was preceded by a meeting, on 1 October 1993, of representatives of 46 countries and organizations, including the United Nations, in Washington, D.C., at a conference to support Middle East peace. The participants pledged $2 billion over five years to finance social and economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In his report of November 1993 (A/48/607-S/26769), the Secretary-General welcomed the Declaration of Principles in the hope that it would lead to a comprehensive peace, and recognized that the socioeconomic advancement of the Palestinian people would be a necessary condition for the continued success of the peace process. The Secretary-General announced the establishment of a high-level task force to identify ways in which the United Nations could expand its programmes of assistance to the social and economic development of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The Task Force, which completed its work on 23 September 1993, highlighted the need to implement projects that would quickly make a visible improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians and stressed the importance of continuing support for programmes which contributed to Palestinian socioeconomic well-being (see A/53/153-E/1998/75).
Out of these initial efforts grew an array of international mechanisms to facilitate such assistance and underwrite the fledgling peace process with the full support of the international community. The General Assembly, in its resolution 55/173, welcomed the work of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and the World Bank serving as its secretariat; the Consultative Group; the Joint Liaison Committee, which provided a forum in which economic policy and practical matters related to donor assistance were discussed with the Palestinian Authority; and the Ministerial Conference to Support Middle East Peace and Development, held in Washington, D.C., on 30 November 1998.
The proliferation of various international support mechanisms notwithstanding, the bilateral negotiations to be undertaken in accordance with the Declaration of Principles were fraught with difficulty, including developments on the ground. According to the United States Department of State, the level of violence in Israel and the occupied territory initially declined following the signing of the Declaration of Principles; however, opposition groups determined to defeat the agreement contributed to an increase in the number of violent incidents and terrorist attacks over the last three months of the year. 113/
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat had their first working meeting in Cairo even before the Declaration entered into force. Two committees were set up in early October, a ministerial-level committee to meet frequently in Cairo, headed by Foreign Minister Peres and PLO Executive Committee member Abbas, the future Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and President of the Palestinian Authority, and a working-level committee based in Taba, headed by Nabil Sha’ath of the PLO, the future Palestinian Authority Deputy Prime Minister, and Major-General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, IDF second in command and in charge of military intelligence. The two sides agreed on an agenda and formed two groups of experts dealing with military questions and the transfer of authority, respectively. As witnessed before, the “labyrinthine negotiations” at Taba had to bridge a basic conceptual divide, with one side intent to “repackage rather than end Israel’s military occupation”. 114/
By mid-December 1993, differences had emerged over such issues as the size of the Jericho area to be placed under Palestinian control; jurisdiction over operating border posts along the Egyptian and Jordanian international boundaries; and security related to the Israeli settlers, which led to the postponement of the date of Israel’s expected withdrawal of troops from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. 114/ Instead of two months, it took almost seven months and much “wrangling” 115/ to reach agreement on the first withdrawal of Israeli military forces, “civil administration” and secret services, setting the tone for a pattern of setbacks, delays and only very partial successes that would ultimately lower expectations to a minimum and erode trust between the parties.
C. Gaza-Jericho Agreement and related bilateral agreements
Following months of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in implementation of the Declaration of Principles, on 4 May 1994, the two sides took a major step forward, when Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat concluded in Cairo the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area that led to Israel’s initial troop withdrawals and transfers of authority to the Palestinians. The Agreement ushered in the five-year transitional or interim period meant to bring about agreement on a permanent settlement.
The run-up to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement was punctuated by a major act of settler violence, the aforementioned Hebron massacre in February that would lead to the first international presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in accordance with Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March, as well as attacks in Israel by Palestinians, including a suicide operation, in the first half of April that would lead the occupying Power to adopt a policy involving tight closures of the Occupied Palestinian Territory that was considered by the Palestinians and the international community as collective punishment. 116/ At the same time, the Prime Minister of Israel refused to remove the Israeli settlers from Hebron 117/, and the tensions there between the Palestinian people and the extremist settler population increased, remaining a constant source of friction and instability (see also chap. II above).
Meanwhile, agreements directly related to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and other bilateral and multilateral agreements were reached, including the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, signed on 29 April 1994 at Paris and later incorporated into the Interim Agreement, addressed below. These helped to move the peace process forward, despite serious crises such as the Hebron massacre and other setbacks that led to the suspension of talks by PLO.
Later in the year, following Chairman Arafat’s much-celebrated return to the Gaza Strip, the parties signed the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in August 1994 to extend to the West Bank the Palestinian Authority’s control over Palestinian civilian matters. The Agreement provided for the assumption by the Palestinian Authority of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military Government and its Civil Administration in the areas of education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and value added tax, which was completed by December 1994.
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, signed in Cairo some five months later than planned, 115/ provided for Israel’s withdrawal of troops from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and the Palestinians’ first ever assumption of self-government. The Palestinians were to gain control over their internal political arrangements and many of their daily affairs in the public domain, including elections, tax collection and the passing and enforcement of legislation. A 24-member Palestinian Authority was established, with legislative and executive powers. The Palestinians were also to establish their own police force of up to 9,000 officers (see A/49/180-S/1994/727).
Israel’s redeployment began on 17 May 1994. By 18 May, Israel had completed its partial withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, home to almost 1 million Palestinians. An estimated 4,000 Israeli soldiers remained in the areas of Israeli settlements, military installations and security zones (the “Security Arrangements” areas, including the “yellow” area), together comprising about 35 per cent of the land. 118/
The same year, Israel and PLO initiated negotiations on the issue of Palestinian elections and on extending the self-government arrangements to the entire West Bank. At the same time, acts of violence against civilians in Israel continued. Also, on 26 October 1994, Israel and Jordan concluded the Treaty of Peace between the two countries (see A/49/35, para. 21; A/49/552-S/1994/1186; and A/50/73-S/1995/83).
In its report to the General Assembly (A/49/35), the Committee noted with satisfaction that the nature of the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip had dramatically changed as the agreed-upon withdrawal of Israel troops and transfer of authority to the Palestinians had begun. Moreover, the Committee welcomed the return of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO to the Gaza Strip to assume the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, and noted with satisfaction that a number of other well-known Palestinian leaders and longstanding deportees had returned. While the Committee welcomed these positive developments, it also expressed its serious concern at the delay in implementing the agreements reached, the lack of full compliance with the provisions of these agreements and the continued settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around Jerusalem.
In his report of 3 November 1994 report to the General Assembly and the Security Council, 119/ the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations had over the past year significantly enlarged its programmes of economic, social and other assistance to the Occupied Territory in support of the Declaration of Principles and in order to promote peace in the region as a whole. To ensure effective coordination of this assistance, and to serve as the focal point for the international donor community, he had appointed, in June 1994, Terje Rød-Larsen of Norway as the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories 120/ (see chap. IV below).
On its part, in relevant resolutions such as 49/88, entitled “Middle East peace process,” the General Assembly expressed its full support for the peace process and welcomed the appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories. At the same session, the Assembly adopted resolution 49/62 D, which, inter alia, called for the timely and scrupulous implementation of the agreements reached, and emphasized the importance of a more active and expanded United Nations role in both the peace process and in its implementation.
Two divergent views emerged concerning the appropriateness of the United Nations involvement in issues directly related to the peace process. In one view − held by a small minority, including Israel − many General Assembly resolutions ignored the new political realities of the ongoing negotiations; attempted to prejudge and even predetermine the outcome of the permanent status negotiations, contrary to the Declaration of Principles; and were fraught with contradictions. In this minority view, the United Nations should not address issues related to permanent status negotiations. In the words of the United States, co-sponsor of the peace process, it was considered inappropriate and unhelpful for the Assembly to take a position on issues under bilateral negotiations (see A/48/607-S/26769 and A/49/PV.88).
The other view, shared by a majority of Member States, emphasized the abiding United Nations responsibility for the question of Palestine, as determined by the General Assembly in its annual resolutions since 1992 and based on the unfulfilled international covenant to the Palestinian People since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 181(II) in 1947. Even as bilateral negotiations were going on, and even if it had been agreed to put off talks on permanent status issues until a later date, international law and human rights standards were still to be applied fully on the ground, until a final resolution of the question of Palestine was effectively reached in all its aspects. 121/
Throughout much of 1995, negotiations under the peace process were hampered by repeated delays in implementing previous agreements and serious acts of violence involving both Israeli and Palestinian perpetrators. For instance, on 24 January 1995, the President of the Security Council strongly condemned the terrorist attack in Nordiya, Israel, saying that its purpose was to undermine Middle East peace efforts. On behalf of the members of the Security Council, he called upon all parties to continue their efforts to consolidate the peace process, stating “The members of the Security Council believe that common ground can only be found through the practice of dialogue, respect and tolerance” (S/PRST/1995/3). A few days later, on 2 February, King Hussein, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat met in a first-ever regional summit to discuss the peace process and to restart the then stalled negotiations. Meeting at a one-day emergency summit in Cairo, they affirmed their respective commitment to the Middle East peace process, threatened by extremists on both sides. They issued a joint statement reaffirming their support for the peace process and condemning bloodshed and terror in the region. Israel and the PLO agreed to resume talks. 122/
D. Interim Agreement (Oslo II)
On 28 September 1995 the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed in Washington, D.C., by Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Peres for the Government of the State of Israel and Chairman Arafat for the Palestine Liberation Organization, witnessed by President Clinton and other high-level representatives, including from Egypt, Jordan, Norway, the Russian Federation and the European Union . 123/
The Interim Agreement, also known as Oslo II, was signed in Cairo on 27 August 1995. 124/ It superseded three earlier agreements implementing certain aspects of the Declaration of Principles, the last of which was the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities. It led to the extension of the civilian control of the Palestinian interim self-government to nearly 30 per cent of the West Bank, including internal security control over some four per cent of the area. 125/
Under the Interim Agreement, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, reaffirmed that the interim self-government arrangements provided therein were an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on permanent status, to start as soon as possible but not later than 4 May 1996, would lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Furthermore, the parties recognized that the elections to be held would constitute a step toward “the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements”.
An important feature of the Agreement was the phased redeployment of the Israeli military forces from populated areas in the West Bank – Palestinian cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets – based on the division of the West Bank into three areas with varying degrees of Israeli and Palestinian responsibility. Area A consisted of seven major Palestinian towns, in which the Palestinian Authority, in the Agreement known as the “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority,” assumed the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order. Area B comprised most of the remaining Palestinian population centres, including the built-up area of certain hamlets, in which the Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for public order for Palestinians and Israel had the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. Israel would retain sole security authority in Area C, which included all settlements with their related road systems, military bases and related areas, and state lands.
Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C were to be carried out in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, with the exception of the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel’s overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.
Moreover, the Interim Agreement provided for the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military Government and its so-called civil administration to the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority. The Interim Self-Governing Authority was to replace the Palestinian Authority, including the Palestinian police, established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994) and was later known by the same name. The new Interim Self-Governing Authority would be composed of an 82-member Council and the Head (“Ra’ees” in Arabic) of its Executive Authority, each to be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding 4 May 1999 (five years from the date of signing the Gaza-Jericho Agreement). Under the Interim Agreement, election arrangements were made concerning the Palestinians of East Jerusalem.
Other provisions regarding legal matters, religious sites, human rights, water, a phased release of Palestinian detainees and prisoners, and cooperation in the areas of environment, economics, technology and science, were also covered by the Agreement, as were steps to foster dialogue and mutual understanding. 126/
In accordance with the Interim Agreement, on 28 December 1995, the IDF withdrew from most of the populated Palestinian areas of the West Bank – the six cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem, as well as several hundred Palestinian villages – initially except Hebron. A further withdrawal was foreseen for 7 September 1996, which did not take place.
Israeli pullbacks left the Palestinian Authority in full control (security and administrative) of about 3 per cent of the West Bank (Area A; on Hebron, see below) – and administrative control of another 24 per cent, where Israel maintained “overriding” security responsibility (Area B). The remainder of the West Bank (Area C) was under complete Israeli control. The Palestinian Authority exercised full control of approximately 80 per cent of the Gaza Strip (the remaining 20 per cent consisted of Israeli settlements and related roads)
Furthermore, Israel’s troop withdrawals from all the major West Bank cities but Hebron paved the way for the holding of the first Palestinian general elections on 20 January 1996 and for the inauguration on 7 March of the Palestinian Legislative Council. On 9 May, Palestinian Authority President Arafat announced the appointment of a 21-member Executive Authority of the Council. 127/ On its part, as did the Secretary-General, the Security Council issued a statement on 22 January 1996 (S/PRST/1996/3), warmly welcoming the elections and describing them as “a major step forward in the Middle East peace process.” The members of the Council also noted “the conclusion of the international observers that the elections were an accurate reflection of the wishes of the Palestinian electorate” (see also chap. I.B above).
The negotiations and implementation architecture evolved significantly after the conclusion of the Interim Agreement. Several standing committees such as the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee, the Civil Affairs Committee, the Legal Committee, the Standing Cooperation Committee, the Continuing Committee on Displaced Persons (see art. XXVII) and the People-to-People Committee were established to facilitate various aspects of the implementation of the Interim Agreement. It will be recalled that under the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (1994), the Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee had been established to deal with matters of security coordination. As under that Agreement (see art. XXVI), the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee established pursuant to art. X of the Declaration of Principles was to ensure the smooth implementation of the Interim Agreement 124/ (see also chap. IV below).
In its report to the General Assembly in 1995 (A/50/35), the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People observed that the Interim Agreement provided the Palestinian people with an opportunity to build on the achievements of the past year and to proceed further in the construction of a State. The Committee was pleased to note that, with the assistance and support of the international community and through the committed efforts of the Palestinian population, the Palestinian Authority had gradually established its administration, taken a number of measures to ensure public order, and had begun to normalize Palestinian political, social, economic and cultural life, as well as to improve living conditions. The Committee noted that a number of countries had established relations with the Palestinian Authority and recognized Palestinian passports; it urged other States to do so as soon as possible.
At the same time, the Committee continued to address Israel’s flagrant violations of the spirit and the letter of the Declaration of Principles, such as the illegal confiscation of land for settlements, in particular in and around occupied East Jerusalem (see chap. II above). In his report of 7 November 1995 to the General Assembly (A/50/725-S/1995/930), the Secretary-General acknowledged the important progress in the Middle East peace process that had occurred during the past year, and noted that both sides had recently indicated their firm commitment to implementing the existing agreements fully and according to the agreed timetable, and to enter into the final status negotiations in accordance with the Declaration of Principles.
On 4 December 1995, the General Assembly adopted resolution 50/21 on the Middle East peace process, in which it expressed full support for the achievements of the peace process thus far. In the resolution, introduced on behalf of sponsors by Norway, the Assembly also expressed hope that final-status negotiations would begin as scheduled in the spring of 1996. The Assembly noted that the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by an Israeli extremist on 4 November 1995 was a reminder that the peace process demanded not only commitment and a clear vision of the future, but also considerable courage. / United Nations Yearbook, 1995, vol. 49./ In its resolution 50/84 D on the question of Palestine, the General Assembly reiterated its call for the timely and scrupulous implementation of the existing agreements between the parties with the goal of negotiating a final settlement.
The Government of Prime Minister Peres, presented to the Knesset on 22 November, was determined to push forward with the peace efforts and would not allow terrorists to stop the process. 128/ A series of suicide attacks against Israelis in February and early March 1996, following the Israeli assassination of suspected Islamic Jihad and Hamas militants led to a deadlock in the negotiations. Israel imposed strict closure regimes on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and continued the practice of extrajudicial killings, discussed above, as the Palestinian Authority stepped up efforts to curb violence. In response to the attacks carried out by Hamas on 3 and 4 March that left almost 60 civilians dead, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/1996/10), in which the members condemned the terrorist attacks and reiterated their support for the peace process:
“These vile acts had the clear purpose of trying to undermine Middle East peace efforts through such terror. The members of the Security Council reiterate their support for the peace process and call on the parties to consolidate it and to increase their cooperation in curbing violence and combating such terrorism.”
In his statement dated 5 March 1996, the Secretary-General called upon the international community to unite in action against what he termed despicable acts of violence. A few days later, on 13 March, he participated in the “Summit of Peacemakers” in Sharm el-Sheikh, convoked jointly by Egypt and the United States to address extremism and violence that threatened to derail the Middle East peace process. The participants expressed their full support for the Middle East peace process and their determination that it should continue in order to accomplish a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region (see A/51/91-S/1996/2381). 129/
Following the Summit, on 24 April 1996, at its meeting in Gaza City, the Palestine National Council agreed, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, to amend the Palestine National Charter. 130/ The vote was widely reported in the media as having repealed the clauses of the Charter that denied Israel’s right to exist and called for its destruction, and was welcomed by Governments in that it was seen as a move to fulfil the agreed-upon obligations of the Palestinians regarding revisions to the National Charter.
On 5 May 1996, in an effort to show respect for the timetable contained in the Declaration of Principles, permanent status negotiations between Israel and PLO were formally launched. The negotiations adjourned after a number of procedural decisions had been taken. In preparation for substantive negotiations, in 1995 two Israeli and two Palestinian academics, respectively reporting to Yossi Beilin and Mahmoud Abbas, had held private meetings in Stockholm to put together a draft text on permanent status. 131/
Moreover, the international presence in Hebron was revived and the ceremonial opening of permanent status negotiations prepared. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron, dormant since August 1994, resumed work on 12 May 1996 in accordance with the Interim Agreement and the “Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron” signed on 9 May 1996 132/ (see chap. III.E below).
Following the elections in Israel at the end of May 1996, a Likud-led coalition Government formed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took office. According to public statements studied by an Israeli expert, the Prime Minister was committed to work for “peace with security” to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, initially without the representative of the Palestinian people – the PLO − that Israel had recognized in 1993. The Palestinian problem was considered a consequence rather than the primary cause of the conflict. 133/ Thus, the Prime Minister’s opposition to the “land-for-peace” deal being pursued under the peace process with the Palestine Liberation Organization was pronounced. 134/
Efforts to bring the two sides together nevertheless continued and bore fruit in September and October 1996, when Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat met for the first time (see chap. III.E below).
The international community welcomed the renewed rapprochement, even as the deterioration of the situation on the ground continued with the violations by Israel of agreements already reached, including the delay in the redeployment of Israeli troops from Hebron and in the opening of the safe passage from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, as well as its decision to open a new entrance to a tunnel along the western wall of Al-Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) in occupied East Jerusalem.
In a press release issued on 10 September 1996 (GA/PAL/734), the Bureau of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People expressed its satisfaction at the resumption, on 4 September, at Beit Hanoun, Gaza Strip, of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The Bureau welcomed the meeting between Palestinian Authority President Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu, expressing the hope that the meeting would clear the way for the continuation of substantive discussions on matters pertaining to the permanent status.
The Committee also welcomed the Middle East Summit, held in the United States on 1 and 2 October 1996 at the invitation of the President of the United States, which included the participation of King Hussein of Jordan, the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority (see A/51/35). In the words of the Secretary-General, Israel and had taken “the reassuring decision to resume negotiations aimed at solving outstanding issues and implementing the Declaration of Principles” (see A/51/678-S/1996/953 and A/48/486-S/26560, annex).
In its annual report to the General Assembly (A/51/35), the Committee expressed its concern about the guidelines adopted by the Government of Israel concerning the very basis of the peace process, including the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), principle of land for peace and final status issues, in particular Jerusalem, settlements, the return of refugees and Palestinian sovereignty.
In his report of 18 November 1996 to the General Assembly and the Security Council (A/51/678-S/1996/953), which at the end of the previous month had called for the immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process on its agreed basis and the timely implementation of the agreements reached (see Council resolution 1073 (1996)), the Secretary-General referred to the challenges that had confronted the Middle East peace process during the second half of the year and expressed his reassurance at the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in October.
In December 1996, the General Assembly expressed grave concern over Israel’s decision to resume settlement activities in violation of international humanitarian law, relevant United Nations resolutions and the agreements reached between the parties. The Assembly would annually reiterate its grave concern about the continuation of settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and call for their complete cessation (see resolution 51/133; see also resolutions 52/66, 53/55, 54/78 and 55/132).
E. Hebron ProtocolIn view of growing delays in implementing various aspects of the peace process agreements reached, in particular the Israeli withdrawal from Hebron in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement, and other developments that deepened the crisis of confidence between the two parties, including resumed settlement activity, 135/ much work was needed for Israel and PLO to proceed. On 15 January 1997, after difficult talks, agreement was reached on the text of the “Protocol concerning the redeployment in Hebron”. Agreement was also reached on the further redeployment of Israeli troops in phases from the West Bank’s rural areas and the holding of permanent status negotiations. News of the agreement on the Protocol, signed two days later, was immediately welcomed by the international community. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that the Hebron agreement would pave the way for further progress towards the full implementation of the process envisaged in the Declaration of Principles (see SG/SM/6145).
On 17 January, the Hebron Protocol was signed by the parties in Jerusalem, 136/ after being overwhelmingly approved by the Knesset on 16 January. 137/ The transfer of authority commenced the same day. The Hebron Protocol had been brokered by the United States, with the assistance of Egypt and Jordan, and was supported by the Russian Federation, the European Union and other members of the international community (see also A/51/782-S/1997/61). The agreement reached, and its various accompanying diplomatic instruments such as a mediator’s letter, note for the record and an agreed minute, concluded the first round of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Government of Prime Minister Netanyahu, under the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement. 138/
Under the Protocol, the city of Hebron was divided into two areas with different security responsibilities for the Palestinian Authority and Israel: about 80 per cent of the municipal area, designated H-1, was transferred to the Palestinians akin to an area A, with the remaining area, designated H-2, to remain under full Israeli control. The H-2 area included Hebron’s Old City and central business district, inhabited by about 450 Israeli settlers and more than 20,000 Palestinians. The Protocol described joint security arrangements and measures, the deployment of Palestinian police and various civilian matters for the Palestinian City’s populations (see http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/p_h.html).
Agreement on the Protocol included a “Note for the record” dated 15 January 1997, prepared by the United States Special Middle East Coordinator, Dennis Ross, at the request of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat, that dealt with further Israeli redeployment phases, the first stage to begin during the first week of March, and wider peace process-related issues and commitments such as the release of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners by Israel, the resumption of negotiations on the opening of a Palestinian airport and sea port in the Gaza Strip, construction of a safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, actual revision of the Palestine National Charter, the fight against terror and prevention of violence, and the size of the Palestinian police.
At the same time, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders agreed that permanent status negotiations would be resumed within two months after implementation of the Hebron Protocol. 139/ On its part, the United States expressed its belief to the parties that the first phase of further redeployments should take place as soon as possible and that all three phases of the further redeployments should be completed within 12 months from the implementation of the first phase of the further redeployments but not later than mid-1998. 140/ In fact, many such implementation issues had to be revisited and fine-tuned in subsequent negotiations, as featured in the Wye River Memorandum (1998) and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (1999), addressed below. An important component of the Hebron Protocol was the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH). 141/
In compliance with the Hebron Protocol, Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered, on 7 February 1997, the release of 30 Palestinian female prisoners who had been due to be released upon the signing of the September 1995 Interim Agreement. 142/ A proposal made by Israel in early March 1997 to withdraw from 9 to 10 per cent of the West Bank fell short of the expectations of the Palestinians and later the United States 143/ and was rejected by the Palestinian side. 144/ Moreover, an acute crisis between the parties was brought about in connection with Israel’s settlement policies. The Prime Minister’s decision, on 19 February 1997, to set in motion plans for the construction of a new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim, on top of a pine forested hill just outside East Jerusalem, drew condemnation from the Palestinians and the international community. The plans for the settlement were deemed illegal under international law, and as having a negative impact on the peace process. 145/ Israel’s decision regarding Jabal Abu Ghneim led to the convening of the Security Council meetings in March 1997 and the vetoing of two resolutions on the matter by the United States, ultimately leading to the convening of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly on illegal Israeli actions in the occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with the first of many meetings under this session held in 1997 (see A/ES-10/PV.3, 5 and 7; see also chap. II above and chap. IV below).
In June 1997, the media reported the outlines of a proposal put forward by Prime Minister Netanyahu as a basis for a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. The proposal, presented during a Security Cabinet meeting, was referred to as the “Allon Plus” Plan. 146/ Reportedly, under the proposal Israel would retain control of the Israeli settlement clusters that would include the “Greater Jerusalem” area, the “Gush Etzion” and “Ma’aleh Adumim” settlement blocs, other large concentrations of settlements in the West Bank, the entire Jordan Valley, a “security area” area east of the Green Line, and a network of bypass roads. The Palestinians would be left with less than half of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, broken up into several unconnected enclaves. The plan drew condemnation from the Palestinian side as an attempt to supplant Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as a basis for the Middle East peace process and replace it with a different framework unilaterally imposed by Israel (see A/51/923-S/1997/453).
Suicide bomb attacks against Israeli civilians in Jerusalem in July and September 1997, the subsequent decision by the Government of Israel to suspend peace negotiations and freeze further transfers of territory to the Palestinian Authority, and an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Hamas leader, Khaled Mashaal, in Amman by Israeli secret agents on 25 September 1997 further poisoned the atmosphere. However, efforts to jump-start the stalled negotiations between the parties to the conflict continued, with United States Special Middle East Coordinator Ross making several trips to the region, followed by a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright from 10 to 12 September 1997, in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a freeze of the controversial construction of Israeli settlements in return for a Palestinian commitment to resume full security cooperation with Israel.
Meanwhile, on 9 September 1997, the Government of Israel published a list of Palestinian security commitments it demanded the Palestinian Authority should undertake, that were given to Secretary of State Albright during her visit to Israel, including: an agreement by the Palestinians to full and unconditional security cooperation; the detention, arrest and imprisonment of all terrorists previously released by the Palestinian Authority, according to lists submitted by Israel; the dismissal of personnel involved in terrorism or violent acts against Israel; the implementation of the security commitments specified in the Hebron Protocol; the collection and confiscation of illegal arms; no further incitement against Israel by officials; compliance with the 33 extradition requests submitted to it; a reduction of the Palestinian Police Force from 35,500 to 24,000; and the submission for approval of a complete list of police recruits. 147/
On 10 September 1997, the Palestinians issued the following demands: immediate transfer by Israel to the Palestinian Authority of the $100 million in Palestinian tax payments withheld; lifting of the internal closure of the West Bank; permission for the import of raw materials into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the export of agricultural products; permission for a fixed number of labourers with permits to work in Israel, even during periods of closures; and resumption of the work of the eight committees aimed at implementing important articles of the 1995 Interim Agreement, including the release of Palestinian prisoners, the opening of an airport, the construction of a sea port and safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In addition, the Palestinians demanded that the following practices be stopped: settlement construction and expansion; the invalidation of identity cards of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem; the demolition of homes in the West Bank built without permit; and the evacuation of Bedouins throughout the West Bank and their transfer from Area C to areas B and A. 147/ On its part, in September 1997 the Palestinian Authority police closed 16 Hamas-related offices and organizations. 148/
Despite a resumption of bilateral talks in Washington, D.C., on 3 November 1997, 149/ and most of 1998 passed without tangible diplomatic or material progress in the peace process. Efforts to “re-energize” the negotiations, including by the United States, 150/ bore no fruit. At the same time, developments on the ground such as the continued construction of the settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim to the south of East Jerusalem contributed to curtailing the positive trend that had been expected to emerge after the implementation of the Hebron Protocol. These developments were also regarded as pre-empting the pursuit of permanent status negotiations (see chap. II above).
At the United Nations, in his report on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East (A/52/581-S/1997/866), the Secretary-General expressed disappointment in the stagnation of the Middle East peace process during 1997. The Secretary-General noted that while the Hebron Protocol had inspired hope that confidence and mutual trust between Palestinians and Israelis would increase and create a positive environment for subsequent negotiations, the decision by Israel to start construction of a settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim to the south of East Jerusalem thwarted that positive trend and led to a dangerous and lengthy stalemate. According to the report of the Secretary-General submitted earlier in the year to the General Assembly at its tenth emergency special session (A/ES-10/6-S/1997/494), the Abu Ghneim incident was viewed as particularly serious for a number of reasons:
“(a) Politically, establishing a new Israeli settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim represented the first move to construct an entirely new settlement on occupied Palestinian lands since the previous Israeli Government in the context of the peace process imposed a freeze on such activities. Palestinians pointed out that such a move prejudices final status negotiations, during which the issue of Jerusalem and borders was to be determined. The settlement was seen as closing the door on what Palestinians unanimously expected to be the future capital of a Palestinian State – East Jerusalem;
“(e) With regard to its effects on the peace process, and the confidence of the Palestinian people in that process, the refusal of the Government of Israel to abandon construction of a new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim appeared to represent, in the view of the Palestinian people, the largest single negative factor in the breakdown of the peace process and the fomenting of unrest in the occupied territories.”
Expressions of political support for the peace process were waning at the United Nations. Norway, speaking also for the Russian Federation and the United States, as co-sponsors of draft resolution A/52/L.62, entitled “Middle East peace process”, said they wished to withdraw the draft. The speaker went on to say the following:
“Since similar texts were first adopted by the General Assembly in 1993, these draft resolutions have been an expression of support for the peace process in the Middle East. In the light of efforts now underway by the sponsors of the peace process and others, with the parties, to inject new momentum into the process, the sponsors are ready to resubmit the draft resolution at a time when we, as well as the parties themselves, believe it will be appropriate and useful again to seek this expression of support for the peace process from the international community” (A/52/PV.68).
It was felt that the lack of progress in the peace process did not warrant the resubmission of the resolution to the General Assembly. On his part, Secretary-General Annan visited the Occupied Palestinian Territory in March 1998, the first such visit by a Secretary-General to the Palestinian Authority. Addressing the Palestinian National Council at Gaza on 23 March (see SG/SM/6501), the Secretary-General said:
“At every juncture and every passage, with every challenge and every success, the United Nations has stood by the proponents of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
“Why? Because we could do no other. Your cause − genuine self-determination for the Palestinian people − is our cause. It is the expression of the most sacred, most enduring and universal principles of our Charter.
“Today in Gaza, I can declare to you that the bonds between the Palestinian people and the United Nations are stronger than ever. Our commitment to your cause is undiminished, our hopes for your future undimmed.
“Only peace, only compromise, only the understanding that two peoples must live − and not die − side by side, will bring peace to this land. Let me repeat: Only peace, only compromise, only the understanding that two peoples must live − and not die − side by side, will bring peace to this land and self-determination for your people. And that peace will only come about if both sides adhere faithfully to the commitments they have made and carry the process through to its conclusion − a comprehensive peace settlement.”
A meeting in May 1998 in London between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat convened by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, ended in failure. The deepening lack of trust between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel rendered the peace process moribund. 151/ However, further efforts, spearheaded primarily by Special Middle East Coordinator Ross, aimed at securing a formula for a further redeployment of Israeli troops from 13 per cent of the West Bank, eventually bore fruit. Initially rejecting the United States proposal in March of 1997, Prime Minister Netanyahu indicated his assent in August of the same year, subject to the proviso that the Palestinian Authority should designate 3 per cent of the territory to be transferred as a nature reserve. Following the meeting of Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat with President Clinton at the White House on 28 September 1998, in early October Secretary Albright again travelled to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, meeting repeatedly with Israeli and Palestinian leaders in preparation for the resumption of face-to-face talks between the two sides later in the month. 152/
F. Wye River Memorandum
On 15 October 1998, the peace process took a further step with a summit held at the Wye River Plantation in Maryland, United States, under the sponsorship of President Clinton and billed as being modelled on the Camp David Summit of 1978. The summit concluded on 23 October with the signing, at the White House, of the Wye River Memorandum by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat.
The President of the Security Council congratulated all the parties involved in the conclusion of the Memorandum, and the Secretary-General expressed his delight “at the news that an impasse in the Middle East peace process has finally been broken” (see SG/SM/6769). The optimism would prove to be short-lived, however, as on 20 December, the Government of Israel decided to suspend the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. 153/
The Memorandum provided for the phased Israeli redeployment in parallel with the Palestinian achievement of security objectives, as well as progress on economic issues, including the Gaza Industrial Estate and Airport, and the relaunch of final status negotiations. The first phase of redeployments took place, whereas further redeployment was delayed and the five-year period of the Interim Agreement of 1995 expired on 4 May 1999 without final status negotiations having all but formally begun.
Under phases one and two of further redeployments, the Wye River Memorandum provided for the transfer of 13 per cent of Area C to Area A (1 per cent) and Area B (12 per cent), in three stages. Three per cent of this area was classified as “green area/natural reserve,” where no construction or other change of landscape could take place. An additional 14.2 per cent was to be transferred from Area B to Area A. These three transfers were to take place within 12 weeks, with a further unspecified redeployment to be discussed by the parties after that, as the third phase”. 154/
Under the Memorandum, the Palestinian side agreed to outlaw, and establish a work plan to combat terrorist organizations and their infrastructure in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to hold biweekly reviews of its implementation with United States representatives; the confiscation of illegal weapons and prevention of weapons smuggling; the apprehension of “the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror”; and, “continuous, intensive and comprehensive” security cooperation. The Palestinian side undertook to issue a decree prohibiting “all forms of incitement to violence and terror” and to establish a mechanism that would “act systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror”. The sides undertook not to take any step that would alter the status of West Bank and Gaza under the Interim Agreement.
With regard to the permanent status negotiations, the two sides agreed immediately to resume talks on an accelerated basis, making a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by 4 May 1999. As stated in the Memorandum, the United States had expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.
Moreover, reaffirming their commitment to enhancing their relationship and recognizing the need to actively promote economic development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli and Palestinian sides agreed to continue or reactivate all standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee, the Civil Affairs Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Standing Cooperation Committee (see chap. IV below). A detailed timeline was included in the Memorandum as an “integral attachment”, which proved difficult for the parties to abide by.
The Memorandum entered into force 10 days from the date of signature. On 19 November 1998, the Israeli Cabinet approved the Memorandum, provided that the Palestinian side renounced plans to declare unilaterally an independent State on 4 May 1999 155/ and no longer called for the release of Palestinian prisoners “with blood on their hands” or those who are members of Hamas; and also demanded that “incitement to violence” should halt immediately. The Palestinians rejected these three conditions. The United States said that the Wye River Memorandum “should be implemented as signed.” Further conditions, as announced by the Prime Minister of Israel were: the third withdrawal from the West Bank would cover only 1 per cent of the area and would be the last; and the Palestine National Council should remove from the PLO Charter passages hostile to Israel. At the same time, Mr. Netanyahu agreed to open the Palestinian airport in the Gaza Strip the following week, and to start the release of 750 Palestinian prisoners. 156/
Moreover, on 20 November, Israeli and Palestinian officials signed a protocol completing Israeli troop redeployment from 2 per cent of Area C and the 7.1 per cent of Area B to Area A. The Palestinian police took over 28 small towns and villages. Work on demarcating the Israeli and Palestinian-controlled areas began. Also, the Head of the Palestinian Civil Aviation Authority and Israeli aviation officials signed the Gaza Airport Protocol allowing for the opening of the international airport in the southern Gaza Strip. The inaugural commercial flight, from Egypt, landed at the Palestinian International Airport, in Al-Dahaniya, on 24 November 1998.
In support of these developments, on 30 November 1998, President Clinton hosted a Middle East Donors’ Conference in Washington, D.C., at which some 40 countries, the majority of them from Europe, pledged over $3 billion in economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority.
Further progress in the negotiations floundered however, over various reasons such as the release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners. 157/ On 24 November 1998, Israel freed a first group of 250 prisoners, many of whom were reported to be common criminals, not Palestinian activists. 158/ A few days later, on 1 December, Prime Minister Netanyahu refused to release Palestinian prisoners accused of attacks on Israelis. Mass demonstrations erupted in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and a hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners followed. Moreover, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced on 16 December that further Israeli troop redeployments were unlikely to take place. 159/
With regard to the permanent status negotiations, a first meeting between Foreign Minister Sharon of Israel and Palestinian Negotiator Abbas took place on 18 November 1998. On 24 November, Israel and the Palestinians postponed the formal beginning of the permanent status negotiations until early December, when a further delay was announced on 3 December. Permanent status negotiations would again only be addressed in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, which was concluded in September 1999 by a new Government of Israel headed by Ehud Barak.
On 10 December 1998, fulfilling its part of advancing the Palestinians’ obligations under the Wye River Memorandum, the Palestine Central Council, a PLO institution that makes policy decisions when the Palestine National Council is not in session, voted overwhelmingly to accept changes to the Palestinian Charter. In the vote, the 105 members present were asked whether they approved a letter from Palestinian Authority President Arafat to President Clinton, in which clauses in the Charter offensive to Israel were declared revoked or amended. Of those present, 81 voted in favour, 7 voted against and 7 abstained. On 14 December, the Palestine National Council meeting in the Gaza Strip, in the presence of President Clinton, passed a similar measure. The Government of Israel expressed its satisfaction with the vote in the Palestinian National Council. 160/
The following day, 15 December, a trilateral summit meeting between President Clinton, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat was held and broke up with no joint statement by the three leaders. Mr. Netanyahu did not commit to a date for further redeployment and reiterated various demands, including that Mr. Arafat publicly renounce plans unilaterally to declare a Palestinian State, which were formulated in the context of the upcoming end of the interim period on 4 May 1999. At any rate, on 20 December, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Office said that the further implementation of the Wye Memorandum would be suspended until after Israeli elections were held, with the date for elections set for 17 May 1999. 161/
On 22 and 23 March 1999, Palestinian Authority President Arafat visited Washington, D.C., to meet with President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright, both of whom reaffirmed their opposition to a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. Ultimately, the Palestinians held back from unilaterally declaring an independent State. On its part, the European Union made a landmark declaration on 25 March 1999, at its summit in Berlin, in which it reaffirmed the unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination, including the option of a State and declared its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State 162/ (see also chap. I above).
After the Knesset voted on 21 December 1998 to dissolve the Government, elections were held on 17 May 1999. The peace process was effectively suspended until the new Government of Ehud Barak was established in early July 1999. On 11 July, Prime Minister Barak and Palestinian Authority President Arafat met at the Beit Hanoun/Erez crossing and their negotiations continued later in the month to implement the Wye River Memorandum and to assess all of the outstanding issues concerning its implementation. The Palestinians expected to obtain a clear commitment from Israel to implement the long-delayed redeployment, which was not forthcoming. The bilateral talks disintegrated over the Prime Minister’s various new proposals and the difficulties in implementing various commitments such as the release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. Gradually, mediation by Egypt, the United States and others salvaged the talks in September. 163/
G. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum
On 4 September 1999, Prime Minister Barak of Israel and Palestinian Authority President Arafat ended more than eight months of stalemate in the peace process by signing the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations. In the words of one observer, “the lumbering caravan of the peace process once again resumed forward motion.” 164/ The Secretary-General warmly welcomed the agreement and congratulated Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat for the successful completion of the negotiations, and President Mubarak and Secretary of State Albright for their role in facilitating this important progress (see SG/SM/7121-PAL/1869).
The delay in implementing its obligation under the Memorandum notwithstanding, by the end of March 2000, Israel had redeployed its troops from an estimated total of 18.2 per cent of West Bank (Area A), which included major Palestinian populations centres. On the ground, Israel maintained total control over the East Jerusalem area, 60 per cent of the West Bank (Area C) and 20 per cent of the Gaza Strip, as well as control limited to security matters, shared with the Palestinian side, over an additional 21.8 per cent of the West Bank (area B), administratively otherwise in Palestinian hands (see annex V below). 165/
Building on the timeline concept used in the Wye River Memorandum, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum spelled out dates 166/ for the “full and mutual implementation” of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements and outstanding commitments made since the signing of the Declaration of Principles (1993) so as to conclude a comprehensive agreement on all permanent status issues, the so-called Comprehensive Agreement for Permanent Status, within one year from the resumption of those negotiations and not later than 13 September 2000. 167/ Talks were to start after the first stage of the release of an initial 350 Palestinian prisoners and the second stage of redeployments and not later than 13 September 1999. The two sides were to make a determined effort to conclude a framework agreement on all permanent status issues, later known by the working title “Framework agreement on permanent status” within five months from the resumption of the permanent status negotiations (13 February 2000).
The Memorandum also dealt with the release of Palestinian prisoners in three stages, 200 prisoners on 5 September 1999, 150 on 8 October and another release to be determined. 168/The two sides were to establish a Joint Committee that was to follow-up on matters related to the release of Palestinian prisoners.
Furthermore, the Memorandum established dates for reconvening the Continuing Committee on Displaced Persons 169/ on 1 October 1999 (a ministerial-level meeting convened on 6 February 2000, and was attended by the representatives of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority); opening the Southern Route of the Safe Passage 170/ between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on 1 October 1999 (began operation on 25 October 1999 between the Beit Hanoun (Erez) crossing in the Gaza Strip and Tarqumiya near Hebron); reaching agreement on the specific location of the crossing point of the Northern Route of the Safe Passage 171/ (not later than 5 October 1999); commencing work on the sea port in the Gaza Strip, like the airport as an international passage (on 1 October 1999); 172/ and opening Shuhada Road in Hebron to Palestinian vehicles, to which it had been closed since 1994 173/ (not later than 30 October 1999). In addition, a high-level joint liaison committee was to review the situation at the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi (not later than 13 September 1999). 174/
On security, in accordance with the prior agreements reached, the two sides would act to ensure the handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they would cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. In this connection, the Palestinian side undertook to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation, ongoing obligations and other issues emanating from the prior agreements, including, in particular, the obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum the previous year. 175/
The Memorandum also established certain implementation modalities, in particular the various intergovernmental coordination committees were to resume their operation not later than 13 September 1999. The sides undertook not to take steps that would change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the Interim Agreement.
On 21 September 1999, the Secretary-General appointed Terje Rød-Larsen of Norway as the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. It was hoped that his presence on the ground would help ensure that United Nations support of the peace process was fully integrated and coordinated, particularly in the area of development assistance (see SG/A/705).
Following the signing of the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the permanent status negotiations were formally resumed on 13 September 1999, at the Beit Hanoun (Erez) crossing. Foreign Minister Levy was appointed to head the Israeli negotiating team, and Mahmoud Abbas headed the Palestinian team. Negotiations on the Framework Agreement on Permanent Status between Israel and the Palestinians resumed on 8 November 1999 in Ramallah. The two sides were represented by Oded Eran and Yasser Abed Rabbo, respectively.
Moreover, at the end of January 2000, the multilateral talks had resumed at Moscow, and on 7 June 2000, the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the implementation of economic issues provided for in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed. Following the meetings of President Arafat with President Clinton in Oslo on 2 November 1999 and Davos, Switzerland, on 29 January 2000, 176/ bilateral talks on permanent status issues between the Israelis and Palestinians were held in March and April at the Bolling Air Force Base near Washington, D.C. 177/ At the beginning of July, the Palestinians agreed again to delay the proclamation of the State of Palestine. 178/
H. Camp David Summit
On 11 July 2000, the United States President convened the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David. For the next two weeks, until 24 July, the parties held intense negotiations, reportedly unprecedented in both scope and detail, addressing all the major aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including borders, the status of Jerusalem and the right of return of the Palestine refugees, in a determined if ultimately unsuccessful effort to reach an agreement on permanent status issues (see chap. IV below). To resolve certain issues, the Summit talks reportedly considered swapping land between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, albeit at a ratio unfavourable to the Palestinians and without yielding 100 per cent of the area of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. A final “Trilateral statement” made at the end of the Summit listed the guiding principles of the negotiations. The Secretary-General expressed disappointment that, despite strenuous efforts at the Camp David Summit, the parties had not been able to reach an overall agreement (see SG/SM/7494).
The Secretary-General welcomed the summit and expressed hope that a “Peace of the Brave” between Israel and the Palestinians would not only end more than 50 years of hostilities, but would pave the way for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and the principle of land for peace. He also stressed that “a successful outcome would require decisions and compromises which would be painful for both sides” (see SG/SM/7480).
In the weeks and months after the Summit, various accounts of the negotiations showed that while Israeli proposals reportedly appeared to go far beyond previous positions, in particular with such novel issues as an “end of conflict” declaration, the gaps between the parties, especially on the issues of Jerusalem and refugees’ right of return, proved too wide to be bridged. While the Summit has often been described as a failure, it was nonetheless also considered a step forward in getting the parties to deal with the substance of the permanent status issues, even if Israel appeared to offer no concessions on the crucial issues of the status of Jerusalem and Palestine refugees. 179/ Diplomatic efforts between the parties nevertheless continued, including at the highest level, when Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat met in Kochav Yair on 25 September and, the next day, in Washington, D.C., at the level of negotiating teams. 180/
The events surrounding the outbreak of the second intifada at the end of September 2000, following the visit of then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Al-Haram Al-Sharif accompanied by hundreds of Israeli security and police personnel, dealt a further serious blow to the peace process. Israeli forces moved back into parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory where they had not been present for some years, Area A around Palestinian population centres, at times using unprecedented methods such as air bombardments and the massive use of snipers against the Palestinian people. 181/ A concerted effort to stop the deterioration of the situation and restart the peace process was made in Paris in October and later the same month at a summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, leading to the appointment of a fact-finding committee that issued its findings (the “Mitchell Report”) in 2001. At the summit, it was agreed that both sides would act immediately to return to the situation prior to the current crisis, including the redeployment of Israeli forces to pre-28 September 2000 positions. 182/ As immediate efforts and some initial progress in lowering the level of violence were made at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, effectively none of what was agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh materialized and the situation was soon to deteriorate further 183/ (see also chap. II.I above).
On 2 October 2000, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (A/55/440-S/2000/936), in connection with the confrontations between the Israeli security forces and Palestinians in Jerusalem expressing the gravest and growing concern of the Committee at the situation.
On 7 October 2000, the Security Council met and adopted resolution 1322 (2000), in which the Council called for the immediate cessation of violence, stressed the importance of establishing a mechanism for a speedy and objective inquiry into the tragic events in Jerusalem and called for the immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process.
On 4 October 2000, the Secretary-General participated in a dramatic meeting in Paris between Prime Minister Barak of Israel and Palestinian Authority President Arafat, held with Secretary of State Albright and the President of France, Jacques Chirac, in an urgent effort to stop the growing violence and to restart the Middle East peace process. Following the meeting, the Secretary-General proceeded to the region and helped to bring about the understandings reached on 17 October at the Sharm el-Sheikh Middle East Peace Summit, jointly chaired by President Clinton and President Mubarak. The main purpose of the Secretary-General was to help Israelis and Palestinians to resolve the ongoing crisis by reaching an agreement based on disengagement, an end to violence and a return to normalcy, a resumption of the peace process and the establishment of a mechanism to inquire into the recent violence and ways of avoiding a recurrence.
The General Assembly met on 20 October 2000 and heard the Secretary-General’s summary of what was agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh (SG/SM/7594):
“First, both sides agreed to issue public statements unequivocally calling for an end of violence. They also agreed to take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation, eliminate points of friction, ensure an end to violence and incitement, maintain calm and prevent recurrence of recent events;
“It was agreed that, to accomplish this, both sides would act immediately to return the situation to that which existed prior to the current crisis, in areas such as restoring law and order, redeployment of forces, eliminating points of friction, enhancing security cooperation and ending the closure and opening the Gaza airport. The United States undertook to facilitate security cooperation between the parties;
“Secondly, it was agreed that the United States would develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The committee’s report will be shared by the United States President with the Secretary-General and the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the United States President for publication;
“Thirdly, it was agreed that, if we are to address the underlying roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there must be a pathway back to negotiations and a resumption of efforts to reach a permanent status agreement based on United Nations Security Council resolution 242 and 338 and subsequent understandings. President Clinton announced that, towards this end, the leaders had agreed that the United States would consult with the parties within the next two weeks about how to move forward.”
On 23 December 2000, President Clinton invited Prime Minister Barak and President Arafat to the White House and read out to them a set of proposals to advance peace in the Middle East, to be known as the “Clinton parameters”. The proposals included Palestinian sovereignty over the holy sites in Jerusalem and Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, as well as approximately 95 per cent of the West Bank, an apparent improvement over the Camp David Summit proposals. 184/ The outgoing Government of Israel and Palestinian Authority President Arafat accepted the parameters as the basis for further efforts, with some reservations. 185/
In response to President Clinton’s initiative, which provided for a larger percentage of the West Bank to be handed over than what had been discussed only a few months earlier at Camp David, President Arafat, in his letter of 28 December 2000, sought various clarifications and explanations, and expressed his readiness to meet with the President to discuss the bridging proposals and develop them further in a meeting at the White House. The meeting took place on 2 January 2001 in Washington, D.C., against the backdrop of escalating violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 186/
As the date of the Israeli elections of 6 February was drawing near, from 21 to 27 January 2001, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators met in Taba, Egypt, with the active mediation of third parties, in a last-ditch effort to make progress on a number of issues, on the basis of the “Clinton parameters”. 187/ According to the envoy of the European Union, Miguel Moratinos, who was present at the talks, both sides accepted the principle of a land swap, but the size and proportionality of it remained under discussion. Both sides accepted, in principle, Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighbourhoods, to become the capitals of the respective States, but the issue of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem remained unresolved. It was agreed, in principle, that the sides would retain control over their respective holy sites in Jerusalem, but the exact delineation and modalities of control were not settled. The Palestinian side insisted that the refugees should have the right of return to their homes, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 194 (III). The Israeli side floated the idea of a 15-year absorption program of a limited number of refugees. In a joint statement released after the Taba talks, the two sides declared that they had never been closer to a final settlement. 188/
In its resolution 55/55, adopted on 1 December 2000, the General Assembly stressed the need for the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination; the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, and resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with its resolution 194 (III). By the beginning of the year 2001, little progress had been made along any of these lines. The permanent status negotiations had not been concluded; the multilateral talks remained frozen; and the Israeli and Palestinian sides were left with the responsibility to implement their respective outstanding commitments under the bilateral agreements reached. As the conditions on the ground palpably worsened, the Palestinian people clung to the very edges of hope.
IV. Living conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and assistance
During the period under consideration, United Nations resolutions and reports consistently continued to reflect the view that the Israeli occupation itself constituted a violation of human rights that also impeded efforts to achieve sustainable development and a sound economic environment (see chap. II above). Curfews, closures, and checkpoints continued to prevent the free movement of Palestinians, preventing workers from reaching their jobs, students from reaching their schools, patients from reaching medical centres, and farmers from reaching agricultural lands. The flow of goods and services were also affected leading to a drop in commerce and foreign currency holdings. The economic situation was also affected by Israel’s land confiscations and its control of water and other natural resources, exacerbated by Israel’s efforts to provide the settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory with a standard of living far exceeding that of the Palestinians, including incentives for transfer to the Territory, placing a further stress on the available resources. Moreover, the uprooting of trees and the destruction of agricultural land remained a major impediment facing Palestinian farmers and negatively impacted thousands of livelihoods.
At the same time, some progress was made in improving the livelihood of Palestinians following the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. IDF redeployment from some areas occupied in 1967 have left the Palestinian Authority in some degree of administrative control of about 40 per cent of the West Bank and 80 per cent of the Gaza Strip. Democratic Palestinian elections were held, and the responsibility for rendering public services to the Palestinian population was gradually transferred to the fledgling Palestinian Authority as new quasi-State institutions were established (see annex IV below).
The Gaza International Airport and a safe passage connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were opened in 1998 and 1999, respectively. In 1993, the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics was established and the first Palestinian census was conducted in 1997. 189/ Furthermore, fresh bilateral and multilateral international assistance and foreign investment, reflecting increased confidence, benefited the living conditions of the Palestinians and helped improve the business climate sufficiently for the Palestinian Authority to establish the Palestinian Stock Exchange in 1997. Private television and radio stations were launched. In 1992, after having been closed for four years, the Orient House reopened, anchoring the Palestinian Authority activities in East Jerusalem (see http://www.orienthouse.org/about/index.html).
Under the peace process, the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the Paris Protocol) was signed on 29 April 1994, by which the two parties laid the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side by recognizing the Palestinians’ right to economic decision-making in accordance with their own development plan and priorities, transferring certain powers relating to economic policy to the Palestinians, such as the import and customs policy, the authority to levy direct and indirect taxes, set industrial and agricultural policy, and establish a monetary authority to regulate financial activities, and setting forth the modalities of import, value added tax and wage tax clearance transfers between the Israeli and the Palestinian side (art. XXIV) (see A/49/35). The same year, the Protocol was incorporated into the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and, in 1995, in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Under the Interim Agreement, standing committees, including the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the Joint Economic Committee, the Civil Affairs Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Standing Cooperation Committee were established. Moreover, annex VI of the Agreement set the principles of economic cooperation and identified the sectors of economic cooperation between the two sides. 126/
Under art. III-6 of the Wye River Memorandum of 1998, the Israeli and Palestinian sides reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agreed on the need to actively promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza, for instance, envisaging progress on such economic issues as the Gaza Industrial Estate Project and the Airport, and to continue or to reactivate all the standing committees established by the Interim Agreement, and agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Economic Committee to deal with a number of specific problematic issues such as taxes, unpaid debts, and trade barriers. Furthermore, under the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of 1999, the two sides recommitted themselves to implement the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Economic Committee. Also, the two sides called upon the international donor community to enhance its commitment and financial support to Palestinian economic development and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In June 2000, the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the implementation of economic issues provided for in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, was signed, detailing the parallel implementation of the economic issues laid out in the Wye River and Sharm el-Sheikh memorandums.
In support of the peace process, the international community and the United Nations extended generous assistance to the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority. In 1994, the United Nations established the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories to guide and coordinate different United Nations programmes and assist the Palestinian Authority and donors in coordinating, among other things, international development assistance. UNSCO also produced annual reports on the economic and social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, analysing the challenges and opportunities of the business environment and the repercussions of adverse situations (see chap. IV.B below).
The Middle East and North Africa Economic summits (subsequently conferences) starting in 1994, constituted a concerted international effort to strengthen an environment that was supportive of the peace process and to develop and promote joint projects in the economic and social sphere (for more information, see chap. III.A above).
At the international level, the World Bank played a central role in providing the Palestinian Authority, as of late 1993, with financial and technical support in a range of economic sectors. International financial assistance delivered by the World Bank was available through the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank in the form of grants or soft loans—which were interest-free with a 10-year grace period and 40 years maturity (see http://web.worldbank.org). The Bank extended technical assistance and provided policy recommendations in the economic and social domains and conducted a number of studies.
The stepped-up humanitarian assistance of UNRWA to the Palestine refugees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is addressed in chapter IV.E below. In 1996, UNRWA headquarters returned to the region and was established in the Gaza Strip.
Throughout the period, the Commission on the Status of Women also continued to keep the situation of the Palestinian women under review. The resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council upon the recommendation of the Commission requested the Secretary-General to continue to review the situation of Palestinian women and to assist them by all available means (see, e.g., Commission resolution 2000/23). In 1994, 1995 and 1996, the Commission on the Status of Women adopted resolutions 38/1, 39/3 and 40/2 entitled “Integration of women in the Middle East peace process”, in which it urged Governments, intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental organizations to include women in the Middle East peace process, and to assist the Palestinian people in the implementation of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements so as to ensure Palestinian women’s political development and participation.
A. Living conditions
During the period under consideration, the United Nations expressed its concern about the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (see also chap. II.I above). Whereas the Middle East peace process, in particular the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, raised high expectations, Israel continued to confiscate land to expand settlements, construct roads to connect those settlements, and further exploit natural and other economic resources to the detriment of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. As a result of Israel’s settlement activities throughout the 1990s, the number of settlers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip doubled, with East Jerusalem settlers accounting for one third of the increase. By the end of 2000, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had exceeded 200,000 persons, with an additional 200,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem, 190/ owing to the establishment of new settlements, the expansion of existing ones and the creation of so-called settlement outposts. In 1997, for example, Israel began construction of a major new settlement in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area south of East Jerusalem. Israel’s settlement activities continued despite their unequivocal condemnation by the General Assembly (see chap. II above) and the reaffirmation by the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention in July 1999 of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
The continued Israeli internal closures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory created tremendous hardship for the Palestinian population, exacerbating unemployment and causing other material losses, as well as limiting access to urgently needed public services. Israel’s external closure policy resulted in an average loss of about 20 per cent of Palestinians’ working days in Israel for the period from 1993 to 2000, with peaks in 1995, 1996 and the fourth quarter of 2000, as well as significant losses in Palestinian external trade and foreign investment. 191/ Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip declined 36.1 per cent between 1992 and 1996, as a result largely of Israeli closures. The most serious negative social effect of this downturn was the emergence of chronic unemployment: the average unemployment rates in the Occupied Palestinian Territory during the 1980s were generally under 5 per cent; by the mid-1990s, that level had risen to over 20 per cent. Starting in 1997, Israel’s use of comprehensive closures eased somewhat, fuelling a modest economic recovery in 1998-1990, which was brought to an abrupt halt in 2000 with the outbreak of the second intifada. 192/
In the period 1990-2000, the living conditions of the Palestinian people were also impacted by house demolitions and uprooting of trees, expropriation of agricultural land and restriction on water use by Israel. During 1999 alone, 460 Palestinians received demolition notifications for their houses. Most of the affected properties were located in Jerusalem and Hebron. On occasion, Israeli forces prevented residents from cultivating their land adjacent to their houses and cut off their neighbourhood water supplies (see A/55/84-E/2000/16, annex, para. 17). The confiscation of land also had a critical impact upon the Palestinian community. During 1999 alone, Israel forcefully expropriated 40,178 dunums 193/ of Palestinian land, of which 19,691 dunums were used for settlement activities and related bypass roads. An additional 7,550 dunums were levelled by uprooting or burning 15,180 trees, mostly productive trees such as olive, almond and fig trees (ibid., para. 13).
Focus: the situation of Palestinian children at the beginning of the first intifadaInternational customary and conventional law such as the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to both The Hague Convention of 29 July 1989 (II) and The Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 (IV), and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention, give legal protection to the child under military occupation. Children are considered in need of protection because of their vulnerability, age, immaturity, and absence de discernment. According to articles 27 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, children, like all civilians, shall be treated humanely, free of coercion, corporal and collective punishments as well as with respect for their life, physical well-being and moral integrity. Furthermore, article 50 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates the following:
“The occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.” During more than 20 years of military rule, two generations of Palestinian children have suffered from serious limitations imposed on their basic rights to education, effective protection of the family, health and worship as well as sustained attempts to alienate them from their rich history, customs and tradition. The violent death and physical injury, the destruction of homes, disregard for nationality, collective punishments, the detention and cruel treatment of children under arrest, and an all-pervasive climate of oppression, suspicion and fear continue to shape the lives of Palestinian children. Every day and in nearly every aspect of life, they are dependent on the policies of the occupation authorities. Whether in the street, at school or at home, Palestinian children live in the shadow of mounting repression, violence and grief.
Source: United Nations, Palestinian children in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 1990.
The General Assembly at the start of this period adopted resolutions 44/174 and 46/162, entitled “Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory,” in which it affirmed that the Israeli occupation was contradictory to the basic requirements for social and economic development in the occupied Palestinian Territory. Moreover, in these resolutions the Assembly called upon Israel to halt practices that were detrimental to the social and economic well-being of Palestinians, and rejected Israel’s plans to expand settlements, deeming them to be illegal. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly on progress made in the implementation in the resolutions.
From 1996 to 2000, the Economic and Social Council adopted similar resolutions, entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan” (see resolutions 1996/40, 1997/67, 1998/32, 1999/53 and 2000/31).
The Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare annual reports on the different Israeli practices that affected the living conditions of the Palestinian people under occupation. In 1989, a report entitled “Israeli trade practices in the occupied Palestinian territories” (A/44/277-E/1989/82) was submitted to the General Assembly upon the request of the Council. 194/ It identified trade practices that were precluding the growth of Palestinian production as well as exploiting low wage Palestinian labour.
The General Assembly recognized that the establishment of settlements by Israelis had adverse repercussion on the economic and social living conditions of the Palestinian people and their well-being, including the continuous exploitation of the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, to the advantage of the settlers. From 1991 until 1995, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions entitled “Economic and social repercussions of Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population in the Syrian Golan” (resolutions 46/199, 47/172, 48/212, 49/133 and 50/129) 195/ in which the Assembly deplored Israel’s practices, in particular land confiscation, the diversion of water resources and the depletion of natural and other economic resources. Starting in 1993, the Assembly, in the resolutions, welcomed the ongoing Middle East peace process and acknowledged its importance, while continuing to recognize the economic and social repercussions of Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory and reaffirming their inalienable right to their natural and other economic resources.
Similarly, from 1992 to 1996, the Economic and Social Council adopted resolutions entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan” (resolutions 1992/57, 1993/52, 1994/45, 1995/49 and 1996/40 of 26 July 1996). In resolutions 1992/57 and 1993/52, the Council deplored the establishment of settlements, as well as other Israeli practices including land confiscation, appropriation of water resources, depletion of other resources, and deportation of the population from their territories. In the relevant resolutions adopted from 1994 to 1996, the Council took into consideration the ongoing peace process and welcomed the signing of the Declaration of Principles, as they expressed their concern about the Israeli establishment of settlements, recognized the social and economic repercussions of these settlements on the Arab population under occupation and reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian and other Arab population to their natural and other economic resources.
Starting in 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 47/172 a report entitled: “Economic and Social repercussions of the Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and other Arab population of the Syrian Golan” (A/48/188-E/1993/78). The report indicated that land confiscation, coupled with curfews imposed by Israel on the Palestinian people, including avoiding clashes between Palestinians and Israeli settlers, have had a negative impact on the agricultural sector. The report also found that the establishment of seaside settlements in the Gaza Strip had reduced the fishing area since fishing near or opposite settlements was not allowed. It also found that Israel had, for purported security reasons, uprooted fruit trees, in particular olive trees, thereby depriving farmers of their main income and forcing them to leave their land.
The reports submitted by the Secretary-General between 1993 and 2000 concluded that Israeli practices − especially the establishment of settlements and the provision of services and security to the settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, had negative economic and social repercussions that affected the living conditions of the Palestinian people under occupation. The reports concluded that land confiscation and Israeli water policies were detrimental to agriculture and precluded Palestinians from building houses; the uprooting of fruit trees and the construction of settlements were affecting the income of many Palestinian farmers and fishermen (see, e.g. A/49/169-E/1994/73); the exploitation of water and other economic resources affected the livelihood of Palestinians; and, the dumping of waste water near water sources and agricultural lands was affecting the Palestinian environment and polluting Palestinian natural resources. The reports also emphasized impediments to the Palestinian economy caused by the curfews and closures imposed by Israel (see chap. II.G above).
The living conditions in the Palestinian Territory through 2000 and the economic situation remained precarious owing to the continued occupation by Israel and its often excessive and destructive responses to the beginning of the second intifada. Moreover, the political uncertainty resulting from the lack of progress in implementing the Israeli-Palestinian agreements had a dampening effect on foreign investment. In addition, trade was stagnant owing to the imposition by Israel of a number of restrictions on Palestinian economic transactions, such as delivering Palestinian products (especially agricultural) to Israel and other foreign markets through Israel, and restricting border and loading operations, which resulted in increased transaction costs and cumbersome transaction processes. These restrictions hindered the growth of exports and thus the growth of the Palestinian economy (see A/55/84-E/2000/16).
As mentioned earlier, the Declaration of Principles of 1993 (annex III, Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programmes) and the Interim Agreement of 1995 (annex III, art. 40, Protocol concerning Civil Affairs), contained provisions related to water. Under the Interim Agreement, Israel recognized the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. 196/ Moreover, the question of water resources was one of the main issues to be resolved in the envisaged final status talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan signed in 1994, especially Annex II on water-related matters, constituted the first major water-related agreement in the region. In the absence of an agreement involving all three riparians of the lower Jordan River basin, the “Declaration of Principles for Cooperation on Water-related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources” of 13 February 1996 addressed some of the cooperation issues related to water resources, without, however, improving the existing limited allocation of water resources available to the Palestinians. On the ground, the water question became critical for the Palestinians and was the subject of many protests.
Out of the total annual supply of 800 million m3 of water, the Palestinians were allowed the use of only 110 million m3 despite the rapid growth in the Palestinian population, while the rest was diverted for use by Israel and the settlements. The prohibition against the Palestinians exploiting their water resources, coupled with an increasing population, affected agriculture and caused water shortages for individual use. Moreover, as more land was seized by Israel for the construction of settlements, the area devoted to rain-fed and cereal cultivation by Palestinians was further reduced. 196/
This situation led the Economic and Social Council, in its resolutions 1989/86, and 1990/53, entitled “Israeli economic practices in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories”, to request the Secretary-General to prepare a report entitled “Israeli land and water policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories”.
The report (A/46/263-S/1991/88) identified a number of serious economic and social consequences of Israel’s land and water policies and practices, such as: conflict and competition over land and water resources between villages and Israeli settlements; only 16 per cent of the groundwater available in the West Bank was left for the Palestinian population; wells in the West Bank were drying up as a result of the continuous drilling of new wells by Israel; and, the overexploitation of groundwater owing to the great increase in demand for water by settlers in the Gaza Strip led to water intrusion and increased salinity, rendering 50 per cent of wells in the Gaza Strip unfit for either human use or irrigation. Moreover, the report indicated that Israel’s policy of confiscating Palestinian land and uprooting fruit trees also affected agriculture and other economic sectors, and thus contributed to the adverse living conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
United Nations bodies such as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have recognized since 1992 the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and population of the Syrian Golan to their natural resources in a succession of resolutions entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied since 1967, and on the Arab population of the Syrian Golan,” and determined the infringement of these rights to be illegal (see General Assembly resolution 48/212). Starting in 1996, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources” (resolutions 51/190, 52/207, 53/196, 54/230 and 55/209).
In these resolutions, the Assembly expressed its concern at the exploitation by Israel, the occupying Power, of the natural resources of the occupied Palestinian, as well as other occupied Arab territories. While the Assembly welcomed the Middle East peace process or called for its resumption as in resolution 55/209, it called upon Israel not to exploit or cause loss or danger to the natural resources. Furthermore, the General Assembly reaffirmed “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water” and recognized “the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or depletion of, or danger to, their natural resources, and expresses the hope that this issue will be dealt with in the framework of the final status negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides.”
B. Assistance to the Palestinian People
As a result of initial progress made in peace efforts, the period between 1993 and 2000 witnessed a fundamental change in dealing with the issue of assistance to the Palestinian people. The international community recognized the need to assist and entrust the Palestinian Authority with the development of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which entailed the creation of numerous Palestinian quasi-governmental institutions, including the Palestinian Police (see General Assembly resolutions 49/21 N and O; and document A/50/763), as well as social, economic, financial, technical and capacity-building assistance. At the same time, UNRWA continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees, including in the refugee camps in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, addressed separately below. Moreover, in response to the deteriorating situation on the ground at the end of 2000, the UNDP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People launched emergency projects in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
According to the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, during the period 1993 to 1999, 48 donors provided $2.75 billion in disbursed funds, thus making the Palestinian Territory the world’s largest recipient of development assistance in per capita terms, with an average of $200 per person (see A/55/137-E/2000/95). Yet, commitments fell yearly, declining from $789.9 million in 1996 to $546.8 million in 1999 and disbursements have fallen from $511.6 million in 1996 to $513 million in 1997, $409.2 million in 1998 and $417.1 million in 1999. However, Israel’s closures − when fully in place − cost the Occupied Palestinian Territory an estimated $4 million to 6 million a day in lost income and output, far exceeding any assistance that the international aid community could provide. 197/
The United Nations during the period from 1989 to 2000 intensified its activities in tangible support of the peace process. As mentioned earlier, the United Nations participated at a conference to support Middle East peace, held on 1 October 1993 in Washington, D.C. The United Nations field presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory increased from 3 organizations in 1993 to 13 in 1999. 197/ As discussed, in 1994, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories with the mandate to guide and coordinate different United Nations programmes and assist the Palestinian Authority and donors in coordinating, among other things, international development assistance. 198/
Since its inception, the office of the Special Coordinator has been instrumental in coordinating and facilitating the work of the different United Nations agencies. In addition, UNSCO has produced annual reports on the economic and social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with updated data from Palestinian, Israeli and international sources. These reports covered issues such as macroeconomics, the labour market, household living standards, private investment trends and approved investment projects. The reports also analysed the challenges and opportunities of the business environment and the repercussions of adverse situations. 199/
In 1999, the Secretary-General reconfigured the mandate of the Special Coordinator, whose title was changed to the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority (see A/55/137-E/2000/95, para. 45).
By 2000, numerous United Nations agencies and programmes were active in extending assistance to the Palestinian people (see A/54/134, E/1999/85). A wide spectrum of projects that were initiated required the expertise of the following United Nations entities, each in its respective field: FAO, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the International Labour Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Trade Centre, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, UNESCO, the United Nations Environment Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Volunteers, the Universal Postal Union, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization (see A/54/134-E/1999/85).
Starting in 1989, the General Assembly adopted annual resolutions entitled “Assistance to the Palestinian people.” The Assembly affirmed in these resolutions that the Palestinian people could not develop their national economy as long as the Israeli occupation persisted. The Assembly also rejected Israeli restrictions on external economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory. In its resolutions from 1989 until 1993, the General Assembly called upon relevant organizations and agencies of the United Nations system to improve coordination through an appropriate mechanism under the auspices of the Secretary-General. From 1994 to 2000, the Assembly stressed the importance of the work done by the Special Coordinator and of the steps taken under the auspices of the Secretary-General to ensure the achievement of a coordinated mechanism for United Nations activities throughout the occupied territories.
The Assembly also emphasized the importance of trade for the growth of the Palestinian economy through the above-mentioned resolutions and others. In its resolutions adopted between 1989 and 1993, the Assembly called for the granting of trade concessions and concrete preferential measures for Palestinian exports on the basis of Palestinian certificate of origin. From 1994 to 2000, the Assembly, in its resolutions, urged “Member States to open their markets to exports from the West Bank and Gaza on the most favourable terms, consistent with appropriate trading rules”.
After 1993, the General Assembly, in its resolutions on assistance, reflected appreciation for the progress made in the peace talks and continued to express awareness that development was difficult under occupation and best promoted in circumstances of peace and stability (see resolutions 48/213, 49/21 N, 54/116 and 55/173). It also reiterated the urgency of improving the deteriorating living and economic conditions in the Occupied Territory and the need to assist in building Palestinian institutions. Throughout the period, the Assembly urged Member States, the international financial institutions of the United Nations system, and others to extend economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people in close cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization and through official Palestinian institutions.
Meanwhile, the Economic and Social Council, throughout the period under consideration, expressed its concern about the development of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the assistance required towards this end. In its resolutions adopted from 1989 to 1994 (resolutions 1989/96, 1990/59, 1991/69, 1192/58, 1993/78 and 1994/29), the Council confirmed its rejection of Israeli restrictions on international assistance, and called upon United Nations system agencies to mobilize resources to improve the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people. It called upon neighbouring countries to facilitate the movement of Palestinian exports, and upon the international community to make concessions for Palestinian merchandise. In 1994, the Council welcomed the progress made in peace negotiations and called for the full engagement of the United Nations in building Palestinian institutions and providing assistance in the fields of elections, police training and public administration (see resolution 1994/29).
On its part, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People also engaged in activities that promoted assistance to the Palestinian people. Starting in 1992, the General Assembly suggested that the Committee consider convening seminars on assistance to the Palestinian people (see resolutions 47/170, 54/39 and 54/40). Responding to these resolutions, and consistent with the mandate of the Committee, starting in 1993, it annually convened seminars on assistance to the Palestinian people. They were instrumental in affirming the need for, discussing modalities of, and encouraging the international community to extend assistance to the Palestinian people. They also provided an opportunity for donors, Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the Palestinian Authority to exchange views and discuss issues related to development and assistance.
In 1993, the Committee convened a seminar entitled “Assistance to the Palestinian people” at UNESCO in Paris. The seminar provided a framework of discussion for experts, donors and various members of the international community (see A/48/168-E/1993/62). The Committee convened seminars in 1994 and 1995, also in Paris, entitled “Palestinian Trade and Investment Needs” and on “Palestinian Administrative, Managerial and Financial Needs and Challenges,” respectively (see A/50/278-E/1995/114).
The following year, in Cairo, the Committee convened a seminar entitled “Building the Palestinian economy: challenges and prospects”. The participants at the meeting focused on the need for: accelerated disbursement by international donors; promoting Palestinian foreign trade; housing; and, lifting the Israeli closure of the Palestinian territories (see A/51/166-E/1996/67). In 1997, the Committee held a seminar in Amman on the theme “Assistance to the Palestinian people”, which provided a forum to discuss sustainable human development and the role of international assistance in this regard, particularly in light of the hardships posed by the occupation (see A/52/179-E/1997/76).
A seminar entitled “Facing the Challenges of the year 2000: Promoting Palestinian National Development” was held in Cairo in 1998 (see A/53/152-E/1998/71). In 1999, the seminar was replaced by the “Bethlehem 2000 International Conference”, held at FAO in Rome. In 2000, the Committee returned to Cairo for a seminar entitled “Prospects for Palestinian Economic Development and the Middle East Peace Process”. The seminar discussed the state of the Palestinian economy and its prospects with a view to mobilize greater support from the international community (see A/55/144-E/2000/87).
From 1989 to 2000, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) continued to provide humanitarian support to Palestinian children and women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Among the objectives of UNICEF humanitarian assistance were: the reduction of child and maternal mortality; the improvement in the quality and relevance of education in and out of school and the extension of physiotherapeutic and psychosocial rehabilitation services for disabled children (see A/48/183-E/1993/74, para.12). Moreover, in 1998, UNICEF contributed $1.8 million to the Palestinian Authority Master Plan of Operations: Palestinian Children and Women (see A/54/134-E/1999/85, para. 54). By 2000, UNICEF was still contributing to the Master Plan by providing technical assistance and supplies for capacity-building of Palestinian governmental and non-governmental institutions and advocacy and social mobilization activities (see A/55/137-E/2000/95, para. 31).
The contribution of UNDP through its Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People, which was created in 1978 by the General Assembly in its resolution 33/147, grew considerably throughout the period under consideration reaching some $35 million to $40 million annually (see http://www.undp.org/dpa/journalists/pappbrief.pdf), with a total portfolio of ongoing projects reaching some $145 million at the end of the decade (see DP/2001/14). A wide spectrum of projects were undertaken by the Programme, ranging from developing infrastructure − such as assisting in constructing roads, reconstructing churches, and clearing agricultural land − to producing an analytical publication on the state of poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (see DP/1994/14, DP/1995/20/Rev.1, DP/1996/15, DP/1996/18/Add.1, DP/1996/39, DP/1997/16/Add.3, DP/1998/17/Add.4, DP/1999/15 and DP/2000/18).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development undertook a number of analytical publications on the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, focusing on trade and Palestinian merchandise (TD/B/42(1)/19 (vol. I & II), TD/B/44/10, A/52/15, TD/B/46/5 and TD/B/47/5). Similarly, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia conducted a number of studies on the effects of the economic and social environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory on the Palestinian population. The Commission also provided recommendations and policy formulation advisory services based on field studies that monitored the social and economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see A/48/183-E/1993/74, paras. 29 and 30; A/50/286-E/1995/113, paras. 54, 92 and 99; A/53/153-E/1998/75, para. 24).
In the context of the Middle East peace process, United Nations assistance to the Palestinian people was extended towards the implementation of the Palestinian Development Plans of 1998-2000 (see A/53/153-E/1998/75) and 1999-2003 (see A/55/137-E/2000/95, para. 10), which included the following goals: infrastructure and natural resources management; institutional capacity-building; human resources and social development; and the development of productive sectors. The United Nations was involved in a wide range of activities that aimed at assisting the Palestinian Authority in implementing the Palestinian Development Plans. By the end of the decade, the United Nations was associated with projects in the Occupied Palestinian Territory valued at more than a three quarters of a billion dollars. 200/
C. Palestinian women
The situation of Palestinian women under occupation, including in refugee camps, was a growing concern for the United Nations during the period under consideration, which saw the establishment of various assistance programmes and the recognition of the need for the involvement of Palestinian women in conflict resolution and peace-related activities. This concern was initially expressed at the World Conference on Women at Nairobi in 1985. The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women specifically addresses Palestinian women both under occupation and in refugee camps:
The special and immediate needs of Palestinian women and children should be identified and appropriate provision made. United Nations projects should be initiated to help Palestinian women in the fields of health, education, and vocational training. Their living conditions inside and outside the occupied territories should be studied by the appropriate United Nations units and agencies assisted, as appropriate, by specialized research institutes from various regions. The results of these studies should be given broad publicity to promote actions at all levels. The international community should exert all efforts to stop the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian women should be allowed to enjoy security in a liberated homeland also in accordance with United Nations resolutions.
201
/
In September 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was convened at Beijing. The Conference resulted in a Platform for Action which−without making reference to any particular national context−considered “Women under occupation” under the strategic area of concern “Women and armed conflict”, where it established a link between the advancement of women and the peaceful settlement of conflict. Moreover, the Platform for Action acknowledged the necessity for women to contribute to conflict resolution and their crucial role during times of armed conflict and collapse of communities.
The Economic and Social Council, for its part, adopted resolutions entitled “Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women,” 202/ in which it requested the Commission on the Status of Women to monitor the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and the Beijing Platform for Action, in so far as Palestinian women are concerned, and to submit reports to the Commission on the status of women on the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions.
In the resolutions, the Council also addressed the specific hardships faced by Palestinian women living under Israeli occupation. In 1989, in its resolution 1989/34 on the situation of Palestinian women, the Council condemned the relentless continuation of the “iron-fist” policy by Israel against Palestinian women and their families in the occupied Palestinian Territory, which had started earlier in the decade. Throughout the period, these resolutions demanded that Israel comply fully with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War in order to protect the rights of Palestinian women and their families, and reaffirmed that the basic improvement of the living conditions of Palestinian women could only be achieved through an end to the occupation and the attainment of their right to establish an independent State (see resolutions 1990/11, para. 1; 1991/19, para. 1; 1992/16, para. 1; and 1993/15, para. 1).
In its resolution 1995/30, the Council welcomed the signing by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Government of Israel of the Declaration of Principles on interim self-government arrangements and the implementation of the agreements reached between the two sides. In subsequent resolutions, the Council continued to support the Middle East peace process, while at the same time reaffirming that the Israeli occupation constituted a major obstacle for the advancement of Palestinian women (see resolutions 1995/30, 1996/5, 1998/10,1999/15 and 2000/23). In addition, the Council urged, throughout the period, Member States, financial organizations of the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations and other relevant institutions to extend financial and technical assistance to Palestinian women.
As a consequence of the Beijing Platform for Action, the Commission on the Status of Women adopted, from 1996 until 1999, resolutions 40/1, 41/1, 42/2 and 43/1 respectively, calling for the release of women and children taken hostages in armed conflicts (see E/CN.6/1996/15-E/1996/27, E/CN.6/1997/9-E/1997/27, E/CN.6/1999/10-E/1999/27 and E/CN.6/2000/9-E/2000/27). These resolutions were also recommended to the Economic and Social Council for adoption. Pursuant to the Interim Agreement of September 1995 and the signing of the Hebron Protocol, in February 1997, Israel released 356 Palestinian detainees, among them 30 Palestinian women. This step was welcomed by the Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, René Felber, and by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and raised expectations about the peace process (see A/52/35 and GA/PAL/767).
In addition to recommending the above-mentioned resolutions to the Economic and Social Council for adoption, in 1994, 1995 and 1996, the Commission adopted resolutions entitled “Integration of women in the Middle East peace process”. In its resolution 40/2, the Commission recalled section E of chapter IV of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and stressed the importance of the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict and:
“3. Urges Governments, intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental organizations to include women in the peace process;
“7. Calls upon all Member States to extend economic, financial and technical assistance to parties in the region and to render support for the peace process, especially with regard to women;
“8. Urges Member States to ensure that all economic, financial and technical assistance to parties in the region take into account the role of women as full participants and beneficiaries;
“9. Considers that an active United Nations role in the Middle East peace process and in assisting in the implementation of the Declaration of Principles can make a positive contribution with regard to the status of women” (see resolutions 38/1, 39/3 and 40/2).
From 1989 until 2000, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on the Status of Women on the situation of Palestinian women. From 1994 to 1996, the Secretary-General’s reports, entitled “Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women” (see E/CN.6/1994/6, E/CN.6/1995/8 and E/CN.6/1996/8, examined the situation of Palestinian women in such critical areas as family life, economy and employment, education and health (from 1997 to 2000, the Secretary-General’s review of the situation of Palestinian women was incorporated into his reports to the Commission of the Status of Women entitled “Follow-up on the Fourth World Conference on Women: Follow-up to and implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action” (see E/CN.6/1997/2, E/CN.6/1998/2/Add.2, E/CN.6/1999/2 and E/CN.6/2000/2)).
For example, the Secretary-General’s report of 1994 (E/CN.6/1994/6) concluded that during the first intifada, Palestinian women had experienced violence and maltreatment owing to the unrest and armed conflict. Palestinian women and their families were exposed to worsening security, economic and environmental conditions. Women and children were particularly affected by military assaults, demolition of homes, and the collective punishment of closures. The closures particularly impacted the Palestinian economy, health care, education and access to services. Moreover, the report concluded that the overexploitation of the water resources by the Israeli authorities and the settlers and the uprooting of olive and fruit trees created ecological problems that were also impacting the life of the Palestinians, especially women and children. It was also noted that the number of female-headed families was high among the refugee population and the life of Palestinian families was characterized by frequent separations. The absence of male family members as a result of detentions, expulsions, imprisonment or death increased the number of female-headed families, which were particularly vulnerable to poverty since the majority of women could not ensure a living for their families owing to a lack of education or skills or because of certain socio-cultural restrictions that restricted their movement. The report concluded:
“23. Adequate funds and resources should be given to women-in-development programmes and women-in-development personnel of sufficient authority should be included in all policy, planning and programming activities. Appropriate quantitative and qualitative national targets need to be identified. A national machinery for the advancement of Palestinian women is already in place but needs recognition, authority and influence at the highest political level. Women need to participate in future governance structures and in existing development institutions, and most importantly, need to be involved in the formulation of development strategies. Skills-training and gender-awareness are important tools for achieving these goals.
“24. Besides providing adequate health services and improved education, the most important programme will be to enhance the development of sustainable income-generation activities for women. Realistic, feasible possibilities and basic support facilities need to be identified. Palestinian women need support from the international community, non-governmental organizations and donor agencies in this respect.”
Towards the end of the period under consideration, the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Commission on the Status of Women on 9 January 2001 (E/CN.6/2001/2) included a section on the situation of and assistance to Palestinian women. The report indicated that, while Palestinian women’s employment and participation in the labour force were showing positive signs, other factors were still adversely affecting their living conditions. Closures and restrictions at checkpoints continued to affect severely the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although a number of Palestinian prisoners had been released within the framework of the peace agreements, the total number of prisoners remained high, which led the Palestinian women to take additional burdens and assume roles other than those traditionally performed by them (ibid., paras. 74-81).
The Secretary-General’s report also discussed the assistance that was extended by various United Nations institutions to Palestinian women. In addition to providing education, health, relief and social services, UNRWA began a review of its gender policies and practices in order to align them with those described in the framework of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Moreover, more than 50 per cent of the Agency’s financial and material assistance was extended to female-headed families. More than 27,000 participants from refugee camps also benefited from the various activities that were provided at 70 UNRWA Women Programme Centres. These activities varied from computer training to English language courses, childcare services for working women, group guaranteed lending, to health awareness and legal counselling. In addition, the UNRWA income-generation programme granted an amount of $3.12 million to 3,716 women who supported more than 20,000 dependents (ibid., paras. 85-90).
For its part, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia carried out in 1999 and 2000 a number of activities concerning Palestinian women, such as seminars and studies that recommended policies aimed at gender mainstreaming in conflict countries (ibid., para. 84).
The ILO Regional Office for Arab States carried out projects that aimed at supporting Palestinian women. Seminars and workshops were held, some for gender mainstreaming in different ministries of the Palestinian Authority, and to train trainers to develop technical capacity and skills for women entrepreneurs. ILO also developed an action plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip on capacity-building on gender, poverty and employment (ibid., para. 91).
UNICEF was also involved in activities aimed at supporting and assisting Palestinian women. In addition to advocacy for women’s rights, non-discrimination and gender equality, UNICEF supported activities aimed at improving women’s quality of health by training doctors and nurses. UNICEF also sought to identify the causes of child and maternal mortality, along with conducting other studies on ways to improve the quality of life of Palestinian women. At the same time, UNICEF launched a number of campaigns among students to raise awareness of gender and development, reviewed textbooks to assess their gender sensitivity and shared the findings with the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Education (ibid., paras. 93-97).
On its part, on 31 October 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on women and peace and security. The resolution emphasized the role of women in peacebuilding and called for the involvement of women in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts.
D. East Jerusalem
Following the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1980, Israel declared that “Jerusalem, whole and united, was the capital of Israel”. This annexation was rejected by the international community deemed to be unlawful, null and void, and the Palestinians continued to claim East Jerusalem as an integral part of the Palestinian Territory occupied in 1967 and as the capital of a future independent State of Palestine. 203/ Israel invested vast resources into altering the physical and demographic characteristics of the city in contravention of international humanitarian law. It enforced a strict quota on Palestinian housing construction, demolished houses, expelled Palestinians, confiscated land and erected physical barriers between the City and the surrounding towns, villages and cities of the West Bank. The General Assembly reflected in its annual resolutions on Jerusalem the concern over Israel’s violations of international law by measures changing the legal and administrative status and the demographic composition of the city and showing little respect for private property and personal rights and freedoms (see resolutions 2253 (ES-V), 36/120 E and 55/50).
Following Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967, around 66,000 Palestinians were living within the municipal boundaries, who were subsequently classified by the occupying Power as permanent residents of Israel. At that time, the Jewish population of East Jerusalem was essentially nil. In 2000, around 170,000 Israeli settlers were estimated to be living within the Israeli-set boundaries of East Jerusalem (see http://www.arij.org/paleye/colony-survey/index.htm).
The civil liberties of Palestinians in East Jerusalem suffered during the first intifada and the situation did not improve during the 1990s. Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, the Israeli authorities sought to curb activities by PLO and the Palestinian Authority in East Jerusalem, on the grounds that they “were undermining Israel’s sovereignty over the City”. 204/ Several offices linked to the Palestinian Authority were closed, and legal proceedings were initiated against the Orient House, the Palestinian centre housing various organizations, which served as the headquarters of the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks (see A/50/463, para. 102). However, Palestinian religious and social institutions continued to function in East Jerusalem. In 1994, Palestinian Authority President Arafat appointed Ikrima Sabri as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Moreover, under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995, certain restrictions on political expression were lifted and East Jerusalem residents were allowed to participate in the Palestinian elections of January 1996, albeit in a restricted fashion (see SG/SM/5879).
Throughout the period under consideration, Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem were expanded 205/ and land expropriation and land use restrictions affected the living conditions and the livelihood of the Palestinian people. The total land area of settlements in East Jerusalem was estimated at 24,754 dunums. Although at the beginning of the peace process there was a certain redirection of resources away from the construction of settlements, the Government of Israel made it clear that construction projects in East Jerusalem would continue. It built subsidized housing in East Jerusalem and offered financial incentives for the settlers to move there. A second tier of newer settlements was gradually expanding outward in a “Greater Jerusalem” area, which reportedly covered approximately 10 per cent of the land area of the West Bank, encompassing an area “from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the South, “Ma’aleh Adumim” in the east, and Mevasseret in the west in one metropolitan area”. 206/
The indefinite closure of the West Bank, imposed by Israel in March 1993, severely restricted the freedom of movement of Palestinians not only to and from Jerusalem, but also between the northern and southern sections of the West Bank. The restriction of movement of people and goods caused a deterioration in economic conditions, disrupted patterns of religious, educational, cultural, and family life as well as access to medical care, and undermined East Jerusalem’s traditional status as the centre of Palestinian economic, cultural and religious life. The closure was condemned by Palestinian and Israeli human rights groups as “an illegal collective punishment of the Palestinian population and as disproportionate to any legitimate security concern”. 207/
The holy site known as Al-Haram Al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) to the Muslims, and the Temple Mount to the Jews, and located in East Jerusalem, remained a very sensitive issue to both sides of the conflict. In the period under consideration, Israeli groups engaged Palestinian worshipers in violent confrontations often leading to a heavy number of casualties among the Palestinians which had a direct bearing on the issue of freedom of worship and the responsibility to protect the Holy Places by Israel, the occupying Power. As mentioned earlier, both the Security Council and the General Assembly called upon Israel effectively to prevent acts of violence by Israeli settlers.
East Jerusalem is also home to the Shu’fat Palestine refugee camp. Towards the end of the period, the population of the camp was estimated at some 10,000 people (see http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/population. pdf). The conditions there were marked by overcrowding with the refugee population increasing while the camp remained restricted by Israel within its original boundaries (see http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/marshy.html). The residents of the refugee camp were among the poorest in Jerusalem, the camp also had the worst infrastructure among the camps administered by UNRWA, camps with unpaved streets and a lack of a water network owing to the restrictions by the Israeli administration of Jerusalem (see http://www.sabeel.org/old/news/newslt13/Index.htm).
E. Palestine refugees
During the period under consideration, UNRWA continued to provide essential education, health, relief and social services as well as other humanitarian assistance to the Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In July 1996, UNRWA completed the move of its headquarters from Vienna to the Gaza Strip and expanded its activities to include certain responsibilities in the emergency and protection areas 208/ (see also chap. I.C above).
Observing on 8 December 1999 the passage of 50 years since the General Assembly adopted resolution 302 (IV) that established the Agency, the President of the General Assembly stated that UNRWA was the longest-running humanitarian programme the United Nations had ever undertaken and the only such programme devoted to the well-being of a single people (see GA/SM/137-PAL/1876). At the same time, the many issues pertaining to the future of the Palestine refugees, notably the exercise of the right of return enshrined in General Assembly resolution 194 (III), 209/ were to be resolved by Israel and the Palestinians through permanent status negotiations. Similarly, the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees established in March 1992, in the context of Madrid Peace Conference, produced no conclusive results 210/ (see chap. III above).
Between 1989 and 2000, UNRWA provided services on a broad scale in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. By 2000, UNRWA schools had an enrolment of more than 220,000 pupils and UNRWA clinics handled almost 3.5 million patient visits. UNRWA also continued to be a safety net for refugees living in poverty: it promoted skills by providing training for women and the youth, arranged for community rehabilitation for persons with disabilities, and initiated a microfinance project in the Gaza Strip for credit-deprived micro-entrepreneurs. The number of registered refugees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, increased from approximately 868,000 in 1989 to 1.4 million in 2000.
In the period from 1988 to 1993, the Agency mounted a large-scale emergency programme to alleviate the suffering of refugee communities affected by Israeli measures during the first intifada. UNRWA extended some degree of protection to the refugees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by seeking to uphold their safety and security, and their legal and human rights, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/47. Because of the special conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UNRWA sought to improve the infrastructure in refugee camps as well as service-delivery capacity to ease the dire living conditions and improve the effectiveness of its health and education activities. The emergency interventions of UNRWA and its development of infrastructure channelled significant funds into the Occupied Palestinian Territory between 1989 and 1993, in addition to its allocations for the regular programmes there, which rose from $93.6 million in 1989 to $133.7 million in 2000.
After the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, UNRWA initiated a Peace Implementation Programme that mobilized project funding for education, health, relief, social development services, and income-generating activities. Some $230 million were allocated through the Programme between 1993 and 2000 throughout the Agency’s five operational fields, of which some $177 million were earmarked for projects in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. That year, the General Assembly, in its resolution 48/40, called upon UNRWA to “make a decisive contribution towards giving a fresh impetus to the economic and social stability of the occupied territories.” The Programme contributed in a very practical and tangible way to the improvement of the refugees’ overall living conditions by creating employment opportunities, developing infrastructure and promoting post-conflict rehabilitation (see A/56/13).
Throughout the 1990s, UNRWA activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, promoted social and economic development. The UNRWA microfinance programme grew to become the largest microcredit operation within the Occupied Palestinian Territory and an important source of local economic sustainability. UNRWA also cooperated closely with the newly established Palestinian Authority, with which it coordinated both education and health activities and promoted knowledge transfer in the area of human development.
V. Conclusion
The period under consideration in the present volume, 1989-2000, witnessed historical changes at both the global and regional levels that had a considerable impact on the search for peace in the Middle East, including efforts aimed at the resolution of the question of Palestine. With the start of the Middle East peace process in 1991 in Madrid, which for the first time brought all the parties to the conflict together, hope emerged that a peaceful settlement might finally be within reach. The hope was further strengthened when Israel and PLO embarked in 1993 on bilateral negotiations under the Declaration of Principles forged at Oslo that led to several agreements and important developments on the ground. The implementation of these agreements, among other things, brought about successive withdrawals of Israeli troops from areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and the holding of Palestinian elections.
In practice, the Declaration of Principles was an “agreement to seek agreement” on a multitude of detailed intermediate results and a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) – a basic commitment requiring the constant rekindling and maintenance of the political will to find a negotiated settlement. The increasingly complex diplomatic architecture that evolved comprised a host of agreements, memorandums and understandings as well as an ever-growing array of implementation agreements, mechanisms and modalities, which would be sorely tried in the years to come. In the meantime, Israel’s occupation and settlement policies continued in total contradiction to the goal of ending the occupation and achieving an end to the conflict based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). Extremism and violence increased on the ground. Urgent calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to ensure the security and protection of the Palestinian civilians under occupation went unheeded.
Ushering in a period of genuine excitement and much anticipation for a negotiated settlement of the question of Palestine, the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations that began in 1993 gave a boost to the fledgling Middle East peace process and, for a while, inspired tremendous hope within the international community and among the Israeli and Palestinian public. Over several years, the agreements reached by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and hard-won experience gained in implementing them, proved to be a legal framework and procedural catalyst that, many times in the face of adversity, helped the two sides to continue their challenging work. As the tangible results of the Middle East peace process became increasingly meagre and, towards the end of 2000, were rolled back when Israel reoccupied areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority, the conditions on the ground and the absence of progress in the diplomatic domain began further to polarize the sides. The political will to continue, let alone revitalize, the negotiating effort had all but dissipated and could not be sustained.
As shown, the peace negotiations that had started in Madrid were beset by serious procedural and difficult substantive problems. Expert observers found that Israel, the occupying Power, was dragging its feet in commencing negotiations with the Palestinians under the Madrid formula and did much, on the ground and at the diplomatic level, to complicate the implementation of agreements reached once the peace process had been put on a new footing under Oslo. 211/ Similarly, the Palestinians were seen as not entirely fulfilling their obligations under the agreements reached, in particular with regard to issues such as security and violence against Israeli civilians. Towards the end of the period under consideration, in 1999, negotiations had to devote a good deal of time and effort merely to finding common ground regarding the parties’ respective outstanding commitments under the bilateral agreements signed, taking the peace process to a new level of complexity. 212/ At the same time, Israel hastened to create facts on the ground, that were regarded as interfering with the fledgling negotiations, in particular the establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which are considered illegal under international law.
For many reasons, including aspects of the sprawling negotiations architecture itself, the peace process had come full circle by the end of the 1990s. By early 2001, with Intifada II well under way, the political will of the sides to seek agreement was exhausted and all but vanished, at tremendous cost for both peoples.
Early on in the process the international community recognized the need to affirm the permanent responsibility of the United Nations for the resolution of the question of Palestine. In its annual report dated 19 November 1992, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People stressed the essential need for an active role by the United Nations, the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the peace process, and reaffirmed the permanent responsibility of the United Nations with respect to the question of Palestine (see A/47/35, para. 88).
Following the Committee’s lead, in its resolution 47/64 A on the question of Palestine, the General Assembly affirmed for the first time that “the United Nations has a permanent responsibility with respect to the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy.” This assertion has been affirmed annually since 1992 by the General Assembly (see resolutions 48/158 A, 49/62 A, 50/84 A, 51/23, 52/49, 53/39, 54/39 and 55/52).
On 11 December 1992, after the vote on General Assembly resolution 47/64 D on the question of Palestine, the representative of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations underscored the importance of three principles: permanent United Nations responsibility in relation to the question of Palestine until the question was resolved in all its aspects; the effective implementation of United Nations resolutions, particularly those of the Security Council, that were binding regardless of developments in the current, or in any other, peace process; and any positive change in the international community’s stance towards Israel should be meticulously concurrent with and equal to genuine progress in the peace process and in the actual situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 213/
These principles remained essential in view of the often excruciatingly difficult negotiations throughout much of the 1990s and the tragic developments of late 2000, including the repeated breakdown of the bilateral peace negotiations between Israel and PLO, the tremendous challenges facing the Palestinian Authority and the worsening of the social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. During the same period, the principle of land for peace enshrined in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) continued to be regarded by the international community as the basis for the negotiated settlement of the question of Palestine, the core of the conflict in the Middle East, as was the full realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and independence.
* *** *
Annex I
List of documents related to the peace process
1. Madrid Peace Conference (30 October – 1 November 1991)
· United States letter of assurances to the Palestinian side · United States letter of assurances to Israel · Russian Federation-United States letter of invitation
2. Israel – Palestine Liberation Organization letters of mutual recognition
(10 September 1993)
3. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(13 September 1993)
4. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (4 May 1994)
· Rabin – Arafat letters · Maps
5. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
(29 August 1994)
6. Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (27 August 1995)
7. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(28 September 1995)
· Maps
8. Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (17 January 1997)
· Note for the Record
· Agreed Minute
· Letter by United States Secretary of State
· Map
9. Wye River Memorandum (23 October 1998)
10. Protocol on Redeployment Completed (20 November 1998)
11. Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations (4 September 1999)
12. Protocol concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(5 October 1999)
13. Trilateral Statement (25 July 2000)
14. President Clinton’s “Parameters” (December 2000)
15. Israeli-Palestinian [Negotiators’] Joint Statement (27 January 2001)
***
Annex II
Timeline attached to the Wye River Memorandum (1998)
Timeline
Note: Parenthetical references below are to paragraphs in “The Wye River Memorandum”, to which this timeline is an integral attachment. Topics not included in the timeline follow the schedule provided for in the text of the Memorandum.
1. Upon entry into Force of the Memorandum:
• Third further redeployment (F.D.R.) committee starts (I (B)) • Palestinian security work plan shared with the United States (II (A) (1) (b)) • Full bilateral security cooperation (II (B) (1)) • Trilateral security cooperation committee starts (II (B) (3)) • Interim committees resume and continue; Ad Hoc Economic Committee starts (III) • Accelerated permanent status negotiations start (IV)
2. Entry into Force – Week 2:
• Security work plan implementation begins (II (A) (1) (b)); (II (A) (1) (c)) committee starts • Illegal weapons framework in place (II (A) (2) (a)); Palestinian implementation report (II (A) (2) (b)) • Anti-incitement committee starts (II (A) (3) (b)); decree issued (II (A) (3) (a)) • PLO Executive Committee reaffirms Charter letter (II (C) (2)) • Stage 1 of further redeployment (F.R.D.) implementation: 2% C to B, 7.1% B to A. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I (A))
3. Week 2-6:•
Palestinian Central Council[*] reaffirms Charter letter (weeks two to four) (II (C) (2))
•
PNC and other PLO organizations reaffirm Charter letter (weeks four to six) (II (C) (2))
•
Establishment of weapons collection program (II (A) (2) (b)) and collection stage (II (A) (2) (c)); committee starts and reports on activities.
•
Anti-incitement committee report (II (A) (3) (b))
•
Ad Hoc Economic Committee: interim report at week three; final report at week six (III)
•
Policemen list (II (C) (1) (a)); Monitoring and Steering Committee review starts (II (C) (1) (c)
•
Stage 2 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B. Israeli officials acquaint their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I (A))
4. Week 6-12:•
Weapons collection stage II (A) (2) (b); II (A) (2) (c) committee report on its activities.
•
Anti-incitement committee report (II (A) (3) (b))
•
Monitoring and Steering Committee briefs U.S. on policemen list (II (C) (1) (c))
•
Stage 3 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B, 1% C to A, 7.1% B to A. Israeli officials acquaint Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out; report on F.R.D. implementation (I (A))
5. After Week 12:
Activities described in the Memorandum continue as appropriate and if necessary, including:•
Trilateral security cooperation committee (II (B) (3))
•
(II (A) (1) (c)) committee
•
(II (A) (1) (e)) committee
•
Anti-incitement committee (II (A) (3) (b))
•
Third Phase F.R.D. Committee (I (B))
•
Interim Committees (III)
•
Accelerated permanent status negotiations (IV)
Annex III
Principal entities related to the peace process
Bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
Joint Liaison CommitteeMonitoring and Steering Committee
Committees:
· Karni Industrial Estate (ad hoc)
· Gaza Airport
· Joint Economic Committee · Ad Hoc Economic Committee
· Passages
· Civil Affairs Committee
Regional subcommittees Professional subcommittees: Telecommunications (Ministry of Communications) Transportation (Ministry of Transport) Electricity (Ministry of Infrastructures) Population Registry (Coordinator) Water (Ministry of Infrastructures) Environment (Ministry of Environment) Postal Issues (Ministry of Communications) Employment (Ministry of Labour) Agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture)
· Safe Passage Committee · Standing Cooperation Committee
· Gaza Port
· Joint Security Committee
· Joint Legal Committee · Legal Affairs · Prisoners · Committee for Third Phase of Further Redeployments
· Trilateral Security Committee
· Trilateral Committee on Illegal Weapons
· Trilateral Anti-incitement Committee
Multilateral track
Steering Committee
· Environment Working Group · Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group · Refugees Working Group · Water Resources Working Group · Regional Economic Development Working Group
Development aid coordination bodies
The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee is a 12-member committee that serves as the principal policy-level coordination mechanism for development assistance to the Palestinian People. This forum seeks to promote dialogue between donors, the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel. Over time, the Committee evolved into a forum for focusing on short-term emergency funding needs. Chair: Norway. Membership: Canada, European Union, Japan, Norway, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United States. Associated members are the Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestinian Authority, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and the United Nations. Secretariat: World Bank.
The Local Aid Coordinating Committee comprises all donors and international agencies with a local presence in the West Bank and Gaza. It provides a forum for aid coordination, exchange of policy views and information on developments in the field. Chair: Norway with, as Co-Chairs, the World Bank and UNSCO. Membership: Local representatives of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and other bilateral and multilateral donors active in the West Bank and Gaza. Representatives of the Palestinian Authority. United Nations agencies attend as observers. Secretariat: World Bank and UNSCO jointly.
Source: http://www.lacs.ps/showLevelDiagram.aspx.
Annex IV
Principal entities of the Palestinian Authority
Presidency
Legislative Council
Ministries:
· Ministry of Agriculture
· Ministry of Civil Affairs
· Ministry of Culture
· Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
· Ministry of Education and Higher Education
· Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs
· Ministry of Finance
· Ministry of Health
· Ministry of Housing
· Ministry of Information
· Ministry of Interior
· Ministry of Justice
· Ministry of Labour
· Ministry of Local Government
· Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
· Ministry of Post and Telecommunication
· Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs
· Ministry of Public Works
· Ministry of Social Affairs
· Ministry of Supplies
· Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities
· Ministry of Transportation
· Ministry of Youth and Sports
Other entities:
· Central Electorate Department
· Civil Aviation Authority
· Energy Authority
· Insurance and Pension General Board
· National Centre for Studies and Documentation
· Oil General Board
· Palestine Monetary Authority
· Palestinian Archive Centre
· Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation
· Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
· Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
· Palestinian National Information Centre
· Palestinian News Agency (WAFA)
· Palestinian Planning Centre
· Palestinian Tobacco Board
· Refugees Affairs Department
· State Information Service
· Water Authority
Annex V
Troop redeployments under the peace process
(Estimates for the Occupied Palestinian Territory)a
(percentage)
East Jerusalem Gaza Strip West Bank
Area A Area B Area C
1994 (Gaza Strip, Jericho) – 80.0 0.3 – –
1995 (Oslo II) – 80.0 3.0 24.0 73.0
1998 (Wye River) – 80.0 10.1 18.9 71.0
1999 (Sharm El-Sheikh -Stage I) – 80.0 10.1 25.9 64.0
2000 (Sharm El-Sheikh Stage II) – 80.0 12.1 26.9 61.0
2000 (Sharm El-Sheikh Stage III) – 80.0 18.2 21.8 60.0
aEstimated to be an area of 5,970 sq km.
* *** *
Notes
1/ See the information note entitled “The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Division for Palestinian Rights”, United Nations, 2005.
2/See resolution 55/128, in which the Assembly expressed appreciation for the work done to preserve and modernize the existing records of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.
3/ European Union Summit Berlin Statement on the Middle East Peace Process of 25 March 1999, available from http://www.palestine-un.org/inter/berlin.html.
4/ Resolutions 45/130, 46/87, 47/82 and 48/94. The last resolution adopted by the General Assembly under such a title was resolution 49/151, which made no specific reference to the Palestinian people. See also resolution 49/149 addressed below.
5/ For United Nations action on the situation and role of Palestinian women in connection with such issues as women and peace and security and peacebuilding and assistance activities (see S/PV.4208; General Assembly special session on Women 2000; various reports of the Commission on the Status of Women and draft resolutions recommended for adoption by the Economic and Social Council; and Economic and Social Council resolutions on Palestinian women); see also chaps. III and IV below.
6/ It will be recalled that, on 15 December 1988, the General Assembly adopted resolution 43/177, in which it recalled Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) on the observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988, and decided that “the designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in the United Nations system”. See also United Nations, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1988, p. 270.
7/ The Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted at the International Conference and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 38/58 C, called for an international peace conference in which all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, would be invited to participate on an equal footing and with equal rights. See also United Nations, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917-1988; A/45/709; and A/48/607.
8/ The talks, headed by Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., the United States Ambassador to Tunisia, and Yasser Abed Rabbo of the Palestine Liberation Organization made no progress on the issue of military operations (see Bilal al-Hassan, “Arafat avant Madrid: Les regles de sa gestion politique”, in: Revue d’etudes palestiniennes, No. 96, été 2005, pp.17f.). See also Ambassador Pelletreau’s statement dated 22 March 1989 and the Palestine Liberation Organization statement contained in document A/45/317-S/21369.
9/ Resolution 44/42 was adopted by a vote of 151 in favour to 3 against, with 1 abstention.
10/ As discussed above, the call had last been made in resolution 47/64 D on the question of Palestine; see resolutions 47/64 A-E; see also United Nations, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, October 1994, p. 22.
11/ See United Nations, The Question of Palestine, 1979-1990, 1991, p. 17.
12/ For a detailed account of the first intifada during 1987 and 1988, see United Nations, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, 1917-1988, pp. 252-271.
13/ See United Nations, The Question of Palestine 1979-1990, July 1991, p. 42ff.; and United Nations, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, October 1994, p. 16ff.; see also General Assembly resolution 43/58 A.
14/ See Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, New York/London, 2000, p. 510, who details that in March 1993, 13 Israelis were killed by Palestinians.
15/ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1993.
16/ Ibid., 1994.
17/ See United Nations, The Question of Palestine, p. 46.
18/ In June 1990, United States President Bush would suspend the two-year dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization because of its failure to condemn a recent act of terrorism committed against Israel. See United States, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 1991.
19/ See United Nations, The Question of Palestine, p. 46f.
20/ Ibid., p. 46.
21/ See also Chinmaya Gharekhan, The Horseshoe Table, New Delhi, 2006, p. 187.
22/ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1993.
23/ See, for instance, the above-mentioned vetoed Security Council draft resolutions during 1989.
24/ See United Nations, The Question of Palestine, p. 47f.
25/ See also United Nations, The Status of Jerusalem, 1997.
26/ See S/22472 of 9 April 1991; and United Nations, The Question of Palestine, pp. 48-52.
27/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 509.
28/ Hamas is a Palestinian Islamic movement established in 1987 at the outset of the first intifada. Hamas is the Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya or Islamic Resistance Movement. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini) became operational in the early 1980s. 29/ Gharekhan, see footnote 21 above, at p. 188.
30/ In February 1993, an agreement with the Israeli Government was secured by the newly elected President Clinton of the United States, by which 100 of the 415 deportees would be immediately repatriated and the remainder by the end of the year. The United States Government was of the view that the agreement was consistent with Security Council resolution 799 (1992) and that further action by the Security Council in that regard was unnecessary. It was not until 15 December 1993 that Israel abided fully by the demands of the international community by allowing the return of the final 197 remaining Palestinians to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (18 activists chose to remain in Lebanon). See A/49/172, para. 292, remarks by the United States Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, as reported in Approaches towards the settlements of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Question of Palestine, Issue 21, February 1993. 31/ See also S/PRST/1996/10 of 4 March 1996 on attacks in Jerusalem on 3 March and in Tel Aviv on 4 March. 32/ See, for instance, Agence France-Presse, Deutsche Presse Agentur and Reuters reports on 21 December 2000.
33/ See also “UNSCO Special Report: An Analysis of the Israeli Closure Policy” in the Second Quarterly Report on Economic and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, April 1997; and Sara Roy, Decline and Disfigurement: The Palestinian Economy after Oslo, in The New Intifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid (editor, Roan Carey), Verso, 2001. 34/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 510, details that in March 1993, 13 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, mostly belonging to Hamas, to which Prime Minister Rabin responded with a “massive retaliation”, including the closure of Israel’s pre-1967 border, the “Green Line”, to Palestinian workers.
35/ Amnesty International, Demolition and dispossession: the destruction of Palestinian homes, 8 December 1999, found 227 parcels under Palestinian control surrounded by areas under Israeli control, with no Palestinian living more than 6km from an area under Israeli control. 36/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 510; see also A/46/522; B’Tselem, Civilians under siege, (information sheet), January 2001; and annual reports of the United States Department of State on human rights.
37/ A/54/134-E/1999/85, para.11, and A/54/325, para. 89; UNSCO, “The impact on the Palestinian economy of confrontations, mobility restrictions and border closures, 28 September-26 November 2000” and A/55/84-E/2000/16 and A/56/90-E/2001/17.
38/ World Bank, Fifteen Months – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis, 18 March 2002, p. v.
39/ For instance, “As the delegates gathered in Washington for the fourth round of talks, toward the end of February 1992, Shamir declared that the settlement drive would continue and that he himself would not be party to any deals that placed the drive at risk. He specifically rejected any link between the settlement issue and Israel’s request for a U.S. loan guarantee.” Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 497.
40/ See Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, vol. 11, No. 3, May-June 2001, p. 1.
41/Ibid., vol. 11, No. 2, March-April 2001, p. 8. On 27 July 2000, the Ministry of the Interior of Israel announced that the number of settlers in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip had risen in the past year by 13,600, or 7.5 per cent, and stood at some 200,000 Israelis.
42/ United States and European Union “letters of assurance” on settlements – e.g., see Clayton E. Swisher, The truth about Camp David, New York 2004, p.54f.
43/ In particular, para. 6 of art. 49 of the Convention. See also ICRC Commentary at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf.
44/ United Nations, The Question of Palestine 1979-1990, pp. 32ff.
45/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at pp. 576-579.
46/ The meeting was requested by the Permanent Representative of Yemen in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group (A/ES-10/17 of 28 October 1997); the Permanent Representative of Indonesia, in his capacity as Chairman of the Islamic Group of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in New York (A/ES-10/18 of 31 October 1997); and the Permanent Representative of Colombia, in his capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (A/ES-10/19 of 31 October 1997).
47/ At the request of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in his capacity as the Chairman of the Arab Group (A/ES-10/21 of 12 March 1998) and by the Permanent Representative of Colombia in his capacity as Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (A/ES-10/22 of 13 March 1998).
48/ Yediot Aharonot, 16 September 1999.
49/ See “Chronological review of events relating to the question of Palestine”, October 1998.
50/ See, for instance, General Assembly resolutions on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories, most recently, resolution 55/130; Human Rights Subcommission resolution 1996/6 and Economic and Social Council resolution 2000/31.
51/ For instance, the United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000, section entitled “Occupied territories”, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2001; the report states that Israel’s overall human rights record in the occupied territories was poor.
52/ Settlements are linked to each other and to Israel by a series of bypass roads patrolled by the Israeli military and strictly off limits to Palestinians. In the West Bank there are some 340 km of bypass roads, covering an area (with buffer zones on either side) of 51.5 km2.
53/ Geneva press briefing on 23 September 1997; Commission on Human Rights, fifty-seventh session, press release of 6 April 2001.
54/ United Nations, The Question of Palestine 1979-1990, July 1991, p. 42ff.; and United Nations, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, October 1994, p. 16ff.
55/ Press briefing, Department of Public Information Service, Geneva, 20 October 2000.
56/ E/CN.4/2001/114; A/55/800, also issued as E/CN.4/2001/133, contains the response by the Government of the State of Israel to the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
57/ Mamdouh Naufal, “Arafat, de Madrid a Taba”, in: Revue d’etudes palestiniennes, No. 96, été 2005, p. 53 indicates 19 persons.
58/ UNSCO press release of 13 February 2001.
59/ These revenues included value added tax as well as customs and petroleum excises. In addition, health insurance and income tax deducted from the payroll of Palestinian workers in Israel were partly transferred to the PA. The last transfer effected by Israel was on December 19, 2000, corresponding to the October clearance revenues. A total of about $500 million in withheld revenues had been accumulated by the end of 2002. See International Monetary Fund, West Bank and Gaza: Economic Performance and Reform under Conflict Conditions, 2003, p. 71.
60/ UNDP/Emergency Response Division, “Transitions”, June/July 2001 (online version).
61/ The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations was signed on September 4, 1999 by Prime Minister Barak of Israel and PLO Chairman Arafat at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt, overseen by the United States, represented by the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright. The memorandum was witnessed and co-signed by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. The memorandum’s purpose was to implement the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) of September 1995 and to implement all other agreements between PLO and Israel since September 1993: Protocol on Economic Relations (1994); Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (1994), Washington Declaration, Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO(1994); Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (1995). The memorandum is available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/25E0CE9A21F463F685256AE700613324.
62/ In the same resolution, the Assembly also demanded the immediate cessation of violence and the use of force, called upon the parties to act immediately to reverse all measures taken since 28 September 2000, and acknowledged that necessary steps had been taken by the parties in this direction since the summit of Sharm el-Sheikh.
63/ As discussed, on 20 December 1990, the President of the Security Council had made a statement reflecting agreement among the members of the Council that an active negotiating process should take into account the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, under the Declaration of Principles (1993) and Interim Agreement (1995) the parties would recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and that the elections to be held would constitute a step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
64/ “Al-Mithaq Al-Watanee Al-Philisteeni” (www.palestine-un.org).
65/ See, for instance, United Nations, The Question of Palestine 1979-1990, 1991, pp. 17-24; and Shlaim, footnote 14 above, at pp. 466-471: On 15 March 1990, the Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was the first in Israel’s history to fall as a result of a parliamentary vote of no confidence, centred around the Government’s “not trying to advance the peace process – its principal tasks”.
66/ On 3 November 1991, the so-called first round of direct, bilateral negotiations opened in Madrid after the plenary session when Israel met with the specially formed joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation as well as Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic separately.
67/ See, for instance, Aaron David Miller, “Israel’s Lawyer”, The Washington Post, 23 May 2005. The writer, who worked at the State Department for 25 years as a Middle East negotiator and adviser on Arab-Israeli affairs, considers the Madrid Conference itself a success in the history of United States peacemaking, and goes on to say: “too often we lose sight of the need to be advocates for both Arabs and Israelis. The most recent example of this was the Clinton administration’s effort in 1999-2000 to broker final deals between Israel, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestinians.”
68/ Exchange of Letters between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat, 9 September 1993, available from http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/36917473237100E285257028006C0BC5.
69/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. xxiv; and PASSIA at http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/19941995.htm.
70/ Its status was subject to the outcome of final status negotiations, addressed below (see also chap. IV.D below).
71/ Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, “The withdrawal percentages, what do they really mean?”, 2001.
72/ Letter of invitation to the peace talks in Madrid, 19 October 1991, in Approaches towards the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine, Issue 7, October 1991.
73/ See http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/madrid-garantie-en.
74/ Resolutions 48/158 D and 49/62 D mark the change from “principles” to “needs”; resolution 55/55.
75/ See A/46/35; see also A/47/35, which states: “The Committee has also continued to promote the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with the guidelines and principles reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991, which provides the most comprehensive, practical and universally accepted framework for peace.”
76/ Bernard Reich, An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1996, pp. 337.
77/ On 4 December 1991, the Palestinian-Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian Arab Republic delegations arrived on time at the three designated sites to resume direct Middle East negotiations in Washington, whereas the Israeli delegation was absent; see http://usinfo.state.gov/mena; see also Shlaim, footnote 14 above, at p. 491f.
78/ Reich, see footnote 76 above, at pp. 337-339.
79/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 493.
80/ Ibid., p. 509.
81/ Ibid., pp. 488-501.
82/ Ibid., p. 503.
83/ Ibid., p. 507 mentions releasing Palestinian detainees and rescinding deportation orders by Israel.
84/ Ibid., p. 509. On 23 June 1992, Labour defeated Likud in Israeli elections and Yitzhak Rabin was elected Prime Minister of Israel on a campaign platform of “land-for-peace,” the principle enshrined in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). According to experts on the subject, Mr. Rabin moved quickly to make goodwill gestures towards the Palestinians: He promised to halt all but “strategic” settlements buildings, sought to repeal Israel’s self-imposed ban on contact with the Palestine Liberation Organization and released 800 Palestinian prisoners. In the actual talks with the Palestinians, however, Prime Minister Rabin was considered uncompromising and soon focused the bilateral talks on Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic (Murphy, ibid., p. 121; Shlaim, p. 507f.; Shlaim further states “the talks with the Palestinians did not get off to a good start, whereas those with the Syrians did” (Shlaim, p. 508).
85/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 509f.
86/ Ibid., p. 509.
87/ Ibid., p. 510f.
88/ Ibid., p. 511.
89/ Ibid., p. 511; starting on 26 February 1993 with the United States, gradually principal actors in the international community were reportedly being informed about the private Oslo talks. In years to come, the effectiveness of its role as “honest broker” would also be widely questioned. According to Avi Shlaim, after 24 August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shimon Peres, informed Warren Christopher about the agreed-upon accord. (Shlaim, p. 516).
90/ Draft resolution A/47/L.41 included a reaffirmation of the Assembly’s conviction that the question of Palestine was the core of the conflict in the Middle East and that no comprehensive peace in the region would be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights and the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and other occupied Arab territories. This language can be found in resolution 45/83 B.
91/The sponsors recommended that the Assembly not take action on the draft, reserving the right to request action on it later in the current session (see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1992, vol. 46).
92/ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1992, vol. 46.
93/ Joel Peters, “Can the Multilateral Middle East Talks be Revived?”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol.3, No. 4, December 1999.
94/ For background information, see United Nations, Water resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 1992.
95/ The refugee working group deals with the various economic and social issues having to do with improving the living conditions of the Palestine refugees, and mobilizing the requisite financial resources.
96/ United Nations, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine, 1994, pp. 18-23; A/47/716-S/24845, para. 6. In its resolutions starting with 47/64 D, the Assembly noted the involvement of the United Nations as a full, extraregional participant in the work of the multilateral working groups.
97/ In March 2000, President Clinton and President Hafez Al-Assad, who would pass away in May, failed to reach agreement on the continuation of these bilateral talks.
98/ Shlaim states that in 1993, 14 secret sessions were held in Oslo alone (see footnote 14 above, at p. 513).
99/ Later on, “Oslo I” would also be used, in contrast to “Oslo II”, short for the Interim Agreement of 1995.
100/ Mustafa Barghouti, himself a critic of the accords, indicates “63 per cent of Palestinians” (see his interview “Palestinian Defiance” in: New Left Review, 32, March-April 2005). According to Samih Shbeib, 10 Palestinian organizations rejected the Declaration of Principles (“L’apres-Arafat – Le regime politique palestinien”, in: Revue d’etudes palestiniennes, No. 95, printemps 2005, p. 5), as did Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.
101/ See also below on “permanent status” work done at Stockholm in 1995.
102/ Jan Egeland, State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, co-initiated and co-organized the “Norwegian channel” between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1992 (cf. SG/A/840/Rev.1*); see also Hilde Henriksen Waage, “‘Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?’ Explaining the Oslo back channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East”, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Evaluation Report 9/2000.
103/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 514f.
104/ Ibid., p. 518.
105/ At the White House, Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Arafat watched Foreign Minister Peres and PLO Executive Committee member Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) sign the Declaration of Principles and sealed the deal with a now historic handshake. President Clinton, former presidents Bush and Carter and some 3,000 dignitaries witnessed the signing.
106/ The 1995 Interim Agreement spelled out the starting date for the permanent status talks as “not later than 4 May 1996”, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles (see chap. III.D below).
107/ Article V, entitled “Transitional period and permanent status negotiations” stipulates that the five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and that permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period.
108/ E.g., 24 November and 3 December 1998; see also chap. III, sects. G and H below.
109/ For some early and very initial permanent status ideas, see the unofficial Beilin-Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) document dated 31 October 1995, “Framework for the conclusion of a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization”.
110/ http://www.nad-plo/permanent; for background information, see United Nations, Water resources of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 1992.
111/ It was allowed to lapse in 1997; see below for information on draft resolution A/52/L.62 of 2 December 1997.
112/ As discussed in chap. II above, the last resolution on the first intifada was 47/64 E.
113/ “Patterns of global terrorism, 1993”, United States Department of State publication 10136, April 1994.
114/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 523f.
115/ According to the Declaration of Principles, annex II, the two sides were to conclude and sign within two months (13 December 1993) from the date of entry into force of the Declaration (13 October 1993) an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement was to include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
116/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 524
117/ Ibid., p. 525.
118/ Ibid., p. 528.
119/ As at 17 October 1994, no reply had been received from the Security Council for inclusion in the Secretary-General’s report (A/49/636-S/1994/1240).
120/ See A/49/263-E/1994/112, press release SG/A/585-SG/SM/5298 of 25 May 1994 and A/49/636-S/1994/1240. As stated, in 1999, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority (see press release SG/A/705 of 21 September 1999).
121/ United Nations Yearbook, 1994, vol. 48.
122/ See PASSIA, at http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/19941995.htm; http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/onthisday/0202.html.
123/ See A/50/35; A/51/889-S/1997/357, annex. Following the signing, President Clinton hosted a summit attended by King Hussein, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, and Chairman Arafat. On 29 September 1995, United States Secretary of State Christopher, Foreign Minister Peres, and Chairman Arafat convened the first meeting of the United States-Israel-Palestinian Trilateral Committee. The parties agreed to promote cooperative efforts to foster economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to explore the means to increase the availability and more efficient use of water resources, to consult on matters of mutual interest and to promote cooperation on regional issues.
124/ The three agreements were: the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed on 29 August 1994 (“the Preparatory Transfer Agreement”); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed on 27 August 1995 (“the Further Transfer Protocol”); see A/51/889-S/1997/357, annex.
125/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 528.
126/ In this connection, see annex VI to the Agreement, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Peace in the Middle East: P2P and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, UNIDIR/2004/33, January 2005, p. 3.
127/ United Nations Yearbook, 1996, vol. 50.
128/ United Nations Yearbook, 1995, vol. 49.
129/ Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic were not among the participants.
130/ A “Al-Mithaq Al-Watanee Al-Philisteeni” – a brief history indicates the following time line: 1964 June: the Palestine National Charter is adopted. 1968 July: during the 4th Palestine National Council in Cairo, the Charter has the sentence “Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine” added. 1988 November: the principle of military attack on Israel to liberate Palestine, is removed from the Charter by the Palestine National Council. 1993 September: PLO Chairman Arafat declares in a letter to Prime Minister Rabin that the principles of the Charter that deny the right of existence for Israel, are “inoperative and no longer valid”, even if the right to amend the Charter is exclusive to the PLO. (http://www.palestine-un.org/plo/pna_three.html; and http://lexicorient.com/e.o/pal_nc.htm).
131/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 554f.; see also the unofficial Beilin-Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) document finalized in Tel Aviv, dated 31 October 1995, entitled “Framework for the conclusion of a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization”.
132/ By Joel Singer for Israel and Saeb Erakat for the Palestine Liberation Organization.
133/ Robert O. Freedman, The Middle East and the Peace Process, the Impact of the Oslo Accords, p. 2.
134/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at pp. 571ff.; the author states that the Prime Minister “adopted a ‘work-to-rule’ approach designed to undermine the Oslo process”. See also Robert O. Freedman, The Middle East and the Peace Process, the Impact of the Oslo Accords, p. 2.
135/ In particular, art. VII of its annex I.
Under the Interim Agreement, redeployment from Hebron was to have been completed no later than six months after the signing of the Agreement, i.e. the end of March 1996, but was delayed after a series of suicide operations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv during February and March 1996 and other events later in the year that had threatened to unravel the negotiating process and create a deepening crisis of confidence between the two sides (see A/51/678-S/ 1996/953 of 18 November 1996).
136/ Done at Jerusalem, 17 January 1997, Dan Shomrom for Israel, Saeb Erakat for PLO.
137/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at pp. 580f.; the writer considers the vote of 87 to 17, with 15 abstentions, as a reflection of a broad national consensus in favour of the peace process. 138/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. 579.
139/ See “Note for the record” dated 15 January 1997; agreement on the Hebron Protocol also included an “Agreed Minute,” spelling out the United States plan on Shuhada Road; available from http://www.palestine-un.org.
140/ See the letter dated 17 January 1997 provided by United States Secretary of State Christopher to Benjamin Netanyahu at the time of the signing of the Hebron Protocol. In reality, the first stage of the further redeployments was only completed on 20 November 1998 (see annex V below). 141/ Under “Miscellaneous”, 17. Temporary International Presence, the Protocol states the following: “There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.” The TIPH was originally established in 1994 following the signing on 31 March 1994 by Israel and the PLO of the “Agreement” on security arrangements in Hebron and the renewal of negotiations on the Gaza Strip and Jericho in accordance with Security Council resolution 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994 for a period of three months. The TIPH had resumed its work on 12 May 1996 in accordance with agreements reached under the peace process (art. VII of the Interim Agreement and “Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron” of 9 May 1996, signed by Joel Singer and Saeb Erakat).
142/ Following a decision by the Supreme Court of Israel rejecting a petition against the move, Israel released 30 Palestinian women prisoners.
143/ For instance, on 8 May 1998, Middle East Peace Coordinator Dennis Ross went to Israel to discuss United States proposals for a troop withdrawal from 13 per cent of the West Bank.
144/ On 7 March 1997, after a seven-hour overnight debate, the Israeli Cabinet voted 10-7 to back the proposal by Prime Minister Netanyahu to withdraw from 9 to 10 per cent of the West Bank. Two alternatives raised in the meeting called for handing over 5 or 7 per cent of the West Bank territory.
145/ See United Nations, The Status of Jerusalem, 1997; see also Shlaim, footnote 14 above, at pp. 581-583.
146/ Named after the original 1967 plan proposed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, Yigal Allon, which included, among other things, the annexation of the Jordan Valley.
147/ “Chronological review of events relating to the question of Palestine”, September 1997.
148/ See Kenizé Mourad, Le parfum de notre terre – Voix de Palestine et d’Israël, Paris, 2003, p. 348.
149/ Secretary of State Albright opened the talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators led by Foreign Minister Levy and Chief Palestinian Negotiator Abbas. The talks were called to explore formulas that could pave the way for accelerated negotiations on a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. United States Middle East Peace Coordinator Ross mediated the talks.
150/ For instance, from 20 to 22 January 1998, President Clinton met separately with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Arafat in Washington, D.C., in an attempt to re-energize the peace process. Following her first visit during 10-12 September 1997, from 31 January to 1 February 1998 Secretary of State Albright returned to the Middle East to put forth a proposal for simultaneous steps by the Palestinians on security and by Israel on further redeployment. Mr. Arafat reportedly provided a letter detailing which parts of the PLO Charter should be considered annulled (see also below). Additional meetings were held in 1998 between the Secretary of State and, separately, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat as well as, on 28 September 1998, between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat at the White House.
151/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at pp. 588.
152/ From 5 to 7 October 1998, with Special Middle East Coordinator Ross.
153/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. xxv.
154/ Under the terms of the Interim Agreement and of United States Secretary of State Christopher’s letters of 17 January 1997 to the two sides relating to the further redeployment process.
155/ The Palestine Central Council decided to postpone the declaration of a State at its meeting from 27 to 29 April 1999 (www.palestine-un.org/news).
156/ “Chronological review of events relating to the question of Palestine”, November 1998.
157/ Although a priority issue for the Palestinians, the prisoner release, was not explicitly addressed in the Wye River Memorandum. However, an oral “understanding” was reached during the Wye River negotiations that Israel would release 750 Palestinian prisoners it held, in three stages. The exact modalities of the release subsequently became a subject of heated controversy, with the Palestinian side insisting on the release of “political” or “security” prisoners, while the Government of Israel maintained that it had never agreed to the release of Hamas or Islamic Jihad members, or those “with blood on their hands”.
158/ As many as 150 prisoners, according to Benny Morris, The Righteous Victims, p. 648.
159/ “Chronological Review of events relating to the question of Palestine”, December 1998.
160/ See “Israeli reactions to the PNC vote in Gaza”, available from http://www.mfa.org.il.
161/ Shlaim, see footnote 14 above, at p. xxv.
162/ Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24 and 25 March 1999, available from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFB2.html.
163/ see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/etc/cron.html; see also Clayton E. Swisher, The truth about Camp David, New York, 2004, pp. 49f.
164/ See Bernard Wasserstein, Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City, p. 307.
165/ On 10 September 1999, Israel transferred 7 per cent of the West Bank from area C to B. Further transfers were delayed by disputes over the territories to be handed over. From 5 to 7 January 2000, Israel transferred a further 2 per cent from area B to area A and 3 per cent from area C to B (this redeployment was originally scheduled to take place on 15 November 1999). The third and final Israeli pullback involving the transfer of 1 per cent from area C to area A and 5.1 per cent from area B to area A took place on 21 March 2000, three months behind schedule, leading to the above-mentioned total extent of troop withdrawal under the peace process of the 1990s.
166/ Obligations pertaining to dates, which occur on holidays or Saturdays, were to be carried out on the first subsequent working day.
167/ The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum reiterated that, in the Wye River Memorandum (1998) the United States had expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations.
168/ Additional Palestinian prisoners were released in December 1999 and in January 2000.
169/ The establishment of the Continuing Committee first appears in the Camp David Accords of 1978 and was reiterated in the art. XII of the Declaration of Principles, as well as in art. 8 of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan. The Continuing Committee was first convened at the ministerial level in Amman in March 1995.
170/ Under Interim Agreement, annex I, art. X. The details of operation were to be provided for in the Safe Passage Protocol that was to be concluded by the two sides not later than 30 September 1999 (it was signed on 5 October 1999).
171/ As specified in annex I, art. X, provision c-4, in the Interim Agreement of 1995.
172/ The relevant agreement was signed on 20 September 2000 by Israeli and Palestinian representatives, however, the Gaza Seaport project, financed by France, the Netherlands, and the European Development Bank was barely started before being razed by IDF in September of 2001.
173/ Shuhada Road, passing through the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron (H2), was closed to Palestinians after the Hebron massacre of February 1994. According to the Hebron Protocol and attached Agreed Minute of 17 January 1997, it was supposed to be reconstructed with help from the United States Agency for International Development and reopened within four months after the signing of the Protocol. It was eventually reopened on 31 October 1999.
174/ Pursuant to annex I, art. VII of the Interim Agreement and in accordance with the United States “Minute of Discussion” of 15 January 1998.
175/ The following four obligations emanating from the Wye River Memorandum are listed in the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum: (a) continuation of the programme for the collection of the illegal weapons, including reports; (b) apprehension of suspects, including reports; (c) forwarding of the list of Palestinian policemen to the Israeli side not later than 13 September 1999; (d) beginning of the review of the list by the Monitoring and Steering Committee not later than 15 October 1999.
176/ The meetings took place in the context of the ceremony in Oslo commemorating the anniversary of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. From 5 to 9 December 1999,Secretary of State Albright traveled to the Middle East to assess the progress toward the aforementioned framework agreement for permanent status between Israel and the Palestinians.
177/ Swisher, see footnote 42 above, at p. 192, states that Oded Eran participated on the Israeli side, Saeb Erakat and Yasser Abed Rabbo on the Palestinian side.
178/ Mamdouh Naufal, “Arafat, de Madrid a Taba”, in: Revue d’etudes palestiniennes, No. 96, été 2005, p. 47; the Palestine Central Council met in Gaza City on 2 and 3 July 2000, affirming its determination to implement the Declaration of Independence adopted by PNC in 1988 with the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital and the achievement of its sovereignty on Palestinian land within the 4 June 1967 borders with the conclusion of the agreed upon transitional period of 13 September 2000 (see http://www.palestine-un.org/news/YearinReview2000.html).
179/ Amnon Kapeliouk, Arafat, l’irréductible (4 February 2004) and “Conducting catastrophe” by Amnon Kapeliouk, in: Le monde diplomatique, February 2002.
180/ Swisher, see footnote 42 above, at pp. 379f.
181/ Swisher, see footnote 42 above, at p. 387f.
182/ The United States undertook to facilitate security cooperation between the parties.
183/ In its resolution ES-10/7, the General Assembly demanded the immediate cessation of violence and the use of force, called upon the parties to act immediately to reverse all measures taken in this regard since 28 September 2000, and acknowledged that necessary steps had been taken by the parties in this direction since the summit of Sharm el-Sheikh.
184/ In a speech to the Israel Policy Forum Gala in New York on 7 January 2001, outgoing President Clinton provided the following details:
1. Palestinian state: sovereign, viable and geographically contiguous. Its territory should be the Gaza Strip and the vast majority of the West Bank. Settlement blocks should be annexed to Israel. (Compensating) territorial swaps, and other arrangements are also necessary.
2. Refugees: right of return to a Palestinian State. Those wanting to go elsewhere (including to Israel) should be able to do so, subject to recipient states’ willingness to have them. No unlimited right of return to Israel. Compensation to all refugees.
3. Security: lasting security guarantees for Israel. An international presence in Palestine. Palestine to be non-militarized.
4. Jerusalem: capital of two states, Israel and Palestine. An open and undivided city, with assured freedom of access and worship for all. Arab areas should be Palestinian. Jewish areas should be Israeli. Special arrangements for Holy Places.
5. An end of conflict declaration.
(Available from http://telaviv.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/archives/2001/january/me0108b.html.)
185/ Swisher, see footnote 42 above, at p. 396, states 94-96 per cent of the West Bank.
186/ “Chronological review of events relating to the question of Palestine”, January 2001.
187/ See Miguel Moratinos, non-paper” on the Taba negotiations, available from http://unispal.un.org.
188/ The text of the Israeli-Palestinian joint statement, released by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on 27 January 2001 was published in the Jerusalem Post (28 January 2001). On 25 February 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with the incoming Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, in Jerusalem and Palestinian Authority President Arafat in Ramallah.
189/ Abu-Libdeh, Hassan, “Conducting census under adverse conditions; challenges and lessons learned”, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, available from http://www.unfpa.org/sustainable/docs/data/presabu-libdeh.doc.
190/ Report on Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, vol. 11, No. 2, March-April 2001, p. 8.
191/ UNSCO, “The impact on the Palestinian economy of confrontations, mobility restrictions and border closures”, 28 September-26 November 2000”, November 2000.
192/ Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2000.
193/ 1 dunum = 0.1 hectare.
194/ On the basis of a note by the Secretary-General (A/43/432-E/1988/68) concerning progress in the implementation of General Assembly decision 40/432 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1987/87, the Council, by its resolution 1988/65, requested the Secretary-General to speed up the preparation of the required report on the trade practices of the Israeli occupation authorities in the occupied Palestinian territories. The report was prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
195/ Resolution 46/199 was entitled “Adverse economic effects of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied since 1967.”
196/ The Interim Agreement dated 28 September 1995, annex III, Protocol concerning Civil Affairs, art. 40, Water and sewage states, under “Principles” that on the basis of good-will both sides had reached the following agreement in the sphere of water and sewage:
“1. Israel recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. These will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources.”
197/ “Closure on the West Bank and Gaza”, UNSCO Fact Sheet, 1997.
198/ See “About UNSCO” section at http://www.unsco.org. In 1999, the Secretary-General reconfigured the mandate of the Special Coordinator, whose title was changed to the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority (see A/55/137-E/2000/95).
199/ See “UNSCO Special Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip private economy: conditions and prospects”, (February 1998).
200/ “UNSCO at a Glance” available from http://www.unsco.org; see also A/56/123-E/2001/97, paras. 9-17.
201/ Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development, and Peace, Nairobi, 15-26 July 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IV.10, chap. I, sect. A, para. 260.
202/ Resolutions 1989/94 and 1990/11 were entitled “Situation of Palestinian women”, resolutions 1991/19,1992/161993/15 and 2000/23 were entitled “Situation of and assistance to Palestinian women” while resolutions1995/30,1996/5, 1998/10, 1999/15 and 2000/23 were entitled “Palestinian women”.
203/ United Nations, The Status of Jerusalem, 1997, p. 1.
204/ Ibid., chap. I.
205/ Between 1991 and 1992, land was confiscated to extend the “Har Homa” settlement on Jabal Abu Ghneim and to build the new settlement of “Ramat Shu’fat”.
206/ Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Report on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, Washington, D.C., February 1994, p. 3.
207/ The Status of Jerusalem, see footnote 203 above, chap. II.
208/ UNRWA, with the Crown Agents of the United Kingdom under contract, also had an initial, limited role in helping to set up the Palestinian Police pursuant to the relevant peace process agreements (see, for instance, A/50/763).
209/ In this connection, the General Assembly annually requested the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps in consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to protect Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel. In 2000, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, in possession of detailed information on land property left behind by Palestine refugees in 1948/1949, noted that the project to preserve and modernize its records, carried out by a contractor in accordance with General Assembly resolution 51/129, had been completed (see A/55/329, annex).
210/ Also, under art. 8 of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan of 26 October 1994, the Parties are to seek to resolve the “massive human problems” caused by the conflict in the Middle East in appropriate forums, in the case of refugees, in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees (see A/50/73-S/1995/83).
211/ E.g., Shlaim, “The significance of the Madrid Peace conference,” in: Politics and International Relations in the Middle East, pp. 133-147, M. Jane Davis (editor), Edward Elgar, United Kingdom and United States, 1995, p. 136, 140-142 and 146; and Emma C. Murphy, “The Arab-Israeli conflict in the New World Order,” in: The Middle East in the New World Order, pp. 110-139, Haifaa A. Jawad (editor), Macmillan Press, 1997 second edition, p. 121.
212/ See the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of 1999 and, for instance, the publication by Israel and the Palestinian side as far back as September 1997 of their respective expectations under the peace process.
213/ See United Nations Yearbook, vol. 46, 1992.
https://www.un.org/unispal/history/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-v-1989-2000/
INTRODUCTION
I. THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
II. ISRAELI POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
A. Violation of human rights in the occupied territory*
B. Acquisition of land and Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
C. Israeli policies on the water resources of the occupied territory
D. Israel’s exploitation of Palestinian labour resources
III. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
1984
1985
1986
1987
IV. INTIFADAH: PALESTINIAN POPULAR UPRISING IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
A. Beginning of the intifadah
B. 1988: The year of the uprising
1. Report of the Secretary-General of 21 January 1988 61/
2. Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory
3. Action taken by the Commission on Human Rights
4. United States action on the PLO representation at the United Nations
5. Developments in the Middle East relative to the question of Palestine
6. Special session of the General Assembly
7. Nineteenth session of the Palestine National Council and its decisions
8. Forty-third session of the General Assembly at Geneva
9. Opening of PLO-United States dialogue
V. CONCLUSION
Notes
Introduction
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, held between 29 August and 7 September 1983 at Geneva, became a landmark event which focused the attention of the international community on the struggle of the Palestinian people for its inalienable rights. The Conference elaborated and adopted two far-reaching political documents designed to map out principal guidelines and directions of activities relating to the question of Palestine in years to come.
The Geneva Declaration on Palestine, adopted by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, laid down guidelines for concerted international efforts aimed at a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the question of Palestine through the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East. The Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights clearly outlined the obligations and responsibilities of United Nations Member States, the United Nations system as a whole and its bodies and agencies in particular. Further, this document highlighted the role of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in raising awareness of the core of the Middle East problem, namely, the question of Palestine.
The need for and urgency of convening an international peace conference were recognized in subsequent years in a series of General Assembly resolutions, proposals by major intergovernmental organizations and individual States Members of the United Nations, as well as by hundreds of NGOs. The years 1984 to 1988 were marked by a continuous effort by all these forces to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East and to find a solution to the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole.
Over the years, the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, other organs and bodies of the United Nations system as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have been continuously seized of the ever-deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has been prompt in responding to the developments in the region through the consideration of this matter at its meetings. It has also brought such developments to the attention of the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council and has called for appropriate measures in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions, including application by Israel of the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 1/ and appropriate action by the Secretary-General to provide protection and assistance to the Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory.
I. THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
The year 1983 was marked by the adoption by the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly of resolution 38/58 C of 13 December 1983. 2/ This resolution welcomed and endorsed the call made by the International Conference on the Question of Palestine to convene the International Peace Conference on the Middle East in conformity with the following guidelines:
“(a) The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;
“(b) The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
“(c) The need to put an end to Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
“(d) The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any de facto situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;
“(e) The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called “Basic Law” on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
“(f) The right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable right of the Palestinian people as stated in subparagraph (a) above.”
The resolution “invited all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other concerned States, to participate in the International Peace Conference on the Middle East on an equal footing and with equal rights”. It also called upon the Security Council to facilitate the organization of such a Conference and requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, urgently to undertake preparatory measures to convene the Conference and to report on his efforts in this direction early in 1984.
II. ISRAELI POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
A. Violation of human rights in the occupied territory*
During the five years under review, the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory has seriously deteriorated. Israel, the occupying Power, has been violating the relevant conventions and rules of international law and the generally accepted norms and principles of international behaviour. In particular, its policies and practices in the occupied territory remain in clear violation of a number of carefully elaborated and universally accepted instruments of international law. 3/ The general policy of the Government of Israel continued to be based on the concept that the territory occupied by Israel since 1967 should be considered as part of the State of Israel. This has allowed Israeli authorities to advance the so-called “homeland doctrine” according to which, international law notwithstanding, the occupied Palestinian territory constitutes part of the “Jewish homeland”, ceasing therefore to be “occupied territory”.
* A further description of violations by Israel of the human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory is contained in chapter IV, section B, of the present study.
In its successive reports, the United Nations Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories brought to the attention of the General Assembly factual data illustrating the worsening of the human rights situation in the occupied territory. The information contained in these reports indicated that the Israeli authorities, in repressing the Palestinians, violating their inalienable rights and denying them their basic freedoms, disregarded the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. The policies of deportation, torture of detainees, mass arrests, demolition of houses, arbitrary beatings and killing of innocent people – among them children, women and the elderly – as well as the humiliation of Palestinians in their daily life have been systematically pursued by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territory. This situation was aggravated by the increasing armed settler violence against the unarmed Palestinian population. According to the West Bank Data Base Project (WBDP), approximately 67,700 Jewish settlers lived in the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in April 1987. 4/ Meron Benvenisti, Director of the Project, writes in the organization’s 1987 report that:
“… all settlers belong to the security forces, being an integral part of the Israeli army (Territorial Defense Units). It is estimated that the settler population possesses no less than 10,000 firearms of all types, as well as other military equipment such as wireless sets and vehicles. The extreme ideological outlook shared by the settlers and their relative independence in defining their military role must lead to excesses. Moreover, military and police authorities are reluctant to prosecute vigilantes even when illegal operations, aimed against official government decisions, are perpetrated.” 5/
The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in its 1988 report noted with concern the noticeable increase of aggressiveness in Jewish settlers’ behaviour towards the civilian Palestinian population of the occupied territory. Acts of violence and aggression perpetrated by the settlers against the Palestinians had reached, according to the Special Committee, “an unprecedented level”. 6/ Particular reference in the report was made to the killing and kidnapping of Palestinian civilians, including children, by groups of Jewish settlers and members of Jewish underground organizations.
The overall picture drawn from the information made available to the Special Committee reflected a new phase in the evolution of the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, “characterized by a level of violence and repression never reached before in the course of the 21 years of occupation”. 7/ The Special Committee stated unequivocally that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in itself constituted a violation of human rights. It was further pointed out in the report that:
“This fact, however, has been consistently denied by the Government of Israel, whose general policy towards the occupied territories is based on the principle that the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 constitute part of the State of Israel and that therefore measures such as the establishment of colonies in the occupied territories and the transfer of Israeli citizens thereto did not constitute a process of annexation. Such an attitude represents a flagrant violation of the international obligations of Israel as a State party to the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.” 8/
Considering the gravity of the situation in the occupied territory, the Special Committee emphasized that the responsibility of the international community was more manifest than ever before and that urgent measures had to be taken to prevent further deterioration of the situation and ensure effective protection of the basic rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territory. The Special Committee concluded that such protection could be ensured only through the negotiation of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict acceptable to all concerned. The Special Committee was of the view that, until such a settlement was achieved, the following measures could contribute to the restoration of the basic human rights of the civilians in the occupied territory:
“…
“(a) The full application, by Israel, of the relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which remains the main international instrument in humanitarian law that applies to the occupied territories, and whose applicability to those territories has repeatedly been reaffirmed by the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant organs of the United Nations;
“(b) The full co-operation of the Israeli authorities with ICRC in order to facilitate efforts to protect detained persons, in particular by ensuring full access of ICRC representatives to such persons;
“(c) The full support, by Member States, of the activities of ICRC in the occupied territories, and positive response by Member States to eventual appeals for additional assistance, including funds to finance the extra activities required by the unprecedented increase in the number of detained persons;
“(d) The full support, by Member States, of UNRWA activities in the occupied territories in order to enable UNRWA to improve the general assistance provided to the refugee population.” 9/
ICRC, in the period under review, continued to carry out its protection and assistance activities in the occupied territory principally based on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. Article 47 of the Convention specifically lays down the inviolability of the rights of protected persons in occupied territory. However, according to ICRC, Israeli authorities continued to violate the provisions of the Convention. These violations by the Israeli authorities included curfews and restriction on the freedom of movement of the Palestinians, destruction and walling up of their houses, expelling Palestinians from the occupied territory, seizing their land and declaring it “State land”. Israeli authorities also continued their practice of inciting Palestinians to collaborate. 10/
B. Acquisition of land and Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
The Israeli policies of expropriation of Palestinian land in the occupied territory, construction of new settlements and improvement and “thickening” of the existing ones went on unabated from 1984 to 1988. To acquire Palestinian land the Israeli authorities and the settlement movement continued to resort to various techniques. These include the long-established practice of confiscating land and declaring it “closed” for military training purposes, declaring Palestinian land as “State land”, expropriating land for “public (Jewish) use” or confiscating it for “nature preserves”. 11/ The impact this policy had on the Palestinians was illustrated by the findings, contained in a 1988 report of the United States Department of State, which summarized the land situation in the occupied territory as follows:
“The use of land by Israeli authorities for military purposes, roads, settlements, and other Israeli purposes which restrict access by Palestinians, discriminates against Palestinians and adversely affects their lives and economic activities. Approximately 2.5 per cent of the total area of the West Bank and East Jerusalem has been turned over to Israeli nationals for residential, agricultural, and industrial use by settlers. Palestinians do not participate in the Higher Planning Council, which plans land use in the territories and exercises certain powers transferred from local, municipal, and village councils in 1971.” 12/
These processes were accompanied by a noticeable growth in the settlements during the years 1984 to 1988. According to WBDP, 11 settlements were populated over this period in the West Bank. 13/ In the Gaza Strip, 6 settlements were added to the 12 already existing settlements. It should also be noted that one third of the Gaza Strip lands was declared “State land” or confiscated for Jewish settlement by the occupation authorities. In the Gaza Strip, with its small territory and very high population density of approximately 3,754 people per square mile with 85 per cent of the population being urban, the establishment of an Israeli settlement network presents a particularly serious problem for the Palestinians. 14/ In some cases, the settlements physically impinge on the Palestinian communities and refugee camps, blocking their expansion and development. The town of Khan Yunis, for example, was virtually enveloped by a cluster of Israeli settlements. 15/ Reports from the occupied territory clearly indicate that the Israeli authorities are making intensive efforts, within the framework of a new plan designed to increase the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank, to raise their number to the equivalent of 40 per cent of the total Arab population. This information was revealed by one of the Israeli Prime Minister’s advisers on 3 December 1987 and was later confirmed by the Chairman of the World Zionist Organization’s Settlement Department, when he said at a press conference on 5 December 1987 at the Gush Emunim settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, that “Israel’s objective in the West Bank [was] to raise the proportion of Jews to 40 to 60 per cent of the total population of the occupied West Bank by the end of the present century”. During the same press conference, he also stated that preparations were under way in Israel for the settlement of a further million and a half Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank during the next 12 months and that the settlement plans and projects were ready to be implemented in different areas of the occupied West Bank. 16/ Similar pronouncements on the subject of increased settlement were made by Mattityahu Drobles, Chairman of the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Department, who had drawn up a new settlement project covering the period up to the year 2000. This plan, called “Climb the mountain and open up the desert”, was first introduced at the International Zionist Conference held in December 1987 in Jerusalem. The plan provides for the establishment of dozens of new Jewish settlements on the mountain ranges of various parts of the occupied West Bank at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian lands. 17/
During the period 1984-1988 the existing settlements were also upgraded and consolidated in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with both a physical increase in the size of the settlements and an increase in the concentration of Jewish settlers in these settlements. According to official Israeli data, the main settlement construction activity in the post-1983 period took place in the existing settlements. In addition, as part of the official campaign to consolidate the settlement process, Michael Dekel, Israeli Deputy Defence Minister, announced his intention to study another project for converting all the military camps in the occupied West Bank into “civilian residential settlements”. 18/ The pro-settlement forces have been dominating the Israeli political scene in 1984-1988. A number of plans, projects and proposals were advanced with a view to expropriating Palestinian lands, establishing new settlements and accommodating Jewish settlers in them. With respect to the Jewish settlement budget, the Israeli Minister of Economics and Planning, Gad Ya’acobi, said in a statement published on 27 January 1988 19/ that the funds spent on the construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied territory during the past 20 years of occupation amounted to a total of $US 20 billion.
With the increase in the number of Jewish settlements and the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it is significant to note that the Israeli defence installations in the territory, the transport network as well as the electricity and water supply systems were integrated into the Israeli infrastructure, as such action was considered necessary for the economic and security requirements of the State of Israel.
C. Israeli policies on the water resources of the occupied territory
Water has always been a vital natural resource for the Palestinians in the occupied territory. Israeli water policies have been implemented in the occupied territory by utilizing available legislation, whether customary, Ottoman, Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli or military. By means of military orders and regulations, the Israeli Government, since June 1967, has been exercising complete legislative, administrative and judicial authority over the occupied territory and its inhabitants. Often, legal enactments applied to the occupied territory and their enforcement have been at variance with the legal framework that existed prior to 1967. The existing institutions have also been modified or replaced in order to facilitate the application of the water policies.
In the early 1980s, the level of annual Palestinian per capita water consumption in the occupied territory was 35 cubic metres in towns and 15 m3 in villages. At the same time, provisions for Jewish settlement consumption were set at 90 m3 per capita. The projections for 1990 indicate that 60 million m3 of water will be made available to some 30 Israeli agricultural settlements in the West Bank, only one third less than the amount available for consumption by 400 Palestinian villages. This imbalance in the present and projected water consumption illustrates the discrimination against the Palestinian population through water distribution. 20/
Since 1967, the West Bank water resources have been under full Israeli control. The direct responsibility for the supply of water for the needs of Israel is exercised exclusively by the Israeli Water Commission either through Mekorot, Israeli Water Co. or Tahal, Water Planning for Israel Co. During the period under review, Israel continued to increase its use of the water resources of the occupied West Bank.
A report on the activities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Civil Administration, prepared in June 1987 by Israel’s State Comptroller, contained a number of findings concerning the potentially dangerous, for the Palestinian population, overexploitation of the area’s water resources by Israel. It also stated that other serious problems included Palestinians’ exorbitant water bills significantly exceeding those of the Israeli settlers’, whose bills are subsidized by the World Zionist Organization; 1986 seizure of Palestinian lands by Mekorot and the laying down of water pipes for a Jewish settlement. Sewage, drinking water, pollution and sanitation problems remained of particular gravity for the Palestinian population. The report pointed out that the sewage problem represented a pollution time-bomb for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 21/ Insufficient drinking water supplies, the level of salinity, and related problems in public hygiene all lead, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), to various infectious diseases among the Palestinian population. 22/
As regards the West Bank, most of its area is part of the Israeli hydrological system. The 1986 estimates showed that about a quarter of Israel’s annual water potential originated from beyond the Green Line (some 475 million m3 per year out of 1,900 million m3). This was the basis for the Israeli claim that control over West Bank water potential must remain in Israeli hands. Otherwise, Israel argued, the entire Israeli system, already overpumping water, would collapse. According to WBDP’s 1986 report, the Israeli water authority was working on the integration of the West Bank system into large regional plants linked up with the Israeli network. 23/
In the Gaza Strip, where agriculture accounts for the largest single economic activity and 90 per cent of all exports, Jewish settlers have been exercising a great degree of control over the very limited water resources. While Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip established 35 to 40 new wells in the mid-1980s, strict water quotas on Palestinian farmers have been enforced for over a decade and overuse has resulted in severe fines being imposed on them. 24/
During the years reviewed in this study, the increase in demand for water in Israel itself has led to expanding use of the Palestinian water resources. This is how The Wall Street Journal, in an article of 22 January 1985, described the situation in the West Bank:
“A series of major pipelines – paid for by Israel to serve Israeli settlements and Arab villages – have now connected the West Bank water network to the Israeli water grid. Availability has led to demand. And as a result of the growth in demand, the West Bank Arabs have become net “importers” of water piped from Israel.”
D. Israel’s exploitation of Palestinian labour resources
Israeli occupation has continued to have an adverse effect on the labour and employment situation in the occupied territory. Besides changes in the sectoral structure of employment, there has been a noticeable shift away from jobs inside the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. In 1984-1988 employment in the occupied territory has been steadily declining, while the percentage of Palestinians employed in Israel increased.* According to the estimates contained in the 1987 WBDP report, in 1985, for example, 30.7 per cent (or 51,300 workers) of the West Bank Palestinian labour force were employed in Israel. The percentage of the Gaza Strip Palestinians forced to seek employment in Israel was even higher, reaching 46.1 per cent (or 43,400 workers). The highest increase in Palestinian labour employment in Israel occurred in the construction sector of the Israeli economy. While in 1985, Palestinian labour in this sector was 62.3 per cent, in 1986 it increased to 65 per cent. Palestinian employment in Israeli agriculture also rose from 29.5 per cent in 1985 to over 30 per cent in 1986. 25/
* Israeli and Palestinian estimates of the actual percentage of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip employed in the Israeli economy differ. In the WBDP 1986 report, Benvenisti explains this by stating that less than half of the Palestinians seeking employment in Israel in 1985 were legally registered with the Israeli Government Employment Service (op. cit., p. 11).
As far as Palestinian employment in the Israeli economy is concerned, the period under review was characterized by a continuing lack of equal pay for equal work. This situation helped to protect Israeli workers from Palestinian competition. Despite the claim of the 1984 annual report of the Israeli Civil Administration, the “equal pay for equal job” concept was not carried through and the Palestinians in the period under review continued to be generally underprivileged and underpaid compared with the Israeli labour force. Benvenisti illustrates this in the following terms:
“… Palestinians employed legally through the Employment Service fare worse than their Israeli counterparts, so that in effect they are not getting equal pay. They have less rights than Israelis with regard to premiums, pensions, sick leave, recuperation, clothing and vacation. A sum equal to 20 per cent of wages is deducted as for Israeli employees, but in the latter case it is transferred to the National Insurance Institute (NII) whereas in the former it is transferred directly to the Treasury, and in effect, constitutes an “occupation tax”. 26/
In examining the conditions of employment of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian workers in Israel, Benvenisti observes that:
“… many are forced to spend the night within Israel illegally, mostly in the Tel Aviv area and in subhuman conditions, sleeping on tables in restaurants where they work, crowded into insanitary cellars and attics. Many report feeling dehumanized by the long hours, low pay (approximately half that of Israeli workers), poor attitudes and treatment by employers and others in the work place and in the street. They are reported as being searched, arrested or harassed in other ways on an average of twice a week.” 27/
According to the 1988 report of the United States Department of State, approximately 100,000 Palestinian workers from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who travel daily to work in Israel, do not enjoy equal treatment with respect to working conditions and social security. To illustrate this situation, the report stated that:
“Non-residents are ineligible for NII old-age, survivors’ and disability pensions (smaller, flat-rate pensions) received by most Israeli retirees in addition to their Histadrut pensions (like United States social security pensions), unemployment, compensation or insurance for long-term care or injury in nonoccupational accidents. They are also ineligible for NII children’s allowances, funded only by employer contributions, and for NII-administered welfare programs funded by Israeli taxpayers through the budget (income support benefits for widows, orphans, mothers of dependent children, victims of disaster, those incapable of working. etc.).” 28/
A distinctive feature of Palestinian employment in Israel is a high percentage of Palestinians seeking daily employment illegally and having to stay overnight illegally in Israel. Often, as the above-mentioned report says, in “unsatisfactory quarters”. Besides, Labour Ministry inspectors have taken action against some workers staying overnight without permission. 29/
E. Economic value of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip markets for Israel
Virtually no trade existed between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israel prior to 1967. The West Bank has supplied neighbouring Arab countries with certain commodities and products such as olive oil, building stone and soap. Similarly, the Gaza Strip developed markets for its citrus crops.
According to the study prepared by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in collaboration with the secretariat of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in 1987, there are three ways in which the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip influences the territories’ market and their trade. First, and most significantly, is the effect of the occupation itself in altering the established patterns and practices of trade and over which the Palestinian economy has little or no power. These include physical barriers imposed by the Israeli occupation between the territories and their hinterland, sectoral developments which had occurred as a direct result of the domination of the territories’ economy by the much more advanced Israeli economy and the boycott policies adopted by Arab countries to prevent the import of Palestinian exports containing any measure of Israeli-produced or imported raw materials. Secondly, over the years, Israel has developed a policy with regard to trade with the territories which resulted in a number of measures having a negative impact on their trading position. Finally, there exist various trading procedures and practices which also adversely affect the ability of the Palestinians to enter markets competitively. 30/
Israel’s major consideration, influencing its policy towards trade with the occupied territory, is that Israeli exports should be able to flow freely into the West Bank and Gaza Strip while exports to Israel should be tightly controlled to safeguard the interests of Israeli producers. This is a deliberate and calculated economic policy, established early in the occupation period and scrupulously applied since. In announcing new policy guidelines for export procedures to Israel, an Israeli Government official affirmed that Palestinian products “threaten Israeli firms with unfair competition”. 31/ Meanwhile, Israeli policy allows the free flow of Israeli-manufactured agricultural and industrial goods to the territories, disregarding the damaging effects on Palestinian producers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
A number of specific restrictive measures aimed at protecting Israeli markets and exploiting the benefits of the Palestinian economy were being implemented by Israel in 1984-1988. Some of the territories’ most lucrative cash crops (e.g. cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplant, melons, etc.), capable of competing with Israeli produce, were generally banned from Israeli markets or, if allowed to enter, were imported only in small and carefully controlled quantities, thus protecting the Israeli producers of these commodities. Additionally, exports of Palestinian agricultural output, notably the Gaza Strip’s citrus fruit, to Western Europe and other markets secured exclusively for Israeli produce remained forbidden and strict punishments were imposed for contraventions of this regulation. To prevent “the threat of competition” from Palestinian manufacturers, a new military order enforced complex labelling guidelines for all Palestinian products adding further costs to an already burdened manufacturing process. 31/
On the whole, while the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not supply a significant part of Israel’s imports (around 3 per cent of Israeli non-military imports), their own trade relations were increasingly influenced by Israel. An average of 16 per cent of Israeli exports were destined for the territories, making the Palestinian market the second largest Israeli (non-military) export market after the United States. Excluding Israeli exports of diamonds to the United States, the West Bank and Gaza, this highly monopolized market, have remained since the mid-1970s the largest single market for Israeli exports. 32/
III. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
1984
The Secretary-General, on 13 March 1984, submitted his report pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/58 C. 33/ He stated in this document that after his consultations with the Security Council on 9 March of that year, he had addressed letters to 19 Governments 34/ and the PLO to ascertain their views on all issues relevant to the organization and convening of the proposed International Peace Conference on the Middle East, including the question of identification of participants.
The replies of the Governments consulted centred around the provisions of General Assembly resolution 38/58 C as it related to the need for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East.
The Permanent Representative of the United States reiterated the opposition of her Government to resolution 38/58 C, stating that the United States believed that the only path to peace in the Middle East lay in a process of negotiations among the parties based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The United States was of the view that holding an international conference, as recommended by the General Assembly, would only hinder the process. 35/
In his reply, the Permanent Representative of the USSR strongly supported the idea of international, collective efforts to resolve the problem of the Middle East. He pointed out that the Soviet Union was continuing consistently to advocate the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East, “which would open up a real path towards an all-embracing solution for all the problems generated by the Middle East conflict”. He also said that the United Nations and its Secretary-General could contribute effectively to the achievement of general agreement on the need to achieve a comprehensive solution of the Middle East problem through collective efforts. 36/
The Israeli Government’s position was that the Conference proposed by resolution 38/58 C would serve “as a forum for the dissemination of anti-Israel propaganda”. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations concluded his letter by completely rejecting the idea of a United Nations-sponsored peace conference on the Middle East as provided for by the resolution. 37/
The Permanent Observer of the PLO to the United Nations, on the instruction of Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, 38/ in which he criticized the “spirit of the letter” of the United States.
The Permanent Observer of the PLO to the United Nations made reference to the statement of Chairman Yasser Arafat during the International Conference on the Question of Palestine. Addressing the Conference, he had put forward a series of specific ideas aimed at finding a solution to the question of Palestine. Chairman Arafat stated, inter alia, that the Fez Summit resolutions constituted a unique opportunity for the achievement of the minimum degree of justice required. He said that the exercise by the people of Palestine of its right to return, self-determination and national independence constituted the only basis for any peace based on justice in the Middle East. Chairman Arafat also called for an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, in which the super-Powers would participate with the rest of the parties concerned, on the basis of the United Nations resolutions relating to the question of Palestine.
The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations stressed his full support for the Conference in accordance with resolution 38/58 C 39/ The Syrian representative also charged that the policy of force and fait accompli pursued by Israel was the main obstacle to the conclusion of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. The Syrian Arab Republic further reaffirmed its support for General Assembly resolution 38/58 C and paid tribute to the efforts made by the Secretary-General in that area. It also expressed its support for the Soviet proposals of 29 July 1984. 39/
The Permanent Representative of Jordan stated that the convening of an International Peace Conference on the Middle East, as envisaged in resolution 38/58;C, was an idea worth pursuing. He added that terms of reference for the Conference should stem from the principles and rules of international law applicable to the issues before the Conference and should include the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, which was a fundamental principle in relations among States, besides being a just and cogent rule of international law. The Jordanian Government believed that Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) should provide terms of reference for the Conference. 40/
The Permanent Representative of Lebanon, in his letter to the Secretary-General, 41/ said that his Government was prepared to participate in such a Conference within the limits of certain concepts. First, Lebanon was host to a large number of Palestinian refugees, who awaited a just solution to their problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions. Consequently, it was concerned with any effort made to attain this goal. Secondly, Lebanon’s agreement to participate in the Conference stemmed from the fact that it was a country concerned with the resolution of the conflict in the region, because it had many times been exposed to problems, acts of aggression and occupation without having been responsible for any act that might give rise to phenomena such as those to which it had been exposed. Thirdly, Lebanon considered that the General Armistice Agreement concluded in 1949 was the legal text governing Lebanese-Israeli relations, as had been stressed in a series of Security Council resolutions over the years.
The Government of Egypt reiterated its belief in the justice of the Palestinian cause and the legitimacy of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, in particular its right to self-determination and to establish its independent State in Palestine. The Government of Egypt called upon the Secretary-General to hold the appropriate consultations and to exert every effort to ensure the participation of the parties to the conflict and to afford suitable arrangements and conditions for the conduct of constructive negotiations within the framework of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 42/
The Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights laid viable groundwork for the future efforts of the United Nations aimed at the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East. Following the provisions of these documents, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/58 C and in line with subsequent developments around the issue, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed, on 31 July 1984, to the Secretary-General a letter transmitting the text of a document dated 29 July 1984 entitled “Proposals by the Soviet Union on a Middle East settlement”. 43/
The proposals defined ways of and offered recommendations for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East on the basis of the principle of the inadmissibility of the capture of foreign lands through aggression, the demands for the return to the Arabs of all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and the dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories after 1967. They focused on the question of action to be taken to guarantee in practice the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to establish its own independent State on the Palestinian lands that would be freed from Israeli occupation on the West Bank of the River Jordan and in the Gaza Strip.
The Soviet proposals asserted the need to put an end to the state of war in the region and the need for the establishment of peace between the Arab States and Israel. Special emphasis was laid in the document on the international guarantees for the settlement. According to the proposals, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council or the Security Council as a whole could assume the role of the guarantor. On its part, the Soviet Union expressed readiness to participate in such guarantees.
The Secretary-General stated, later in September 1984, that from the replies he had received and the discussions he had held with the Governments and authorities concerned, it was evident that the convening of the proposed Conference would require, in the first place, the agreement in principle of the parties directly concerned, as well as the United States and the USSR, to participate in the Conference. He said that it was clear from the replies of the Governments of Israel 37/ and the United States 35/ that they were not prepared to participate in the proposed Conference.
In its annual report to the General Assembly, 44/ the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People expressed regret over the negative attitude of Israel and the United States to the idea of the Conference and decided to maintain its efforts for the early convening of the Conference, while urging the understanding and co-operation of all concerned for the resolution of a problem fundamental to the maintenance of international peace and security, and involving a clear case of the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination.
The Secretary-General, in his report of 26 October 1984 on the situation in the Middle East 45/ stressed, inter alia, that the Middle East conflict, involving complex interrelated issues, could be fully resolved only by a comprehensive settlement covering all its aspects. The Secretary-General continued to believe that a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East would have to meet the following conditions: the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territory; respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force; and, lastly, a just settlement of the Palestinian problem based on the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. In this context, the question of Jerusalem also remained of primary importance.
The Secretary-General added that a comprehensive settlement would have to be reached at least in its final stage, if not earlier, through a process of negotiation in which all the parties concerned would participate. He stated that it was generally recognized that the support of the major Powers, especially the USSR and the United States, would be essential for any lasting settlement in the Middle East. From a purely rational point of view, all these requirements could best and most readily be met if negotiations were undertaken under some form of United Nations auspices.
Various aspects of the question of Palestine were considered throughout 1984 by prominent intergovernmental organizations such as the European Economic Community (EEC), the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and its Committee of Nine on Palestine,* the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and its Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Committee.** A number of significant documents were adopted over the year by the above-mentioned organizations.
* Established at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi, India, from 7 to 12 March 1983. It later became the Committee of Nine on Palestine. At the time of writing, the members of the Committee are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cuba, India, Palestine, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe
** Established upon the recommendation of the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of States Members of OIC, held at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in June 1975. The Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez, Morocco, placed the Al-Quds Committee under the chairmanship of King Hassan II of Morocco.
1985
The Security Council held 20 meetings during the year in which it deliberated on various aspects of the situation in the Middle East and in the occupied territory and on other related issues. On 12 and 13 September 1985, at the request of the Group of Arab States, the Council met to consider Israeli practices against the civilian population in the occupied Palestinian territories. The Security Council had before it a draft resolution which deplored the repressive measures taken by Israel since 4 August 1985 against the civilian Palestinian population in the occupied territory; called upon Israel to immediately stop such measures, release the detainees and refrain from further deportations; and called on Israel to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. The draft was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member, the United States.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, at its forty-first session held at Geneva from 4 February to 15 March 1985, considered an agenda item entitled “Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territory, including Palestine” and adopted two resolutions.
In resolution 1985/1 A, the Commission, inter alia, denounced the continued refusal of Israel to allow the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories access to the occupied territory; reiterated the deep alarm expressed by the Special Committee at Israel’s policies towards those territories; confirmed its declaration that Israel’s breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols were war crimes and an affront to humanity; called upon Israel to refrain from such policies and to implement all pertinent United Nations resolutions; reiterated its call to all States not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territory, and to avoid taking any action or extending any aid which might be used by Israel in pursuit of such policies; and requested the General Assembly to recommend to the Security Council the adoption against Israel of measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
In resolution 1985/1 B, the Commission reaffirmed that the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 was applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem; condemned Israel’s failure to acknowledge such applicability; and urged once more all States parties to the Convention to make every effort to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in the occupied territory.
In the Declaration adopted by the Commemorative Meeting in Observance of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung, Indonesia, from 24 to 25 April 1985, participating States expressed their full solidarity with and support for the struggle of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative. They condemned Israeli practices against the population of the Palestinian and Arab territories and reaffirmed their conviction that there could be no just and lasting solution to the Middle East conflict until Israel totally and unconditionally withdrew from all territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.
The Fifty-Seventh Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Ten States Members of EEC, held at Luxembourg, on 29 April 1985, adopted a Declaration in which the Ten reaffirmed their conviction that the achievement of a just and lasting peace called for the participation and active support of all the parties concerned, and reconfirmed their willingness to contribute to such a process on the basis of the principles stated by them on previous occasions.
Later that year, from 18 to 21 July 1985, the twenty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted two resolutions regarding the question of Palestine and the Middle East conflict. It reiterated its unwavering support for the people of Palestine led by the PLO, its sole legitimate representative. It strongly condemned any initiatives or measures of agreements which did not take into account the aspirations of the people of Palestine and of the PLO, and considered null and void any agreement on the Palestine question which excluded the PLO.
The Extraordinary Summit Conference of Arab States, convened at Casablanca, Morocco, from 7 to 9 August 1985, stated the need for continued Arab support for the resolutions regarding the Palestinian question and its support for the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Conference also considered that the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of the USSR, the United States and the other permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the PLO, along with the other concerned parties, would contribute to the promotion of peace in the region.
The Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda, Angola, from 2 to 7 September 1985, reaffirmed that the question of Palestine was the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and emphasized that a comprehensive, just and durable solution could not be achieved without the total and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights. The Conference stressed the necessity for the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/58 C.
Within the United Nations, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People continued its efforts aimed at solving the question of Palestine. In its 1985 report, 46/ it strongly pointed out that the question of Palestine had reached a critical phase and urged renewed, concerted and collective action to find a just solution under United Nations auspices and on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions to end the plight of the Palestinian people. The Committee also expressed its conviction that the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, as endorsed in General Assembly resolution 38/58 C, and generating quasi-unanimous support, could provide a comprehensive opportunity for all parties concerned to participate in negotiations that would lead to a just and lasting solution of the problem.
In its annual report, 47/ the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories again stressed the hardships of the day-to-day life of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. It also dealt with further deterioration of the human rights situation of the civilian population, violation by the Israeli occupation authorities of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Israeli policy of annexation of the Palestinian lands and the unabating Jewish settler violence towards the unarmed Palestinian population. It stated that:
“The extent and force of the activities undertaken by these settlers in regard to the Palestinians in the occupied territories showed that, in fact, it was the settlers who constituted the real authority in the country …
“The civilian population remained without any protection whatsoever. Corroborative of this attitude of the Israeli authorities is the leniency with which members of the Jewish underground found guilty of murder and physical abuse of the civilian population were treated by the authorities. … There remains no doubt that the true political force in the occupied territories, which determines the fate of the civilian population, is made up of the settlers implanted illegally in these territories.”
In the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East, 48/ of 22 October 1985, it was underlined that the Security Council had a major and universally recognized responsibility for this complex and potentially explosive issue and could play a vital role in the evolution of a just and lasting settlement in the region. The Secretary-General stated that he was aware of the many difficulties facing this endeavour, the success of which would depend on the agreement and co-operation of the major Powers. It would also require the necessary accommodations and adjustments by the parties directly concerned.
During 1985 the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory continued to worsen, according to reports issued by a variety of sources such as Governments, United Nations system, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, individual experts and the media. The continuing deterioration of the living conditions and situation of the Palestinian refugees in south Lebanon, as a result of Israeli expansionist policies and practices, were other distinctive features of this period.
The information reviewed by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People left no doubt that Israel had persisted in its policy of confiscating Arab-owned land in the occupied Palestinian territory and of increasing the size and number of its settlements, despite the fact that such policy was in violation of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and contrary to United Nations resolutions. At the same time, Israel had persisted in its policy of Judaization of the occupied Palestinian territory through its economic and administrative subjugation and gradual incorporation into the infrastructure of Israel.
The Palestinians became the victims of the reinstatement, in August 1985, of the emergency regulations of 1945, introduced during the British Mandate, which provide inter alia for deportation of persons, administrative detention without charges or trial for renewable six-month periods, and the closing down of newspapers. This measure was reported to have become the corner-stone of a new repressive policy of the Israeli authorities aimed at curbing activities in opposition to the occupation. 49/
At its fortieth session the General Assembly, reiterating once again, in its resolution 40/96 D, the conviction that the convening of an International Peace Conference would constitute a major contribution by the United Nations towards the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, reaffirmed its endorsement of the call for convening the Conference and called upon the Governments of Israel and the United States to reconsider their position towards the attainment of peace in the Middle East through the convening of the Conference.
1986
By 1986 the idea of the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the aegis of the United Nations, as the only effective and efficient means of resolving the question of Palestine, gained almost universal recognition and proposals to that end were advanced by the United Nations bodies and intergovernmental organizations.
The question of the situation in the occupied Arab territories occupied by Israel was on the agenda of the Security Council throughout 1986. Particular attention was given by the Council to the profanation by Israel of the sanctuary of Haram al-Sharif in the Holy City of Al-Quds (Jerusalem). An urgent meeting of the Security Council was convened at the request of Morocco, in its capacity as the Chairman of OIC.
At its meeting, on 30 January 1986, the Security Council had before it a draft resolution by which the Council would have expressed its deep concern at “the provocative acts by Israelis, including members of the Knesset, which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem” and would have strongly deplored them, affirming that “such acts constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the failure of which could also endanger international peace and security”. The draft also criticized Israel’s violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It would further have requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. However, the draft was not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member, the United States.
At its forty-second session, held from 3 February to 14 March 1986, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights considered an agenda item entitled “Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine”. Two resolutions were adopted on this item.
In resolution 1986/1 A, the Commission reaffirmed the fact that the occupation itself constituted a fundamental violation of the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied Arab territories; it also reiterated its deep concern at Israel’s policy in the occupied territories, based on the “homeland doctrine” envisaging a monoreligious (Jewish) State that would include territories occupied by Israel since June 1967; the Commission firmly reiterated its condemnation of and rejected Israel’s decision to annex Jerusalem and to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territory, including Jerusalem, and considered all those measures and their consequences null and void.
In its second resolution 1986/1 B, the Commission condemned Israel’s failure to acknowledge the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories it had occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem; it further strongly condemned Israel for its policies of ill-treatment and torture of Palestinian detainees and prisoners in Israeli prisons and the practice of deportation of the liberated Palestinian prisoners; the Commission also urged Israel to co-operate with ICRC.
OIC and its Al-Quds Committee held a number of meetings in 1986 at which issues related to the question of Palestine were considered. At its tenth session, convened at Marrakesh, Morocco, from 21 to 22 January 1986, the Al-Quds Committee recommended the continuation of the effective support to the struggle of the Palestinian people at all levels, political, military, economic, as well as at the level of information, in order to enable it to resist on its land and in its homeland with greater firmness and to oppose more effectively the Zionist occupation. Special attention was also given to the question of the joint efforts of the PLO and the Jordanian Government to safeguard the Holy Places of Islam in occupied Palestine, particularly in Al-Quds al-Sharif.
In its final communiqué, the Co-ordinating Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of OIC, held at New York, on 2 October 1986, emphasized the importance of holding the International Peace Conference on the Middle East and reiterated its determination to adhere to the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject.
The seventy-fifth Inter-Parliamentary Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, held at Mexico City, from 7 to 12 April 1986, adopted a resolution on the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine. In this document the Conference demanded the full, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territory, affirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return to its homeland, to self-determination and to the establishment of its independent State under the leadership of its sole and legitimate representative, the PLO. The Conference called upon parliaments and Governments to support all efforts toward the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 38/58 C, with the participation of all concerned parties, including the PLO, the United States, the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The Council of Ministers of OAU, meeting at its forty-fourth ordinary session at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21 to 26 July 1986, reiterated its position as regards the question of Palestine in two of its resolutions. Reaffirming the legitimacy of and support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, OAU called upon the Security Council to take effective measures to guarantee the exercise by the people of Palestine of its national and imprescriptible rights recognized by the United Nations General Assembly. It firmly supported the Arab Peace Plan adopted at the Twelfth Arab Summit, held at Fez, from 6 to 9 September 1982 as an important contribution to the search for a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. OAU also supported the holding of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East.
The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries considered issues related to the question of Palestine during several meetings at various levels. The eighth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries convened at Harare, Zimbabwe, from 1 to 6 September 1986, adopted its Political Declaration in which the Movement reaffirmed its active solidarity with the Arab countries victims of Israeli aggression and with the just struggle of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO. The Declaration condemned any accord or treaty that violated or infringed the rights of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people. It also stressed the urgent need to organize the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in conformity with the 1983 Geneva Declaration and General Assembly resolution 38/58 C in order to achieve a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem, based essentially on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the right to establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian State in its national homeland. The Declaration also called upon the United Nations Security Council to consider setting up a preparatory committee, with the participation of the Security Council’s permanent members, to examine effective ways and means of holding the International Peace Conference on the Middle East.
However, despite strong endorsement in the world of the idea of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under United Nations auspices, the observations of the Secretary-General’s report 50/ of 14 March 1986, submitted in pursuance of resolution 40/96 D, reflected a measure of concern about the obstacles to be negotiated in this complex issue. The Secretary-General stated the following in this regard:
“In light of the debate of the General Assembly on the above resolution and other available information, I believe that the obstacles which have so far prevented the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East as called for by the General Assembly still exist. However, I also believe that the observations contained in my report of 22 October 1985, which are recalled above, remain valid.”
In its 1986 report, 49/ the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People observed that Israel had continued to occupy Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, in violation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and to take measures to strengthen its control, including growing repression of the local population and the expansion of settlers’ activities. The Committee also stated that, as a consequence of the policies and practices of Israel and of the resulting lack of progress towards a peaceful, just, durable and comprehensive solution, tension and violence had continued to grow in the area, further endangering international peace and security. The priority of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People throughout 1986 was the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East in accordance with resolution 38/58 C.
New factors aggravating the plight of the civilian Palestinian population of the occupied territory were presented in the 1986 report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. 51/ The report stated that the Committee had observed the escalation of violence caused by the implementation by the Government of Israel of a revived “iron-fist” policy, as announced by the Israeli authorities themselves. The policy had been illustrated by a number of harsh measures affecting the human rights of the Palestinian population of the occupied territory, such as an increasing number of arrests and trials leading to the detention of many civilians (including minors) imprisoned for political or security offences, as well as the imposition of measures of administrative detention. Another preoccupying aspect of the “iron-fist” policy had been the resumption, on a large scale, of the expulsion and deportation policy.
The report stated further in paragraph 90 that, on the basis of the evidence and information before it, the Special Committee had reached the conclusion that:
“… the policy pursued by the Government of Israel in the occupied territories continues, as in the past, to be based on the principle that the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 constitute a part of the State of Israel. This is at the source of the policy of annexation and establishment of settlements in occupied territories, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the international obligations of Israel as a State Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.”
In his report of 29 October 1986 52/ the Secretary-General laid special emphasis on the alarming absence of a generally accepted and active negotiating process in that area. In that connection he mentioned the difference in the positions of the major Powers regarding the modalities of a negotiating process. The Secretary-General further maintained that, given the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a just and lasting peace could be best achieved through a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the conflict and involving all the parties concerned, including the PLO. On the prospects for the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East he said that:
“… the idea of an International Peace Conference appears to be gaining wider support and a number of procedural proposals have been made in bilateral contacts involving the parties in the region and others who are interested in a settlement of this long-standing conflict. Important disagreements nevertheless remain on the scope of the Conference, on its timing and especially on the question of participation. The latter question, more specifically how the interests and rights of the Palestinian people should be represented, has so far proved impossible to resolve in a manner acceptable to all the potential participants in the proposed Conference. Agreement on that issue would do more than anything else to unblock the present deadlock in the negotiating process.”
The disagreements on the issue of the convening of the Conference, however, could also be observed during the debate at the forty-first session of the General Assembly which, by a vast majority, adopted resolution 41/43 D, which reaffirmed its endorsement of the call for convening the Conference. Moreover, the resolution called for setting up a preparatory committee, within the framework of the Security Council, with the participation of the permanent members of the Council to take the necessary action to convening the Conference. By the same resolution the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, was requested to continue his effort with a view of convening the Conference and to report on this matter to the General Assembly not later than 15 May 1987.
1987
The year 1987 was marked by several anniversaries of significant events in the history of the Palestinian people. It was the year marking the seventieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations partition resolution of 1947 (resolution 181 (II)), the twentieth anniversary of the 1967 war and the fifth anniversary of the brutal massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians – men, women and children – at the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut on 17 and 18 September 1982. In commemoration of these anniversaries, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People decided that it would keep in mind, in its programme of work for the year, a proposal by the NGO community to designate the year 1987 as “The Year of the Palestinian People”.
The idea of holding a United Nations-sponsored international peace conference on the Middle East received vigorous endorsement in the relevant resolution of the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference held at Kuwait, from 26 to 29 January 1987. The Islamic States, in resolution No. 1/5-P(IS), expressed their commitment to the convening of such a conference with the participation of all the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO, on an equal footing with them, as well as the permanent members of the Security Council. The Islamic Conference endorsed the establishment of a preparatory committee comprised of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
An important position statement came early that year from the States members of EEC which contained their endorsement for the convening of the Conference in a document entitled “Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve States Members of the European Community on the Middle East”. The Declaration was adopted during their meeting at Brussels, Belgium, on 23 February 1987. The expression of support of the Twelve for the forum was contained in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General 53/ in which they pointed out that they were in favour of an international peace conference, held under United Nations auspices, with the participation of the parties concerned and of any party able to make a direct and positive contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace, as well as to the region’s economic and social development.
In the United Nations the Commission on Human Rights, at its forty-third session, held from 2 February to 13 March 1987, adopted two resolutions entitled “Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine”. Resolution 1987/2 A, while reiterating the majority of the provisions contained in the similar resolutions in previous years, strongly condemned the implementation by Israel of the “iron-fist” policy against the population of the occupied territory as well as all terrorist acts undertaken against the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territory by Zionist gangs under the supervision of the occupation authorities; the Commission also strongly condemned the Israeli practice of hindering religious freedom and practices. In its resolution 1987/2;B, the Commission focused its attention on the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Convention to all Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.
The Foreign Ministers of the Scandinavian States meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, from 25 to 26 March 1987, had the Middle East problem high on their agenda. Upon the termination of the meeting, the Nordic Foreign Ministers issued a statement supporting the idea of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the parties concerned.
States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries once again voiced their support for the convening of the Conference during the meeting of their Committee of Nine on Palestine held at Harare, Zimbabwe, from 14 to 15 April 1987. The Committee urged intensified efforts to begin the preparatory process for the early convening of the Conference.
At its eighteenth session, held at Algiers, Algeria from 20 to 26 April 1987, the Palestine National Council (PNC) strongly endorsed the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, within the framework of the United Nations and under its auspices, with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the concerned parties, including the PLO, on an equal footing with the other parties. The report also rendered support for the proposal regarding the establishment of the preparatory committee for the Conference.
Later in the year the Secretary-General, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 41/43 D of 2 December 1986 (para. 6), submitted his report on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East. 54/ The report was prepared on the basis of the Secretary-General’s round of consultations with all the members of the Security Council and representatives of the Member States directly concerned – Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic – and the PLO. Its focal point was the attitude of the Security Council members towards the Secretary-General’s effort to explore ways for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict in general and for an international peace conference on the issue in particular. Describing new elements in this process, the Secretary-General stated in paragraph 3 that:
“All members of the Security Council were concerned about the Middle East problem, and all expressed support for a continuation of the Secretary-General’s efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Moreover, in contrast with experience of recent years, none of the Council members opposed in principle the idea of an International Conference under United Nations auspices. It was clear, however, that wide differences still existed regarding the form that a conference should take. It was also generally agreed that the position of the parties themselves remained far apart on a number of issues of procedure and of substance but that in recent months there had been indications of greater flexibility in attitudes towards the negotiating process and that this should be encouraged.”
The Secretary-General concluded by pointing out that, while it was apparent that sufficient agreement did not exist to permit the convening of the International Conference, as called for in resolution 41/43 D, he was determined to continue his efforts to establish a process that would lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
On 28 and 29 May 1987, a session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held at Berlin. Addressing the issue of the ways of finding a just political solution to the Middle East problem, the leaders of the States parties to the Treaty stated that a United Nations-sponsored conference attended by all the interested parties, including the PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, would be of great importance for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and the attainment of lasting peace in the region. They were of the view that a preparatory committee involving the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as all interested parties, could be a great practical step towards convening such a conference. 55/
On 13 November 1987, the Secretary-General submitted his report on the situation in the Middle East 56/ to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. In his overview of the developments related to negotiating a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the prospects for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Secretary-General said that two factors – international backing as well as the support of the parties concerned – had provided an important basis for the several rounds of consultations.
On the issue of the existing differences between the parties, the Secretary-General pointed out that those are “differences about the procedural aspects of a conference”. He also expressed his hope that with the principle accepted, the gaps on procedure could be bridged through patient diplomacy. The Secretary-General, however, clearly outlined the still existing obstacle to the convening of such a conference and made the following observation in paragraph 33:
“The major obstacle at present, however, is one of a different kind, namely, the inability of the Government of Israel as a whole to agree on the principle of an international conference under United Nations auspices. Until the Israeli Government accepts that such a conference is the best way to negotiate a peace settlement, the way forward will remain difficult.”
The Secretary-General’s findings, however, pointed to certain positive developments in this area. The Secretary-General concluded that he was nevertheless encouraged by the fact that:
“… the idea of an international conference under United Nations auspices has been given high priority among the Arab parties to the conflict, and has been the subject of lively debate within Israel. These positive trends, combined with the growing international consensus in favour of the early convening of a conference, demand of us that we consolidate and build on the foundation that has so far been established.”
The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, in its 1987 report, 57/ stated that the general climate of confrontation and repression in the occupied territories had a negative impact in various fields. The day-to-day reality faced by civilians in the occupied territory was marked by the persistence and even intensification of the various forms of harassment and humiliation of the Arab population. Another arbitrary practice used against the Palestinians was that of expulsion and deportation. The report also contained information on measures affecting the enjoyment by the Palestinians of certain basic freedoms. The Special Committee concluded that:
“… the situation in the occupied territories denotes a continuing deterioration of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the civilian population. The relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention continue to be disregarded. The persistent policy of annexation of the occupied territories, which meets with fierce resistance on the part of the civilian population, and the cycle of tension and repression that the implementation of such a policy involves, have led to an explosive situation that seems bound to provoke yet more dramatic events in the future.
The report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People 58/, submitted in 1987, emphasized that international understanding of the question of Palestine and support for the attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people had reached new heights in late 1986 and into 1987. At the same time, the grave deterioration of the situation of Palestinians in the area had aroused the most widespread and serious concern that tension and violence could continue to increase, with possible disastrous consequences for the region, unless progress was finally made towards a negotiated settlement of the problem. It was stressed in the report that urgent positive action by the Security Council was required on the recommendations formulated by the Committee in its first report, as well as on those adopted by the 1983 International Conference on the Question of Palestine, which had been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly.
The Committee in 1987 intensified its efforts aimed at convening the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 38/58 C and 41/43 D. In the view of the Committee, such a Conference was the most comprehensive and widely accepted proposal aimed at resolving the Palestinian problem.
The Arab Summit, held at Amman, Jordan, from 8 to 11 November 1987 affirmed, inter alia, that the Palestinian issue was the core issue of the Middle East conflict. It supported the convening of the United Nations-sponsored International Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing, in addition to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The issue of the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East was one of the major issues discussed at the forty-second session of the General Assembly. The general debate at the session clearly indicated that there was a growing understanding and awareness among Member States of the urgency and complexity of the question of Palestine, as the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The debate also reflected increased interest within the international community in a just, peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Almost all the delegations spoke in favour of the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.
By an overwhelming majority of votes, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/66 D relating to the convening of such a Conference. The resolution endorsed anew the call for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East stressing “the urgent need for additional concrete and constructive efforts by all Governments in order to convene the Conference without further delay”.
IV. INTIFADAH: PALESTINIAN POPULAR UPRISING IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
A. Beginning of the intifadah
At the end of 1987, the question of Palestine and that of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole remained in the forefront of the international community’s attention as one of the most protracted and difficult of all conflicts after the Second World War. Along with the growing international understanding of the question of Palestine and support for the attainment and exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its inalienable rights, tension and violence mounted in the region with tragic consequences for the Palestinians.
During the period between September and December 1987, various incidents reflecting the climate of growing unrest among the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip took place. This brief period was marked by numerous violent demons- trations, armed clashes and shootings, leading in some instances to serious injuries and killings, the throwing of petrol bombs and grenades and business and school strikes in various towns, localities, refugee camps and universities in the occupied territory.
In early December 1987 the Palestinian problem entered a new phase. The massive uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian population erupted early that month in the occupied Gaza Strip and then spread to the rest of the occupied territory. On 8 December, four Palestinians died and nine others were injured after an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) truck struck their vans at an army road block in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians believed that the deaths were deliberately caused and popular protests followed. The Israeli forces began to use live ammunition against the Palestinian protesters which resulted in high casualties on the Palestinian side.
Following these intense Gaza protests the Palestinian popular uprising flared up in the West Bank and Jerusalem. To subdue and disperse the all-out Palestinian protest demonstrations, IDF, special forces, police and Jewish settlers used live ammunition, indiscriminate beatings of Palestinians, as well as other means of repression.
Immediately following the start of the uprising, the Security Council was convened on 11 December to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories at the request of Democratic Yemen, Chairman of the Group of Arab States for that month. 59/ The Security Council considered the issue at its nine meetings during the month of December.* On 22 December 1987 the Council adopted resolution 605 (1987) by 14 votes in favour to none against with 1 abstention (United States of America). In that resolution 60/ the Security Council “strongly deplored the policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians”. It also reaffirmed that “the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 [was] applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem”. The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to examine the situation in the occupied territory by all means available to him and to submit a report containing his recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation.
* Security Council, 2770th, 2772-2777th and 2780-2781st meetings.
Despite direct appeals to the Israeli Government to abide by article 49 of the foresaid Geneva Convention and not to resort to the deportation of Palestinians from the occupied territory, Israel went ahead and obtained an arbitrary court decision for the deportation of nine Palestinians.
On 5 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 607 (1988) in which, inter alia, it called upon Israel to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory. The Council’s appeal to Israel “to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported” was contained in its resolution 608 (1988), adopted on 14 January 1988 by 14 votes in favour to none against with 1 abstention.
B. 1988: The year of the uprising
Report of the Secretary-General of 21 January 1988 61/
In response to Security Council resolution 605 (1987), the Secretary-General dispatched his representative, Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, to visit Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories with a twofold mission: to examine on the spot the situation in the occupied territory and to explore ways and means to ensure the safety and protection of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza which could be recommended by the Secretary-General to the Security Council.
The Secretary-General’s representative, after meeting with Israeli Government officials and discussing the situation in the occupied territory with about 200 Palestinian men and women, forwarded his findings and observations to the Secretary-General. On 21 January 1988 the Secretary-General submitted his report on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories to the Security Council.
Part I of the report, entitled “The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories”, dealt with the human rights abuses committed by the occupying Power and the living conditions of the Palestinian population of the occupied territory. According to the report, the Palestinians consulted by the Under-Secretary-General rejected the Israeli occupation and bitterly complained about the practices of the Israeli security forces (this term includes IDF, the border police, the civilian police and the General Security Services (GSS), also known as Shin Beth). Equally common was the complaint (which was also made against officials of the Israeli Civil Administration in the territories) that Palestinians were treated with a contempt and arrogance that seemed to be deliberately intended to humiliate them and undermine their dignity as human beings. Complaints were also made regarding routine violence in detention centres, as well as about the whole system of administrative detention. It was said that the purpose of interrogation was normally to extract a confession, for use in subsequent proceedings in the military courts, and that heavy physical and psychological pressure was used for this purpose by GSS, which used techniques (e.g. hooding) that left no permanent physical disfigurement.
Part I also contained other complaints made by the Palestinians regarding the lack of outlets for their political activity, the taking of land in the occupied territory for the establishment of Israeli settlements and the Israeli practice of deportation of the Palestinians.
Part II of the report, entitled “Ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation”, considered such problems as the need for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the question of the observance of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, various types of protection of the civilian Palestinian population and ways and means to ensure the civilian population’s protection.
In discussing the need for a political settlement of the problem, the Secretary-General, in paragraph 20, stated the following:
“… It is certainly necessary that more should be done to ensure the safety and protection of the civilian population. But such measures can only be palliatives. They cannot cure the underlying problem, which is the continuing occupation by Israel of the territories captured in the 1967 war.
“… In the long run, the only certain way of ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and of the people of Israel, is the negotiation of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict acceptable to all concerned. An urgent effort is required by the international community, led by the Security Council, to promote an effective negotiating process and to help create the conditions necessary for it to succeed.”
Regarding the question of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Israeli policies in the occupied territory, the report unequivocally stated in paragraph 26 that:
“Several Security Council and General Assembly resolutions (including resolution 242 (1967)) have declared the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and insisted on Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied since the 1967 war. The Security Council and the General Assembly have consistently maintained since 1967 that the territories that came under Israeli control during the 1967 war are ‘occupied territories’ within the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have also stated in numerous resolutions that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to these occupied territories. Accordingly, even though Israel does not accept the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the opinio juris of the world community is that it must be applied.”
The Secretary-General suggested certain urgent measures to be taken with a view to alleviating the present situation. He also stated in paragraph 27 that:
“The most effective way, pending a political settlement, of ensuring the safety and protection of the civilian population of the occupied territories would thus be for Israel to apply in full the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. To this end, I recommend that the Security Council should consider making a solemn appeal to all the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention that have diplomatic relations with Israel, drawing their attention to their obligation under article 1 of the Convention, to ‘… ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’ and urging them to use all the means at their disposal to persuade the Government of Israel to change its position as regards the applicability of the Convention.”
The Secretary-General also put forward, in paragraph 28, a set of possible protective measures that could be undertaken by the Security Council to help to ensure the civilian population’s safety. The proposed forms of “protection” were as follows:
“…
“(a) ‘Protection’ can mean physical protection, i.e. the provision of armed forces to deter, and if necessary fight, any threats to the safety of the protected persons;
“(b) ‘Protection’ can mean legal protection, i.e. intervention with the security and judicial authorities, as well as the political instances, of the occupying Power, by an outside agency, in order to ensure just treatment of an individual or group of individuals;
“(c) ‘Protection’ can also take a less well-defined form, called in this report ‘general assistance’, in which an outside agency intervenes with the authorities of the occupying Power to help individuals or groups of individuals to resist violations of their rights (e.g. land confiscations) and to cope with the day-to-day difficulties of life under occupation, such as security restrictions, curfews, harassment, bureaucratic difficulties and so on;
“(d) Finally, there is the somewhat intangible ‘protection’ afforded by outside agencies, including especially the international media, whose mere presence and readiness to publish what they observe may have a beneficial effect for all concerned; in this report this type of protection is called ‘protection by publicity’.”
In his concluding remarks, the Secretary-General made a series of action-oriented recommendations and described certain steps to be undertaken to bring about a just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Secretary-General pointed out that the underlying problems could be resolved only through a political settlement. He outlined his long-standing position on the issue in these terms in paragraph 53:
“… I continue to believe that this should be achieved through a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and taking fully into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination. Such a settlement should be negotiated by means of an international conference under United Nations auspices, with the participation of all the parties concerned.”
In the final sections of the report, the Secretary-General underscored the socio-economic conditions under which the population of the occupied territories lives. He referred, inter alia, to the situation in the refugee camps, pointing out to the “squalid living conditions in many of the camps, especially in the Gaza Strip, resulting from the lack of such basic amenities as paved roads, sewage, water, lighting and housing of a minimum standard”. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General asked the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) urgently to prepare proposals for improving the infrastructure of the camps and to seek the necessary funds. The Secretary-General also stated that many of the Palestinians consulted expressed the hope that a concerted international effort could be undertaken to revive the territories’ economy. To this end, the Secretary-General asked the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to study this possibility.
Finally, in paragraph 60, the Secretary-General expressed his belief that:
“… an urgent effort is required by the international community, led by the Security Council, to promote an effective negotiating process. This is what the Charter requires and it is the fundamental recommendation in this report. I remain personally committed to the search for a settlement and will contribute in any way that I can to that objective.”
The deliberations on this issue in the Security Council were preceded by a series of communications addressed to the Secretary-General. He received letters from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations.
The representative of Kuwait transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the communiqué 62/ adopted at the urgent meeting of the members of OIC at the United Nations, held in New York on 19 January 1988, concerning the desecration by the Israeli troops of Masjid (Mosque) al-Aqsa during Friday prayers. The letter stated that on 15 January 1988, while worshippers were performing their Friday prayers at Masjid al-Aqsa and at the Dome of the Rock in Al-Quds al-Sharif (Jerusalem), Israeli troops rushed into the Mosque, opened fire and launched tear gas grenades at the peaceful worshippers, which resulted in multiple serious injuries and their subsequent hospitalization.
The OIC meeting condemned these Israeli policies and practices against the Palestinian Arab people in the occupied Palestinian territory that were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The members of OIC at the United Nations supported the Palestinian uprising in the occupied Palestinian territory and voiced their solidarity with the uprising.
The Secretary-General received a letter dated 20 January 1988 63/ from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in which the Chairman of the Committee stated:
“The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People wishes to express once again its utmost concern at these policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which are in clear violation of the basic rights of the Palestinian people, of United Nations resolutions and of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. The Committee is particularly concerned by the imposition of collective punishment on the entire Palestinian population, which can only exacerbate tension and further hamper international efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine.”
The Chairman of the Committee went on to stress the necessity of stepping up efforts to find a solution to the Palestinian problem on the basis of General Assembly resolution 38/58 C. He concluded by stating the following:
“The Committee appeals to you to take all possible measures to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation, particularly to ensure the continuous supply of food and other necessities to the refugee camps. Further, the Committee reiterates its appeal for the intensification of efforts by all concerned to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine, in accordance with United Nations resolutions, in particular through the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/58 C of 13 December 1983.”
On the eve of the Security Council meeting on the situation in the occupied Arab territories, the Secretary-General also received a message from Mr. E. A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. 64/ In the letter, he pointed to the urgent need of transforming the political will of States reflected in the General Assembly’s decisions into concrete practical steps to solve the hard-core problems of the Middle East and suggested that special role in this process be played by the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council. He put forward the following proposal:
“We suggest that the members of the Security Council proceed to consultations to consider the relevant questions. The initiative in this matter, we believe, could belong to the permanent members of the Security Council. Conclusions and recommendations arrived at during such consultations could be considered at a formal meeting of the Council. In view of the particular importance of this question for the maintenance of international security, we propose that such a meeting should be held at the Foreign Minister level. We hope that you, for your part, will use the means at your disposal and your personal authority to contribute effectively to a general agreement on immediate practical steps for the convening of an International Conference on the Middle East.”
The report of the Secretary-General was discussed by the Security Council at five meetings held on 27 and 28 January and 1 February 1988.* Thirty-two delegations addressed the issue. The overwhelming majority of the delegations pointedly criticized Israel for its repressive and harsh measures against the participants in the civilian Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories.
* Security Council, 2785-2787th and 2789-2790th meetings.
The debate on the report in the Security Council proved that there was a broad understanding among those delegations that addressed the issue on the need for a concerted collective effort to break the existing deadlock in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to find a political solution to the problem. The only constructive and effective mechanism to reach such a solution would be the early convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the PLO.
At the final stage of the Security Council’s deliberations, six delegations, representing the non-aligned States, drafted a resolution 65/ which called upon Israel, as the occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, to accept de jure the applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to comply fully with its obligations under that Convention, to desist forthwith from its policies and practices which violated the human rights of the Palestinian people; requested Israel to facilitate the task of ICRC and UNRWA and requested all members to give them their full support; requested the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied territories by all means available to him and to make regular and timely reports to the Council; and affirmed the urgent need to achieve, under the auspices of the United Nations, a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an integral part of which was the Palestinian problem, and expressed its determination to work towards that end. On 1 February 1988 the draft was put to the vote but was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council. All the other 14 Council members voted in favour of the draft resolution.
Despite the failure of the Security Council to adopt the above-mentioned draft resolution, the significance of the document, its findings and conclusions and the Council’s near-unanimous agreement on the modalities of the Middle East settlement cannot be overestimated. In this respect the Security Council’s action on the report of the Secretary-General was an important event in the recent history of the United Nations efforts to find a solution to the question of Palestine.
Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian territory
Following the January 1988 deliberations on the Secretary-General’s report in the Security Council, a number of events directly affecting the Palestinian people took place in the area of the Middle East and elsewhere. Unquestionably, the most significant of them for the Palestinians was the continuation of and qualitative changes in the intifadah. Israeli occupation authorities, despite the world-wide condemnation of their practices in the occupied territory, persisted in the “iron-fist” policy against the Palestinians. Methods used by the Israeli forces in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip in dealing with the popular uprising resulted in mass injuries and heavy loss of life among the civilian Palestinian population including children, women and the elderly. The reliance of the Israeli military on certain types of tear gas in high concentrations was from the start of the intifadah the cause of numerous deaths and miscarriages among pregnant Palestinian women and deaths among children. Palestinians were constantly subjected to the indiscriminate beatings and other forms of physical abuse by IDF and GSS personnel. They were also exposed to attacks, at times violent, by the Israeli settlers. Curfews, collective punishment, demolition of houses, detentions and deportations of the Palestinians became standard practice of the Israeli authorities. At the time of writing, over 450* Palestinians were reported to have been killed by the Israeli troops, over 20,000 wounded or injured and 51 deported from the occupied territory by the Israeli authorities. During 1988, thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip were detained for different periods of time. At various times during the uprising, over 2,000 persons were under administrative detention for the period of three to six months. 66/ Up to 12,000 persons were held under detention at certain periods.**
Israel’s violations of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory have been sharply criticized and condemned by the international community. The United States Department of State, in its 1988 report, indicated that, in the view of the United States Government, certain Israeli policies and practices contravened the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.*** These violations include deportations of Palestinian civilians that became more frequent in 1988 than in 1987, transferring prisoners from the occupied territories and house demolitions as a punishment for families. This report cited serious violations of the Palestinians’ rights by the Israeli authorities. According to the report, the response of IDF to the intifadah “led to a substantial increase in human rights violations”. The Department of State in this report stated that the Israeli soldiers, in trying to control the uprising, “frequently used gunfire in situations that did not present mortal danger to troops, causing many avoidable deaths and injuries”. Reported were “five cases in 1988 in which unarmed Palestinians in detention died under questionable circumstances or were clearly killed by the detaining officials”. Reference was also made to the reports of beatings of suspects and detainees, and of “harsh and demeaning treatment of prisoners and detainees”. Particularly severe abuse of Palestinian prisoners was reported at the new facility of Dahiriya. 67/
* This includes deaths from gunfire, tear-gas, beatings and other causes. Palestinian, Israeli, United Nations and other sources differ on the exact number of casualties among the Palestinian population.
** Palestinian, Israeli and other sources differ as to the exact number of casualties and detainees among the Palestinian population.
*** The United States considers Israel’s occupation to be governed by The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
On 19 January 1988, Mr. Itzhak Rabin, Israeli Minister of Defence, stated that in an effort to put down the intifadah, Israel’s first priority [was] “force, might, beatings”. 68/ According to the State Department’s same report:
“… in late January and February Palestinian and foreign physicians, human rights organizations, and the international and Israeli press reported widespread incidents in which IDF troops used clubs to break limbs and beat Palestinians who were not directly involved in disturbances or resisting arrest. Soldiers turned many people out of their homes at night, making them stand for hours, and rounded up men and boys and beat them in reprisal for stone-throwing.” 69/
The Attorney-General of Israel criticized this policy and declared it illegal.
The report said that Palestinian children were treated by the Israeli authorities as adults in security offences. To conceal the above-mentioned practices from the international community, and in part to stop the continuing intifadah, Israel resorted to a media and information blackout. It is stated in the report of the State Department that “to halt the uprising, the Israeli authorities imposed increasing restraints on freedom of expression and press in 1988, citing security reasons”. 70/
Other restrictions were imposed upon the Palestinians, according to the Department of State. These include administrative detention and greater resort to often prolonged curfews that cause severe hardship to the Palestinian residents.
Action taken by the Commission on Human Rights
Throughout 1988 the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory and turbulent developments in the Middle East in general were at the centre of attention of the international community which considerably stepped up its political, humanitarian and economic support for the Palestinian people. A number of significant decisions were adopted and actions taken in 1988 on the question of Palestine both within the United Nations and by other intergovernmental organizations and bodies such as EEC, the League of Arab States, OIC, OAU, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Nordic States, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Caribbean Community and the Association of South-East Asian Nations.
The Commission on Human Rights, the major United Nations body working to promote and protect human rights, continued in 1988 to focus its attention on the violation of human rights in the occupied territory. The report submitted at its forty-fourth session, which was held from 1 February to 11 March, contained two resolutions entitled “Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine”. In resolution 1988/1 A, the Commission reiterated, inter alia, its strong condemnation of Israel’s policy of physical violence in the occupied territory, breaking the bones of children, women and men and causing women to miscarry as a result of severe beating. It condemned other systematic violent practices of the Israeli authorities, such as killing, wounding, arresting and torturing thousands of Palestinians and kidnapping Palestinian children. The Commission firmly rejected Israel’s decision to annex Jerusalem. While urging Israel to refrain from policies and practices that violate human rights in the occupied territory, the Commission requested the Economic and Social Council to recommend to the Security Council the adoption against Israel of the measures referred to in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations for its persistent violation of such rights.* Resolution 1988/1 B urged Israel, which had been systematically refusing to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention in all its provisions to the Palestinian or Arab territories, occupied since 1967, to abide by this international legal instrument and respect it.
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* Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (Arts. 39-51), entitled “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of violence”, describes possible provisional United Nations measures, diplomatic, economic or military, to be taken to restore international peace and security.
During the same session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted a third resolution relating to the question of Palestine. In that resolution, 1988/3, entitled “Situation in occupied Palestine”, the Commission reaffirmed its support for the call to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/58 C.
United States action on the PLO representation at the United Nations
Among developments of special concern to the United Nations in 1988 was the adoption by the United States of the legislation contained in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, as it affected the maintenance of the PLO Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations in New York. The General Assembly reaffirmed that the Mission was covered by the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement,* that the PLO had the right to establish and maintain premises and adequate functional facilities and that the personnel of the Mission should be enabled to enter and remain in the United States to carry out their official functions. The Assembly also pointed out that a dispute existed between the United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agreement, and that the dispute settlement procedure provided for under section 21 of the Agreement should be set into operation. The International Court of Justice on 26 April 1988 unanimously gave its advisory opinion that “the United States of America, as a party to the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations of 26 June 1947, is under an obligation, in accordance with section 21 of that Agreement, to enter into arbitration for the settlement of the dispute between itself and the United Nations”. The Assembly, in its resolution 42/232 of 13 May 1988, endorsed the advisory opinion of the Court and urged the host country to abide by its international legal obligations and accordingly to name its arbitrator to the arbitral tribunal provided for under section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement.
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*”Agreement between the United States and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations”. This document, also known as the “Headquarters Agreement” was signed at Lake Success on 26 June 1947 and came into force on 21 November 1947 by an exchange of notes, in accordance with section 28 thereof.
On 13 September 1988, the Secretary-General submitted a report pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/232 of 13 May 1988 in which he reviewed the dispute that had arisen with the host country over its domestic legislation, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which would have led to the closure of the Permanent Observer Mission of the PLO. 71/ Enclosed with the report was the judgement of the United States District Judge in Manhattan of 29 June 1988 which dismissed the United States Government lawsuit seeking to close the PLO Mission under the said legislation.
According to the relevant rules of court, the United States had 60 days from the date of the decision in question within which to file an appeal. On 29 August 1988, the United States Department of Justice announced that the United States had decided not to appeal the decision. On the same day this statement was issued, attributable to the spokesman for the Secretary-General:
“The United Nations welcomes the decision by the United States not to appeal the judgement of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. The dispute between the United Nations and its host country on the PLO Observer Mission has thus come to an end.” 72/
Developments in the Middle East relative to the question of Palestine
In the course of the year, along with the unabating repression of the Palestinian population of the occupied territory, Israel continued its threats and attacks against the PLO. This culminated in the assassination by a commando force on 16 April 1988 of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian Armed Forces and a member of the Central Committee of the PLO. An investigation carried out by the Tunisian Government has ascertained the direct responsibility of Israel in the attack.
This matter was brought to the attention of the Security Council which considered it at its four meetings held between 21 and 25 April 1988. On 25 April 1988, the Security Council, by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention, adopted resolution 611 (1988). By that resolution the Council, inter alia, condemned vigorously the aggression perpetrated on 16 April 1988 against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct.
By mid-1988 the situation in the occupied territory and the repressive policies and practices of Israel towards the civilian Palestinian population, as well as the repeated violations by it of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the area, had reached a critical point, making it imperative to advance to a comprehensive political solution to the question of Palestine. At the same time, numerous developments related to the Arab-Israeli conflict brought about an increased awareness and understanding of the issue, along with the support for the idea of convening an international United Nations-sponsored forum to resolve the question of Palestine, the heart of the conflict.
In June 1988, an important statement was made by the PLO spokesman, Mr. Bassam Abu Sharif, who said that the key to the Palestinian-Israeli settlement was through negotiations between the two parties to the conflict. He also expressed the PLO’s readiness to talk with any party chosen by the Israeli side to represent it at such negotiations. Mr. Abu Sharif said that the PLO accepted Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) within the framework of a United Nations resolution that recognized the Palestinian people’s rights. He added that the PLO was ready to accept the placing of the occupied territory under international guardianship. The PLO spokesman further emphasized that the PLO would agree to and even insist on international guarantees for the security of all countries in the region, including Palestine and Israel. He said that the Organization’s desire to have such guarantees was the motive for the PLO’s demand for bilateral peace negotiations with Israel that would be carried out within the framework of an international conference under United Nations supervision. Mr. Abu Sharif was of the view that a plebiscite among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision would allow the Palestinian people to decide upon who would represent them in a future peace process. 73/
A fundamentally new element was introduced in the Middle East situation when the Government of Jordan decided to sever its legal and administrative links with the Israeli-occupied West Bank. In a major address to the nation, on 31 July, King Hussein of Jordan made the following statement:
“Of late, it has become clear that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation which believes in the need to highlight the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities that are related to the Palestine question and its developments. It has also become obvious that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and administrative relationship with the West Bank – and the consequential special Jordanian treatment of the brother Palestinians living under occupation through Jordanian institutions in the occupied territories – goes against this orientation. It would be an obstacle to the Palestinian struggle which seeks to win international support for the Palestine question, considering that it is a just national issue of a people struggling against foreign occupation.” 74/
King Hussein made it clear, however, that Jordan would continue to support the Palestinian people’s steadfastness and its uprising until the Palestinians achieve their national objectives. Later, the King dissolved the lower house of the Jordanian Parliament, which included representatives of West Bank Palestinians. These moves were welcomed by the PLO, which expressed its readiness to assume full responsibility for the administration of the occupied Palestinian territory.
In August-October 1988, the PLO considerably intensified its diplomatic activity with the aim of improving international understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in particular, the question of Palestine. On 28 August Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, met at Geneva with the United Nations Secretary-General and discussed with him the situation in the occupied territory and prospects of political and material assistance the United Nations could further extend to the Palestinian people.
Two weeks later, on 13 September, Chairman Arafat addressed a meeting of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament at Strasbourg, France. In his statement he expressed his views of the status quo in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as of the conditions and plight of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation. Chairman Arafat laid special emphasis on the Palestinian popular uprising in the occupied territory. Outlining the position taken by the PLO in the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, he stated that the PLO could only agree to the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the parties to the conflict in the region, including the PLO and Israel, on the basis of two options, namely, all the resolutions dealing with the question of Palestine, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), or Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) along with the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost of which is its right to self-determination. Addressing the issue of terrorism, Chairman Arafat reiterated the PLO’s commitment to the 1985 Cairo declaration and General Assembly resolution 42/159 of 7 December 1987. He stated that the PLO was working to establish an independent Palestinian State in the territory liberated from Israeli occupation, with a democratic, republican, multi-party system respecting human rights, where there would be no distinctions among its citizens because of colour, race or religion. 75/
Special session of the General Assembly
On 30 September, the Secretary-General, in a continuing effort to find an appropriate way to convene the International Peace Conference on the Middle East under the United Nations auspices, submitted another report 76/ containing the positions of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He made a number of crucial observations as to the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine.
The Secretary-General was encouraged by the fact that all the members of the Security Council believed that it was desirable to convene an international conference and it was possible to identify in the positions adopted by the parties that there should be an international framework for the negotiation of a just and lasting settlement of the conflict. While pointing to the remaining differences as regards the nature of that framework, its powers, the basis on which it would be convened and about who should take part in it, the Secretary-General emphasized the urgent need to establish a process acceptable to all for the negotiation of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement.
In the meantime, the overall situation in the occupied territory was rapidly deteriorating. Cases of collective punishment of the civilian Palestinian population by the occupation authorities became more frequent and included extended curfews and military sieges of towns, villages and refugee camps. Israelis continued to demolish Palestinian houses, close down schools and universities, outlaw labour unions and local committees and practice other sanctions and restrictions against the Palestinians.
In view of these grave circumstances, the Group of Arab States at the United Nations requested on 25 October that a special meeting of the General Assembly be held on the intifadah under the agenda item entitled “Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories”. On 3 November the General Assembly met in its plenary session to discuss the proposed item, and following a debate, adopted resolution 43/21 on the uprising.* The resolution, inter alia, condemned such acts as “the opening of fire by the Israeli army and settlers that result in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians, the beating and breaking of bones, the deportation of Palestinian civilians, the imposition of restrictive economic measures, the demolition of houses, collective punishment and detentions, as well as denial of access to the media”. The General Assembly also called upon all the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 “to take appropriate measures to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying Power, for the Convention in all circumstances in conformity with their obligation under article 1”. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to examine the situation in the occupied territory “by all means available to him” and to submit periodic reports on this matter.
The first report emanating from General Assembly resolution 43/21, 77/ was submitted by the Secretary-General on 21 November. The Secretary-General, who was assisted in preparing this document by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights,** stated that he considered it essential that the occupying Power apply scrupulously the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. He emphasized again that measures to enhance the safety and protection of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory, urgent as they were, would not resolve the underlying problem. The Secretary-General was of the view that a resolution of the problem could be reached only through a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and taking into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including self-determination.
* The draft was sponsored by 54 Member States. One hundred and thirty votes were cast in favour of the resolution to 2 against, with 16 abstentions.
** The Centre serves as the secretariat for the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.
The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in its 1988 report to the General Assembly, 78/ voiced its grave concern about the situation in the occupied territory as a result of “the increasing resort by Israel to armed force and other draconian measures in an effort to suppress the popular uprising, which began in early December 1987, against the continued occupation and gradual annexation of the occupied Palestinian territory and against the Israeli policies and practices violating the rights of the Palestinian people”. The report contained information on the policies and practices, including some new ones, applied by the Israeli authorities in order to halt the intifadah. The Committee once again drew the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council to those policies which constituted flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, prevented the Palestinian people from attaining its inalienable rights and thwarted international efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.
Nineteenth session of the Palestine National Council and its decisions
Of historic significance to the Palestinian people are the decisions and final documents adopted by the nineteenth extraordinary session of PNC, the supreme legislative Palestinian body, held at Algiers, from 12 to 15 November 1988. Palestinians called this session the session of the intifadah and national independence, the session dedicated to Abu Jihad, slain earlier in the year. The session culminated in the adoption on 15 November of two landmark documents, namely “The Political Communiqué of the Palestine National Council” and “The Declaration of Independence”. A decision was also taken to set up a provisional government.
In its “Political Communiqué”, PNC, among other things, affirmed the determination of the PLO to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of its essence, the question of Palestine, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and provisions of international legitimacy, the rules of international law, the resolutions of the United Nations – the most recent being Security Council resolutions 605 (1987), 607 (1988) and 608 (1988) – and the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, in a manner that ensured the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return, to exercise self-determination and to establish its independent national State on its national soil, while also making arrangements for the security and peace of every State in the region.
In order to realize this task, PNC insisted on the implementation of the following:
“(a) The need to convene the effective international conference on the subject of the Middle East problem and its essence, the question of Palestine, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict in the region, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing, with the provision that the said international conference shall be convened on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and shall guarantee the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost among which is the right to self-determination, in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the right to self-determination of peoples, the inadmissibility of seizure of land belonging to others by means of force or military invasion, and in accordance with United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine;
“(b) Israel’s withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories which it has occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;
“(c) Cancellation of all measures of attachment and annexation and removal of the settlements established by Israel in the Palestinian and Arab territories since the year 1967;
“(d) An endeavour to place the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem, under United Nations supervision for a limited period, in order to protect our people and to provide an atmosphere conducive to a successful outcome for the international conference, the attainment of a comprehensive political settlement and the establishment of security and peace for all through mutual acceptance and satisfaction, and in order to enable the Palestinian State to exercise its effective authority over those territories;
“(e) Solution of the Palestine refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions on that subject;
“(f) Assurance of freedom of worship and the practice of religious rites at the holy places in Palestine for adherents of all religions;
“(g) The Security Council’s establishment and assurance of arrangements for security and peace among all the concerned States in the region, including the Palestinian State.” 79/
Another document adopted by the PNC session, “The Declaration of Independence”, proclaimed the establishment of a Palestinian State. The document referred to several international legal instruments in which provisions for the establishment of a Palestinian State had been made. It pointed out, inter alia, that,
“Despite the historical injustice done to the Palestinian Arab people in its displacement and in being deprived of the right to self-determination following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 1947, which partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish State, that resolution nevertheless continues to attach conditions to international legitimacy that guarantee the Palestinian Arab people the right to sovereignty and national independence.” 80/
As regards the establishment of a Palestinian State, the Declaration states:
“By virtue of the natural, historical and legal right of the Palestinian Arab people to its homeland, Palestine, and of the sacrifices of its succeeding generations in defence of the freedom and independence of that homeland, “Pursuant to the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference and on the basis of the international legitimacy embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations since 1947, and
“Through the exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its right to self-determination, political independence and sovereignty over its territory;
“The Palestine National Council hereby declares, in the name of God and on behalf of the Palestinian Arab people, the establishment of the State of Palestine in the land of Palestine with its capital at Jerusalem.” 81/
The Declaration outlined the principal characteristics of the newly established Palestinian State as follows:
“The State of Palestine shall be for Palestinians, wherever they may be, therein to develop their national and cultural identity and therein to enjoy full equality of rights. Their religious and political beliefs and human dignity shall therein be safeguarded under a democratic parliamentary system based on freedom of opinion and the freedom to form parties, on the heed of the majority for minority rights and the respect of minorities for majority decisions, on social justice and equality, and on non-discrimination in civil rights on ground of race, religion or colour or as between men and women, under a Constitution ensuring the rule of law and an independent judiciary and on the basis of true fidelity to the age-old spiritual and cultural heritage of Palestine with respect to mutual tolerance, coexistence and magnanimity among religions.
“The State of Palestine shall be an Arab State and shall be an integral part of the Arab nation, of its heritage and civilization and of its present endeavour for the achievement of the goals of liberation, development, democracy and unity.
…
“The State of Palestine declares its commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the policy and principles of non-alignment.
“The State of Palestine, in declaring that it is a peace-loving State committed to the principles of peaceful coexistence, shall strive, together with all other States and peoples, for the achievement of a lasting peace based on justice and respect for rights, under which the human potential for constructive activity may flourish, mutual competition may centre on life-sustaining innovation and there is no fear for the future, since the future bears only assurance for those who have acted justly or made amends to justice.” 82/
The State of Palestine declared that it believed in the solution of international and regional problems by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by it, and that, without prejudice to its natural right to defend itself, it rejected the threat or use of force, violence and intimidation against its territorial integrity and political independence or those of any other State.
In his report on the situation in the Middle East, 83/ issued on 28 November, the Secretary-General referred in particular to the role of the intifadah in the occupied territory. In his view, the intifadah had been a dominating factor in the political agenda in the Middle East and an inspiration behind the PNC session at Algiers. He believed that the Algiers session had generated new momentum in the diplomatic process and offered fresh opportunities for progress towards peace, which should be seized.
The establishment of the State of Palestine was immediately welcomed by the international community. Within a month, independent Palestine was recognized by almost 80 States in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. 84/
Forty-third session of the General Assembly at Geneva
Prior to the PNC session, the PLO decided that Chairman Arafat would head the PLO delegation to the forty-third session of the General Assembly during the consideration of its agenda item entitled “Question of Palestine”. It was also expected that Chairman Arafat would participate in the debate and make an opening statement. On 25 November, the documents necessary to obtain a United States entry visa for Chairman Arafat were presented to the United States Consulate in Tunisia. The Permanent Observer of the PLO to the United Nations expressed his hope that the visa request would be processed promptly facilitating Chairman Arafat’s access to the United Nations.
However, on the grounds of a threat to its security, the United States refused to issue a visa to Chairman Arafat. The United Nations Legal Counsel, speaking on the decision of the United States, as the host country, to deny entry of Chairman Arafat into the United States for the purpose of addressing the General Assembly session, stated before the meeting of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country on 28 November that,
“… the statement of the Department of State does not make the point that the presence of Mr. Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, at the United Nations would per se in any way threaten the security of the United States. In other words, the host country did not allege that there was apprehension that Mr. Arafat, once in the United States, might engage in activities outside the scope of his official functions directed against the security of the host country. The reasoning given in the statement of the State Department of 27 November 1988 does not meet the standard laid down in the talks between Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and the United States authorities and reported back by Mr. Hammarskjöld in the report cited above.”*
* The United Nations Legal Counsel refers here to a case that took place in 1953 when a problem arose concerning the denial of a visa to an invitee of the Economic and Social Council on the grounds of national security. The then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, engaged in negotiations with the host country in an effort to find a way in which such difficulties could be handled and dealt with. On these negotiations, the Secretary-General published a progress report (document E/2492 of 27 July 1953) and a chapter in his annual report for 1953-1954 (document A/2663). He informed Member States that the United States representatives had assured him that, if in the future there should arise any serious problems with respect to the application in special cases of provisions concerning access to the Headquarters district or to sojourn in its vicinity, the latter would consult him and keep him as fully informed as possible in order to ensure that the decision made was in accordance with the rights of the parties concerned.
“To sum up, I am of the opinion that the host country was and is under an obligation to grant the visa request of the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, an organization which has been granted observer status by the General Assembly.” 85/
A week later, this issue was considered by the General Assembly at its plenary meeting. On 2 December, a draft resolution entitled “Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country” was subsequently put to the vote. In this resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, deplored the failure of the host country to respond favourably to the request of the General Assembly, contained in its resolution 43/48, and decided to consider the question of Palestine, item 37 of its agenda, at the United Nations Office at Geneva, from 13 to 15 December. General Assembly resolution 43/49 was adopted by a recorded vote of 154 in favour, 2 against and 1 abstention.
Pursuant to resolution 43/49, agenda item 37 “Question of Palestine” was considered by the forty-third session of the General Assembly at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 13 to 15 December 1988. Ninety-six delegations addressed the General Assembly on this agenda item, including 31 Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
The delegation of the PLO was headed by Chairman Arafat, who on 13 December made a statement before the General Assembly. In his address, Chairman Arafat gave a historical retrospective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in particular, the question of Palestine. He spoke about numerous peace plans and initiatives aimed at reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict, which had been proposed over the past decades. He underscored the crucial role the intifadah played in the struggle of the Palestinian people for its rights and independence. Prominent attention was given in the speech to the decisions of the nineteenth extraordinary session of PNC. Chairman Arafat specifically referred to the position taken by PNC on the issue of terrorism, stating that the session had reiterated its rejection of terrorism of all kinds, including State terrorism.
On the question of finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he emphasized that the acceleration of the tempo of the peace process in the region required an exceptional effort on the part of all the parties concerned and of the international parties, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, which bore a special responsibility towards the cause of peace in the Middle East. He was of the opinion that the United Nations, “the permanent members of the Security Council and all international blocs and bodies [had] a vital role to play at this stage”.
Mr. Arafat, in his capacity as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, that at the time carried out the functions of the provisional government of the State of Palestine, presented to the General Assembly the following Palestinian peace initiative:
“First, that a serious effort be made to convene, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the preparatory committee of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East – in accordance with the initiative of President Gorbachev and President Mitterrand, which President Mitterrand presented to the Assembly towards the end of last September and which was supported by many States, in order to pave the way for the convening of the International Conference, which commands universal support, with the exception of the Government of Israel;
“Secondly, on the basis of our belief in international legitimacy and the vital role of the United Nations, that actions be undertaken to place our occupied Palestinian land under temporary United Nations supervision, and that international forces be deployed there to protect our people and at the same time to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from our country;
“Thirdly, that the PLO will work for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement among the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel and the other neighbouring States, within the framework of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people’s rights to freedom and national independence, and for respect for the right of all the parties to the conflict to exist in peace and security.” 86/
The peace plan was warmly welcomed by nearly all delegations, which spoke in support of the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people for its inalienable rights. Virtually every delegation reiterated that the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, should participate in any peace process aimed at finding a solution to the question of Palestine, the core issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, on an equal footing with other concerned parties.
The debate on the question of Palestine clearly indicated the growing concern of the international community about the continuing attempts by the Israeli Government to crush the intifadah. Statements made at Geneva were marked by pointed criticism of Israel’s position on the question of Palestine, its policies and practices towards the civilian Palestinians under occupation. Many delegations spoke in support of the newly established State of Palestine.
On the following day, 14 December, at a news conference at Geneva, Mr. Arafat further specified the key points he had made in his statement before the General Assembly. At the opening of the news conference, Mr. Arafat made the following statement:
“In my speech … yesterday, it was clear that we mean our people’s rights to free and national independence, according to resolution 181, and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and, as I have mentioned, including the State of Palestine, Israel and other neighbours, according to resolutions 242 and 338.
“As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms and yet I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism.” 87/
Mr. Arafat’s statements at the news conference were an important development welcomed by the majority of delegations attending the General Assembly session in Geneva.
On 15 December, the last day of plenary deliberations on the agenda item, four draft resolutions were submitted for voting. Following established practice, one of the resolutions on the question of Palestine dealt with the work and tasks of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights and the Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat. This three-part resolution was adopted by a large majority of votes. Of greater political impact, however, were the voting results on two other resolutions. One of them, resolution 43/176, called for “the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing, and the five permanent members of the Security Council, based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self-determination”. This resolution spelled out five principles for the achievement of comprehensive peace in the area, which included the withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and from other occupied Arab territories; guaranteeing arrangements for security of all States in the region, including those named in resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries; resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees in conformity with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, and subsequent relevant resolutions; dismantling the Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967; and guaranteeing freedom of access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites.
The General Assembly, in this resolution, noted the expressed desire and endeavours to place the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a limited period, as part of the peace process. As regards the role of the Security Council in the peace process, the General Assembly requested the Council to consider measures needed to convene the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, including the establishment of a preparatory committee, and to consider guarantees for security measures agreed upon by the Conference for all States in the region. This resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 138 votes in favour to 2 against, with 2 abstentions.
Another resolution (43/177) dealt with the question of the establishment of the State of Palestine at the PNC session. In this resolution, the General Assembly acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine by PNC and affirmed the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise sovereignty over its territory occupied since 1967. By the same resolution, the General Assembly decided that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation “Palestine” should be used in the United Nations system in place of the previously used designation “Palestine Liberation Organization” without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the PLO within the United Nations system, in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice. This resolution was adopted by 104 votes in favour to 2 against, with 36 delegations abstaining.
The United States, one of only two delegations that voted against the draft resolutions, stated in explaining the vote that, in its view, the PLO’s explicit acceptance of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), recognition of Israel’s right to exist and renunciation of terrorism constituted “another step forward towards the direct negotiations between the parties concerned that are essential to achieving a comprehensive settlement”. The United States representative said that his country was “encouraged by this positive movement”. He maintained that on this basis the United States had announced on 14 December that it was “prepared to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO”. Yet, the United States delegation remained opposed to the draft resolution on convening an international peace conference because, as the United States ambassador put it, “this draft fail[ed] to address the centrality of direct negotiations between the parties”. Regarding his delegation’s strong objection to the second draft resolution, the United States representative said that his Government’s decision “to engage in a substantive dialogue with the PLO should not be taken to imply acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian State”. 88/
Opening of PLO-United States dialogue
The position adopted by the delegation of the PLO during the Geneva session of the General Assembly set off a series of far-reaching political developments. The foremost among them was the resumption, after a long period of time, of an official PLO-United States dialogue. On 14 December following Mr. Arafat’s news conference, the President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, issued a statement on United States relations with the PLO in which, inter alia, he said:
“The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and renounced terrorism. These have long been our conditions for a substantive dialogue. They have been met. Therefore, I have authorized the State Department to enter into a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.
“…
“The initiation of a dialogue between the United States and PLO representatives is an important step in the peace process, the more so because it represents the serious evolution of Palestinian thinking toward realistic and pragmatic positions on the key issues.” 89/
The first meeting between the two delegations took place on 16 December in the Tunisian town of Carthage.* These talks, a direct result of the General Assembly session held at Geneva, constituted a significant undertaking for both sides. The very fact that talks took place paved the way for further diplomatic contacts and efforts which would extend into 1989. They also marked the start of a new diplomatic thrust aimed at bringing about a comprehensive political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
* The PLO delegation was headed by Mr. Yasser Abed Rabbo and the United States by Mr. Robert H. Pelletreau, Ambassador to Tunisia.
V. CONCLUSION
The political and diplomatic developments affecting the Palestinian people, outlined in the previous chapters took place against the background of a highly volatile status quo in the region as well as serious deterioration during 1984 to 1988 of the living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territory. These circumstances required urgent identification of particular needs of the Palestinians as well as prompt planning, developing and implementing of economic and social assistance programmes and projects.
International, national and private relief organizations continued, over the period reviewed, to render economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people. Various organizations of the United Nations system have been providing assistance to the Palestinian people in the occupied territory. 90/ The United Nations economic and social assistance and development activities were designed to present practical and credible ways of alleviating the existing economic and social development problems of the Palestinian people. The worsening economic situation in the occupied territory and, in particular, the large number of Palestinian workers forced to seek employment in Israel were of utmost concern to the organizations providing assistance. The primary objective of development activities for the occupied territory was the restructuring of the productive base of the economy of these areas.
By the end of 1988, and particularly in the wake of the Geneva session of the General Assembly, Israel, as a party to the conflict, found itself increasingly isolated in the United Nations and in the region. This factor, coupled with recent moves and endeavours of Western European countries in their search for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the growing understanding in the United States of the plight of the Palestinian people, could bring about a qualitatively new situation in the Middle East. If the peace process is to go forward, all the parties to the conflict would have to adopt realistic and responsible negotiating positions primarily on the question of Palestine, and on a diversity of other elements in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The years 1984-1988 and into 1989 were years of considerable strengthening of the role of the United Nations in an effort to speed up a just political settlement of the four-decade long conflict. This is particularly true in the case of the Palestine problem, a complex and delicate interlacing of the destinies of two peoples of the Middle East – one Arab, the other Jewish. Over the years, the United Nations, as is recognized by the overwhelming plurality of its Member States, succeeded in working out a balanced, even-handed approach to this sensitive issue. The idea of an international peace conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, gained wide-ranging support in all parts of the world. Because of the multilateral nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and involvement of several concerned parties, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the PLO and the Syrian Arab Republic, the format of such a United Nations forum appears to be the most appropriate and effective. Today, the international community is of the view that such a conference is the only way likely to bear fruit for the long-suffering Palestinian people as well as other peoples of the region, a region torn apart by decades of continuous strife.
Since February 1989, and until the time the present publication went to print, the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, other organs and agencies of the United Nations system as well as major intergovernmental organizations throughout the world have placed special emphasis in their activities on the plight of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory.
During that period, a series of diplomatic efforts directly related to the search for a solution to the question of Palestine were undertaken by Governments in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, despite the ever-growing endeavours by various parties, a just, comprehensive and lasting political solution to the problem has yet to be achieved.
Notes
1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75, 1973.
2/ The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at each session are compiled in a Supplement to the Official Records of the General Assembly for that session.
3/ These instruments include: the Charter of the United Nations; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949; the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 14 May 1954; the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 reflecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
4/ Meron Benvenisti, 1987 Report. Demographic, economic, legal, social and political developments in the West Bank, West Bank Data Base Project, as quoted in The Jerusalem Post, 1987, p. 52.
5/ Ibid., pp. 41-42.
6/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/43/694), paras. 499 and 619.
7/ Ibid., para. 610.
8/ Ibid., para. 611.
9/ Ibid., para. 621.
10/ See ICRC Annual Reports: 1984, pp. 66-68; 1985, pp. 72-73; 1986, pp. 71-72; and 1987, pp. 83-85.
11/ Joseph Schechla, “The Past as Prologue to the Intifadah”, in Without Prejudice, vol. I, No. 2, 1988, p. 73.
12/ See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988. Reports submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations (U.S. Senate) and Committee on Foreign Affairs (U.S. House of Representatives) by the Department of State, February 1989, Washington, pp. 1385-1386.
13/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 55.
14/ Sara Roy, “The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development”, in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XVII, No. 1, Autumn 1987, p. 58.
15/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, (A/41/680), para. 82.
16/ See letter dated 2 February 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/118-S/19473), p. 3.
17/ Ibid., p. 4.
18/ See letter dated 22 December 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/63-S/19376), p. 4.
19/ See letter dated 24 February 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/166-S/19537), p. 6.
20/ Meron Benvenisti and Shlomo Khayat, The West Bank and Gaza Atlas, West Bank Data Base Project, The Jerusalem Post, 1988, p. 26.
21/ The Jerusalem Post, 2 July 1987.
22/ See World Health Organization, Health Conditions of the Arab population in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine, report of the Special Committee of Experts appointed to study the health conditions of the inhabitants of the occupied territories (A/37/13), paras. 3.3.2 and 3.4.
23/ Benvenisti, 1986 Report, West Bank Data Base Project, The Jerusalem Post, 1986, pp. 20 and 22.
24/ Sara Roy, “The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-Development”, in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. VII, No. 1, Autumn 1987, p. 69.
25/ Benvenisti, 1987 Report, op. cit., pp. 16 and 18.
26/ Benvenisti, 1986 Report, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
27/ Ibid., p. 13.
28/ See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, op. cit., pp. 1374 and 1384.
29/ Ibid., p. 1375.
30/ “The Palestinian financial sector under Israeli occupation”, study prepared by the secretariat of UNCTAD in collaboration with the secretariat of ESCWA (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3), para. 52.
31/ The Jerusalem Post, 6 May 1986.
32/ UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, para. 57; also see Fawzi A. Gharaibeh, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Westview Press, Boulder, Co., 1985, p. 110.
33/ Report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine (A/39/130-S/16409).
34/ The 15 members of the Security Council, namely, China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Upper Volta (now known as Burkina Faso) and Zimbabwe, and the Governments which are directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not members of the Security Council, namely, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.
35/ See A/39/130-S/16409, appendix, p. 8.
36/ Letter dated 28 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/222-S/16516), pp. 1-2.
37/ Letter dated 26 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/214-S/16507).
38/ See A/39/130/Add.1-S/16409/Add.1.
39/ See letter dated 20 August 1984 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/416-S/16708), p. 2.
40/ Letter dated 9 May 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/238-S/16543), pp. 1-2.
41/ See letter dated 24 May 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/275-S/16584), annex, p. 2.
42/ See letter dated 27 April 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/219-S/16512), annex, p. 5.
43/ See letter dated 30 July 1984 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/39/368-S/16685).
44/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/39/35).
45/ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/39/600-S/16792).
46/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/40/35), paras. 167-168.
47/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/40/702), para. 323.
48/ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/40/779-S/17587), paras. 39-40.
49/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/41/35).
50/ Report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East (A/41/215-S/17916), para. 2.
51/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/41/680).
52/ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/41/768-S/18427), para. 37.
53/ See letter dated 24 February 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/42/151-S/18718), annex.
54/ Report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East (A/42/277-S/18849).
55/ See letter dated 29 May 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/42/313-S/18888), annex.
56/ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/42/714-S/19249).
57/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories (A/42/650).
58/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/42/35).
59/ Letter dated 11 December 1987 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/19333).
60/ The resolutions adopted by the Security Council are compiled annually in the Official Records of the Security Council for that year.
61/ Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 605 (1987) (S/19443).
62/ See letter dated 20 January 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/94-S/19439), annex.
63/ Letter dated 20 January 1988 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/95-S/19441).
64/ See letter dated 20 January 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/96-S/19442), annex.
65/ S/19466.
66/ Letter dated 3 June 1988 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/392-S/19926).
67/ See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, op. cit., pp. 1377-1378, et seq.
68/ The New York Times, 23 January 1988.
69/ See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, op. cit., p. 1397.
70/ Ibid., p. 1382.
71/ Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, report of the Secretary-General (A/42/915/Add.5).
72/ See United Nations, Department of Public Information, Press Release SG/SM 4184 of 29 August 1988.
73/ Al-Safir (in Arabic), 18 June 1988.
74/ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-88-147, 1 August 1988, p. 39.
75/ Ibid., No. FBIS-NEW-88-179, 15 September 1988, pp. 3-8.
76/ Report of the Secretary-General on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East (A/43/691-S/20219), paras. 5 and 7.
77/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, report by the Secretary-General (A/43/806).
78/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third session, Supplement No. 35 (A/43/35), para. 19.
79/ See letter dated 18 November 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/43/827-S/20278),
annex II.
80/ Ibid., annex III, pp. 13-14.
81/ Ibid., pp. 14-15.
82/ Ibid., p. 15.
83/ Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/43/867-S/20294), paras. 32-37.
84/ The Times, 14 December 1988.
85/ Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country (A/C.6/43/7), paras. 11-12.
86/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session, document A/43/PV.78 of 3 January 1989, pp. 33-35.
87/ The Washington Post, 15 December 1988.
88/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-third Session (A/43/PV.82), pp. 43-47.
89/ See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 89, No. 2143, February 1989, p. 51.
90/ The following United Nations system organizations provide economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people in the occupied territories: UNDP, UNRWA, Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNCTAD, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Fund for Population Activities/United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), ESCWA, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), WHO, Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).
89-20684 1283-86e (E)
https://www.un.org/unispal/history/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-iv-1984-1988/
Introduction
The evolution of the question of Palestine from its beginning up to the year 1977 has been dealt with in parts I and II of the present study. Since 1978 the question has remained in the forefront of United Nations attention. Its political and humanitarian aspects in particular have reverted to the centre of international attention as never before.
It has become evident that the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community are convinced that the attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a sine qua non for peace in the Middle East.
Certain basic considerations have also emerged which have the acceptance of the majority among the international community. These are that:
(a) The question of Palestine is at the heart of the problem of the Middle East and consequently no solution to the Middle East problem can be envisaged without taking into account the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
(b) The realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and to self-determination, and the right to establish their own independent State in Palestine will contribute to a solution of the crisis in the Middle East;
(c) The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with all other parties on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX), is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations;
(d) The acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and hence the obligation which devolves on Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all territory so occupied.
These views have been expressed repeatedly and unanimously by intergovernmental organizations such as the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, as well as by individual Governments.
While many States and organizations have consistently maintained this position, in recent years other governmental groups have also taken positions which appear to approach this conclusion. At the meeting of the Heads of State and Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community in Venice, Italy, in its declaration of 13 June 1980, the then Group of Nine detailed its position on the Middle East. 1/ It declared that the time had come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and security of all States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implied the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It took a firm position on the question of Palestine and on the fact that the Palestinian people must be placed in a position to exercise fully their right to self-determination; that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be associated with the negotiations to that end; that Israel should put an end to the occupation of the territories which it had held since 1967; that Israeli settlements constituted a serious obstacle to peace in the Middle East and were illegal under international law and that the Nine would not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem.
On 28 July 1982, a draft resolution was presented by Egypt and France to the Security Council. In its main provisions the resolution reaffirmed the right of all States in the region to existence and security, as well as the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination, with all its implications. This draft resolution was never put to a vote.
Furthermore, in September 1983, the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, which was widely attended, adopted inter alia the following principles:
– the need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any de facto situation created by Israel as were contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements;
– the need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, which had altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called “Basic Law” on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel;
– the right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which was their recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
Events on the spot, however, remained on a negative course, although no major offensive took place after the cease-fire agreement signed on 24 July 1981. A period of some nine months of relative stability ensued. After some sporadic but fatal incidents in June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon initially with the declared intention of driving Palestinians out of a zone 25 miles wide which bordered on Israel. However, after declaring that “its intention was to eliminate the PLO”, Israel subsequently moved its troops in Lebanon to Beirut where the forces of the PLO held out for over two months. The PLO’s withdrawal from Beirut came only after a cease-fire had been arranged on 14 August which was to be maintained with the help of multinational troops. PLO troops withdrew from Beirut and were transferred to neighbouring countries. After appropriate guarantees of safety were provided for thousands of Palestinian civilians who would be left behind, the Organization’s headquarters moved to Tunisia.
On 15 September 1982 Bashir Gemayel, President-elect of Lebanon, was assassinated shortly after the withdrawal of the multinational troops.
Early on the same day, Israeli forces advanced into West Beirut. By 16 September the Israeli army had established its control of most of the West Beirut sector of the city and took up positions around the Palestinian refugee camps. The following day the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 520 (1982) condemning the recent incursions by Israel into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions.
On 17 September reports were received that armed men had the previous evening entered the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in West Beirut and were engaging in wholesale killing of the civilian population.
On 18 September it was confirmed that a large-scale massacre had taken place in the refugee camps. A large number of bodies of men, women and children were found, some of them mutilated, many of them apparently killed while trying to escape; many homes had been blown up with their occupants still inside; there also appeared to be a mass grave on the perimeter of one of the camps.
The events in Lebanon in the summer of 1982 once again highlighted the need for a settlement of the question of Palestine. International interest in urgently finding some solution was again reflected in the various proposals made at the time.
On 1 September 1982, President Reagan made detailed proposals summarizing the position of the United States of America regarding a comprehensive Middle East settlement which, in the view of the United States Government, would take into account the preoccupation of all parties and would respond to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, in association with Jordan, offered the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace. This approach was based on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolution 242 (1967). He remained convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations. 2/ However, these proposals were immediately rejected by Israel and were subsequently criticized by most Arab States which felt that the proposals fell short of ensuring Palestinians the exercise of their rights in Palestine.
On 9 September 1982, the twelfth Arab Summit Conference, held at Fez, Morocco, adopted an eight-point peace plan for the Middle East: 3/
(a) The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by it in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;
(b) The dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories since 1967;
(c) The guaranteeing of freedom of worship and performance of religious rites of all religions in the Holy Places;
(d) The reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the exercise of their inalienable and imprescriptible national rights, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of those who did not desire to return;
(e) The placing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the control of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months;
(f) The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital;
(g) The establishment by the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State;
(h) The guaranteeing by the Security Council of the implementation of these principles.
Although rejected by Israel, these proposals, which converge on many points with the position of the United Nations as initially recommended by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, have been regarded by many as a sound basis for a settlement.
On 15 September 1982 a six-point plan for the Middle East settlement was presented by L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These six points, subsequently reaffirmed on 5 January 1983 by the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, were: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and consequently, the need for the complete withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan, including the eastern part of Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Lebanese territories; the exercise in practice of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and to the establishment of their own independent State in the Palestinian territories – the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip; safeguarding the right of all States in the region to secure an independent existence and development on a basis of complete reciprocity; termination of the state of war and the establishment of peace between the Arab States and Israel; and the elaboration and adoption of international guarantees of a peaceful settlement. 4/
The events of the summer of 1982 also had their reflection in the United Nations, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.
I. PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1978-1983
The General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine to self-determination without external interference and to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. It has also reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted. The Assembly also emphasized that full respect for the realization of the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine was indispensable for a solution of the problem and recognized that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In 1974 the Assembly had conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the Assembly and in other international conferences held under United Nations auspices. 5/ The representative of the PLO has since been invited to participate in the Security Council debates and that invitation has conferred upon it the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State when it is invited to participate under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. In the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, the PLO participated in it as the representative of the party most directly concerned. The Conference decided that the PLO delegation should be placed among the full participants in the Conference.
The Assembly has also repeatedly endorsed the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and has urged the Council to do so as soon as possible. However, many of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Palestine have not been implemented and the wider Arab-Israeli tension and the situation in the Middle East are still unresolved. The matter remains before the Security Council.
A. Emergency special session of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine
In view of the constantly deteriorating situation in the region, and the fact that the Security Council was unable to adopt and implement the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly for lack of unanimity among its permanent members, the question of Palestine was considered by the General Assembly in an emergency special session held between 22 and 29 July 1980.
Resolution ES-7/2 was adopted by 112 votes in favour to 7 against, with 24 abstentions.
In it, the General Assembly recalled and reaffirmed its resolutions 3236 and 3237 (XXIX) and all other relevant United Nations resolutions pertinent to the question of Palestine. It reaffirmed that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine. It reaffirmed also the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent sovereign State. The General Assembly reaffirmed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations. It reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, called upon Israel to withdraw from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and urged that such withdrawal should start before 15 November 1980. It also demanded that Israel comply with all United Nations resolutions relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem. It expressed its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside of their homeland. The General Assembly requested and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 59 to 72 of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution. It also requested the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel, to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. It decided to adjourn temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.
In recent years, General Assembly resolutions endorsing the recommendations of the Committee have had increasing support in the voting. In 1980 a resolution was adopted by 98 in favour to 16 against with 32 abstentions. In 1981 the voting pattern was 111 to 12 with 20 abstentions and, in 1982, 119 in favour to 2 against with 21 abstentions; in 1983, 126 in favour to 2 against with 19 abstentions.
As a consequence of further grave incidents, the seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly was resumed in April, June, August and September 1982, a clear indication of the international concern given to the question of Palestine.
B. Invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982
When Israel invaded Lebanon on 4 June 1982 the Security Council met urgently and on 5 and 6 June unanimously adopted resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) respectively. These resolutions, inter alia, called upon all the parties to the conflict to cease all military activities within Lebanon immediately and simultaneously demanded that Israel should withdraw its military forces from Lebanon forthwith and unconditionally. The texts of the two resolutions are annexed (annex II).
Cease-fire arrangements had come into effect on 12 August 1982 but the Security Council met on 17 September 1982 to consider the situation in Lebanon in the light of Israeli incursions into West Beirut. In resolution 520 (1982), the Security Council condemned Israeli incursions into West Beirut and demanded an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982. The text of the resolution is annexed (annex II).
In November 1983, following disaffection within the PLO, hostilities broke out between some armed elements in and around the Lebanese city of Tripoli.
On 23 November the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 542 (1983) by which it requested the parties concerned immediately to accept a cease-fire and invited them to settle their differences exclusively by peaceful means. The text of the resolution is attached (annex II).
In December the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, accompanied by 3,000 armed elements and 1,000 militia, embarked from Tripoli aboard Greek ships. The Secretary-General, after having had consultations with the members of the Security Council, agreed to the request that a United Nations flag be flown over the evacuation ships as a humanitarian gesture.
Massacres of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila occurred on 17 and 18 September 1982, when several hundred men, women and children were brutally killed. In this connection, the Israeli Government decided on 28 September to authorize the establishment of an independent judicial inquiry into the political and military circumstances of the Beirut massacre. The report was published on 8 February 1983. 6/ Another investigation has been carried out by the Lebanese Government but its findings are not yet available.
On 19 September the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 521 (1982) condemning the massacre and requesting the Secretary-General to take steps aimed at ensuring full protection of civilians in and around Beirut. The text of the resolution is attached (annex II).
At a one-meeting resumption of its seventh emergency special session on the question of Palestine on 24 September 1982, the Assembly adopted resolution ES-7/9 by a recorded vote of 147 in favour to 2 against, with no abstentions. Separate votes were taken on two operative paragraphs of that resolution. Operative paragraph 2, by which the Assembly urged the Security Council to investigate, through the means available to it, the circumstances and extent of the massacre of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 17 September 1982, and to make public the report on its findings as soon as possible, was adopted by a vote of 146 in favour to none against, with no abstentions. Operative paragraph 4, by which the Assembly demanded that all Member States and other parties observe strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, was adopted by a recorded vote of 149 in favour to none against, with no abstentions. The text of the resolution is attached (annex II).
When the question of Palestine was considered by the General Assembly from 30 November to 2 December 1982, in resolution 37/86 D, the Assembly reaffirmed the principle of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and also reaffirmed that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established without the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and without the exercise and attainment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. It requested the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter and recognize the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the right to self-determination and the right to establish its independent Arab State in Palestine. The Assembly reiterated its request that the Security Council take the necessary measures, in execution of the relevant United Nations resolutions, “to implement the plan which, inter alia, recommends that an independent Arab State shall come into existence in Palestine”.
In resolution 37/86 E, the Assembly recalled, in particular, the principles relevant to the question of Palestine that had been accepted by the international community, including the right of all States in the region to existence within internationally recognized boundaries, and justice and security for all the people, which required recognition and attainment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of self-determination and the right to establish an independent State in Palestine. In conformity with the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, the Assembly demanded that Israel withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact. The Assembly urged the Security Council to facilitate the process of Israeli withdrawal and recommended that, following the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian territories, those territories should be subjected to a short-term transitional period under the supervision of the United Nations, during which the Palestinian people would exercise their right to self-determination. The Assembly also urgently called for the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, based on the resolutions of the United Nations and under its auspices, in which all the parties concerned, including the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people, would participate on an equal footing.
C. Israeli settlements in the occupied territories
As a result of the Israeli policies and practices in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied since 1967, in resolution 446 (1979) the Security Council determined that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 had no legal validity and constituted a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
It called on Israel to abide scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949 7/ and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories.
It also established a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and requested the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 1 July 1979. The members of the Commission were Bolivia, Portugal and Zambia under the chairmanship of Portugal.
The Commission was unable to obtain the co-operation of the Government of Israel in the fulfilment of its mandate despite its repeated appeals to Israeli authorities.
In its endeavours to discharge its mandate, the Commission brought up to date the basic information already at the disposal of the Security Council. It determined the consequences of the settlement policy on the local Arab population and assesssed the impact of that policy and its consequences regarding the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 8/
On 20 July 1979, the Security Council adopted resolution 452 (1979) which commended the work done by the Commission and requested it, in view of the magnitude of the problem of settlements, to report back to the Security Council before 1 November 1979.
Following the submission of the Commission’s second report (S/13679), the Security Council, on 1 March 1980, adopted resolution 465 (1980) which commended the work done by the Commission in preparing its second report and accepted the conclusions and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report. It determined that “all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal validity and that Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”. The resolution called upon “all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories” and requested the Commission “to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, to investigate the reported serious depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources with a view to ensuring the protection of those important natural resources of the territories under occupation, and to keep under close scrutiny the implementation of the present resolution”. The Commission was requested to report to the Security Council before 1 September 1980.
In its third report (S/14268), the Commission concluded that:
“In the fulfilment of its mandate and during its contacts with the government authorities, pertinent organizations and private individuals directly concerned, the Commission has examined the situation in the closest manner possible, as the previous reports so indicate. The Commission has noted deep anxiety about what was unanimously considered as a continuous process of detrioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, which is marked by heightened tensions and increased conflict and could lead to a major conflagration.
“Consequently, after having carefully examined all the elements of information which the Commission has been in a position to gather in the implementation of its mandate, the Commission would like to reaffirm the entirety of the conclusions contained in its two previous reports, and more specifically the following:
“(a) The Israeli Government is actively pursuing its wilful, systematic large-scale process of establishing settlements in the occupied territories;
“(b) A correlation exists between the establishment of Israeli settlements and the displacement of the Arab population;
“(c) In the implementation of its policy of settlements, Israel is resorting to methods – often coercive and sometimes more subtle – which include the control of water resources, the seizure of private property, the destruction of houses and the banishment of persons in complete disregard for basic human rights;
“(d) The settlement policy has brought drastic and adverse changes to the economic and social pattern of the daily life of the remaining Arab population and is causing profound changes of a geographical and demographic nature in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem;
“(e) Those changes constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and of the relevant decisions adopted by the Security Council in the matter.
“Consequently the Commission wishes to reiterate that Israel’s policy of settlement, by which, as an example, 33.3 per cent of the West Bank has been confiscated to date, has no legal validity and constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the area.
“In view of the recent deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, the Commission considers that Israel’s settlement policy, with the unjustified sufferings which it imposes on a defenceless population, is an incitement to further unrest and violence.
“The Israeli policy of settlements has led to major displacements and dispossession of Palestinians, adding to the ever-growing number of refugees with all the attendant consequences.
“Available evidence shows that Israeli occupying authorities continue to deplete the natural resources, particularly water resources, in the occupied territories for their advantage and to the detriment of the Palestinian people.
“As water is a scarce and precious commodity in the area, its control and apportionment means control of the most vital means of survival. It would seem, therefore, that Israel employs water both as an economic and even political weapon to further its policy of settlements. Consequently, the economy and agriculture of the Arab population is adversely affected by the exploitation of water resources by the occupying authorities.
“On Jerusalem, the Commission has noted with grave concern that tension and confrontation between Israel and the Islamic world have increased, especially following the enactment of a ‘basic law’ in the Israeli Knesset, proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City, which has also affected Christendom.”
The third report of the Commission has not as yet been considered by the Security Council.
Despite the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council declaring the settlements illegal, Israel has persisted in the pursuit of its policies of establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories and by 1983 had established 204 settlements and has publicly stated its plan to increase that number in the near future.
D. The status of Jerusalem
Bearing in mind the specific status and special character of the City of Jerusalem and the need for protection and preservation of the unique and spiritual dimension of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, in June 1980, in reaction to proposed legislative action by Israel to make a united Jerusalem its capital, the Security Council considered the question and adopted resolution 476 (1980), by which it deplored the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City. The Security Council was gravely concerned about the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with the aim of changing the character and the status of Jerusalem.
After the enactment of the “Basic Law” by Israel the Security Council adopted resolution 478 (1980). In this resolution, the Security Council called upon those States that had established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City. As a result, 13 countries withdrew their missions from Jerusalem.
In resolution 35/169 E of 15 December 1980, the General Assembly also censured in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the “Basic Law” on Jerusalem which constituted a violation of international law and did not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which altered or purported to alter the character and status of Jerusalem, particularly the “Basic Law” and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, were null and void and must be rescinded forthwith.
In resolution 36/120 E of 10 December 1981, the General Assembly deplored the persistence of Israel in changing the physical character, the demographic composition, the institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem. It determined once again that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, which had altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and in particular, the so-called “Basic Law” and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, were null and void and must be rescinded forthwith. Israel has however continued to pursue its policies in Jerusalem and to consider Jerusalem its eternal capital.
E. Violation of human rights
Since its establishment by General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories has been following developments concerning human rights in the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the war of June 1967. It has reported regularly to the Secretary-General in accordance with its mandate and these reports have been transmitted to the General Assembly. At each session, the General Assembly has renewed the mandate of the Special Committee, requesting the Committee to continue with its investigations. Ever since its inception, the Special Committee has requested the co-operation of the Government of Israel in the execution of its mandate. Israel has refused to co-operate with the Special Committee, including denying it access to the occupied territories in order to examine allegations of violations of human rights received by the Special Committee.
On 22 January 1982, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to establish contact with the Israeli Government and to use his good offices to make another effort aimed at securing their co-operation. On 23 February 1982 the Special Committee was informed that the Israeli authorities had not changed their position.
Following the dismissal on 18 March 1982 of the Mayor and Municipal Council of the town of El Bireh by the occupation authorities, strikes and demonstrations took place in several West Bank towns, provoking clashes with Israeli troops and leading to the death of a number of demonstrators. This was followed on 25 March by the summary dismissal of the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, again leading to further resistance by the local population and corresponding intervention by the Israeli army.
The Special Committee, in its 1982 report (A/37/485), noted that the situation in the occupied territories remained volatile, and the level of determination in the resistance of the civilian population to the occupation clearly was reaching limits that would threaten further violence.
Among the conclusions of the Special Committee in its 1982 report to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly were:
“… the Special Committee continued to apply its mandate and it informed itself on the situation in the occupied territories on the basis of sources considered to be reliable and in any not contradicted by the Government of Israel. The information contained in the preceding chapter led to a fundamental conclusion, namely that the persistent violation of human rights derives from the very fact of a 15-year military occupation and a policy of colonization and annexation of the occupied territories. The Palestinian people as well as the Syrian people under occupation cannot expect to enjoy their fundamental rights so long as they are denied the right to self-determination. None is free to enjoy his rights if he is not himself directly or indirectly responsible and involved in the determination and the application of his rights and obligations as a citizen. In a situation of occupation it is the occupying Power which dictates the limits of these rights. The years of occupation have shown that the Government of Israel as an occupying Power has legislated in such a manner as to subject the civilian population to the Government of Israel’s own requisites. The military orders through which Israel has changed law in all areas have exceeded 950 in all. In the Golan Heights, Israel claims to have applied, in its entirety, Israeli legislation which constitutes de facto annexation, and this is a flagrant violation of international law.
“It is therefore vital that the international community recognizes that the violation of human rights in the occupied territories will cease only when the Palestinian people are allowed to enjoy their right to self-determination. The Syrian nationals in the Golan Heights who are themselves under occupation will not secure their own rights until that territory is reintegrated into Syrian territory …
“The results of the prolonged occupation has led to the complete subjugation of the economy of the occupied territories to the Israeli economy. Agriculture in these territories, which is the main economic sector, is largely conditioned by the vicissitudes of Israeli agriculture. The latter, benefiting from subsidies and centralized planning, has taken control of markets that would normally constitute the outlets for agriculture in the West Bank.
“Parallel to these events and starting in September 1981, the Government of Israel, in its efforts to eliminate the popular base of the municipalities, undertook the establishment of ‘village leagues’ in various areas. These ‘village leagues’ are without any popular base and include persons whose reputation and standing in the Palestinian community leave room for doubt. These ‘village leagues’ have been accorded, over a period of time, such power and influence as to make them indispensable in the daily life of the civilian population in the occupied territories. Originally established as ‘charitable organizations’ they have already been accorded the power to issue certain permits, as, for example, building permits and permits for summer visits issued to persons wishing to visit relatives abroad …
“… the Special Committee notes that there is a greater tendency to consolidate the settlements that have already been established and these in particular in those areas considered as being densely populated by Palestinians, as, for example, the peripheries of the towns of Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah. The Special Committee concluded that the argument of security invoked in support of the policy of annexation and settlement is without any justification.”
The General Assembly has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning Israel’s policies and actions in the occupied territories. During the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, resolution 38/79 D was adopted after consideration of the Special Committee’s report (A/38/409) by a vote of 115 in favour to 2 against, with 27 abstentions. The text of the resolution is attached (annex II).
Similar action has been taken by the Human Rights Commission which has also condemned Israel’s violation of human rights in the occupied territories, reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and recognized their right to regain their rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1983, Supplement No. 3 (E/1983/13 and Corr.1)).
F. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine
In resolution 36/120 C, the General Assembly decided to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, an international conference on the question of Palestine not later than 1984, on the basis of General Assembly resolution ES-7/2, for a comprehensive effort to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and to exercise its rights.
The gravity of the Palestinian question has reached new heights as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Sabra and Shatila massacres and the creeping annexation of the West Bank. In essence, time seemed to be running out.
Accordingly, at the resumed seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine, in resolution ES-7/7 the General Assembly took note of the final communiqué of the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the non-aligned countries on the question of Palestine and, on the basis of its recommendations, decided to convene the International Conference on the Question of Palestine at the headquarters of UNESCO, in Paris, from 16 to 27 August 1983.
On the basis of the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session endorsed the two main objectives of the Conference as:
(a) To increase international awareness of the facts relating to the question of Palestine;
(b) To attain governmental and non-governmental support for effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights in Palestine on the basis of United Nations resolutions. More specifically, the purpose of the Conference was to ensure Palestinian rights and the establishment of a Palestinian State within the framework of action adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. The Conference would set in motion agreed modalities for the implementation of agreed decisions.
The Preparatory Committee planned five regional meetings to deal with specific themes. The African regional meeting took place at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 29 March to 12 April 1983. Political and juridical aspects of the question of Palestine were discussed at the meeting. Managua was the site of the Latin American meeting from 11 to 15 April 1983. Its main theme was Palestine and international law. The Western Asia meeting at Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, from 25 to 29 April 1983 dealt with economic, civic, social and cultural conditions of the Palestinians. The Asian regional meeting held at Kuala Lumpur, from 3 to 7 May 1983, discussed the question of Palestine and world politics. The European meeting took place at Geneva, from 4 to 8 July 1983 and took up the issue of the United Nations role and the future of Palestine.
At each regional preparatory meeting for the International Conference on the Question of Palestine, recommendations were adopted which formed part of the documentation of the Conference.
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine was held at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 36/120 C of 10 December 1982, and with the subsequent recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.
Of high importance was the representative character of the Conference. Representative attendance of such a high level and in such large numbers reflected the hopes of the international community that the Conference would contribute to genuine peace and security and manifest the new, quasi-global consensus which has unequivocally emerged for the achievement of Palestinian rights.
One hundred and thirty-seven States attended the Conference, 20 of them as observers. The PLO participated in the Conference as the representative of the party most directly concerned. The Conference decided that, in the spirit of General Asssembly resolutions 3210 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX) of 14 October 1974 and 10 November 1975 respectively, the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization should be placed among the full participants in the Conference.
In addition, 25 intergovernmental organizations, United Nations bodies and programmes, as well as specialized agencies and related organizations, participated in the work of the Conference. A total of 104 non-governmental organizations were represented by observers. Sixteen eminent persons made their valuable contributions. This overwhelming international presence spoke for itself: never before have so many governmental representatives, representing an overwhelming percentage of humanity, and so many non-governmental organizations devoted so much time and energy exclusively and directly to the rights of the Palestinian people, rights to which the people of Palestine are entitled no less than other peoples.
At its eighth plenary session, the Conference heard a statement by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO.
In his address, he deplored the negative role of the United States in the Security Council and explained the reasons why the Palestine Liberation Organization could not accept the proposal advanced by President Reagan. The Palestine National Council accepted the Arab peace plan adopted by the twelfth Arab Summit Conference at Fez on 9 September 1982 and supported the peace initiative of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Arafat stressed that the people of Palestine rejected war and were fighting for justice. He expressed the hope that the Conference could advance the search for practical means to secure the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
In that regard, the PLO wished to put forward the following considerations:
(a) The Middle East region should remain secure from monopolization by any one Power in the world;
(b) Regaining of the rights of the Palestinian people was a legitimate international responsibility;
(c) The Fez Summit resolutions provided the minimum base for the attainment of justice;
(d) The only basis for peace in the region was the exercise of the Palestinian people’s right to return, self-determination and national independence;
(e) The continuation of Israeli military aggression with United States support destroyed any prospects for peace;
(f) United States-Israeli policies which called for capitulation were rejected by the PLO;
(g) The PLO was ready to co-operate with the United Nations system within the framework of its resolutions relating to the question of Palestine. The PLO called for an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, in which the two major Powers would participate with all concerned parties in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.
Mr. Arafat conveyed his greetings to democratic Jewish forces in and outside Israel that had rejected Israel’s policies against the Palestinian people.
He stressed that all efforts to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization and to liquidate its infrastructure had failed. The Organization was determined to continue the struggle until victory.
At its concluding session on 7 September 1983, the Conference adopted, by acclamation, the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights. The Geneva Declaration on Palestine contains guidelines, consistent with the principles of international law, which have been presented on this question, such as the Arab Peace Plan, adopted at the twelfth Arab Summit Conference in Fez, in September 1982, which should serve as a basis for concerted international efforts to resolve the question of Palestine. The Declaration calls for the convening under the auspices of the United Nations of an international peace conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and other concerned States, on an equal footing. The Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights consists of recommendations addressed to Member States, to the Security Council, the Secretary-General and organs and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as to world-wide public opinion to undertake concrete action to assist the Palestinian people in securing and implementing its inalienable rights, in particular, the establishment of a sovereign State of its own in Palestine.
At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly, in resolution A/38/58 A endorsed once more the recommendations of the Committee; it also requested the Committee to keep under review the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights adopted by the International Conference.
The General Assembly, in resolution 38/58 C endorsed the Geneva Declaration, as well as the call for convening an international peace conference on the Middle East, in conformity with the following guidelines:
(a) The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;
(b) The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
(c) The need to put an end to Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
(d) The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any de facto situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;
(e) The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called “Basic Law” on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
(f) The right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as stated in subparagraph (a) above.
The General Assembly invites all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other concerned States, to participate in the International Peace Conference on the Middle East on an equal footing and with equal rights.
II. CONCLUSION
The question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East continues to dominate international affairs and remains vitally important to the political and economic stability of the region and of the world at large.
In his report of 1981 on the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General stated:
“The United Nations has since 1948 been engaged in a practical way in operations designed to control conflict in the Middle East. Without these efforts the situation would undoubtedly be infinitely more dangerous and destructive than it actually is. The Organization is also a universal forum in the framework of which efforts to evolve a peaceful settlement may in the end best be pursued. Such efforts will require not only the participation of all concerned, but their active determination to succeed. The issues are well known and include the right of all States in the area to live in peace, within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination, and withdrawal from occupied territories. In this context, the question of Jerusalem remains of primary importance. We need urgently, in the interests of world peace as well as of the peoples of the Middle East, to take every possible step to encourage the will to negotiate and to settle on a solution to the central and obdurate problem of the Middle East.”
And in 1982:
“It is absolutely essential that serious negotiations on the various aspects of the [the Middle East] problem involve all the parties concerned at the earliest possible time. Far too much time has already elapsed, far too many lives and far too many opportunities have been lost, and too many faits accomplis have been created.
“I feel that the Security Council, the only place in the world where all the parties concerned can sit at the same table, could become a most useful forum for this absolutely essential effort.”
In its report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People considered the final documents of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine to be of great value for a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the question of Palestine. While unanimously supporting the Geneva Declaration and the Programme of Action, the Committee appealed to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session and to the Security Council to endorse those documents and to give full support for their implementation.
The Committee recommended resolute action by all nations, particularly those in the region, through the Security Council, so that the present destructive momentum will be revised, conflict will cease and a steady course of action in the search for durable and comprehensive peace will be set in motion.
The Committee also recommended that concrete actions be undertaken in order to convene an international peace conference on the Middle East as it was proposed at the International Conference on the Question of Palestine and appeals to all parties concerned, as well as the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to co-operate fully on this matter.
Notes
1/ A/35/299-S/14009.
2/ The New York Times, 2 September 1982, sect. A. p. 11.
3/ A/37/696-S/15510.
4/ A/38/696-S/15556.
5/ General Assembly resolutions 3210 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX).
6/ The Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 1983. Final report published in The Jerusalem Post of 9 February 1983.
7/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.
8/ S/13450.
Annex I
A. GENEVA DECLARATION ON PALESTINE
In pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 36/120 C of 10 December 1981, ES-7/7 of 19 August 1982 and 37/86 C of 10 December 1982, an International Conference on the Question of Palestine was convened at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 29 August to 7 September 1983 to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and to exercise their inalienable rights. The Conference was opened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Moustapha Niassé.
1. The Conference, having thoroughly considered the question of Palestine in all its aspects, expresses the grave concern of all nations and peoples regarding the international tension that has persisted for several decades in the Middle East, the principal cause of which is the denial by Israel, and those supporting its expansionist policies, of the inalienable legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Conference reaffirms and stresses that a just solution of the question of Palestine, the core of the problem, is the crucial element in a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement in the Middle East.
2. The Conference recognizes that, as one of the most acute and complex problems of our time, the question of Palestine – inherited by the United Nations at the time of its establishment – requires a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement. This settlement must be based on the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and the attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and the right to the establishment of its own independent State in Palestine and should also be based on the provision by the Security Council of guarantees for peace and security among all States in the region, including the independent Palestinian State, within secure and internationally recognized boundaries. The Conference is convinced that the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable rights, as defined by General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, will contribute substantially to the achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.
3. The Conference considers the role of the United Nations in the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East to be essential and paramount. It emphasizes the need for respect for, and application of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the resolutions of the United Nations relevant to the question of Palestine and the observance of the principles of international law.
4. The Conference considers that the various proposals, consistent with the principles of international law, which have been presented on this question, such as the Arab peace plan adopted unanimously at the twelfth Arab Summit Conference held at Fez, Morocco, in September 1982, should serve as guidelines for concerted international effort to resolve the question of Palestine. These guidelines include the following:
(a) The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;
(b) The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;
(c) The need to put an end to Israel’s occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently, the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
(d) The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any de facto situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;
(e) The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called “Basic Law” on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;
(f) The right of all States in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all the people, the sine qua non of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as stated in paragraph (a) above.
5. In order to give effect to these guidelines, the Conference considers it essential that an international peace conference on the Middle East be convened on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, an essential element of which would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in Palestine. This peace conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well as the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other concerned States, on an equal footing. In this context the Security Council has a primary responsibility to create appropriate institutional arrangements on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions in order to guarantee and to carry out the accords of the International Peace Conference.
6. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine emphasizes the importance of the time factor in achieving a just solution to the problem of Palestine. The Conference is convinced that partial solutions are inadequate and delays in seeking a comprehensive solution do not eliminate tensions in the region.
B. PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine agreed that no effort should be spared to seek effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to attain and exercise their rights in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a/ and the principles of international law. The Conference, taking into consideration the Geneva Declaration on Palestine (sect. A above), recommended the following Programme of Action.
I
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine recommends that all States, individually or collectively, consistent with their respective constitutions and their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the principles of international law:
1. Recognize the great importance of the time factor in solving the question of Palestine;
2. Intensify efforts for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State within the framework of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant United Nations resolutions and the guidelines of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine;
3. Consider the continued presence of Israel in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, as exacerbating instability in the region and endangering international peace and security;
4. Oppose and reject, as a serious and continuing obstacle to peace, the expansionist policies pursued by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and in particular the alteration of the geographic nature and demographic composition, and the Israeli attempt to alter, through domestic legislation, the legal status of those territories, and all the measures taken in violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War b/ and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, c/ both of 12 August 1949, and of the Hague Regulations of 1907 d/ such as the establishment and expansion of settlements, the transfer of Israeli civilians into those territories and the individual and mass transfers therefrom of the Arab Palestinian population;
5. Refrain from providing Israel with assistance of such a nature as to encourage it militarily, economically and financially to continue its aggression, occupation and disregard of its obligations under the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
6. Not encourage migration to the occupied Arab territories until Israel has put a definitive end to the implementation of its illegal policy of establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967;
7. Fully comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its specialized agencies on the Holy City of Jerusalem, including those which reject Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem and its declaration of that city as its capital;
8. Undertake universal efforts to protect the Holy Places and urge Israel to take measures to prevent their desecration;
9. Consider ways and means of meeting the threat that Israel poses to the regional security in Africa in view of Israel’s disregard of United Nations resolutions, and its close collaboration with the apartheid régime in the economic, military and nuclear fields, thereby contributing to the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and enhancing the régime’s repressive and aggressive capacity;
10. Encourage, through bilateral and multilateral contacts, all States, including Western European and North American States which have not done so, to welcome all peace initiatives based on the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, which were also welcomed by Chairman Yasser Arafat in his address to the International Conference on the Question of Palestine;
11. Seek and develop ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources;
12. Express concern that Israel debars Palestinians from economic activity and access to national resources on Palestinian territory, in consistent violation of General Assembly resolutions on the right of the Palestinians to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources;
13. Declare null and void, and counter such measures and practices applied by Israel in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, as the annexation and the expropriation of land, water resources, and property and the alteration of the demographic, geographic, historical and cultural features thereof;
14. Undertake measures to alleviate the economic and social burdens borne by the Palestinian people as a result of the continued Israeli occupation of their territories since 1967;
15. Consider contributing or increasing special contributions to the proposed budgets, programmes and projects of the relevant organs, funds and agencies of the United Nations system that have been requested to provide humanitarian, economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people, with particular reference to:
(a) General Assembly resolution 33/147 of 20 December 1978, and the appeal of the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme at its thirtieth session, for additional special contributions amounting to at least $8 million during the third programming cycle (1982-1986) aimed at helping to meet the economic and social needs of the Palestinian people; e/
(b) The proposed programme budget of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for the biennium 1984-1985 regarding the establishment within UNCTAD of a special economic unit, f/ as requested by that Conference at its sixth session at Belgrade; g/
(c) Establishing a special legal aid fund to assist Palestinians in securing their rights under conditions of occupation, h/ in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
16. Ensure that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East can meet the essential needs of the Palestinians without interruption or any diminution in the effectiveness of its services;
17. Review the situation of Palestinian women in Israeli occupied territories and, in view of their special hardships, urge the Preparatory Committee of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women, to be held at Nairobi in 1985, to include this item on the agenda of the Conference;
18. Review, if they have not yet done so, in conformity with their national legislation, their economic, cultural, technical and other relations with Israel, and the agreements governing them with the aim of ensuring that these regulations and agreements will not be interpreted or construed as implying in any way recognition of any modification of the legal status of Jerusalem and of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, or an acceptance of Israel’s illegal presence in those territories;
19. Recognize that the process of enabling the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights in Palestine is a significant contribution to the restoration of the rule of law in international relations;
20. Assure the observance of the stipulations provided in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, speech, publication, education, assembly and association;
21. Express concern that the laws applicable in the occupied Arab territories have been totally eclipsed by a plethora of military orders that have been designed
to establish a new “legal régime” in violation of the Hague Regulations of 1907, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
22. Act in accordance with their obligations under existing international law, in particular with regard to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which require States Parties to respect and to ensure respect for those conventions in all circumstances, and in particular ensure the respect by Israel for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
23. Express concern that the Palestinians and other Arabs in the occupied territories are deprived of juridical and other kinds of protection, that they are victims of repressive legislation, involving mass arrests, acts of torture, destruction of houses, and the expulsion of people from their homes, acts which constitute flagrant violations of human rights;
24. Recognize the necessity that Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel be accorded the status of prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949, i/ if combatants, or in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949, j/ if civilians;
25. Strive for the adoption of international measures so that Israel will implement in the West Bank and Gaza the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, in the light of Security Council resolution 465 (1980);
26. Recognize, if they have not yet done so, the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people and establish with it appropriate relations;
27. Encourage, in conformity with their national legislations, the formation of national committees in support of the Palestinian people;
28. Encourage the observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, in a most effective and meaningful way;
29. Request the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session to designate a Year of Palestine, to be observed at the earliest possible time, taking into consideration the factors necessary to ensure its effective preparation for the purpose of galvanizing world-wide public opinion and support for further implementation of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Programme of Action.
___
a/ General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).
b/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 972, p. 135.
c/ Ibid., No. 973, p. 287.
d/ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 100.
e/ See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1983, Supplement No. 9 (E/1983/20).
f/ A/C.5/38/4, para. 8 (c).
g/ Recommendation 146 (VI) of 2 July 1983 of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
h/ Recommendation 19 of the Latin American Regional Preparatory Meeting, Managua, 12-15 April 1983 (A/CONF.114/2).
i/ United Nations, Treaty Series, op. cit.
j/ Ibid., No. 973, p. 187.
II
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine stresses the obligation of all Member States, under the Charter of the United Nations to enable the United Nations through an expanded and more effective role to fulfil its responsibility for achieving a solution to the question of Palestine. To this end:
A
States participating in the Conference invite the Security Council, as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security:
1. To suppress continuing and growing acts of aggression and other breaches of peace in the Middle East which endanger peace and security in the region and the world as a whole;
2. To take prompt, firm and effective steps and actions to establish an independent sovereign Palestinian State in Palestine through the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, by facilitating the organization of the international peace conference on the Middle East, as called for in paragraph 5 of the Geneva Declaration on Palestine, and by creating in this context the appropriate institutional arrangements on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions in order to guarantee and carry out the accords of the international peace conference, including the following:
(a) Taking measures consistent with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force to ensure Israel’s withdrawal from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, within a specific time-table;
(b) Undertaking effective measures to guarantee the safety and security and legal and human rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territories pending the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
(c) Subjecting those territories, following the withdrawal of Israel, to a short transitional period, under the supervision of the United Nations, during which period the Palestinian people would exercise its right to self-determination;
(d) Facilitating the implementation of the right to return of the Palestinians to their homes and property;
(e) Supervising elections to the constituent assembly of the independent Palestinian State in which all Palestinians shall participate, in the exercise of their right to self-determination;
(f) Providing, if necessary, temporary peace-keeping forces in order to facilitate the implementation of subparagraphs (a)-(e) above.
B
Meanwhile the Security Council is also invited:
1. To take urgent action to bring about an immediate and complete cessation of such Israeli policies in the occupied territories, and in particular, the establishment of settlements as have been determined by the Security Council to have no legal validity and as a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
2. To consider urgently the reports of the Commission established under its resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, which examined the situation concerning settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to reactivate the above-mentioned Commission;
3. To initiate action to terminate Israel’s exploitative policies which go against the indigenous economic development of the occupied territories, and to compel Israel to lift its restrictions on water use and well-drilling by Palestinian farmers as well as its diversion of West Bank water resources into the Israeli water grid systems;
4. To keep under its constant attention the actions committed by Israel against the Palestinian people in violation of the stipulations provided for in relevant General Assembly resolutions, in particular the stipulations of resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights and freedoms;
5. To consider, in the event of Israel’s persistent non-compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions which embody the will of the international community, appropriate measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure Israel’s compliance with these resolutions.
C
1. Taking into account the recommendations of the five regional preparatory meetings of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine k/ and United Nations resolutions concerning economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to convene a meeting of the specialized agencies and other organizations associated with the United Nations, as well as representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and of those countries which are hosts to Palestinian refugees, and other potential sources of assistance, to develop a co-ordinated programme of economic and social assistance to the Palestinian people and to ensure its implementation.
2. The meeting should also look into the most effective inter-agency machinery to co-ordinate and sustain and intensify United Nations assistance to the Palestinian people.
_____
k/ African region, A/CONF.114/1; Latin American region, A/CONF.114/2; Western Asian region, A/CONF.114/3; Asian region, A/CONF.114/4; European region, A/CONF.114/5.
D
The dissemination of accurate and comprehensive information world wide, and the role of non-governmental organizations and institutions, remains of vital importance in heightening awareness of and support for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent sovereign Palestinian State. To these ends:
1. The Department for Public Information of the United Nations, in full co-operation and constant consultations with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People should:
(a) Co-ordinate all information activities of the United Nations system on Palestine through the Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC);
(b) Expand publications and audio and visual coverage of the facts and of developments pertaining to the question of Palestine;
(c) Publish newsletters and articles in its respective publications on Israeli violations of human rights of the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories and organize fact-finding missions for journalists to the area;
(d) Organize regional encounters for journalists;
(e) Disseminate appropriate information on the results of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine;
2. Relevant organizations of the United Nations systems should organize meetings, symposia and seminars on topics within their terms of reference and relating to specific problems of the Palestinian people by establishing closer liaison with non-governmental organizations, the media and other groups interested in the question of Palestine.
III
The International Conference on the Question of Palestine, convinced of the important role of world-wide public opinion in resolving the question of Palestine, and in the implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action, urges and encourages:
1. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to increase awareness by the international community of the economic and social burdens borne by the Palestinian people as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and its negative effects on the economic development of the West Asian region as a whole;
2. Non-governmental organizations and professional and popular associations to intensify their efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people in every possible way;
3. Organizations such as those of women, teachers, workers, youths and students to undertake exchanges and other programmes of joint action with their Palestinian counterparts;
4. Women’s associations, in particular, to investigate the conditions of Palestinian women and children in all occupied territories;
5. The media and other institutions to disseminate relevant information to increase public awareness and understanding of the question of Palestine;
6. Institutions of higher education to promote the study of the question of Palestine in all its aspects;
7. Various jurists’ associations to establish special investigative commissions to determine the violations by Israel of the Palestinians’ legal rights and to disseminate their findings accordingly;
8. Jurists to initiate with their Palestinian counterparts consultations, research and investigations on the juridical aspects of problems affecting the southern African and Palestinian struggles, in particular the detention of political prisoners and the denial of prisoner-of-war status to detained members of the national liberation movements of southern Africa and Palestine;
9. Parliamentarians, political parties, trade unions, organizations for solidarity and intellectuals particularly in Western Europe and North America, to join their counterparts in other parts of the world in giving their support, where it has not been done, to an initiative which would express the desire of the international community to see the Palestinian people at last living in their own independent homeland in peace, freedom and dignity.
Annex II
A. RESOLUTION 508 (1982)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2374th meeting
on 5 June 1982
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and its ensuing resolutions, and more particularly, resolution 501 (1982),
Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982, a/
Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region,
Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Lebanon,
Reaffirming and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 4 June 1982, b/ as well as the urgent appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1982,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, c/
1. Calls upon all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and not later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982;
2. Requests all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the present resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than 48 hours after the adoption of this resolution.
a/ S/15161 and S/15162.
b/ S/15163.
c/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1982, 2374th meeting.
B. RESOLUTION 509 (1982)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2375th meeting
on 6 June 1982
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), of 19 March 1978 and 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982,
Gravely concerned at the situation as described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council, d/
Reaffirming the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,
1. Demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;
2. Demands that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;
3. Calls on all parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their acceptance of the present resolution within 24 hours;
4. Decides to remain seized of the question.
____________
d/ Ibid., 2375th meeting.
C. RESOLUTION 520 (1982)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2395th meeting
on 17 September 1982
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 15 September 1982, e/
Condemning the murder of Bashir Gemayel, the constitutionally elected President-elect of Lebanon, and every effort to disrupt by violence the restoration of a strong, stable government in Lebanon,
Having listened to the statement by the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, f/
Taking note of the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,
1. Reaffirms its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 516 (1982) in all their components;
2. Condemns the recent Israeli incursions into Beirut in violation of the cease-fire agreements and of Security Council resolutions;
3. Demands an immediate return to the positions occupied by Israel before 15 September 1982, as a first step towards the full implementation of Security Council resolutions;
4. Calls again for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon;
5. Reaffirms its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;
6. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement Security Council resolution 516 (1982) concerning the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut and requests all the parties concerned to co-operate fully in the application of that resolution;
7. Decides to remain seized of the question and asks the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on developments as soon as possible and not later than 24 hours.
______________
e/ Ibid., document S/15382/Add.1.
f/ Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, 2394th meeting.
D. RESOLUTION 521 (1982)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2396th meeting
on 19 September 1982
The Security Council,
Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,
Having heard the report of the Secretary-General, g/
Noting that the Government of Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations Observers to the sites of greatest human suffering and losses in and around that city,
1. Condemns the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut;
2. Reaffirms once again its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982), which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination, and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;
3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from ten to fifty, and insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of those observers in order that they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate to the effort to ensure full protection for the civilian population;
5. Requests the Secretary-General, as a matter of urgency, to initiate appropriate consultations and, in particular, consultations with the Government of Lebanon on additional steps which the Council might take, including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian populations in and around Beirut and requests him to report to the Council within 48 hours;
6. Insists that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to discharge their mandates and, in this connection, solemnly calls attention to the obligation of all Member States, under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the Charter;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on an urgent and continuing basis.
g/ Ibid., Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982, document S/15400.
E. RESOLUTION 542 (1983)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2501st meeting
on 23 November 1983
The Security Council,
Having considered the situation prevailing in northern Lebanon,
Recalling the statement made on this question by the President of the Council on 11 November 1983, h/
Deeply concerned by the intensification of the fighting, which continues to cause much suffering and great loss of human life,
1. Deplores the loss of human life caused by the events taking place in northern Lebanon;
2. Reiterates its call for the strict respect for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
3. Requests the parties concerned immediately to accept a cease-fire and scrupulously to observe the cessation of hostilities;
4. Invites the parties concerned to settle their differences exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force;
5. Pays tribute to the work done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and by the International Committee of the Red Cross in providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in Tripoli and its surroundings;
6. Calls upon the parties concerned to comply with the provisions of this resolution;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the situation in northern Lebanon, to consult with the Government of Lebanon, and to report to the Council, which remains seized of the question.
h/ S/16142.
F. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ES-7/9
The question of Palestine
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency special session,
Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, i/
Recalling and reaffirming, in particular, its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,
Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut,
Recalling Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982, 513 (1982) of 4 July 1982, 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982 and 521 (1982) of 19 September 1982,
Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General relevant to the situation, particularly his report of 18 September 1982, j/
Noting with regret that the Security Council has so far not taken effective and practical measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure implementation of its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),
Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, k/ and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907, l/
Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations,
Noting the homelessness of the Palestinian people,
Reaffirming the imperative need to permit the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights,
1. Condemns the criminal massacre of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 17 September 1982;
2. Urges the Security Council to investigate, through the means available to it, the circumstances and extent of the massacre of Palestinian and other civilians in Beirut on 17 September 1982, and to make public the report on its findings as soon as possible;
3. Decides to support fully the provisions of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), in which the Council, inter alia, demanded that:
(a) Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;
(b) All parties to the conflict cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;
4. Demands that all Member States and other parties observe strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
5. Reaffirms the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
6. Resolves that, in conformity with its resolution 194 (III) and subsequent relevant resolutions, the Palestinian refugees should be enabled to return to their homes and property from which they have been uprooted and displaced, and demands that Israel comply unconditionally and immediately with the present resolution;
7. Urges the Security Council, in the event of continued failure by Israel to comply with the demands contained in resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and the present resolution, to meet in order to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
8. Calls upon all States and international agencies and organizations to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a photographic exhibit of the massacre of 17 September 1982 and to display it in the United Nations visitors’ hall;
10. Decides to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.
i/ See A/ES-7/PV.32.
j/ S/15400.
k/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.
l/ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).
G. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 38/79
Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices
Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories
D
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, m/
Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, n/ as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,
Recalling all its resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977, 33/113 C of 18 December 1978, 34/90 A of 12 December 1979, 25/122 C of 11 December 1980, 36/147 C of 16 December 1981 and 37/88 C of 10 December 1982, and also those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights, in particular its resolution 1983/1 of 15 February 1983, o/ and other United Nations organs concerned and by the specialized agencies,
Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, p/ which contains, inter alia, public statements made by officials of the Government of Israel,
1. Commends the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly and for its thoroughness and impartiality;
2. Deplores the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
3. Demands that Israel allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
4. Reaffirms the fact that occupation itself constitutes a grave violation of the human rights of the civilian population of the occupied Arab territories;
5. Condemns the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as “grave breaches” thereof;
6. Declares once more that Israel’s grave breaches of that Convention are war crimes and an affront to humanity;
7. Strongly condemns the following Israeli policies and practices:
(a) Annexation of parts of the occupied territories, including Jerusalem;
(b) Imposition of Israeli laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Syrian Golan Heights, which has resulted in the effective annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights;
(c) Establishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private and public Arab lands, and transfer of an alien population thereto;
(d) Evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories and denial of their right to return;
(e) Confiscation and expropriation of private and public Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
(f) Excavations and transformations of the landscape and the historical, cultural and religious sites, especially at Jerusalem;
(g) Pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
(h) Destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
(i) Collective punishment, mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
(j) Ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
(k) Interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
(l) Interference with the system of education and with the social and economic development of the population in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
(m) Interference with the freedom of movement of individuals within the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
(n) Illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
8. Strongly condemns the arming of Israeli settlers in the occupied territories to commit acts of violence against Arab civilians and the perpetration of acts of violence by these armed settlers against individuals, causing injury and death and wide-scale damage to Arab property;
9. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel’s policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention and of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;
10. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above;
11. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to take immediate steps for the return of all displaced Arab and Palestinian inhabitants to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
12. Urges the international organizations and the specialized agencies, in particular the International Labour Organisation, to examine the conditions of Arab workers in the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem;
13. Reiterates its call upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and the specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
14. Requests the Special Committee, pending the early termination of Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
15. Requests the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;
16. Condemns Israel’s refusal to permit persons from the occupied territories to appear as witnesses before the Special Committee and to participate in conferences and meetings held outside the occupied territories;
17. Requests the Secretary-General:
(a) To provide all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating the Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
(b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
(c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;
(d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;
18. Requests the Security Council to ensure Israel’s respect for and compliance with all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to initiate measures to halt Israeli policies and practices in those territories;
19. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled “Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories”.
____
m/ Resolution 217 A (III).
n/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.
o/ See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1983, Supplement No. 3 (E/1983/13 and Corr.1), chap. XXVII.
p/ See A/38/409.
1 The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: PART III (1978-1983)
1.1 Introduction
1.2 I. PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1978-1983
1.2.1 A. Emergency special session of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine
1.2.2 B. Invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982
1.2.3 C. Israeli settlements in the occupied territories
1.2.4 D. The status of Jerusalem
1.2.5 E. Violation of human rights
1.2.6 F. The International Conference on the Question of Palestine
1.3 II. CONCLUSION
1.4 Annex I
1.5 A. GENEVA DECLARATION ON PALESTINE
1.1 Introduction
1.2 I. The Beginnings of the Palestine Issue
1.2.1 The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire
1.2.2 Anglo-Arab understandings on Arab independence
1.2.3 The Committee on the Husain-McMahon correspondence
1.3 II. The Balfour Declaration
1.3.1 The historical background of the “Jewish national home” concept
1.3.2 Zionist efforts directed at the British Government
1.3.3 The drafting of the Declaration
1.3.4 The “safeguards” in the Declaration
1.3.5 The meaning of the Balfour Declaration
1.3.6 The reactions to the Declaration
1.3.7 The implications of the Declaration
1.4 III. The League of Nations Mandates
1.4.1 Arab nationalism and Great Power plans
1.4.2 The Covenant of the League of Nations
1.4.3 The allocation of Arab territories
1.4.4 The working of the Mandates System
1.5 IV. Palestine Mandated
1.5.1 The Zionist Commission
1.5.2 The Paris Peace Conference
1.5.3 The King-Crane Commission
1.5.4 Allied policy on Palestine
1.5.5 The drafting of the Palestine Mandate
1.5.6 The borders of Palestine
1.5.7 The question of the validity of the Mandate
1.6 V. Mandated Palestine: The “Jewish National Home”
1.6.1 The course of the Mandate
1.6.2 The start of the Mandate
1.6.3 The “Churchill Memorandum”
1.6.4 Immigration into Palestine, 1920-1929 68
1.7 VI. Mandated Palestine – Palestinian Resistance
1.7.1 The Start of Palestinian Resistance
1.7.2 The Revolt of 1929
1.7.3 The riots of 1933
1.7.4 The Palestinian rebellion against the British Mandate
1.8 VII. Mandated Palestine: The Partition Plans
1.8.1 On the rebellion:
1.8.2 On its causes:
1.8.3 On the new Arab hostility towards the Jews:
1.8.4 On the Arab-Jewish relationship:
1.8.5 On Palestinian demands for independence:
1.8.6 The London Conference, 1939
1.8.7 The “MacDonald White Paper”
1.9 VIII. Palestine and the League of Nations
1.10 IX. The Ending of the Mandate
1.10.1 Palestine in 1939
1.10.2 The implementation of the 1939 White Paper
1.10.3 The Jewish response
1.10.4 The “Biltmore Programme”
1.10.5 The Anglo-American Enquiry Committee
1.10.6 The London Conference
1.10.7 The transformation of Mandated Palestine
1.11 Notes:
1.12 Annexes
1.12.1 Annex I – The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916
1.12.2 Annex II – “Excluded areas” under Hussein-McMahon Correspondence Map
1.12.3 Annex III – Ottoman Administrative Districts – Map
1.12.4 Annex IV – Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919
1.12.5 Annex V – The Mandate for Palestine, 24 July 1922
1.12.6 Annex VI – Zionist Claims for Palestine – Map
1.12.7 Annex VII – Royal Commission’s Partition Plan “A” – Map
1.12.8 Annex VIII – Palestine Partition Commission Plan “B” – Map
1.12.9 Annex IX – Palestine Partition Commission Plan “C” – Map
Introduction
The question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations shortly after the end of the Second World War.
The origins of the Palestine problem as an international issue, however, lie in events occurring towards the end of the First World War. These events led to a League of Nations decision to place Palestine under the administration of Great Britain as the Mandatory Power under the Mandates System adopted by the League. In principle, the Mandate was meant to be in the nature of a transitory phase until Palestine attained the status of a fully independent nation, a status provisionally recognized in the League’s Covenant, but in fact the Mandate’s historical evolution did not result in the emergence of Palestine as an independent nation.
The decision on the Mandate did not take into account the wishes of the people of Palestine, despite the Covenant’s requirements that “the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”. This assumed special significance because, almost five years before receiving the mandate from the League of Nations, the British Government had given commitments to the Zionist Organization regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, for which Zionist leaders had pressed a claim of “historical connection” since their ancestors had lived in Palestine two thousand years earlier before dispersing in the “Diaspora”.
During the period of the Mandate, the Zionist Organization worked to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The indigenous people of Palestine, whose forefathers had inhabited the land for virtually the two preceding millennia felt this design to be a violation of their natural and inalienable rights. They also viewed it as an infringement of assurances of independence given by the Allied Powers to Arab leaders in return for their support during the war. The result was mounting resistance to the Mandate by Palestinian Arabs, followed by resort to violence by the Jewish community as the Second World War drew to a close.
After a quarter of a century of the Mandate, Great Britain submitted what had become “the Palestine problem” to the United Nations on the ground that the Mandatory Power was faced with conflicting obligations that had proved irreconcilable. At this point, when the United Nations itself was hardly two years old, violence ravaged Palestine. After investigating various alternatives the United Nations proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent States, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized. The partition plan did not bring peace to Palestine, and the prevailing violence spread into a Middle East war halted only by United Nations action. One of the two States envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence as Israel and, in a series of successive wars, its territorial control expanded to occupy all of Palestine. The Palestinian Arab State envisaged in the partition plan never appeared on the world’s map and, over the following 30 years, the Palestinian people have struggled for their lost rights.
The Palestine problem quickly widened into the Middle East dispute between the Arab States and Israel. From 1948 there have been wars and destruction, forcing millions of Palestinians into exile, and engaging the United Nations in a continuing search for a solution to a problem which came to possess the potential of a major source of danger for world peace.
In the course of this search, a large majority of States Members of the United Nations have recognized that the Palestine issue continues to lie at the heart of the Middle East problem, the most serious threat to peace with which the United Nations must contend. Recognition is spreading in world opinion that the Palestinian people must be assured its inherent inalienable right of national self-determination for peace to be restored.
In 1947 the United Nations accepted the responsibility of finding a just solution for the Palestine issue, and still grapples with this task today. Decades of strife and politico-legal arguments have clouded the basic issues and have obscured the origins and evolution of the Palestine problem, which this study attempts to clarify.
I. The Beginnings of the Palestine Issue
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire
By the turn of the century, the “Eastern question” was a predominant concern of European diplomacy, as the Great Powers manoeuvred to establish control or spheres of influence over territories of the declining Ottoman Empire. “The dynamics of the Eastern question thus lay in Europe”1 and the issue finally was resolved by the defeat of Turkey in the First World War.
While the war was at its height and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire became clearly imminent, the Entente Powers already were negotiating over rival territorial ambitions. In 1916 negotiations between Britain, France and Russia, later also including Italy, led to the secret Sykes-Picot agreement on the allocation of Ottoman Arab territories to spheres of influence of the European Powers (annex I). Since places sacred to three world religions were located there, an international régime was initially envisaged for Palestine which, however, eventually was to come under British control.
Although the European Powers sought to establish spheres of influence, they recognized that sovereignty would rest with the rulers and people of the Arab territories, and the Sykes-Picot agreement specified recognition of an “independent Arab State” or “confederation of Arab States”. This reflected the recognition of regional realities, since the force of emergent Arab nationalism constituted a major challenge to the supra-national Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism sought manifestation in the form of sovereign, independent national States on the European model. Great Britain’s aims in the war linked with these Arab national aspirations and led to assurances of sovereign independence for the Arab peoples after the defeat of the Axis Powers.
Anglo-Arab understandings on Arab independence
These assurances appear in correspondence 2 during 1915-1916 between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sherif Husain, Emir of Mecca, who held the special status of the Keeper of Islam’s most holy cities. He thus acted as a representative of the Arab peoples, although not exercising formal political suzerainty over them all.
In the course of the protracted correspondence, the Sherif unequivocally demanded “independence of the Arab countries”, specifying in detail the boundaries of the territories in question, which clearly included Palestine. McMahon confirmed that “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca”.
To assuage Arab apprehensions aroused by the revelation of the Sykes-Picot agreement by the Soviet Government after the 1917 revolution, and by certain conflicting statements of British policy (see sect. II below), further assurances followed concerning the future of Arab territories.
A special message (of 4 January 1918) from the British Government, carried personally by Commander David George Hogarth to Sherif Husain, stated that “the Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world … So far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to another”. 3
Six months after General Allenby’s forces had occupied Jerusalem, another declaration, referring to “areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied Forces during the present war”, announced “… the wish and desire of His Majesty’s Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed, and this policy has and will continue to have support of His Majesty’s Government”. 4
A joint Anglo-French declaration (7 November 1918) was more exhaustive and specific, affecting both British and French spheres of interest (the term “Syria” still being considered to include Lebanon and Palestine):
“The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the [Arab] peoples and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.
In order to carry out these intentions, France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of the indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.”5
The Committee on the Husain-McMahon correspondence
While these British assurances of independence to the Arabs were in unequivocal terms, the British position, since the end of the war, had been that Palestine had been excluded, an assertion contested by Palestinian and Arab leaders.
During the Husain-McMahon correspondence, the British made a determined effort to exclude certain areas from the territories to achieve independence, on the grounds that “the interests of our ally, France, are involved”. Sherif Husain reluctantly agreed to suspend, but not surrender, Arab claims for independence to that area, stating that “the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (from what we avert our eyes today) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts”.
The area in question had been described by McMahon as “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo”. This would appear to correspond to the coastal areas of present-day Syria and the northern part of Lebanon (map at annex II), where French interests converge. Prima facie it does not appear to cover Palestine, a known, identifiable land with an ancient history, sacred to the three great monotheistic religions, and which, under the Ottomans, approximated to the independent sanjak of Jerusalem and the sanjaks of Acre and Balqa (map at annex III).
In 1939, shortly after the Husain-McMahon papers were made public, a committee consisting of both British and Arab representatives was set up to consider this specific issue. Both sides reiterated their respective interpretations of the Husain-McMahon letters and were unable to reach an agreed view, but the British delegation conceded that the Arab
“… contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase ‘portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo’ have greater force than has appeared hitherto … they agree that Palestine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca in his letter of 14 July 1915, and that unless Palestine was excluded from that area later in the correspondence it must be regarded as having been included in the area which Great Britain was to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a proper construction of the correspondence Palestine was in fact excluded. But they agree that the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time”.6
Behind the diplomatic language there appears recognition that Palestine was not unequivocally excluded from the British pledges of independence. The report, referring to the Husain-McMahon papers as well as the British and Anglo-French declaration to the Arabs after the issue of the Balfour Declaration, concludes:
“In the opinion of the Committee it is, however, evident from these statements that His Majesty’s Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which – upon any interpretation of the correspondence – His Majesty’s Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the correspondence”. 7
On 17 April 1974, The Times of London published excerpts from a secret memorandum prepared by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office for the use of the British delegation to the Paris peace conference. The reference to Palestine is as follows:
“With regard to Palestine, His Majesty’s Government are committed by Sir Henry McMahon’s letter to the Sherif on October 24, 1915, to its inclusion in the boundaries of Arab independence … but they have stated their policy regarding the Palestine Holy Place and Zionist colonization in their message to him of January 4, 1918.”
An appendix to the memorandum notes:
“The whole of Palestine … lies within the limits which His Majesty’s Government have pledged themselves to Sherif Husain that they will recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs.”
Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, who dealt with the Palestine question as a member of the British Foreign Office at the time of the Peace Conference, wrote in 1968:
“… as I interpret the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, Palestine had not been excepted by the British Government from the area in which they had pledged themselves to King Hussein to recognize and support Arab independence. The Palestinian Arabs could therefore reasonably assume that Britain was pledged to prepare Palestine for becoming an independent Arab state.”8
These acknowledgements that the British Government had not possessed the right “to dispose of Palestine” appeared decades after the commitments to the Arabs not only had been infringed by the Sykes-Picot agreement but, in disregard of the inherent rights and the wishes of the Palestinian people, the British Government had given Zionist leaders separate assurances regarding the establishment of a “national home for the Jewish people in Palestine”, an undertaking that sowed the seeds of prolonged conflict in Palestine.
II. The Balfour Declaration
These undertakings to the Zionist Organization were made known in a declaration issued by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour, (whose name it has borne since):
“Foreign Office,
2 November 1917
“Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty’s Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:
‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour”.
The pivotal role of the Balfour Declaration in virtually every phase of the Palestinian issue cannot be exaggerated. The Declaration, which determined the direction of subsequent developments in Palestine, was incorporated in the Mandate. Its implementation brought Arab opposition and revolt. It caused unending difficulties for the Mandatory in the last stages pitting British, Jews and Arabs against each other. It ultimately led to partition and to the problem as it exists today. Any understanding of the Palestine issue, therefore, requires some examination of this Declaration which can be considered the root of the problem of Palestine.
The historical background of the “Jewish national home” concept
The Balfour Declaration was the direct outcome of a sustained effort by the Zionist Organization to establish a Jewish State in Palestine.
Moved by anti-Semitism and pogroms in Eastern Europe, Theodor Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, wrote in Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in 1896:
“The Idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish State.
…
Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation, the rest we shall manage for ourselves”.9
Herzl mentioned Palestine and Argentina but, the following year, the first Zionist Congress held in Basle declared that the goal of zionism was to “create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law”. Herzl wrote:
“Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word – which I shall guard against pronouncing publicly – it would be this: at Basle I founded the Jewish State … If I said this out loud today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in 5 years and certainly in 50 everyone will know it.”10
Following rejection by the Ottoman authorities of his ideas, Herzl approached the British, German, Belgian and Italian Governments and such far-flung locations as Cyprus, East Africa and the Congo were considered, but did not materialize. The creation of a Jewish State in Palestine became the avowed aim of zionism, zealously pressed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann when he came to head the movement.
Since Palestine was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, the Zionist Organization was cautious in declaring its aims, particularly after the young Turk revolution. The term “State” was avoided, “homeland” being used instead.
According to a Herzl associate, Max Nordau:
“I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish State in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express all we meant, but would say it in a way so as to avoid provoking the Turkish rulers of the coveted land. I suggested “Heimstätte” as a synonym for “State” … This is the history of the much commented expression. It was equivocal, but we all understood what it meant. To us it signified “Judenstaat” then and it signifies the same now”.11
In Herzl’s words:
“No need to worry [about the phraseology]. The people will read it as ‘Jewish State’ anyhow”.12
Leonard Stein, authoritative historian of zionism, writes:
“If their distrust of zionism was to be dispelled, there must be no more talk of a Charter or, even worse, of an international guarantee; still less must there be any room for the suspicion that the real purpose of the Zionist movement was to detach Palestine from Turkey and turn it into a Jewish State. However reluctant they might be to acknowledge that Herzl’s ideas were outmoded, even the ‘political’ Zionists were forced to recognize that, without abandoning the essence of aspirations the movement must change its tactics”13
The words of another eminent Zionist historian, who participated in the drafting of the Declaration, conform to this tactic:
“It has been said and is still being obstinately repeated by anti-Zionists again and again, that zionism aims at the creation of an independent ‘Jewish State’. But this is wholly fallacious. The ‘Jewish State’ was never part of the Zionist programme”14
But the direction was clear – the goal of zionism from the start was the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The rights of the people of Palestine themselves received no attention in these plans.
What the political concept of a Jewish State in Palestine needed to give it reality was to transfer people to Palestine. The religious and spiritual solidarity of the Jews in the Diaspora with the Holy Land had survived over the centuries. Despite the anti-Semitism in Europe, only small groups had emigrated to Palestine to settle in Palestine for purely religious sentiments. They numbered perhaps 50,000 at the end of the nineteenth century, and personified, or symbolized, the Jewish link to Palestine which was, in essence, spiritual.
The Zionists drew on this ancient spiritual potential to build a political movement. A stirring slogan was spread abroad:
“A land without people for a people without land”
ignoring the fact that the Palestinians themselves, well over half a million at the turn of the century, lived in Palestine, that it was their home. The great Zionist humanist, Ahad Ha’am warned against the violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, and his words are well known in the literature of Palestine.
“… Ahad Ha’am warned that the settlers must under no circumstances arouse the wrath of the natives … ‘Yet what do our brethren do in Palestine? Just the very opposite! Serfs they were in the lands of the Diaspora and suddenly they find themselves in unrestricted freedom and this change has awakened in them an inclination to despotism. They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without cause and even boast of these deeds; and nobody among us opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination …’
“… The same lack of understanding he found in the boycott of Arab labour proclaimed by Jewish labour … ‘Apart from the political danger, I can’t put up with the idea that our brethren are morally capable of behaving in such a way to humans of another people, and unwittingly the thought comes to my mind: if it is so now, what will be our relation to the others if in truth we shall achieve at the end of times power in Eretz Yisrael? And if this be the “Messiah”: I do not wish to see his coming.’
“Ahad Ha’am returned to the Arab problem … in February 1914 … ‘[the Zionists] wax angry towards those who remind them that there is still another people in Eretz Yisrael that has been living there and does not intend at all to leave its place. In a future when this illusion will have been torn from their hearts and they will look with open eyes upon the reality as it is, they will certainly understand how important this question is and how great our duty to work for its solution’.”15
But Ahad Ha’am’s plea went unheeded as political zionism set about to realize its goal of a Jewish State.
Zionist efforts directed at the British Government
Dr. Weizmann’s approaches to various Governments led him to conclude that zionism’s strongest hopes for a Jewish State in Palestine, tentatively destined for internationalization under the Sykes-Picot agreement, lay with Great Britain. Links with British leaders were established, notably with Lloyd George, a future Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, a future Foreign Secretary, Herbert Samuel, a future High Commissioner of Palestine, and Mark Sykes. In 1915, Samuel in a memorandum entitled The Future of Palestine, proposed:
“… the British annexation of Palestine [where] we might plant 3 or 4 million European Jews”. 16
Weizmann describes the links built up with British leaders, commenting in particular that:
“One of our greatest finds was Sir Mark Sykes, Chief Secretary of the War Cabinet … I cannot say enough regarding the services rendered us by Sykes. It was he who guided our work into more official channels. He belonged to the secretariat of the War Cabinet, which contained, among others, Leopold Amery, Ormsby-Gore and Ronald Storrs. If it had not been for the counsel of men like Sykes we, with our inexperience in delicate diplomatic negotiations, would undoubtedly have committed many dangerous blunders. The need for such counsel will become evident [in] the complications which already, at that time, surrounded the status of the Near East.” 17
Zionist leaders stressed the strategic advantages to Britain of a Jewish State in Palestine. In a letter written in 1914 to a sympathizer, Weizmann said:
“… should Palestine fall within the British sphere of influence, and should Britain encourage a Jewish settlement there, as a British dependency, we could have in 20 to 30 years a million Jews out there – perhaps more; they would … form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal.” 18
Another Weizmann letter of 1916 reads:
“… The British Cabinet is not only sympathetic toward the Palestinian aspirations of the Jews, but would like to see these aspirations realized …
“England … would have in the Jews the best possible friends, who would be the best national interpreters of ideas in the eastern countries and would serve as a bridge between the two civilizations. That again is not a material argument, but certainly it ought to carry great weight with any politician who likes to look 50 years ahead.”19
Sykes was especially valuable in helping Weizmann and his colleagues, particularly Nahum Sokolow, in trying to persuade France to renounce its residual claims in the internationalized Jerusalem agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot accord. Original French ambitions had embraced all of Syria, including Palestine, to whose internationalization it had agreed only on strong British insistence. Sykes advised that “the Zionists should approach M. Picot and convince the French” 20 to relinquish their claims and accompanied Sokolow to Paris, reporting progress of the mission to the Foreign Office. Sokolow told Picot that “the Jews had long had in mind the sovereignty of the British Government” 21/ but Picot demurred, pointing to the interests of other Governments.
Stein recounts how the French objections were countered:
“The plan of campaign now began to take shape. Weizmann was to join Sykes in Egypt and go on with him to Palestine when the time was ripe. Sokolow was to see what he could do to create a more favourable atmosphere in Paris, where the Government had been disinclined to take the Zionists seriously and the leading Jews for the most part openly hostile. Sokolow’s mission was in the end to take him to Rome as well as Paris, but this was not originally planned or foreseen. An organized effort was to be made to secure the support of the American and Russian Zionists, and, if possible, of their Governments, for what was now to be put forward openly as the Zionist programme – the building up of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine under the aegis of Great Britain. Sykes, for his part, was getting ready to break it to Picot that Great Britain meant to insist on some form of British suzerainty in Palestine and that the French would have to reconcile themselves to the relinquishment of their claims”. 22
Eventually the French were persuaded to accept “the development of Jewish colonization in Palestine”23 and let Palestine pass into the British sphere of control.
The drafting of the Declaration
Weizmann writes:
“The time had come, therefore, to take action, to press for a declaration of policy in regard to Palestine on the part of the British Government; and toward the end of January 1917, I submitted to Sir Mark Sykes the memorandum prepared by our committee, and had several preliminary conferences with him …
“The document was called: ‘Outline of Programme for the Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist movement’. Its first point had to do with national recognition:
“The Jewish population of Palestine (which in the programme shall be taken to mean both present and future Jewish population), shall be officially recognized by the Suzerain Government as the Jewish Nation, and shall enjoy in that country full civic, national and political rights. The Suzerain Government recognizes the desirability and necessity of a Jewish resettlement of Palestine.” 24
Stein describes the initiation of the consultations between the British Government and the Zionist Organization:
“On 2 February 1917 a meeting of representative Zionists in London was attended by Sir Mark Sykes … ostensibly present in his private capacity, but he occupied an influential position at the Foreign Office, and was playing an important part in shaping British policy in the Middle East. The conference of February 2nd was, in fact, the starting point of a prolonged exchange of views between the Zionist Organization and the British Government … In July 1917, a formula for a proposed declaration was submitted to the Government by the Zionist representatives. This formula recognized Palestine as ‘the national home of the Jewish people’ and provided for the establishment of a ‘Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of the country’. The Government replied with an alternative draft which formed the basis of … the Balfour Declaration.” 25
Actually there were six drafts exchanged and discussed between the British Government and the Zionist movement, United States assent also being obtained before the British Foreign Secretary issued the final text of the Declaration in November 1917. The process has been described by more than one authority. 26 There was no thought of consulting the Palestinians.
The final version of the Declaration received the most careful examination. The Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, is quoted as saying that the Declaration “… was prepared after much consideration, not merely of its policy but of its actual wording”. 27 Jeffries says:
“… The first thing of all to be said of the Balfour Declaration is that it was a pronouncement which was weighed to the last pennyweight before it was issued. There was but sixty-seven words in it, and each of these … was considered at length before it was passed into the text”. 27
This meticulous drafting process assumes significance precisely because the result of this lengthy and careful drafting was a statement remarkable for the ambiguities it carried. To quote Stein:
“What were the Zionists being promised? The language of the Declaration was studiously vague, and neither on the British nor on the Zionist side was there any disposition, at that time, to probe deeply into its meaning – still less was there any agreed interpretation.” 28
Although the Declaration had fallen short of Zionist hopes, it was considered politic not to press further. Dr. Weizmann writes:
“It is one of the ‘ifs’ of history whether we should have been intransigent, and stood by our guns. Should we then have obtained a better statement or would the Government have wearied of these internal Jewish divisions and dropped the whole matter? Our judgement was to accept”. 29
The “safeguards” in the Declaration
Yet the British Government had exercised caution where the original Zionist draft, sent to Balfour by Lord Rothschild, had proposed that “His Majesty’s Government accept(s) the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people”, 30/ the official statement stated that the Government view(s) with favour the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people”. There is a significant difference – it would be a home, not the home, and would be established not reconstituted, the latter term implying a legal right.
The original Zionist draft had proposed that “His Majesty’s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievements of this object, and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization”. 30/ The official version stated that the Government “will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object”. The formal recognition of the Zionist Organization as an authority, implicit in the Zionist draft, had been dropped. Weizmann was sensitive to these significant changes:
“A comparison of the two texts – the one approved by the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, and the one adopted on 4 October, after Montagu’s attack – shows a painful recession from what the Government itself was prepared to offer. The first declares that “Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people”. The second speaks of “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race”. The first adds only that the “Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods with the Zionist Organization”; the second introduced the subject of the “civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities” in such a fashion as to impute possible oppressive intentions to the Jews, and can be interpreted to mean such limitations on our work as completely to cripple it”. 31
One of Weizmann’s concerns was over a “safeguard” clause concerning the interests of the Palestinian people. Its wording is remarkable, particularly when the careful drafting of the Declaration’s language is recalled. This clause does not mention the Palestinian or Arab people, whether Christian or Muslim, who compromised over 90 per cent of the population of Palestine, and who owned about 97 per cent of its land. Instead, the Declaration refers to them as the “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, a formulation which has been likened to calling “the multitude the non-few” or the British people “the non-Continental communities in Great Britain”. 32
Further, at a time when the principle of self-determination was being accorded recognition it was being denied to the people of Palestine. The Declaration’s language seeks to prevent actions “which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”, but is singularly silent on their more fundamental political rights.
This is of particular interest because the concept of political rights is present in the very next phrase, providing “… that nothing shall be done which may prejudice … the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”. This second “safeguard” had not been proposed by the Zionist Organization, and is believed to have been the outcome of Sir Edwin Montagu’s apprehensions over the repercussions of the Declaration on Jews who chose to remain in their own countries.
The meaning of the Balfour Declaration
An eminent authority in international law, Professor W. T. Mallison, writes:
“There is no doubt concerning the centrality of the Balfour Declaration in the Zionist-Israel juridical claims. The issue of its accurate juridical interpretation is therefore, one of very substantial importance. In view of these considerations, it is necessary to use the most reliable evidence, the primary public law source materials, for interpretational purposes. Among these sources, the negotiating history of the Declaration including the various negotiating positions, as well as the final official text, are essential”. 33
He then summarizes the negotiating objectives of both the British Government and the Zionist Organization.
“The British Government had two principal political objectives during the period of the negotiations. The first was to win the war, and the second was to maximize the British power position through the ensuing peace settlement …
“The consistent Zionist objectives before and during the negotiations were to obtain public law authority for their territorial ambitions …
“The Zionists entered the negotiations with the expectations of obtaining their full territorial demands. These expectations, however, were necessarily limited by two objective factors. The first was that the number of Jews in Palestine during the World War was only a small fraction of the entire population of the country. The second was that the Zionists could not expect anything from the British Government which did not accord with its actual or supposed imperial interests”. 34
Another authority states that the fact that the Declaration was:
“A definite contract between the British Government and Jewry represented by the Zionists is beyond question. In spirit it is a pledge that in return for service to be rendered by Jewry, the British Government would ‘use their best endeavours’ to secure the execution of a certain definite policy in Palestine”. 35
The reactions to the Declaration
The Balfour Declaration became a highly controversial document. It disturbed those Jewish circles who were not in favour of the Zionist aim of the creation of a Jewish State (the “internal divisions” referred to by Weizmann). Many Jewish communities of non-Zionist convictions regarded themselves as nationals of their countries, and the concept of a “Jewish national home” created strong conflicts of loyalties, notwithstanding the clause in the Declaration assuring retention of their status in their respective countries.
Foremost among Jewish critics was Sir Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India and the only Jewish member of the British Cabinet. His dissent from the political nature of Zionist aims stemmed from conviction that Judaism was a universal faith, distinct from nationality, and that in the era of the modern nation-State the Jewish people did not constitute a nation. He questioned the credentials of the Zionist Organization to speak for all Jews. In secret memoranda (later made public) he wrote:
“Zionism has always seemed to me to be a mischievous political creed, untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom … I have always understood that those who indulged in this creed were largely animated by the restrictions upon and refusal of liberty to Jews in Russia. But at the very time when these Jews have been acknowledged as Jewish Russians and given all liberties, it seems to be inconceivable that zionism should be officially recognized by the British Government, and that Mr. Balfour should be authorized to say that Palestine was to be reconstituted as the ‘national home of the Jewish people’. I do not know what this involves, but I assume that it means that Mohammedans and Christians are to make way for the Jews, and that the Jews should be put in all positions of preference and should be peculiarly associated with Palestine in the same way that England is with the English or France with the French, that Turks and other Mohammedans in Palestine will be regarded as foreigners, just in the same way as Jews will hereafter be treated as foreigners in every country but Palestine … When the Jews are told that Palestine is their national home, every country will immediately desire to get rid of its Jewish citizens, and you will find a population in Palestine driving out its present inhabitants, taking all the best in the country …
“I deny that Palestine is today associated with the Jews or properly to be regarded as a fit place for them to live in. The Ten Commandments were delivered to the Jews on Sinai. It is quite true that Palestine plays a large part in Jewish history, but so it does in modern Mohammedan history, and, after the time of the Jews, surely it plays a larger part than any other country in Christian history …
“… When the Jew has a national home, surely it follows that the impetus to deprive us of the rights of British citizenship must be enormously increased. Palestine will become the world’s ghetto. Why should the Russian give the Jew equal rights? His national home is Palestine”. 36
This was very much a minority view in the British Government whose policy was summed up by Prime Minister Lloyd George:
“There can be no doubt as to what the [Imperial War] Cabinet then had in their minds. It was not their idea that a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that, when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth. The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered the head of anyone engaged in framing the policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing”. 37
The implication is clear – the achievement of a Jewish majority would assure the establishment of a Jewish State. The fundamental question of the rights of the Palestinians themselves did not enter into the picture.
The implications of the Declaration
Three features of the Balfour Declaration draw attention.
One is that evidently it was not in accordance with the spirit of the pledges of independence given to the Arabs both before and after it was issued. The second is that the disposition of Palestine was determined in close consultation with a political organization whose declared aim was to settle non-Palestinians in Palestine. Not only did this ignore the interests of the native Palestinians, but it was a deliberate violation of their rights (see sect. IV below). The third is that through the Declaration the British Government made commitments to the Zionist Organization regarding the land of the Palestinians at a moment when it was still formally part of the Ottoman Empire.
One authority writes:
“The most significant and incontrovertible fact is, however, that by itself the Declaration was legally impotent. For Great Britain had no sovereign rights over Palestine, it had no proprietary interest, it had no authority to dispose of the land. The Declaration was merely a statement of British intentions and no more”. 38
Other authorities in international law have also held the Declaration to be legally invalid 39 but this was not an issue in 1917, when the Balfour Declaration became official British policy for the future of Palestine. The ambiguities and contradictions within the Declaration contributed heavily towards the conflict of goals and expectations that arose between the Palestinian Arabs and the non-Palestinian Jews. The Zionist Organization was to use the assurances for “a national home for the Jewish people” to press its plans for the colonization of Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and its implementation through the League of Nations Mandates System. The Palestinian people were to resist these efforts, since their fundamental political right to self-determination had been denied, and their land was to become the object of colonization from abroad during the period it was under a League of Nations Mandate.
III. The League of Nations Mandates
Arab nationalism and Great Power plans
Nationalist aspirations in the Arab world, including Palestine, were ascendant when the war ended. One of the foremost authorities on Middle Eastern affairs, Professor J. C. Hurewitz, writes:
“The demise of the Ottoman Empire, in fact, ‘resolved’ the Eastern question. Yet while Britain and France inherited the political controls they significantly did not annex Near and Middle East territory outright. Mandates and preferential alliances were no more than provisional arrangements, and the presence of the Western Powers in various guises stimulated the growth of local nationalism dedicated to the early realization of full sovereignty.” 40
A major question facing the victorious European Powers was the political status of territories and peoples formerly under Ottoman rule. Of President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” outlining the framework of the peace agreements to be negotiated, the one dealing with self-determination was directly applicable to Palestine:
“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development …”
The Allied Powers, however, decided at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to bring these territories under the mandates system introduced by the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed on 28 June 1919, as an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles which concluded peace with Germany.
The Covenant of the League of Nations
The League of Nations was a body sui generis, established by an unprecedented agreement by the victorious States of the post-war world to establish their concept of order in international relations. The place of the colonies ruled by the victorious States and the territories detached from the defeated States was a special problem in this order.
Colonialism then was still part of the international system, although President Wilson’s programme, a liberal landmark in the development of anti-colonialism, acknowledged that the concept of the right of self-determination applied equally to the non-Western part of humanity:
“A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.”
The League of Nations, designed to respond to the prevailing order, adopted the mandates concept, an innovation in the international system, as a way to accommodate the demands of the colonial age with the moral and political need to acknowledge the rights of the colonized.
Article 22 (full text at annex IV) of the Covenant established the Mandates System, founded on the concept of the development of such territories under the “tutelage … of advanced nations” formed “a sacred trust of civilization”. The degree of tutelage was to depend on the extent of political maturity of the territory concerned. The most developed would be classified as ‘A’ Mandates, the less developed as ‘B’, and the least developed as ‘C’.
The character of the Arab peoples, themselves inheritors of an ancient and advanced civilization, could not but be recognized, and the clauses directly applied to Arab lands as class ‘A’ Mandates read:
“Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”
Palestine was in no manner excluded from these provisions.
The allocation of Arab territories
Article 22 laid down no rules for the selection of the Mandatory Powers or for the distribution of mandates between them. Turkey and Germany were simply made to renounce their claims to sovereignty over the territories whose distribution was to be decided by the Allied Powers. Germany’s divestiture of titles was codified in the Treaty of Versailles (article 119). In the case of Turkey, such renunciation was provided for in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 (article 132) but, since that treaty never came into force, the renunciation of Turkish claims over non-Turkish territories was formalized in the Treaty of Lausanne. The treaties of Versailles and of Lausanne contained explicit provisions empowering the Allied Powers to apportion the “freed” territories as their mandates.
The former German territories were allotted by a decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers on 7 May 1919, shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The former Turkish territories, however, were divided at the Conference of San Remo on 25 April 1920, while a legal state of war with Turkey still existed, three years before the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The administration of Syria and Lebanon was awarded to France, and that of Palestine and Transjordan and of Mesopotamia (Iraq) to Great Britain.
The working of the Mandates System
All the mandates over Arab countries, including Palestine, were treated as class ‘A’ Mandates, applicable to territories whose independence had been provisionally recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The various mandate instruments were drafted by the Mandatory Powers concerned but subject to the approval of the League of Nations.
The mandate for Iraq, while in the process of being drafted, was amended to provide for the signature of a treaty between Britain and Iraq, which was concluded in 1922. This was supplemented by further agreements, all approved by the League as meeting with the requirements of article 22 of the Covenant. Iraq obtained formal independence on 3 October 1932.
The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon did not provide for any special treatment as in the case of Iraq. Both territories were governed under the full control of France until the Mandate was terminated. Lebanon achieved full independence on 22 November 1943 and Syria on 1 January 1944.
Palestine and Transjordan (as it was then called) were included in the same Mandate but treated as distinct territories. Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate empowered Great Britain to withhold, with the League’s approval, the implementation of any provision of the Mandate in Transjordan. On the request of the British Government the Council of the League, on 16 September 1922, passed a resolution effectively approving a separate administration for Transjordan. This separate administration continued until the territory attained independence as the Kingdom of Jordan on 22 March 1946.
Only in the case of Palestine did the Mandate, with its inherent contradictions, lead not to the independence provisionally recognized in the Covenant, but towards conflict that was to continue six decades later.
IV. Palestine Mandated
The contradictions inherent in the Mandate for Palestine arose from the incorporation in it of the Balfour Declaration. The importance of gaining international support for a Jewish State was recognized from the outset for several reasons:
(a) To consolidate divergent Jewish opinion behind Zionist policies;
(b) To draw the support of European Powers to harmonize with British policy;
(c) To obtain some form of international approval for the enterprise.
Weizmann is quoting as stating that the effort of zionism must be “… to make the Jewish question an international one. It means going to the nations and saying, ‘we need your help to achieve our aim’”.41
The Zionist Commission
The first move was the dispatch to Palestine in April 1918 of a Zionist Commission consisting of Dr. Weizmann and Zionist representatives from France and Italy, accompanied by British officials. The telegram to the British High Commission in Egypt outlined its task:
“… object of Commission is to carry out … any steps required to give effect to government declaration in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people …
“Among the most important functions of the Commission will be the establishment of good relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and to establish the Commission as the link between the military authorities and the Jewish population and Jewish interests in Palestine.
“It is most important that everything should be done to obtain authority from the Commission in the eyes of the Jewish world, and at the same time allay Arab suspicions regarding the true aims of zionism. …” 42
Although formally still part of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine was under British military occupation since December 1917. Palestinian apprehension over the intents of the Balfour Declaration had been reported to London by the military authorities, and when the Zionist Commission arrived in Jerusalem, Weizmann wrote the Foreign Office:
“We were prepared to find a certain amount of hostility on the part of the Arabs and Syrians, based largely on misconception of our real aims, and we have always realized that one of our principal duties would be to dispel misconceptions and to endeavour to arrive at an amicable understanding with the non-Jewish elements of the population on the basis of the declared policy of His Majesty’s Government. But we find among the Arabs and Syrians, or certain sections of them, a state of mind which seems to us to make useful negotiations impossible at the present moment, and so far as we are aware – though here our information may be incomplete – no official steps have been taken to bring home to the Arabs and Syrians the fact that His Majesty’s Government has expressed a definite policy with regard to the future of the Jews in Palestine”. 43
The Military Governor, Colonel (later Sir) Ronald Storrs, commented:
“I cannot agree that, as Dr. Weizmann would seem to suggest, it is the business of the military authorities to ‘bring home to the Arabs and Syrians the fact that His Majesty’s Government has expressed a definite policy with regard to the future of the Jews in Palestine’. This has already been done by Mr. Balfour in London, and by the press throughout the world. What is wanted is that the Zionists themselves should bring home to the Arabs and Syrians an exposition at once as accurate and conciliatory as possible of their real aims and policy in the country;…
“Speaking myself as a convinced Zionist, I cannot help thinking that the Commission are lacking in a sense of the dramatic actuality. Palestine, up to now a Moslem country, has fallen into the hands of a Christian Power which on the eve of its conquest announced that a considerable portion of its land is to be handed over for colonization purposes to a nowhere very popular people. The dispatch of a Commission of these people is subsequently announced … From the announcement in the British press until this moment there has been no sign of a hostile demonstration public or private against a project which if we may imagine England for Palestine can hardly open for the inhabitants the beatific vision of a new heaven and a new earth. The Commission was warned in Cairo of the numerous and grave misconceptions with which their enterprise was regarded and strongly advised to make a public pronouncement to put an end to those misconceptions. No such pronouncement has yet been made; …” 43
The Commission completed its stay in Palestine, and the Zionist Organization prepared itself for the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Proposals were submitted to the Foreign Office for consideration at the Conference. Lord Curzon (then Foreign Secretary and formerly Viceroy of India and Lord President of the Council) commented to Balfour on these proposals:
“… As for Weizmann and Palestine, I entertain no doubt that he is out for a Jewish Government, if not at the moment then in the near future …
“What all this can mean except Government I do not see. Indeed a Commonwealth as defined in my dictionary is a ‘body politic’ a ‘State’ an ‘independent community’ a ‘republic’.
“I feel tolerably sure therefor that while Weizmann may say one thing to you, or while you may mean one thing by a national home, he is out for something quite different. He contemplates a Jewish State, a Jewish nation, a subordinate population of Arabs, etc. ruled by Jews; the Jews in possession of the fat of the land, and directing the Administration.
“He is trying to effect this behind the screen and under the shelter of British trusteeship.
“I do not envy those who wield the latter, when they realize the pressure to which they are certain to be exposed. …” 44
The Paris Peace Conference
The delegation of the Hijaz (now Saudi Arabia), led by Sherif Husain’s son, Emir Feisal, was the only Arab delegation at the Conference, and presented the Arab case for independence, although their credentials were not recognized by all Arab leaders. Feisal relied heavily for guidance on the British Government, which had sponsored his participation in the Conference. His position is described by George Antonius:
“… the pressure to which he was being subjected in London was telling on him. He felt keenly the insufficiency of his equipment, his ignorance of English, his unfamiliarity with the methods of European diplomacy … It added to his sense of weakness and isolation that he knew the French to be hostile to his person and to his mission: apart from the scant courtesy with which he had been treated on his passage through France, he had had a multitude of signs to show him that his own distrust of the French was unfeignedly reciprocated. He allowed himself to be persuaded that his chances of neutralizing the hostility of the French would be greater if he could see his way to meeting Great Britain’s wishes to the fullest possible extent.” 45
Feisal apparently did not fully appreciate the implications of Zionist aims. He could play no significant role in the Conference and, influenced by British officials, he presented a brief memorandum dated 1 January 1919 to the Paris Peace Conference, outlining the case for the independence of Arab countries. The paragraph relating to Palestine reads, in stilted and peculiar language:
“In Palestine, the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.” 46
It is evident that although prompted to say that “there is no conflict of character between the two races … In principles we are absolutely at one”, Feisal in no manner consented to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, but only implied acceptance of a mandate.
The ambiguity in the wording of Feisal’s proposals might have stemmed not only from his unfamiliarity with international diplomacy, but also from the need to retain flexibility for the political ambitions of Sherif Husain and his sons to extend their suzerainty over as wide an area as possible. Thus Feisal’s claim to being an interlocuteur valable has been questioned by Palestinian leaders. The significant point is the absence of representation of the Palestinian principals in decision on their fate, a characteristic also of subsequent rulings on Palestine.
Both Weizmann and Sokolow spoke before the Conference, where the Zionist Organization presented a detailed memorandum (drafted by a Committee including Samuel and Sykes), whose introductory portions, suggesting the alienation of Palestinian sovereignty, read:
“The Zionist Organization respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference:
The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their national home …
The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League …
The Mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:
(1) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish national home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth …” 47
However, during meetings on the mandates question of the Allied Supreme Council, President Wilson declared that “one of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed” and proposed the dispatch of an inter-allied commission “… to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory”. This proposal materialized in the “King-Crane” Commission, and it was agreed that its jurisdiction would include Palestine.48
The King-Crane Commission
For their own reasons both Britain and France did not nominate members to the Commission. According to Anthony Nutting, “Britain and France backed out rather than find themselves confronted by recommendations from their own appointed delegates which might conflict with their policies”. 49 President Wilson appointed two Americans, Henry King and Charles Crane.
Soon after the Commission arrived in Damascus, Arab nationalists, meeting as the “General Syrian Congress”, including representatives from Lebanon and Palestine, adopted a resolution to be presented to the Commission. The resolution asked for full independence for Syria (including Lebanon and Palestine), rejecting any form of foreign influence or control. The resolution included the first formal declaration of Arab opposition to the plans being made for Palestine:
“We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish Commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country, for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.”50
The Commission’s report recommended that, in view of the opposition to French influence, consideration be given to an American mandate over Syria. The portions dealing with Palestine recommended:
“… serious modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State …”
Referring to President Wilson’s preparation of the principle of self-determination, the Commission stated:
“If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine’s population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine – nearly nine-tenths of the whole – are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the peoples’ rights though it kept within the forms of law;…
“The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British Officer consulted by the Commissioners believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the programme. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a “right” to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.”51
Allied policy on Palestine
The Commission’s recommendations received little attention and in any case were to become moot with the United States’ decision to stay out of the League. Meanwhile, the actual policy for Palestine was being given final shape. Balfour told Justice Brandeis, leader of the Zionist movement in the United States:
“The situation is further complicated by an agreement made early in November (1918) by the British and French, and brought to the President’s attention, telling the people of the East that their wishes would be consulted in the disposition of their future;… Palestine should be excluded from the terms of reference because the Powers had committed themselves to the Zionist programme which inevitably excluded numerical self-determination. Palestine presented a unique situation. We are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to reconstitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future …” 52
In a memorandum to Lord Curzon on 11 August 1919, Balfour candidly wrote:
“The contradiction between the letters of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the ‘independent nation’ of Palestine than in that of the ‘independent nation’ of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are.
“The four Great Powers are committed to zionism. And zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
“In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonized with the (Anglo-French) declaration of November 1918, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.
“I do not think that zionism will hurt the Arabs, but they will never say they want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine, it is not now an ‘independent nation’, nor is it yet on the way to become one. Whatever deference should be paid to the view of those living there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them. In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate;…” 53
The final disposition of Palestine was decided by the Allied Supreme Council at the San Remo Conference on 25 April 1920. The process has been described as follows:
“The allocation of the Mandate was for several reasons a slow process. In the first place, it hung upon the Anglo-French agreement as to the validity of the Sykes-Picot arrangements for the whole of the ex-Turkish territories, and this was held up by discord over Syria and Mosul, involving discussions très vives de ton between Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. As a result of the compromise, Palestine, which had under the Sykes-Picot plan been destined for international administration, in the end passed by mutual consent into British tutelage.” 54
The decision was taken without any heed to the requirement of article 22 of the Covenant that “the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a Mandatory”.
The decision of the Allied Powers to support Zionist aims drew protest from Palestinians. Citizens of Nazareth reminded the British Administrator in Jerusalem:
“In view of the declaration of the decision of the Peace Conference regarding the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, we hereby beg to declare that we are the owners of this country and the land is our national home …” 55
The drafting of the Palestine Mandate
Undeterred, the Zionist Organization pressed to obtain international support for its aims by securing approval from the League of Nations. Weizmann writes that his advisers:
“… fought the battle of the Mandate for many months. Draft after draft was proposed, discussed and rejected, and I sometimes wondered if we should ever reach a final text. The most serious difficulty arose in connection with a paragraph in the Preamble – the phrase which now reads: ‘Recognizing the historic rights of the Jews to Palestine’. But Curzon would have none of it, remarking dryly: ‘If you word it like that, I can see Weizmann coming to me every other day and saying he has a right to do this, that, or the other in Palestine! I won’t have it!’ As a compromise, Balfour suggested ‘historial connection’, and ‘historical connection’ it was.” 56/
The wording of the Mandate was the object of strong opinions within the British Government, with Curzon strongly resisting formulations that would imply recognition of any legal rights for the Zionist movement in Palestine. Excerpts from official memoranda are informative:
On a draft to the effect that the British Government would be:
“responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home and the development of a self-governing Commonwealth …”
Curzon commented:
“… development of a self-governing Commonwealth’. Surely most dangerous. It is an euphemism for a Jewish State, the very thing they accepted and that we disallow;…
“The Zionists are after a Jewish State with the Arabs as hewers of wood and drawers of water.
“So are many British sympathisers with the Zionists.
“Whether you use the word Commonwealth or State that is what it will be taken to mean.
“That is not my view. I want the Arabs to have a chance and I don’t want a Hebrew State.
“I have no idea how far the case has been given away to the Zionists. If not I would prefer ‘self-governing institutions’. I have never been consulted as to this Mandate at an earlier stage, nor do I know from what negotiations it springs or on what undertakings it is based … I think the entire concept wrong.
“Here is a country with 580,000 Arabs and 30,000 or is it 60,000 Jews (by no means all Zionists). Acting upon the noble principles of self-determination and ending with a splendid appeal to the League of Nations, we then proceed to draw up a document which … is an avowed constitution for a Jewish State. Even the poor Arabs are only allowed to look through the keyhole as a non-Jewish community.” 57/
The Zionist Organization was being consulted in the drafting of the Mandate although Curzon disapproved:
“I told Dr. Weizmann that I could not admit the phrase (historical connection) in the preamble … It is certain to be made the basis of all sorts of claims in the future. I do not myself recognize that the connection of the Jews with Palestine, which terminated 1,200 years ago, gives them any claim whatsoever … I would omit the phrase. I greatly dislike giving the draft to the Zionists, but in view of the indiscretions already committed, I suppose that this is inevitable …” 58/
Balfour, by then Lord President of the Council, continued to help Weizmann. In a memorandum on the Mandate for the British Cabinet, Curzon wrote:
“… this Mandate … has passed through several revisions. When it was first shown to the French Government it at once excited their vehement criticism on the ground of its almost exclusively Zionist complexion and of the manner in which the interests and rights of the Arab majority … were ignored. The Italian Government expressed similar apprehensions … The Mandate, therefore, was largely rewritten, and finally received their assent;…
“In the course of these discussions strong objection was taken to a statement which had been inserted in the Preamble of the first draft to the following effect:
‘Recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to reconstitute Palestine as their national home.’
“It was pointed out (1) that, while the Powers had unquestionably recognized the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine by their formal acceptance of the Balfour Declaration and their textual incorporation of it in the Turkish Peace Treaty drafted at San Remo, this was far from constituting anything in the nature of a legal claim, and that the use of such words might be, and was, indeed, certain to be used as the basis of all sorts of political claims by the Zionists for the control of Palestinian administration in the future, and (2) that, while Mr. Balfour’s Declaration had provided for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, this was not the same thing as the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish national home – an extension of the phrase for which there was no justification, and which was certain to be employed in the future as the basis for claims of the character to which I have referred.
“On the other hand, the Zionists pleaded for the insertion of some such phrase in the preamble, on the ground that it would make all the difference to the money that they aspired to raise in foreign countries for the development of Palestine.
“Mr. Balfour, who interested himself keenly in their case, admitted, however, the force of the above contentions and, on the eve of leaving for Geneva, suggested an alternative form of words which I am prepared to recommend.” 59
When the question of the British Mandate over Palestine was discussed in Parliament, it became clear that opinion in the House of Lords was strongly opposed to the Balfour policy, as illustrated by the words of Lord Sydenham in reply to Lord Balfour:
“… the harm done by dumping down an alien population upon an Arab country – Arab all around in the hinterland – may never be remedied … what we have done is, by concessions, not to the Jewish people but to a Zionist extreme section, to start a running sore in the East, and no one can tell how far that sore will extend.” 60
The House of Lords voted to repeal the Balfour Declaration, but a similar motion was defeated in the House of Commons and the British Government formally accepted the Mandate.
The Zionist Organization however, succeeded in having its formulation concerning “historical connection” and “reconstitution” of the “national home” included in the final text of the Mandate (annex V) which was approved by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, and came into formal effect in September 1923 when the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey came into force. It thus gave international sanction – which then meant the sanction of the victorious Allied Powers – to the Balfour Declaration, and determined the direction of developments in Palestine. The important clauses of the Mandate read:
“Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 2 November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and
“Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country;
“Article 1: The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate.
“Article 2: The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
“Article 4: An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.
“The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
“Article 6: The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.”
The Mandate provided for no body to serve the interests of the Palestinian people, similar to the Jewish Agency given official status. Nor were the Palestinians ever consulted in the choice of the mandatory, as required by article 22 of the Covenant. The only move towards consultation had been the American King-Crane Commission, whose views were ignored. The United States, however, had become associated with the Balfour Declaration’s policy through a joint Congressional resolution incorporating the Declaration’s language. 61 Three years later the Anglo-American Convention of 1925 formalized United States’ consent to the implementation of a Mandate 61/ embedded with conflicting obligations, and in which the inherent political rights of the Palestinian people had been overridden.
The borders of Palestine
Zionist ambitions for the national home had sought considerably more territory, extending into Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt, than was actually assigned to the Mandatory Power. The Zionist Organization’s initial proposal asked that the Jewish national home be established within the following borders:
“… In the north, the northern and southern banks of the Litany River, as far north as latitude 33° 45′. Thence in a south-easterly direction to a point just south of the Damascus territory and close and west of the Hedjaz Railway.
“In the east, a line close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway.
“In the south, a line from a point in the neighbourhood of Akaba to El Arish.
“In the west, the Mediterranean Sea.
“The details of the delimitation should be decided by a Boundary Commission, one of the members of which should be a representative of the Jewish Council for Palestine hereinafter mentioned.
“There should be a right of free access to and from the Red Sea, through Akaba, by arrangement with the Arab Government …”
The map covered by these proposed frontiers is shown in the map at annex VI.
These Zionist claims were not admitted, and the borders of Palestine enclosed a far more restricted area (also shown in the map) within which Great Britain exercised its mandate.
The question of the validity of the Mandate
It is clear that by failing to consult the Palestinian people in the decision on the future of their country, the victorious Powers ignored not only the principle of self-determination that they themselves had endorsed, but also the provisions of Article 22 of the League’s Covenant.
Even during the mandate, the Palestinians protested against this denial of their fundamental rights. The report of the Royal Commission (of 1937) records these protests:
“… though the Mandate was ostensibly based on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, its positive injunctions were not directed to the ‘well-being and development’ of the existing Arab population but to the promotion of Jewish interests. Complete power over the legislation as well as administration was delegated to the Mandatory, who undertook to place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home …
“… One member of the Arab Higher Committee dealt more closely with the legal argument. He remarked that the terms of the Mandate are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Paragraph 4 of that Article recognizes the existence of two juristic persons – one the community which should govern independently and the other the foreigner who is to assist and advise until the former is able to stand alone. But in Palestine there is one person who governs and who assists himself. Your Majesty is the Mandatory and Your Majesty’s Government and their nominees are the Government of Palestine and, while the Preamble speaks of a Mandate, article 1 denies the existence of a Mandate in the proper sense by conferring upon what is called ‘the Mandatory’ full powers of legislation and administration. The community which is to be provisionally recognized as independent has no existence …” 62
From among the several authorities of international law who have questioned the validity of the Mandate, the views of Professor Henry Cattan may be quoted:
“The Palestine Mandate was invalid on three grounds set out hereinafter.
“1. The first ground of invalidity of the Mandate is that by endorsing the Balfour Declaration and accepting the concept of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine it violated the sovereignty of the people of Palestine and their natural rights of independence and self-determination. Palestine was the national home of the Palestinians from time immemorial. The establishment of a national home for an alien people in that country was a violation of the legitimate and fundamental rights of the inhabitants. The League of Nations did not possess the power, any more than the British Government did, to dispose of Palestine, or to grant to the Jews any political or territorial rights in that country. In so far as the Mandate purported to recognize any rights for alien Jews in Palestine, it was null and void.
“2. The second ground of invalidity of the Mandate is that it violated, in spirit and in letter, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, under the authority of which it purported to be made. The Mandate violated Article 22 in three respects:
“(a) The Covenant had envisaged the Mandate as the best method of achieving its basic objective of ensuring the well-being and development of the peoples inhabiting the Mandated Territories.
“Was the Palestine Mandate conceived for the well-being and development of the inhabitants of Palestine? The answer is found in the provisions of the Mandate itself. The Mandate sought the establishment in Palestine of a national home for another people, contrary to the rights and wishes of the Palestinians … It required the Mandatory to place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of a Jewish national home. It required the Mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine. It provided that a foreign body known as the Zionist Organization should be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish national home. It is clear that, although the Mandates System was conceived in the interest of the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, the Palestine Mandate was conceived in the interest of an alien people originating from outside Palestine, and ran counter to the basic concept of mandates. As Lord Islington observed when he opposed the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the Palestine Mandate: “The Palestine Mandate is a real distortion of the mandatory system”. The same distinguished Lord added:
“When one sees in Article 22 … that the well-being and development of such peoples should form a sacred trust of civilization, and when one takes that as the note of the mandatory system, I think your Lordships will see that we are straying down a very far path when we are postponing self-government in Palestine until such time as the population is flooded with an alien race.”
“(b) The Palestine Mandate also ran counter to the specific concept of mandates envisaged by Article 22 for countries detached from Turkey at the end of the First World War. In the case of those countries, the intention was to limit the Mandate to the rendering of temporary advice and assistance. It is doubtful whether the people of Palestine, as also other Arab peoples detached from Turkey, were in need of administrative advice and assistance from a Mandatory. Their level of culture was not inferior to that existing at the time in many of the nations that were Members of the League of Nations. Such Arab communities had actively participated with the Turks in the government of their country. Their political maturity and administrative experience were comparable to the political maturity and administrative experience of the Turks, who were left to stand alone.
“Be that as it may, the framers of the Palestine Mandate did not restrict the Mandatory’s role to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance, but granted the Mandatory ‘full powers of legislation and administration’ (Article 1). Such ‘full powers of legislation and administration’ were not laid down in the interest of the inhabitants, but were intended to be used, and in fact were used, to establish by force the Jewish national home in Palestine. Clearly this was an abuse of the purpose of the Mandate under the Covenant and a perversion of its raison d’être.
“The whole concept of the Palestine Mandate stands in marked contrast to the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon which was given to France on 24 July 1922. This Mandate conformed to Article 22 of the Covenant …
“… The third ground of invalidity of the Mandate lies in the fact that its endorsement and implementation of the Balfour Declaration conflicted with the assurances and pledges given to the Arabs during the First World War by Great Britain and the Allied Powers. The denial to the Palestine Arabs of their independence and the subjection of their country to the immigration of a foreign people were a breach of those pledges.” 63
At the time that the Mandate was established, however, the people of Palestine were unable to question or to challenge it, and the process of establishing the “Jewish national home” commenced.
V. Mandated Palestine: The “Jewish National Home”
The course of the Mandate
While the Mandate in principle required the development of self-governing institutions, its preamble and operative articles left no doubt that the principal thrust would be the implementation of the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of the “Jewish national home”. British policy in Palestine during the period of the Mandate was directed to this end but, on facing strengthening Palestinian resistance, from time to time was adjusted to the force of circumstance. The basic policy was elaborated in 1922 (in the “Churchill Memorandum”) and a pattern developed, by which an outburst of violent Palestinian resistance would be followed by an official inquiry Commission which would recommend modifications, but pressure from the Zionist Organization would veer official policy back to its main direction. This was the prevalent pattern in the 1920s but, as the Palestinian resistance strengthened, British policy was obliged to take into consideration the fact that the Palestinian people would not acquiesce in the alienation of their rights. By the end of the 1930s, Palestine became the scene of full-scale violence as the Palestinians rebelled for independence, the Zionists retaliated to hold the ground they had gained, and the British Government strove to control a situation, created by the Mandate, which was fast sliding into war.
The start of the Mandate
The British Mandate acquired jurisdiction de jure over Palestine in September 1923 following conclusion with Turkey of the Treaty of Lausanne. Before this, the de facto administration was first in the form of a military government from December 1917 to June 1920, with a civilian High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, taking office on 1 July 1920. In March 1921, ministerial responsibility for Palestine (along with other Mandated Territories), was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office under Sir Winston Churchill.
The Balfour Declaration was first officially made public in Palestine only in 1920 after the installation of the civilian administration, having been kept officially confidential until then to minimize the chances of disorder caused by the protests that were anticipated from the Palestinians. Of course, the nature and object of the Declaration and the policy it sought to introduce had quickly become common knowledge. It had led quickly to violent conflict in Palestine. In London, a delegation from the Moslem-Christian Association of Palestine tried in 1921 and 1922 to present the Palestinian case to counter the sustained influence of the Zionist Organization on British authorities in both London and Jerusalem.
The “Churchill Memorandum”
The British Government moved to elaborate its policy in a statement (referred to as the “Churchill Memorandum”) of 1 July 1922:
This statement disclaimed any intent to create “a wholly Jewish Palestine” or to effect “the subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine”. But, at the same time, the statement, to assuage the Jewish community, made it clear that:
“… The Balfour Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change … in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection …
“For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals”. 64
The “Churchill Memorandum” thus reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, and the “historic connection” of the Jews with Palestine, asserting their presence was “as of right and not as sufferance”. Immigration was to be subject only to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. Despite the assurances to the Palestinians, there was no doubt left that the principal object of the Churchill policy was to establish the “Jewish national home”.
That indeed this was the intention was reiterated by Churchill several years afterwards, when he said that the intention of the 1922 White Paper was “to make it clear that the establishment of self-governing institutions in Palestine was to be subordinated to the paramount pledge and obligation of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine”. 65 Faced with this determined effort concerted between a Great Power and a Jewish organization that had demonstrated its strength and influence, the Palestinian people refused to acquiesce in the scheme. They refused to join in the Churchill plan of setting up a legislative council to further these schemes, and they protested against the policy that strengthened the drive towards a Jewish “national home” in Palestine despite the strong opposition of the Palestinians, who declared:
“… We wish to point out here that the Jewish population of Palestine who lived there before the War never had any trouble with their Arab neighbours. They enjoyed the same rights and privileges as their fellow Ottoman citizens, and never agitated for the Declaration of November 1917. It is the Zionists outside Palestine who worked for the Balfour Declaration …
“We therefore here once again repeat that nothing will safeguard Arab interests in Palestine but the immediate creation of a national government which shall be responsible to a Parliament of all whose members are elected by the people of the country – Moslems, Christians and Jews …
“… [Otherwise] we see division and tension between Arabs and Zionists increasing day by day and resulting in general retrogression. Because the immigrants dumped upon the country from different parts of the world are ignorant of the language, customs and character of the Arabs, and enter Palestine by the might of England against the will of the people who are convinced that these have come to strangle them. Nature does not allow the question of a spirit of co-operation between two peoples so different, and it is not to be expected that the Arabs would bow to such a great injustice, or that the Zionists would so easily succeed in realizing their dreams …” 66
The “Churchill policy” secured the road for the Zionist Organization towards its goal of a Jewish State in Palestine made possible by the Balfour Declaration.
Two of the principal means advocated by the Zionist Organization for achieving the national home were large-scale immigration and land purchase. A third was the denial of employment to Palestinian labour.
The King-Crane Commission had reported that Jewish colonists were planning a radical transformation of Palestine:
“The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission’s conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase”. 67/
Large scale immigration had started under the aegis of the Balfour Declaration soon after the war ended, and had already led to violent opposition by Palestinians in 1920 and 1921. With the endorsement of the Churchill policy, immigration accelerated, reaching a peak in 1924-1926, but soon sharply declined. At this point, Weizmann records:
“The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was built on air … every day and every hour of these last 10 years, when opening the newspapers, I thought: Whence will the next blow come? I trembled lest the British Government would call me and ask: ‘Tell us, what is this Zionist Organization? Where are they, your Zionists?’ … The Jews, they knew, were against us; we stood alone on a little island, a tiny group of Jews with a foreign past.”
The table below shows immigration figures during the 1920s.
Immigration into Palestine, 1920-1929 68
Recorded immigration
Year Jews non-Jews
1920 (September-October) 5 514 202
1921 9 149 190
1922 7 844 284
1923 7 421 570
1924 12 856 697
1925 33 801 840
1926 13 081 829
1927 2 713 882
1928 2 178 908
1929 5 249 1 31
Thus during the decade about 100,000 Jewish immigrants entered Palestine, far short of the numbers envisaged by the Zionist Organization, but substantial enough to make a marked impact in a country where the total population in 1922 was officially estimated at about 750,000. 69 In absolute terms the Jewish population more than doubled, and in percentage terms rose from below 10 per cent to over 17 per cent during this period.
Immigration was virtually under the control of Zionist organizations, as described in the report of an official Commission:
“… We were informed by the Chief Immigration Officer that in the allocation to individuals of the certificates which are supplied in blank to the General Federation of Jewish Labour, it is the practice of that body to have regard to the political creed of the several possible immigrants rather than to their particular qualifications for admission to Palestine. It is clearly the duty of the responsible Jewish authorities to select for admission to Palestine those of the prospective immigrants who are best qualified on personal grounds to assist in the establishment of a Jewish national home in that country: that political creed should be a deciding factor in the choice between applicants is open to the strongest exception”. 70
Similarly, a number of Jewish organizations such as the Colonisation Department of the Zionist Organization, financed by the Keren ha-Yesod, were actively engaged in acquisition of land both for individual immigrant families as well as for the Yishuv or Jewish settlements. Several of these organizations had been operating since the nineteenth century, notably the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association (PICA)*. With the British occupation of Palestine in 1918 all land transactions were suspended. The registers were reopened in 1920, at which time it was estimated that Jewish land acquisitions stood at about 650,000 dunums** or 2.5 per cent of the total land area of 26 million dunums). 71 By the end of the decade this figure had nearly doubled to 1,200,000 dunums, just below 5 per cent. 72
* PICA was the Palestinian section of ICA (Jewish Colonisation Association) led by Baron Maurice de Hirsch. The aim of ICA was to support Jewish emigration from Europe and Asia to other parts of the world; to create agricultural settlements in North and South America; and to obtain authorization and autonomy for these settlements.
** 1 dunum = approx. 1,000 sq. metres or 1/4 acre (1 sq. mile = approx. 2,560 dunums).
A strict policy of what in today’s terms would be described as racial discrimination was maintained by the Zionist Organization in this rapid advance towards the “national home”. Only Jewish labour could service Jewish farms and settlements. The eventual outcome of this trend was a major outbreak of violence with unprecedented loss of life in 1929, which was investigated by the Shaw Commission. Another commission headed by Sir John Hope Simpson followed to investigate questions of immigration and land transfers. Certain observations of the Hope Simpson Commission are of interest, particularly on labour and employment policies.
The Commission went into great detail in its report, dividing Palestine into areas according to cultivability, and estimating total cultivable land at about 6.5 million dunums of which about a sixth was in Jewish hands. 73
The report described in some detail the employment policies of the Zionist agencies quoting some of their provisions:
“The effect of the Jewish colonization in Palestine on the existing population is very intimately affected by the conditions on which the various Jewish bodies hold, sell and lease their land.
“The Constitution of the Jewish Agency: Land Holding and Employment Clauses …
“(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and … the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.
“(e) The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour … it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed …”
“Keren Kayemet draft lease: Employment of Jewish labour only
“… The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render the lessee liable to the payment of compensation …”
“The lease also provides that the holding shall never be held by any but a Jew …”
“Keren ha-Yesod agreements: Employment of labour
The following provisions are included:
‘Article 7 – The settler hereby undertakes that … if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish workmen only.’
“In the similar agreement for the Emek colonies, there is a provision as follows:
‘Article 11 – The settler undertakes … not to hire any outside labour except Jewish labourers.’” 74
Commenting on the Zionist attitude towards the Palestinians, the report noted the Zionist policy of allaying Arab suspicions:
“Zionist policy in regard to Arabs in their colonies. The above-quoted provisions sufficiently illustrate the Zionist policy with regard to the Arabs in their colonies. Attempts are constantly being made to establish the advantage which Jewish settlement has brought to the Arab. The most lofty sentiments are ventilated at public meetings and in Zionist propaganda. At the time of the Zionist Congress in 1931 a resolution was passed which ‘solemnly declared the desire of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people, to develop the homeland common to both into a prosperous community which would ensure the growth of the peoples’. This resolution is frequently quoted in proof of the excellent sentiments which zionism cherishes towards the people of Palestine. The provisions quoted above, which are included in legal documents binding on every settler in a Zionist colony, are not compatible with the sentiments publicly expressed.” 75
At the same time, the Commission, rejecting Zionist arguments in support of their discriminatory policies, considered that they violated the Mandate:
“Policy contrary to article 6 of Mandate … The principle of the persistent and deliberate boycott of Arab labour in the Zionist colonies is not only contrary to the provisions of that article of the Mandate, but it is in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the country.” 76
The report noted in the strongest terms the effect on indigenous Palestinians of Zionist policies.
“The effect of the Zionist colonization policy on the Arab. Actually the result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialized. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land. Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mortmain and inalienable. It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and goodwill on the part of the Zionists in view of the policy which the Zionist Organization deliberately adopted.”75
“Land available for settlement. It has emerged quite definitely that there is at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish agencies hold in reserve.” 77
These developments in Palestine at the end of the 1920s – the 1929 Palestinian revolt and the reports of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Commissions – heightened awareness of the dangerous situation in Palestine as the Zionist drive towards a Jewish State met increasing Palestinian opposition. While reinforcing its military strength in Palestine, Great Britain issued a new statement of policy, called the Passfield White Paper of October 1930, in an effort to control the pressures that were building.* While criticizing both Jewish leaders for exerting pressure to obtain official compliance with Zionist wishes in matters of immigration and land transfers, and Palestinians for demanding self-determination which “… would render it impossible;… to carry out, in the fullest sense, the double undertaking”, 78/ the 1930 policy, attempted to introduce an important change in emphasis from the Churchill paper which gave first priority to establishing the Jewish State. The Passfield paper commented:
“… attempts have been made to argue, in support of Zionist claims, that the principal feature of the Mandate is the passages regarding the Jewish national home, and that the passages designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish community are merely secondary considerations qualifying, to some extent, what is claimed to be the primary object for which the Mandate has been framed …
“It is a difficult and delicate task of His Majesty’s Government to devise means whereby, in the execution of its policy in Palestine, equal weight shall at all times be given to the obligations laid down with regard to the two sections of the population and to reconcile those two obligations where, inevitably, conflicting interests are involved”. 79
* Named after the then Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield.
The paper announced a renewed attempt to establish a legislative council. Further it gave notice of intent to reassert authority over the vital issues of immigration and land transfers, which had been dominated by the Jewish Agency, working heavily against Palestinian interests. 80/ Reflecting awareness of the intensifying conflict the paper concludes with a suggestion of realization that Palestinian grievances had justification, but were faced with inimical circumstance:
“To the Arabs His Majesty’s Government would appeal for a recognition of the facts of the situation, and for a sustained effort at co-operation in obtaining that prosperity for the country as a whole by which all will benefit. From the Jewish leaders, His Majesty’s Government ask a recognition of the necessity for making some concessions on their side in regard to the independent and separatist ideals which have been developed in some quarters in connection with the Jewish national home …” 81
The Passfield White Paper drew strong criticism from the Zionist Organization and its supporters, and soon was virtually negated by a letter written in 1931 by the British Prime Minister to Dr. Weizmann, again giving paramountcy to the goals of Zionism rather than “equal weight” to the rights of the people of Palestine. Stating that the letter was meant “to meet certain criticisms put forward by the Jewish Agency”, the letter reasserted that “the undertaking of the Mandate is an undertaking to the Jewish people and not only to the Jewish population of Palestine”. 82
The “MacDonald letter” made clear that Palestine would be governed in accordance with the Churchill policy of 1922, and that the restrictions suggested by Lord Passfield on Jewish immigration and land transfers would not be applied.
Dr. Weizmann’s words on these developments are of interest:
“… The Passfield White Paper may be regarded as the most concerted effort – until the White Paper of 1939 – on the part of a British Government to retract the promise made to the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration. That attack, too, was successfully repulsed.
“… On February 13, 1931, there was an official reversal of policy. It did not take the form of a retraction of the White Paper – that would have meant a loss of face – but of a letter addressed to me by the Prime Minister, read in the House of Commons and printed in Hansard. I considered that the letter rectified the situation – the form was unimportant – and I so indicated to the Prime Minister.
“I was to be bitterly attacked in the Zionist Congress of that year for accepting a letter in place of another White Paper. But whether I was right or not in my acceptance may be judged by a simple fact: it was under MacDonald’s letter to me that the change came about in the Government’s attitude, and in the attitude of the Palestine administration, which enabled us to make the magnificent gains of the ensuing years. It was under MacDonald’s letter that Jewish immigration into Palestine was permitted to reach figures like 40,000 for 1934 and 62,000 for 1935, figures undreamed of in 1930”. 83/
This sudden reversal of British policy, coming as it did after Palestinian hopes for fair play had been raised by the Passfield White Paper, did little to improve the deteriorating situation in Palestine.
The start of the notorious Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe brought repercussions to Palestine which were to exacerbate the mounting tensions. While the majority of European Jews fleeing the Nazi terror chose the United States and Britain, large numbers sought refuge in Palestine. Immigration thus sharply increased, as shown by the following figures:
Immigration into Palestine 1930-1939 84
1930 4 944
1931 4 075
1932 9 553
1933 30 327
1934 42 359
1935 61 854
1936 29 727
1937 10 536
1938 12 868
1939 16 405
Compared to the 100,000 in the 1920s, Palestine received about 232,000 legal immigrants in the 1930s. The Jewish population in 1939 numbered over 445,000 out of a total of about 1,500,000 – nearly 30 per cent compared to the less than 10 per cent 20 years before. Similarly, by the end of 1939, Jewish holdings of land had risen to almost 1.5 million dunums compared to the 650,000, of the total area of 26 million dunums, held at the start of the Mandate.
Between 1930 and 1936, the British Administration tried to initiate measures, such as the establishment of elected municipal councils, and later, a legislative council (with a large majority of appointed members) in an attempt to reduce political friction. These measures were ineffective. The drive of political zionism to establish a settler State in Palestine was met by violent resistance from the Palestinians, and this situation simmered until it boiled over in 1936.
VI. Mandated Palestine – Palestinian Resistance
The Start of Palestinian Resistance
Throughout the period of the mandate, Palestinian resentment against the denial of their inherent right of national self-determination, and against the colonization of their land by non-Palestinians, manifested itself in a series of outbreaks of violence which, becoming virtually endemic in Palestinian politics, mounted in intensity as the mandate prolonged. The British Government regularly appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the “disturbances” and to present recommendations. But as long as the inherently conflicting lines of policy in the mandate were implemented, violence and resistance continued.
On 2 November 1918, non-violent protests marked the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. As early as April 1920, while Palestine was still under military government, anti-Jewish riots broke out just as the San Remo Conference was finalizing the allocation of the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain. The report of the military commission of inquiry was not published at the time, but was referred to in the report of the Royal Commission in 1937. The underlying causes of the riots were cited as:
“The Arabs’ disappointment at the non-fulfilment of the promises of independence which they believed to have been given them in the War.
“The Arabs’ belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination and their fear that the establishment of a national home would mean a great increase of Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews.” 85/
Within a year of Palestine’s coming under civil administration, riots again broke out in May 1921, spreading from a clash between Jewish factions. There were 95 dead and 220 injured. A formal inquiry commission, headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft, Chief Justice of Palestine, found:
“The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and the subsequent acts of violence was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration, and with their conception of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents.
“The immediate cause of the Jaffa riots on the 1st May was an unauthorized demonstration of Bolshevik Jews, followed by its clash with an authorized demonstration of the Jewish Labour Party.
“The racial strife was begun by Arabs, and rapidly developed into a conflict of great violence between Arabs and Jews, in which the Arab majority, who were generally the aggressors, inflicted most of the casualties.
“The outbreak was not premeditated or expected, nor was either side prepared for it; but the state of popular feeling made a conflict likely to occur on any provocation by any Jews …”86
The Revolt of 1929
The “Churchill Memorandum” reaffirmed the “national home” policy, and Palestinian resentment again broke out into violence in August 1929, sparked by a dispute over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The clashes between Palestinians and Jews left 220 dead and 520 injured on both sides, and British reinforcements, including aircraft, naval vessels and armoured cars, had to be called in from outside Palestine before the situation was brought under control.
A special Commission, headed by Sir Walter Shaw, a retired Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, investigated this outbreak. The Shaw Commission observed:
“In less than 10 years three serious attacks have been made by Arabs on Jews. For 80 years before the first of these attacks there is no recorded instance of any similar incidents. It is obvious then that the relations between the two races during the past decade must have differed in some material respect from those which previously obtained. Of this we found ample evidence. The reports of the Military Court and of the local Commission which, in 1920 and in 1921 respectively, enquired into the disturbances of those years, drew attention to the change in the attitude of the Arab population towards the Jews in Palestine. This was borne out by the evidence tendered during our inquiry when representatives of all parties told us that before the War the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least with tolerance, a quality which to-day is almost unknown in Palestine”. 87
The Commission’s findings on the causes of the violence:
“… If there was in Palestine in August last a widespread feeling of resentment amongst the Arabs at the failure of His Majesty’s Government to grant them some measure of self-government, it is at least probable that this resentment would show itself against the Jews, whose presence in Palestine would be regarded by the Arabs as the obstacle to the fulfilment of their aspirations”.
“That such a feeling existed among the leaders of the Arabs and the official and educated classes there can be no question …
“… The Arab people of Palestine are today united in their demand for representative government. This unity of purpose may weaken but it is liable to be revived in full force by any large issues which involve racial interests. It is our belief that a feeling of resentment among the Arab people of Palestine consequent upon their disappointment at the continued failure to obtain any measure of self-government … was a contributory cause to the recent outbreak and is a factor which cannot be ignored in the consideration of the steps to be taken to avoid such outbreaks in the future”. 88
The Shaw Commission’s report was a major factor in the issue of the Passfield White Paper towards redressing these grievances, but it proved abortive, and the people of Palestine were soon to resort to violence again.
The riots of 1933
In 1933, the Nazis took power in Germany, and their imminent infamous persecution of Jewry brought an exodus of Jews from Germany and other European countries. Large numbers came to Palestine, exciting the already simmering resentment again into violence. No formal commission was appointed to inquire into this new outbreak in 1933, which was surveyed in the Peel Report of 1937.
Examining the effects of the sudden increase in immigration, the report comments:
“The Arab reaction to this sudden and striking development was quite natural. All that the Arab leaders had felt in 1929 they now felt more bitterly … the greater the Jewish inflow, the greater the obstacle to their attainment of national independence. And now, for the first time, a worse fate seemed to threaten them than the withholding of their freedom and the continuance of Mandatory rule. Hitherto, with the high rate of natural increase among the Arabs, it has seemed impossible that the Jews could become a majority in Palestine within measurable time. But what if the new flood of immigration were to rise still higher? That question gave a very different colour to the idea of self-government in Palestine as Arab nationalists had hitherto conceived it. It opened up the intolerable prospect of a Jewish State – of Palestinian Arabs being ruled by Jews. It is not surprising, therefore, to find … the old antagonism growing hotter and hotter, till it bursts again into flames.” 89
Clashes erupted mainly in Jerusalem and Jaffa, with considerable casualties, although not as heavy as those of 1929. The report continues:
“So one more page of the history of Palestine under the Mandate had been written in blood. And there was one feature of this last outbreak of Arab violence which was as unprecedented as it was significant. In 1920, 1921 and 1929 the Arabs had attacked the Jews. In 1933 they attacked the Government. The idea that the British authorities in London or Jerusalem were trying to hold the balance even between Arab and Jews was now openly scouted. They were allies of the Jews, it was said, and the enemies of the Arabs. The Mandate was merely a cynical device for promoting British ‘imperialism’ under a mask of human consideration for the Jews …
“It was thus becoming clear that the crux of the situation in Palestine was not growing less formidable with the passing of time. On the contrary, the longer the Mandate operated, the stronger and more bitter Arab antagonism to it became”.90
This Palestinian antagonism and resistance to the Mandate from then on gathered strength. By 1933, the various Palestinian political parties and groupings had united to form an Arab Executive Committee, and showed more inclination to co-operate with the British authorities. At this stage the Jews, still in a minority despite massive immigration, were the party to feel apprehension over representative government, and a new move in 1936 to set up a legislative council was defeated in Parliament after the Zionist Congress had:
“… expressed its categorical rejection of the scheme … as contrary to the spirit of the Mandate”.91
The Palestinian rebellion against the British Mandate
In 1936, the Palestinian resistance to foreign rule and to foreign colonization broke out into a major rebellion that lasted virtually until the outbreak of the Second World War. Palestinian demands for independence drew impetus from the simultaneous nationalist agitations in Egypt and Syria which had forced Great Britain and France to open treaty negotiations with those two Arab countries neighbouring Palestine.
In April 1936, what started as minor Arab-Jewish clashes quickly flared into a widespread revolt. A new union of Palestinian political parties was formed, the Arab Higher Committee, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Al Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The Committee called for a general strike to support the demand for national government. Despite strong Palestinian resistance to Jewish immigration, the British Government issued permits for several thousand new immigrants, offering further provocation to Palestinian nationalists. An unprecedented feature of this nationalist movement was the open identification with it by senior Arab officials of the Palestine administration who protested to the High Commissioner that Palestinians had been forced to violence because of loss of faith in British pledges and alarm at the extent to which Britain was susceptible to Zionist pressure.
As the strike prolonged, violence increased. There were attacks on British troops and police posts as well as on Jewish settlements, sabotage of roads, railways, pipelines and so on. The British administration imposed curfews, called in troop reinforcements from Britain, Egypt and Malta, and resorted to mass arrests, collective fines, and internments in concentration camps and other emergency measures. Large parts of the Arab quarter in the town of Jaffa were demolished by the authorities on the grounds of urban improvement – in the midst of the revolt – but order could not be restored.
During earlier Palestinian Arab uprisings, Jewish settlers often had restrained retaliation under the doctrine of the Havlaga, or restraint. But now, not unexpectedly, there were Jewish reprisals. The principal vehicle was the Haganah, a covert paramilitary force formed early in the mandate years (and which was to play a leading role in later events in Palestine). The Jewish settlers also benefited from 2,800 of their number being enrolled in the police forces as supernumeraries.
The failure of the Palestine authorities to suppress the revolt by military means led to political measures. The British Government announced the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of the “disturbances” and turned to the rulers of other Arab States for the mediation that eventually led to the calling off of the strike in October 1936. The official count of casualties was 275 dead and 1,112 wounded, but the Royal Commission’s estimate was 1,000 deaths. 92
The end of the strike was to prove a lull in the rebellion. The issue of the Royal Commission’s report brought an almost immediate renewal of violence, starting with the assassination of a British District Commissioner. Although it was not conclusively established that the assassins were Arab, the High Commissioner declared the Arab Higher Committee proscribed, arresting its prominent leaders and deporting them to the Seychelles Islands, while the Mufti of Jerusalem was able to escape to Lebanon, from where he continued to direct the rebellion.
Military courts were established, awarding 58 death sentences by the end of 1938, apart from numerous life imprisonments. 93/ To interdict support for the guerrillas, a barbed-wire fence, called the “Teggert line” was set up along portions of the Syrian, Transjordanian and Lebanese borders.
“Throughout 1937 British armed forces in Palestine had amounted to no more than two infantry brigades. In July 1938, two additional infantry battalions, two squadrons of the Royal Air Force, an armoured car and cavalry unit, and a battle cruiser were endeavouring to suppress terrorism which, since April, had become open rebellion. By the end of October there were in the country eighteen infantry battalions, two cavalry regiments, a battery of howitzers, and armoured car units, or a total of 18,000 to 20,000 troops, while some 2,930 additional British police were recruited during the year. A virtual military reoccupation of the country proved necessary to deal with the explosion of bombs and land mines, the murder and snipings which were almost daily occurrences. Heavy military concentrations alone preserved a semblance of order in the northern and central parts of the country, while the Jerusalem and southern districts were entirely out of hand … The main military campaign culminated during the first weeks of October, when troops peacefully occupied the old city – or Arab quarter – of Jerusalem. This operation, which might have been dangerous owing to the narrow streets, was accomplished without serious loss, and by the end of that month all Palestine was under military control …
“The nature and extent of the Arab rebellion of 1938 can be gauged not only from the figures given above of British armed forces in the country, but also from the fact that casualties during the year reached a total of 3,717, as against 246 in 1937 …” 94
As in the first phase of the rebellion, the Jewish side also conducted its own retaliations and reprisals. In addition to the Haganah, another organization, the Irgun Tzeva’i Leumi was active, as were “special night squads”, trained by Major Orde Wingate, a serving British officer. According to Christopher Sykes, “the SNS gradually became what Wingate secretly intended, the beginnings of a Jewish army”. 95
By 1939, the large-scale military operations by the British Government against the Palestinian nationalist guerrillas were showing success. Meanwhile, Palestinian grievances were at last being heard in London at a conference attended by other Arab States. As war approached, Britain again turned to these friendly Arab States to intercede in Palestine, and the rebellion was ended after three and a half years.
The rebellion of 1936-1939 culminated 15 years of Palestinian resistance to the Mandate, and was to bring far-reaching consequences in Palestine. It left no doubt that the Palestinians would not acquiesce in the loss of their country under the Balfour Declaration and disproved the Churchill policy’s insistence that the “dual obligations” undertaken could be reconciled and would not disturb the peace in Palestine. The response of the British Government had been to propose, in place of the independence pledged two decades earlier, a plan to partition Palestine.
VII. Mandated Palestine: The Partition Plans
The Peel Commission Report
The Royal Commission to inquire into the “disturbances” was headed by a former Secretary of State for India, Lord Robert Peel, and presented a 400-page report, a document of major importance in any examination of the Palestine problem. While defending the British Government’s record in Palestine and standing by the Balfour Declaration, it recognized the force and justice of the demands by the Palestinian people for independence. It acknowledged that, contrary to the previous official position, Palestinian resistance to the Mandate had shown that the “dual obligations” were not reconcilable. Faced with this dilemma it recommended, in Solomonian fashion, the partition of Palestine.
Because of its importance as a major turning point, after the Balfour Declaration, in British policy in Palestine, the Royal Commission’s report is quoted below at some length.
Commenting on the assumption that the “dual obligations” were reconcilable:
“It must have been obvious from the outset that a very awkward situation would arise if that basic assumption should prove false. It would evidently make the operation of the Mandate at every point more difficult, and it would greatly complicate the question of its termination. To foster Jewish immigration in the hope that it might ultimately lead to the creation of a Jewish majority and the establishment of a Jewish State with the consent or at least the acquiescence of the Arabs was one thing. It was quite another thing to contemplate, however remotely, the forcible conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs. For that would clearly violate the spirit and intention of the Mandates System. It would mean that national self-determination had been withheld when the Arabs were a majority in Palestine and only conceded when the Jews were a majority. It would mean that the Arabs had been denied the opportunity of standing by themselves; that they had, in fact, after an interval of conflict, been bartered about from Turkish sovereignty to Jewish sovereignty. 96
“… the crux was plain enough to Arab eyes. It was the Balfour Declaration and its embodiment in the draft Mandate and nothing else which seemingly prevented their attaining a similar measure of independence to that which other Arab communities already enjoyed. And their reaction to this crux was logical. They repudiated the Balfour Declaration. They protested against its implementation in the draft Mandate. ‘The people of Palestine,’ they said, ‘cannot accept the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.’ And they refused to co-operate in any form of government other than a national government responsible to the Palestinian people. 97
“… Nowhere, as it happened, was the spirit of nationalism more acute after the War than in this area of the Near and Middle East. In all of its constituent territories, except Transjordan, there were serious disturbances, and in all of them, except Palestine, there was a marked advance towards self-government.” 98
On the rebellion:
“… One other feature of the ‘disturbances’ of last year had likewise appeared before. It has been pointed out that the outbreak of 1933 was not only, or even mainly, an attack on the Jews, but an attack on the Palestine Government. In 1936 this was still clearer. Jewish lives were taken and Jewish property destroyed; but the outbreak was chiefly and directly aimed at the Government. The word ‘disturbances’ gives a misleading impression of what happened. It was an open rebellion of the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by fellow-Arabs from other countries, against British Mandatory rule.” 99
On its causes:
“… After examining this and other evidence and studying the course of events in Palestine since the War, we have no doubt as to what were ‘the underlying causes of the disturbances’ of last year. They were:
“(i) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
“(ii) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home.
‘We make the following comments on these two causes:
“(i) They were the same underlying causes as those which brought about the ‘disturbances’ of 1920, 1921, 1929 and 1933.
“(ii) They were, and always have been, inextricably linked together. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate under which it was to be implemented involved the denial of national independence at the outset. The subsequent growth of the national home created a practical obstacle, and the only serious one, to the concession later of national independence. It was believed that its further growth might mean the political as well as economic subjection of the Arabs to the Jews, so that if, ultimately, the Mandate should terminate and Palestine become independent, it would not be a national independence in the Arab sense but self-government by a Jewish majority.
“(iii) They were the only ‘underlying’ causes. All the other factors were complementary or subsidiary, aggravating the two causes or helping to determine the time at which the disturbances broke out.” 100
On the new Arab hostility towards the Jews:
“… It is indeed, one of the most unhappy aspects of the present situation – this opening of a breach between Jewry and the Arab world. We believe that not in Palestine only but in all the Middle East the Arabs might profit from the capital and enterprise which the Jews are ready enough to provide; and we believe that in ordinary circumstances the various Arab Governments would be ready enough on their side to permit a measure of Jewish immigration under their own conditions and control. But the creation of the national home has been neither conditioned nor controlled by the Arabs of Palestine. It has been established directly against their will. And that hard fact has had its natural reaction on Arab minds elsewhere. The Jews were fully entitled to enter the door forced open for them into Palestine. They did it with the sanction and encouragement of the League of Nations and the United States of America. But by doing it they have closed the other doors of the Arab World against them. And in certain circumstances this antagonism might become dangerously aggressive.” 101
On the Arab-Jewish relationship:
“An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent, with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them. The Arab community is predominantly Asian in character, the Jewish community predominantly European. They differ in religion and in language. Their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace.” 102
On Palestinian demands for independence:
“… When at last they came before us, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, the first words of the prepared statement he made to us, were these: ‘The Arab cause in Palestine is one which aims at national independence. In its essence it does not differ from similar movements amongst the Arabs in all other Arab territories.’ And at the close of his statement he stated that the first cause of the ‘disturbances’ was ‘the fact that the Arabs in Palestine were deprived of their natural and political rights’; and he summed up the Arab demands as (1) ‘the abandonment of the experiment of the Jewish national home’, (2) ‘the immediate and complete stoppage of Jewish immigration’, (3) ‘the immediate and complete prohibition of the sale of Arab land to Jews’, and (4) ‘the solution of the Palestine problem on the same basis as that on which were solved the problems in Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon, namely by the termination of the Mandate and by the conclusion of a treaty between Great Britain and Palestine by virtue of which a national and independent government in constitutional form will be established’.
“Thus it is clear that the standpoint of the Arab leaders has not shifted by an inch from that which they adopted when first they understood the implications of the Balfour Declaration. The events of 17 years have only served to stiffen and embitter their resistance and, as they argue, to strengthen their case. And the core of their case, it must be stressed again, is political.
“… Nor is the conflict in its essence an interracial conflict, arising from any old instinctive antipathy of Arabs towards Jews. There was little or no friction, as we have seen, between Arab and Jews in the rest of the Arab world until the strife in Palestine engendered it. And there has been precisely the same political trouble in Iraq, Syria and Egypt – agitation, rebellion and bloodshed – where there are no ‘national homes’. Quite obviously, then, the problem of Palestine is political. It is, as elsewhere, the problem of insurgent nationalism. The only difference is that in Palestine Arab nationalism is inextricably interwoven with antagonism to the Jews. And the reasons for that, it is worth repeating, are equally obvious. In the first place, the establishment of the national home involved at the outset a blank negation of the rights implied in the principle of national self-government. Secondly, it soon proved to be not merely an obstacle to the development of national self-government, but apparently the only serious obstacle. Thirdly, as the home has grown, the fear has grown with it that, if and when self-government is conceded, it may not be national in the Arab sense, but government by a Jewish majority. That is why it is difficult to be an Arab patriot and not to hate the Jews.
“… The story of the last 17 years is proof that this Arab nationalism with its anti-Jewish spearhead is not a new or transient phenomenon. It was there at the beginning; its strength and range have steadily increased; and it seems evident to us from what we saw and heard that it has not yet reached its climax.” 103
Before making its recommendations, the Royal Commission recapitulated the political situation in Palestine in a chapter entitled “The Force of Circumstance”, recognizing that the terms of the Mandate, with its inclusion of the Balfour Declaration, could only be implemented by force; and with no assurance of success:
“… The moral objections to maintaining a system of government by constant repression are self-evident. Nor is there any need to emphasize the undesirable reactions of such a course of policy on opinion outside Palestine.
“And the worst of it is that such a policy leads nowhere. However vigorously and consistently maintained, it will not solve the problem. It will not allay, it will exacerbate the quarrel between the Arabs and the Jews. The establishment of a single self-governing Palestine will remain just as impracticable as it is now. It is not easy to pursue the dark path of repression without seeing daylight at the end of it.” 104
The Royal Commission then made its recommendations:
“… Manifestly the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question, ‘Which of them in the end will govern Palestine?’ must surely be ‘neither’ …
“… Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can see none in any other plan.” 105
This public recognition that the irreconcilable terms of the Mandate had made it unworkable signalled its imminent end. The radical recommendation of partition was accepted by the British Government in a White Paper in July 1937:
“In spite of many discouraging experiences during the past seventeen years, His Majesty’s Government have based their policy on this expectation, and have taken every opportunity of encouraging co-operation between Arabs and Jews. In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the Commission, they are driven to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied under the terms of the present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock …
“In supporting a solution of the Palestine problem by means of partition, His Majesty’s Government are much impressed by the advantages which it offers both to the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress. They would be finally delivered from all fear of Jewish domination … On the other hand, partition would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home and relieve it from any possibility of its being subject in the future to Arab rule. It would convert the Jewish national home into a Jewish State;…” 106
Partition was unacceptable to the Palestinians, whose struggle for self-determination had brought the British Government to admit the unworkability of the Mandate. The rebellion flared up again, lasting until 1939. The Arab Higher Committee formally reasserted the right of Palestinians to full independence in the whole of Palestine, and the replacement of the Mandate by a treaty between Great Britain and an independent Palestine.
The Royal Commission’s report was the subject of intense debate at the twentieth Zionist Congress in Zurich in August 1937. Dr. Weizmann urged acceptance of the partition plan (with fundamental modifications) since the world was now viewing the problem in terms of a Jewish State. However, the Congress apparently did not consider that the time had come to accept a Jewish State in only part of Palestine. It was too early – the ultimate aim was to establish the Jewish State in all of Palestine, and at this point the numbers of immigrants were too small and, in Zionist eyes, the mission of the Mandate was unfulfilled. The Congress declared that it:
“… rejects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfillment. The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.
“The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by the Royal Commission is unacceptable.
“The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty’s Government for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State.” 107
The Royal Commission’s partition plan (which, the Commission emphasized, was not a final or definitive proposal) allotted roughly the northern quarter of Palestine and the major part of the western coastal plain to the Jewish state, about a third of the country’s area. Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth, with a corridor to the sea at Jaffa, would continue under a British Mandate (map at annex VII).
The British Government then dispatched another “technical” commission, known as the “Woodhead Commission” to examine the practicability of partition. This Commission, which held its inquiries in Palestine from April to August 1938, concluded that the Royal Commission’s plan was unworkable since almost half of the population of the proposed Jewish State would be Palestinian Arab, and raise the danger of mass population transfers. The Commission proposed two other plans. One amended the Royal Commission’s plan by placing Galilee under mandate instead of allotting it to the Jewish State (annex VIII). The other proposed that virtually the southern half of Palestine, the Jerusalem enclave, and a large area in the north remain under mandate, the Jewish State occupying the coastal plain north of Jaffa, with the Arab state being allotted the remainder of the territory (annex IX).
The Commission itself expressed reservations over the viability of any partition scheme, and with the resurgence of the Palestinian rebellion, the British Government abandoned the idea of partitioning Palestine, announcing in a new statement of policy that:
“… further examination has shown that the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable.” 108
The London Conference, 1939
To discuss alternatives, a round-table conference in London was held to which the British Government invited representatives of Palestinians (excluding those held responsible for violence), Jews (who could select whichever representatives they wished) and Arab States. If the Conference could not produce an agreement, the British Government announced, it would decide and implement its own policy.
The London Conference turned out to be parallel but separate Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Jewish conferences in February-March 1939, since the Arabs refused to formally recognize the Jewish Agency. All the independent Arab States participated: Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and the Yemen. It was for this conference, which reached to the roots of the Palestine issue, that the British Government made public the Husain-McMahon correspondence, which was examined by the Anglo-Arab Committee.
The Arabs were determined to secure the inherent right of the Palestinians to their independence, which had been pledged 20 years earlier and for which the Palestinians had risen up in arms. The Jews, backed by the Balfour Declaration and its incorporation in the Mandate, were determined to achieve a Jewish State, particularly at a time when Nazi persecution of Jewry in Europe was inflicting its notorious excesses and his people were facing what Dr. Weizmann described as “this, the blackest hour of Jewish history”. Although meetings between all three sides took place towards the end of the London Conference, British proposals for an agreement were first rejected by the Jewish side and, after revision to partially meet the Jewish objections, by both sides.
The “MacDonald White Paper”
The end of this attempt to reach an agreement left the British Government facing the situation which its policies of two decades had created in Palestine, and now it presented its unilateral policy. A new White Paper was issued in May 1939, disclaiming any intention to create a Jewish State, rejecting Arab demands that Palestine become independent as an Arab State, and envisaging the termination of the mandate by 1949 with independence for Palestine in which both Palestinians and Jews would share in government. Immigration would end, after the admission of 75,000 new immigrants over the first five years. The Government would strictly regulate transfer of land.
Important excerpts from this last major British policy statement on Palestine before the Second World War deserve note:
“… His Majesty’s Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country’s economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and, equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored … it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East …
“… His Majesty’s Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well-being of the whole people of Palestine, a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of participation recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty’s Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in Palestine …
“… It has been urged that the expression ‘a national home for the Jewish people’ offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty’s Government do not wish to contest the view, which has been expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognized that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty’s Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country …
“… and His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will …” 109
“… The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in … treaty relations with the United Kingdom.
“… the independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded …” 109
After two decades of Mandatory rule and colonization from abroad, the inherent rights of the Palestinians finally had been acknowledged. But the independence now being pledged was to a country where population and land patterns had been so transformed while it had been a territory under a League of Nations mandate, that the road to independence was full of pits and obstructions. For the Zionist movement the White Paper was a severe setback to their plans, and a new strategy was to be devised outside the framework of the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in any event, was nearing its end.
VIII. Palestine and the League of Nations
The international sanction for Great Britain to implement the Balfour Declaration’s policy in Palestine had formally derived from the League of Nations, which conferred the legal title, and in whose name the Mandatory Power had governed. The question of where the ultimate sovereignty of a Mandated Territory lay has been the subject of varying interpretations, which need not be examined in this study. Several authorities, basing their views on the wording of Article 22 of the Covenant, and stressing that the League was founded on the principle of non-annexation of territories and that the mandates prohibited the alienation of territory (article 5 of the Palestine Mandate), have ruled that sovereignty rested with the people of a Mandated Territory, albeit in suspense since they could not exercise it. One representative view may be quoted:
“The drafters of the Treaty of Versailles, bearing in mind above all the right of peoples to self-determination, formally declared that Mandated Territories were not to be annexed by any Power, be it the community of States known as the League of Nations that was based at Geneva or any individual State. To all intents and purposes, these Territories belong to the indigenous inhabitants and communities, which the League has set out to defend and on whose behalf it acts as a kind of family council”. 110/
The view taken by the International Court of Justice in the question of the status of South-West Africa is that sovereignty was not transferred to the Mandatory Power:
“The terms of this Mandate, as well as the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant and the principles embodied therein, show that the creation of this new international institution [the Mandate] did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to the Union of South Africa. The Union Government was to exercise an international function of administration on behalf of the League, with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the inhabitants”. 111/
According to Professor Quincy Wright:
“Communities under ‘A’ Mandates doubtless approach very close to sovereignty”. 112/
Since Palestine as an “A” Mandate whose sovereignty could not be alienated either by the Mandatory Power or by the League, it is of interest to glance briefly at the supervisory responsibility of the League of Nations, as exercised through the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC), during the life of the Palestine Mandate.
In a report to the League Assembly the Council noted:
“With regard to the responsibility of the League for securing the observance of the terms of the Mandates, the Council interprets its duties in this connection in the widest manner.
“Nevertheless the League will obviously have to display extreme prudence, so that the exercise of its rights of control should not in any way increase the difficulties of the task undertaken by the Mandatory Powers”. 113/
In practice this meant that the PMC required annual reports from the Mandatory Power and offered comment on policies and developments in the mandated territory. Only when there was a major outbreak of violence, as in 1929 or in 1936, did the PMC exercise the functions in any wider manner.
In its very first meeting after the Palestine mandate came into effect in 1923, the PMC noted its sui generis nature and recorded its concern over its inherent contradictions, observing:
“Whereas all the other mandates the application of which it has hitherto examined were only intended to give effect to the general principles laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant, the Palestine Mandate is of a more complex nature. As is expressly stated in the preamble of the Mandate, and as is clearly shown by several of the clauses of this document, the Council, in drawing up its terms, desired, while giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, to carry out also the plan of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people, as stated in the historic Declaration of 2 November, 1917, with which Lord Balfour’s name is associated – a Declaration which the Principal Allied Powers adopted. According to the fundamental principle of Article 22 of the Covenant the paramount duty of the Mandatory Power is to ensure the development of the mandated territories by administering them in conformity with the interests of their inhabitants. On the other hand, in the terms of the Declaration of 2 November 1917, the Mandatory Power is instructed to assist the establishment in Palestine of a ‘national home for the Jewish people … it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country’.
“It is not in any way for the Commission, whose duty it is, according to Article 22 of the Covenant, ‘to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandate’, to offer any observations whatever concerning the actual contents of the Mandates, the application of which it is called upon to examine, or to contrast the two principles which the Council sought to embody in the terms of the Mandate for Palestine. But, as this Mandate of necessity reflects the dual nature of its inspiration, and as its application has given rise to complaints by persons basing their case on one or other of these principles to the exclusion of the other, the Commission would not be fulfilling its task if it refrained from making any reference to the facts which have come to its notice in this connection …” 114/
In the following years the reports from the Mandatory Power were treated in a routine fashion. In 1929, however, the PMC expressed sharp criticism of the Shaw report on the “disturbances” that year, expressing the opinion that the violence arose from direct opposition to British policies that the Palestinian Arabs considered as a denial of their inherent natural rights.
“The Mandates Commission considers that the Palestine disorders cannot justly be regarded as an unexpected disturbance in the midst of political calm, like those sudden explosions of popular passion which have so often been witnessed in the East. They were preceded during the last four months of 1928 and in the early part of 1929 by a number of premonitory incidents which were usually connected with the Wailing Wall …
“The conclusion, that the outbreak was not directed against British authority, seems to be expressed too categorically.
“Doubtless the Arab attacks were directed only against the Jews, but the resentment which caused the Arabs to commit these excesses was ultimately due to political disappointments which they attributed to the parties concerned in the mandate, and primarily to the British Government. All the declarations by persons and organizations representing the Arab section tend to emphasize the fact that the Arab movement was a movement of resistance to the policy of the Mandatory Power solely in its capacity as mandatory. This has never been more clearly stated than in a letter from the Palestinian Arab delegation, and in a telegram from the Arab Executive, both received by the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission during the extraordinary session. The first reads as follows:
“We believe that the main cause of the disturbances which have led to continual bloodshed in Palestine for the last 12 years is the persistence of the British Government in depriving the Arabs of their natural rights. We feel that there can be no security in future against the recurrence of disturbances such as those which have taken place, or perhaps of an even more serious nature, unless the British Government promptly and radically changes its policies …” 115
Yet, paradoxically, the principle of self-determination was not upheld by the Commission. While it expressed understanding of the Palestinian desire for self-government, it warned that this was contrary to the terms of the Mandate, and that therefore the Commission could not support those aspirations:
“The claim for self-government is in no way surprising in a people who can watch the operation of representative institutions in some of its neighbours of the same race and civilization; it is an expression of a sentiment – pride of race – which certainly commands respect and can be justified to some extent by the terms of the Covenant and of the mandate itself. If those responsible for the agitation hoped by its means to secure the triumph of their opposition to the League of Nations as a party to the mandate, they will find no encouragement from the Mandates Commission …
“To all the sections of the population which are rebelling against the mandate, whether they object to it on principle or wish to retain only those of its provisions which favour their particular cause, the Mandatory Power must obviously return a definite and categorical refusal. As long as the leaders of a community persist in repudiating what is at once the fundamental charter of the country and, as far as the Mandatory Power is concerned, an international obligation, which it is not free to set aside, the negotiations would only unduly enhance their prestige and raise dangerous hopes among their partisans and apprehensions amongst their opponents … 116
This session of the PMC had heard statements on the “dual obligation”, asserting that:
“… It was the duty of the Mandatory Power to establish the national Jewish home, and to develop self-governing institutions so far as was compatible with such establishment …”
The view of the Chairman was:
“… In considering the two parts of the mandate, it was necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle of all the mandates. The purpose of the mandates as described in Article 22 of the Covenant was the development and welfare of the inhabitants of the mandated territory … It was necessary to insist that the establishment of the national home for the Jews must be made compatible with the introduction of autonomous institutions. That was the Arab view and it was consistent with the fundamental purpose of the mandate …” 117
However in its report, the PMC made clear that in its view the dual obligations were of equal weight and were not irreconcilable.
(On this occasion, the League Council, on the request of the British Government, dispatched a League Commission to investigate Jewish and Muslim claims concerning the Wailing Wall. Their recommendations in 1931 in general confirmed the status quo and were implemented by the Palestine authorities.)
For the following five years the reports on the Palestine Mandate again received routine comments, until the outbreak of the Palestinian rebellion in 1936, when the League Council called the PMC to formulate a “Preliminary Opinion” on the Royal Commission’s proposal for terminating the Palestine Mandate by partition rather than independence, a radical proposal with weighty implications for the Mandates system. The PMC elaborated on the contradictions inherent in the mandate, and the problems raised by the British proposal:
“By these communications, the Permanent Mandates Commission was given a task that was entirely new to it. It was no longer a question of examining the annual reports of the Mandatories and advising the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates, as its mission is defined in the Covenant itself; nor was it a duty such as that assigned to it by the Council in 1931, of determining whether a mandated territory had reached a degree of maturity justifying its emancipation.
“The Commission’s task today is to express a preliminary opinion on the intentions of a Mandatory Power which proposes to the Council the termination of the mandate it has been carrying out for 15 years, and which, in support of this proposal, adduces not so much the attainment of maturity by the ward as the difficulties of guardianship.
“This opinion, it is true, was expressly requested by the Council and the Mandatory Power itself. But the Commission could not turn for guidance either to the mandate, which had been challenged, or to the Covenant, which is wholly silent on this subject.
“In the light of what principles, therefore, should it consider the question submitted to it? And, first of all, what exactly was that question itself? …
“Although the question at issue was its revision, the Palestine mandate remained the centre of the whole of the deliberations. The mandate defines the obligations assumed by the Mandatory Power towards the League of Nations, on whose behalf the territory is administered. These obligations themselves are derived from the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, and from the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, to which the United Kingdom Government, in accepting the mandate, undertook to give effect.
“The Commission has never imagined that the Mandatory Power might desire to withdraw from these obligations. The very idea of changing the existing régime was, in fact, the outcome of the difficulties experienced by the Mandatory in carrying out its obligations and of its desire to adapt its policy more closely to the requirements of its mission …
“The first question to which the Commission has to give a reply to the Council is therefore that of the maintenance of the existing mandate. Although the obligations of the mandate have not appeared to be irreconcilable, the aspirations of Arabs and Jews in Palestine have constantly clashed ever since the mandate was established. What people could be expected to agree wholeheartedly that its country should be used for the establishment of a national home for another people, even if it were thereby to reap appreciable material benefits? And again, it is surprising that a people which, for nearly two thousand years, has been scattered over the face of the earth should have hastened to welcome an offer made to it to reconstruct a national home in the land of his forefathers, under the protection of a mighty empire? It was inevitable from the outset that there would be a conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs of Palestine, desirous of remaining or rather of becoming complete masters in their own house, and the Jews, desirous of constituting or rather reconstituting a national home in Palestine. The very wording of the Balfour Declaration and of the Palestine mandate clearly shows that this inevitable antagonism had been realised by the authors of those documents …
“The disturbances of 1936 showed how widespread and intense was the hostility of the Arabs to Jewish immigration, and the repressive measures perforce taken by the mandatory Power only added to its doubts of the possibility of applying the mandate without resorting to the constant use of force.” 118/
The Commission noted the repercussion of the Peel report on the mandate and expressed reservations on the partition proposal:
“The present mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the two-fold authority conferred on it by its impartiality and its unanimity, and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself …
“While declaring itself favourable in principle to an examination of a solution involving the partition of Palestine, the Commission is nevertheless opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent States …
“The Commission therefore considers that a prolongation of the period of political apprenticeship constituted by the mandate would be absolutely essential both to the new Arab State and to the new Jewish State.” 119/
The PMC proposed alternate forms of “apprenticeship”, and the Council authorized Great Britain to prepare a partition plan for the League’s consideration.
The situation remained fluid as the rebellion in Palestine continued, the PMC commenting in 1938:
“The Royal Commission considered that, during that period, the present mandate would continue to be the governing instrument of the administration of Palestine. In actual fact, however, the Mandates Commission cannot but recognize that the application of the mandate is partially suspended now, as events have prevented some of its essential objects from being pursued.” 120
The 1939 White Paper’s reversal from immediate termination of the Mandate by partition to its prolongation with eventual independence for a united Palestine created a new situation for the PMC which, faced with fluctuations in British policy, was unable to make any definite recommendations:
“From the first, one fact forced itself to the notice of the Commission – namely, that the policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had always placed upon the Palestine mandate.
“In order to prove this, it will be enough to say that, only two years ago, the Government of the Mandatory Power declared, in the Statement of Policy which accompanied the report published by the Royal Commission, that the present mandate was unworkable. In view of this, the Mandates Commission communicated to the Council its opinion that a mandate which was declared unworkable by the Mandatory Power almost became so by that very fact.
“In 1937, there was already a conflict between Jewish and Arab aspirations, which the United Kingdom Government admitted its inability to reconcile; that conflict was the principal obstacle to Palestine’s being administered in accordance with the mandate. Since that time, the conflict has become more and more intense. In 1937, the United Kingdom Government, feeling itself unable equitably to administer Palestine under the present mandate, believed that the possibility of so doing was to be found in a territorial partition for which no provision was made therein, while today it considers its new policy to be in accordance with the mandate. Does this not show that that instrument had at that time a different meaning in the eyes of the Mandatory Power than that which it has today?
“The Commission did not, however, confine itself to establishing this single fact. It went on to consider whether the Palestine mandate might not perhaps be open to a new interpretation which, while still respecting its main principles, would be sufficiently flexible for the policy of the White Paper not to appear at variance with it. The Commission was all the less reluctant to raise this question since, according to the Mandatory Power, no such contradiction existed. The Commission learned from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Mandatory Power considered, on the strength of the opinion expressed by its legal advisers that, in view of the changed situation, the policy which it proposed to pursue was in agreement with the mandate, itself based on Article 22 of the Covenant and on the Balfour Declaration.” 121
There was no consensus in the PMC, but its comment that the 1939 White Paper was not in accordance with the accepted interpretation of the Mandate – with the establishment of the Jewish National Home as its principal objective – was further to complicate the controversy, though any further interest or activity by the League of Nations in the problem of Palestine was precluded by the outbreak of war in September 1939.
IX. The Ending of the Mandate
Palestine in 1939
By 1939 the situation in Palestine had reached a crucial point. The Royal Commission had declared the Mandate unworkable. The Commission’s own partition proposals had proved equally unworkable. The 1939 White Paper had postulated an independent unified Palestine, with a Palestinian Arab majority, in 10 years, but the League of Nations had expressed reservations on this new policy declaration. Yet the League itself had proved incapable of playing any effective role in arresting the deteriorating situation in Palestine. The Palestinians had sensed that only through violence could they force recognition of their inherent rights. The Zionists in turn had reacted with violence to hold the ground they had gained and to press towards their ultimate aspirations of a Jewish State in Palestine. The monstrous Nazi crimes against the Jewish people led them to look to the “national home” in Palestine as a refuge. The Second World War was to act as a catalyst in the interplay of these forces, and the pace of events accelerated.
Shortly before the war broke out, both the Jewish Agency as well as Palestinian Arab leaders declared their support of the Allies. The Mufti, still in exile, eventually aligned himself with the Axis powers. Violence subsided as the leaders of both sides observed a political truce. Jewish and Arab battalions were formed in Palestine, the Jewish units ultimately forming a Jewish Brigade.
The implementation of the 1939 White Paper
Despite the demands of the war effort, the British Government, disturbed by the dangerous situation in Palestine, proceeded with the policy of the 1939 White Paper in an effort to diminish the political tension. In February 1940, the Palestine authorities issued the Land Transfer regulations, dividing Palestine into three zones. In the largest zone, any transfer of land to a person who was not a “Palestinian Arab” was prohibited, exceptions being permitted only under specific conditions and with the High Commissioner’s permission. In the second zone “Palestinian Arabs” were permitted to transfer land only between themselves. In the third zone there were not restrictions on land transfers.
The clauses of the 1939 White Paper relating to immigration were also implemented, but at the end of the five-year period in 1944, only 51,000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates provided for had been utilized. In circumstances where Jewish refugees from Europe were fleeing violence and persecution, the White Paper’s limits were relaxed and legal immigration was permitted to continue indefinitely at the rate of 18,000 a year.
The Jewish response
The Palestinian rebellion, the Royal Commission’s report and the 1939 White Paper’s policies constituted a series of reversals to the aim of political Zionism to establish a settler state in Palestine. It had become evident that the Mandatory Power was re-interpreting its earlier commitment to the Balfour Declaration. Three features of the response by some Zionist groups were illegal immigration, terrorism and an attempt to obtain support from the United States.
Illegal immigration was not a wartime phenomenon. The Hope-Simpson Report of 1930 had recorded that “some thousands each year” of unauthorized immigrants settled in Palestine, either having evaded frontier controls or having arrived as “pseudo travellers” and then staying on. 122This type of immigration was bound to increase with the conditions prevailing in Europe, and it is estimated that between April 1939 and December 1943, over 20,000 illegal immigrants arrived in Palestine. 123 The conditions under which this immigration was swelling were politically exploited by Jewish organizations to exert pressure on the British Government, as described in an official document:
“The regulation of Jewish immigration into Palestine has been greatly complicated, since before the outbreak of war, by attempts to organize the unauthorized entry of large bodies of immigrants. During the war it was more than ever imperative that the Administration should resist this threat to its authority, since the shiploads of refugees came from inside Axis-controlled Europe and offered an opportunity for the infiltration of enemy agents. In November 1940, it was decided that illegal immigrants would be deported to an alternative place of refuge in the Colonial Empire. The first contingent of deportees under this policy was assembled on board the s.s. Patria in Haifa Harbour. The Patria, however, was scuttled at her moorings on 25 November, as a result of sabotage by Jewish sympathizers ashore, with the loss of 252 lives. Numbers of illegal immigrants were subsequently deported to Mauritius; they were admitted to Palestine in 1945 and an equivalent number was deducted from the quota provided for in the White Paper”. 124
The Jewish immigrants claimed to have practised often the doctrine of Havlaga, or restraint and non-violence, in the face of the various uprisings by Palestinian Arabs, culminating in the rebellion. During the war years, the Jewish community also resorted to violence. The recourse to terrorism is described in an official British document as follows:
“The lull in terrorist activity did not continue throughout the war years. The Jewish community resented the Land Transfers Regulations and the measures taken against unauthorized immigration. In 1942, a small group of Zionist extremists, led by Abraham Stern, came into prominence with a series of politically motivated murders and robberies in the Tel Aviv area. In the following year there came to light a widespread conspiracy, connected with Haganah (an illegal military formation controlled by the Jewish Agency), for stealing arms and ammunition from the British forces in the Middle East. In August 1944, the High Commissioner narrowly escaped death in an ambush outside Jerusalem. Three months later, on the 6th November, the British Minister of State in the Middle East (Lord Moyne) was assassinated in Cairo by two members of the Stern group. A third illegal Jewish organization, the Irgun Tzeva’i Leumi, was responsible for much destruction of Government property during 1944. The outrages perpetrated by the Stern group and the Irgun Zvei Leumi were condemned by the official spokesmen of the Jewish community;…
“On the 22nd July 1946, the campaign conducted by terrorist organizations reached a new climax with an explosion which wrecked a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, containing the offices of the Government Secretariat as well as part of military headquarters, and killed 86 public servants, Arab, Jewish and British, as well as five members of the public. Later terrorist activities have included the kidnapping of a British judge and of British officers, sabotage of the railway system and of oil installations at Haifa, and the blowing up of a British Officers’ Club in Jerusalem with considerable loss of life. In order that the administration of the country might proceed unhampered by terrorist reprisals against the British community as threatened, non-essential British civilians and military families were evacuated from Palestine and the remaining members of the British community were concentrated in security zones at the beginning of February 1947. In the same month ‘statutory martial law’ was imposed for a limited period (in specified areas);…” 125
Notwithstanding formal disclaimers of its responsibility, there appears to be some evidence of involvement of the Jewish Agency, as indicated in an official report:
“The information which was in the possession of His Majesty’s Government when they undertook their recent action in Palestine led them to draw the following conclusions:
(1) That the Haganah and its associated force the Palmach (working under the political control of prominent members of the Jewish Agency) have been engaging in carefully planned movements of sabotage and violence under the guise of ‘the Jewish Resistance Movement’;
(2) That the Irgun Tzeva’i Leumi and the Stern Group have worked since last autumn in co-operation with the Haganah High Command on certain of these operations;…
(3) That the broadcasting station ‘Kol Israel’ which claims to be “the Voice of the Resistance Movement” and which has been working under the general direction of the Jewish Agency has been supporting these organizations.” 126
This campaign of terror against Palestinian Arabs and the British reached such proportions that Churchill, a strong supporter of Zionist aims and at that time Prime Minister, stated in the House of Commons:
“If our dreams for zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past. If there is to be any hope of a peaceful and successful future for zionism, these wicked activities must cease and those responsible for them must be destroyed, root and branch;…
Referring to the appeal of the Jewish Agency to the Jewish community ‘… to cast out the members of this destructive band, to deprive them of all refuge and shelter, to resist their threats and to render all necessary assistance to the authorities in the prevention of terrorist acts and in the eradication of the terrorist organization’, he said:
“These are strong words but we must wait for these words to be translated into deeds. We must wait to see that not only the leaders but every man, woman and child of the Jewish community does his or her best to bring this terrorism to a speedy end.” 127
The “Biltmore Programme”
The Zionist Organization sought to strengthen its position by drawing support from the United States to substitute for that loss from Great Britain. In May 1942 the Jewish Agency Executive, meeting in New York, formally made public in what is known as the “Biltmore Programme”, the long-standing aim of the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine through unlimited immigration, declaring that:
“The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes “a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration;…
“The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world;…” 128
The Jewish Agency formally presented its demands to the British Government in May 1945 as follows:
“(1) That an immediate decision be announced to establish Palestine as a Jewish State.
“(2) That the Jewish Agency be invested with all necessary authority to bring to Palestine as many Jews as it may be found necessary and possible to settle, and to develop, fully and speedily, all the resources of the country – especially land and power resources.
“(3) That an international loan and other help be given for the transfer of the first million of Jews to Palestine, and for the economic development of the country.
“(4) That reparations in kind from Germany be granted to the Jewish people for the rebuilding of Palestine, and – as a first instalment – that all German property in Palestine be used for the resettlement of Jews from Europe.
“(5) That international facilities be provided for the exit and transit of all Jews who wish to settle in Palestine.” 129
The Zionist Organization formally endorsed the programme as its declared policy and concentrated its efforts in the United States:
“By November 1945, however, a new chapter in the history of Palestine was about to open. Zionist pressure in the United States, which the Government of that country had resisted during the course of the war, again made itself felt on the restoration of peace, taking as its text reports of American Congressmen … on the plight of Jews in camps for displaced persons.
“President Truman responded to it in a letter to Mr. Attlee, in which he called on the British Government to open the gates of Palestine to an additional 100,000 of the homeless Jews in Europe.” 130
As the war ended, the outcome of United States involvement was the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry to make recommendations on Palestine to both Governments. The Foreign Secretary of the new Labour Government in Great Britain, prevented by circumstance from implementing the 1939 White Paper, and faced with a situation where the League of Nations had been extinguished by the war, and succeeded by the United Nations, indicated future policy on the following lines:
“His Majesty’s Government cannot divest themselves of their duties and responsibilities under the Mandate while the Mandate continues … that is, until arrangements can be made – arrangements which it is hoped will be facilitated by the Report of the Committee of Enquiry – for placing Palestine under Trusteeship. The British Government … will prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations and, if possible, an agreed one.” 131
The Anglo-American Enquiry Committee
The 12-member Committee began work in January 1946 with a 120-day time-limit and finalized its report in April. As in the case of previous British Commissions, it surveyed the history of Palestine over the years since the Balfour Declaration, but concluded with a set of recommendations that virtually negated those by the British Commission.
Describing the Jewish view, the report observed:
“The Jews in Palestine are convinced that Arab violence paid. Throughout the Arab rising, the Jews in the national home, despite every provocation, obeyed the orders of their leaders and exercised a remarkable self-discipline. They shot, but only in self-defence; they rarely took reprisals on the Arab population. They state bitterly that the reward for this restraint was the Conference and the White Paper of 1939 …
“An immediate result of the success of Arab terrorism was the beginning of Jewish terrorism and, even more significant, a closing of the ranks, a tightening of the discipline, and a general militarization of Jewish life in Palestine. The Agency became the political headquarters of a citizen army which felt that at any moment it might have to fight for its very existence. Deprived, as he believed, both of his natural and of his legal rights, the Palestinian Jews began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. The dangerous belief was spread that not patience but violence was needed to achieve justice. The position of the moderates who urged self-restraint and a reliance on Britain’s pledged word was progressively undermined; the position of the extremists, eager to borrow a leaf from the Arab copy book, was progressively strengthened … 132
“The State within the State:
“The Jews have developed under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, a strong and tightly-woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish non-territorial State with its own executive and legislative organs, paralleled in many respects to the Mandatory Administration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National Home. This Jewish shadow government has ceased to co-operate with the Administration in the maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of terrorism …” 133
“A sinister aspect of recent years is the development of large illegal armed forces. The following is the structure as stated to us by the military authorities.
“The general organization is the ‘Haganah’. It is an illegal development of the former organization, in the days of Turkish rule, of armed watchmen who protected Jewish settlements. Today, it is completely organized, under a central control and with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women, viz:
. “A static force composed of settlers and townfolk, with an estimated strength of 40,000;
. “A field army, based on the Jewish Settlement Police and trained in more mobile operations, with an estimated strength of 16,000;
. “A full-time force (Palmach), permanently mobilized and provided with transport, with an estimated peace establishment of 2,000 and war establishment of some 6,000.
“It is known that the Haganah has been procuring arms over a period of years. Vast quantities have been obtained from the residue of the campaigns in the Middle East. Arms and ammunition are kept and concealed in specially constructed caches in settlements and towns …
“Apart from the Haganah, two further illegal armed organizations exist, both having cut away from the parent body. One is the ‘Irgun Tzeva’i Leumi’, which was formed in 1935 by dissident members of the Haganah. The other is the ‘Stern Group’ which broke away from the Irgun early in the war when the latter announced an ‘armistice’. The Irgun operated under its own secret command mainly in sabotage and terrorism against the Mandatory; its strength is estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000. The Stern Group engages in terrorism; its strength is said to be between 200 and 300 … (The British Government commented that these estimates were ‘on the conservative side’.)
“All three organizations to which reference has been made are illegal …” 134
The Palestinian Arab view was summed up as follows:
“… Stripped to the bare essentials, the Arab case is based upon the fact that Palestine is a country which the Arabs have occupied for more than a thousand years, and a denial of the Jewish historical claims to Palestine. In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs maintain, the British Government were giving away something that did not belong to Britain, and they have consistently argued that the Mandate conflicted with the Covenant of the League of Nations from which it derived its authority. The Arabs deny that the part played by the British in freeing them from the Turks gave Great Britain a right to dispose of their country. Indeed, they assert that Turkish was preferable to British rule, if the latter involves their eventual subjection to the Jews. They consider the Mandate a violation of their right of self-determination since it is forcing upon them an immigration which they do not desire and will not tolerate – an invasion of Palestine by the Jews …
“The suggestion that self-government should be withheld from Palestine until the Jews have acquired a majority seems outrageous to the Arabs. They wish to be masters in their own house. The Arabs were opposed to the idea of a Jewish national home even before the Biltmore Programme and the demand for a Jewish State. Needless to say, however, their opposition has become more intense and more bitter since that programme was adopted …” 135
The Anglo-American Committee rejected the idea of early independence for Palestine, whether partitioned or unified, considering that Palestinian Arab-Jewish hostility “would result in civil strife as might threaten the peace of the world” … The Committee appeared to anticipate that the hostility would eventually disappear (it did not elaborate how this would happen) and that until such time Palestine should become a United Nations trusteeship, pending which the Mandate should continue. It also appeared to anticipate that unity would somehow be maintained and recommended a declaration.
“That Jews shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine; that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State”. 136
and that the future government would be internationally guaranteed.
Among immediate measures the Committee recommended the rescinding of the 1940 Land Transfer Regulations so as to allow free transfers of land, and the immediate issue of 100,000 immigration certificates to the victims of Nazi persecution. It also recommended a declaration that terrorism would be suppressed, and called on the Jewish Agency to co-operate with the authorities to this end.
In effect the Committee recommended the continuation of a Mandate that the Mandatory Power had found unworkable. Immediately on publication of the Committee’s report, the United States President issued a statement in which, inter alia, he said:
“I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest despatch … I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939 including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish national home. It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carrying out of large scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population. In addition to those immediate objectives, the report deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement”. 137
However, the British Government stated that it could not accept the Committee’s recommendations immediately, and they would be examined further. In the course of this examination by British and American officials, a scheme was produced for two autonomous provinces in a Palestine that continued to be governed under a British High Commissioner. This scheme received the approval of the British Government, but not of the United States Government, and the issue remained unresolved.
Both Governments then requested the views of the independent Arab Governments which, in the meantime, had formed the Arab League in March 1945, envisioning the future membership of an eventually independent Palestine. Since the Palestinian Arabs could not present their own views, the Arab Governments actively advocated their case, and obtained assurances from the United States Government of consultation on any formula for Palestine. They now proposed a conference to discuss the Palestine problem.
The London Conference
The new London Conference met from September 1946 to February 1947, starting in the absence of representatives of either the Palestinian Arabs or Jews both of whom had refused the invitation. The Arab countries attending opposed the provincial scheme, and presented to the British Government their own proposals, with the following principal features:
(a) Palestine would be a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority, and would attain its independence as such after a short period of transition (two or three years) under British Mandate;
(b) Within this unitary State, Jews who had acquired Palestinian citizenship (for which the qualification would be 10 years’ residence in the country) would have full civil rights, equally with all other citizens of Palestine;
(c) Special safeguards would be provided to protect the religious and cultural rights of the Jewish community;
(d) The Jewish community would be entitled to a number of seats in the Legislative Assembly proportionate to the number of Jewish citizens (as defined) in Palestine, subject to the proviso that in no case would the number of Jewish representatives exceed one third of the total number of members;
(e) All legislation concerning immigration and the transfer of land would require the consent of the Arabs in Palestine as expressed by a majority of the Arab members of the Legislative Assembly; and the safeguards provided for the Jewish community would be alterable only with the consent of a majority of the Jewish members of the Legislative Assembly”. 138
On its side the Zionist Congress, meeting in Basle in 1947 five decades after the Basle Declaration, rejected the provincial autonomy scheme as “a travesty of Britain’s obligation under the Mandate”, also rejecting any form of trusteeship and demanding:
“(a) That Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the democratic world;
“(b) That the gates of Palestine be opened to Jewish immigration;
“(c) That the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for the upbuilding of the country”. 139
In February 1947, the British Government then presented its own proposals to the Arab representatives, by then joined by representatives of the Palestinian Arab Higher Executive, and to the Jewish Agency, which had entered into unofficial negotiations with the British Government. Both sides rejected the proposals. The Zionist Organization, fortified by new large-scale immigration, legal and illegal, well equipped forces, with the Jewish Brigade providing the nucleus, and powerful foreign support, was unprepared to compromise on its long-standing objective towards which it had advanced so close – a Jewish State in Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs, with the support of other Arab peoples, were determined to guard and hold their country, and to prevent it from being dominated further by continued Jewish immigration. The impasse was total, and large-scale violence was imminent in Palestine.
Faced with this situation, Great Britain decided to relinquish its mandatory role and to hand over the Palestine problem, created over three decades by the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, to the United Nations. On 18 February 1947, the Foreign Secretary stated in the House of Commons:
“His Majesty’s Government have … been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have quite clearly shown that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty’s Government are empowered, as “Mandatory”, to take. His Majesty’s Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.
“It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgement of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty’s Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken by the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab Plan, the Zionists’ aspirations, so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report, and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution”. 140
The transformation of Mandated Palestine
At the culmination of a quarter century of Mandatory rule, Palestine had been radically transformed in demographic terms. The population of Palestine had increased tremendously – from the 750,000 of the 1922 census to almost 1,850,000 at the end of 1946 – an increase of nearly 250 per cent. During this period the Jewish population had soared from 56,000 after the First World War to 84,000 in 1922 to 608,000 in 1946, an increase of about 725 per cent. 141 From constituting less than a tenth of the population in Palestine after the First World War, the Jewish community in 1947 constituted nearly a third. A good part of this was due to births within Palestine but legal immigration alone accounted for over 376,000, with illegal immigration being estimated at another 65,000 – a total of 440,000. 142 This Jewish population was primarily urban – about 70 per cent to 75 per cent in and around the cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa-Tel Aviv and Haifa. 143
Land holding patterns had also changed considerably. From the 650,000 dunums held by Jewish organizations in 1920, of the total land area of 26 million dunums, the figure at the end of 1946 had reached 1,625,000 dunums – an increase of about 250 per cent 144 and Jewish settlement had displaced large numbers of Palestinian Arab peasants. Even so, this area represented only 6.2 per cent of the total area of Palestine and 12 per cent of the cultivable land. 145
Ironically, the Palestinian Arabs were to suffer an experience similar to the Jews – a diaspora. That the Jews deserved sympathy was unquestionable. Even before the Nazi terror, this sympathy existed for the Jewish people among the Palestinian Arabs. The absence of racial rancour before the Balfour Declaration received emphasis in virtually every official report. Even as late as 1937, during the Palestinian rebellion for independence, the Royal Commission on Palestine said:
“An able Arab exponent of the Arab case told us that the Arabs throughout their history have not only been free from anti-Jewish sentiment but have also shown that the spirit of compromise is deeply rooted in their life. There is no decent-minded person, he said, who would not want to do everything humanly possible to relieve the distress of those persons, provided that it was not at the cost of inflicting a corresponding distress on another people.” 146
Arnold J. Toynbee who, before becoming recognized as an eminent world historian had dealt directly with the Palestine Mandate in the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1968:
“All through those 30 years, Britain (admitted) into Palestine, year by year, a quota of Jewish immigrants that varied according to the strength of the respective pressures of the Arabs and Jews at the time. These immigrants could not have come in if they had not been shielded by a British chevaux-de-frise. If Palestine had remained under Ottoman Turkish rule, or if it had become an independent Arab state in 1918, Jewish immigrants would never have been admitted into Palestine in large enough numbers to enable them to overwhelm the Palestinian Arabs in this Arab people’s own country. The reason why the State of Israel exists today and why today 1,500,000 Palestinian Arabs are refugees is that, for 30 years, Jewish immigration was imposed on the Palestinian Arabs by British military power until the immigrants were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well-armed to be able to fend for themselves with tanks and planes of their own. The tragedy in Palestine is not just a local one; it is a tragedy for the world, because it is an injustice that is a menace to the world’s peace.” 147
Notes:
1 Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), vol. II, p. xvi.
2 British Government, Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, Parliamentary Papers – Cmd. 5957 (1939).
3 Ibid., Report of a Committee on Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, Parliamentary Papers – Cmd. 5974 (1939), p. 48.
4 Ibid., p. 49.
5 Ibid., pp. 50 and 51.
6 Ibid., p. 11.
7 Ibid., p. 11. A historical footnote to the Anglo-Arab understandings appeared in the “Feisal Documents”, consisting of correspondence exchanges in 1919 between Sherif Husain’s son and Weizmann. It has been asserted that this correpondence (in English, which was unknown to Feisal) invalidated the preceding understandings.
However, it is evident that this later correspondence was not official, and the opinion of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is conclusive:
“The Feisal-Weizmann agreement did not acquire validity, since the condition attached (i.e. Arab independence) was not fulfilled at the time”. United Nations document A/364, report of the Special Committee on Palestine to the General Assembly, 3 September 1947, p. 35).
The question of the validity of these documents has been examined by an authority who possesses the original of the document. See Jeffries, J. M. N.: Palestine: The Reality (London, Longmans Green, 1939), pp. 248-257.
8 Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, vol. I (1914-1945), (New World Press, New York, 1970), p. xiv.
9 Laqueur, Walter, The Israel Arab Reader (New York, Bantam Books, 1976), pp. 6-11.
10 Herzl, Theodor, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New York, Herzl Press and Thomas Yosecoff, 1960), vol. I, p. 343.
11 Sykes, Christopher, Crossroads to Israel (London, Collins, 1965), p. 24.
12 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947), vol. I, p. 41.
13 Stein, Leonard, The Balfour Declaration (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 64.
14 Sokolow, Nahum, History of Zionism, 1600-1918 (London, Loggmans, Green, 1919), vol. I, p. xxi.
15 Kohn, Hans, “Ahad Ha’am: Nationalist with a Difference” in Smith, Gary (ed.): Zionism: The Dream and the Reality (New York, Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 31-32.
16 Weisgal, Meyer (ed.), Chaim Weizmann (New York, Dial Press, 1944), p. 131.
17 Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error (New York, Harper, 1949), p. 149.
18 Ibid., pp. 177-178.
19 Ibid., p. 181.
20 Ibid., p. 374.
21 Ibid., p. 375.
22 Ibid., p. 386.
23 Ibid., p. 416.
24 Ibid., p. 186.
25 Stein, Zionism (London, Ernest Benn, 1925), pp. 113-115.
26 Stein, op. cit., chapters 31, 34 and 35; Jeffries, J. M. N., Palestine: The Reality (London, Longman, 1939), pp. 163-171; and Robert John and Sami Hadawi, op. cit., pp. 75-91.
27 Jeffries, op. cit., p. 172.
28 Stein, op. cit., p. 552.
29 Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 207-208.
30 Stein, op. cit., p. 470.
31 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 207.
32 Jeffries, op. cit., p. 178.
33 Mallison, W. T., “The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law” in Abu Lughod, Ibrahim: The Transformation of Palestine (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 6.
34 Ibid., p. 67-69.
35 Temperley, Harold (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, vol. VI (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), p. 173.
36 British Government, British Public Record Office, Cabinet No. 24/24 (August 1917).
37 Weizmann, op. cit., p. 212.
38 Linowitz, Sol M., “The Legal Basis for the State of Israel” American Bar Association Journal, vol. 43, 1957, p. 522.
39 Cattan, Henry, Palestine and International Law (London, Longman, 1973), Mallison, op. cit.
40 Hurewitz, Op. cit., pp. xvi-xvii.
41 Weisga, Op. cit., p. 297.
42 British Government, Public Record Office Cabinet No. 27/23 (1918) (as reproduced in Ingrams, Doreen, The Palestinian Papers, London, John Murray, 1972).
43 Ibid., Foreign Office No. 371/3398 (1918), op. cit.
44 Ibid., Foreign Office No. 800/215 (1919).
45 Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening (New York, Putnam, 1946), p. 283.
46 Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 39.
47 Ibid., p. 45.
48 United States Government, Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference (Washington, 1944), vol. I, pp. 1-14.
49 Nutting, Anthony, The Arabs (London, Hollis and Carter, 1964), p. 68.
50 United States Government, op. cit., vol. XII, pp. 780-781.
51 Ibid., vol. XII, pp. 793 ff.
52 British Government, op. cit., Foreign Office No. 800/217 (1919).
53 Ibid., Foreign Office No. 371/4183 (1919).
54 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine (London, Chatham House, 1946), p. 13.
55 British Government, op. cit., Foreign Office No. 371/5114.
56 Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 279-280.
57 British Government, op. cit., Foreign Office No. 371/5199.
58 Ibid., Foreign Office No. 371/5245.
59 Ibid., Foreign Office No. 371/5248.
60 British Government, Hansard’s Reports, House of Lords, 21 June 1922, p. 1025.
61 Esco Foundation, op. cit., vol. I, p. 252.
62 British Government, Palestine Royal Commission: Report – Cmd. 5479 (1937), p. 108.
63 Cattan, op. cit., pp. 30-33.
64 British Government, Palestine: Statement of Policy – Cmd. 1700 (1922), pp. 19-20.
65 Report of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (A/648), p. 21.
66 Moore, John Norton, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton, University Press, 1974), pp. 22 ff.
67 British Government, The Political History of Palestine under the British Administration (Memorandum to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), Jerusalem, 1947, p. 3.
68 Ibid., Palestine Royal Commission Report – Cmd. 5479 (1937), p. 279.
69 Ibid., Report and General Statement of the Census of 1922, Jerusalem, 1922, p. 3.
70 Ibid., Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances – Cmd. 3530 (1930), pp. 104-105.
71 Palestine, Government of, A Survey of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1946, vol. I, p. 244.
72 British Government, Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development – Cmd. 3686, p. 39.
73 Ibid., p. 23.
74 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
75 Ibid., p. 54.
76 Ibid., p. 55.
77 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
78 Ibid., Palestine: Statement of Policy, Parliamentary Papers – Cmd. 3692 (1930), pp. 4-5.
79 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
80 Ibid., pp. 18-21.
81 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
82 Moore, op. cit., pp. 143-149 (text of letter).
83 Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 335.
84 RIIA, Great Britain and Palestine, p. 61.
85 British Government, Palestine Royal Commission: Report, Cmd. 5479 (1937), p. 50.
86 Ibid., Palestine: Disturbances in May 1921, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Cmd. 1540 (1921), p. 59.
87 Ibid., Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929, Cmd. 3530 (1930), p. 150.
88 Ibid., pp. 124-131.
89 British Government, Palestine Royal Commission: Report, Cmd. 5479 (1937), p. 82.
90 Ibid., pp. 84-87.
91 Ibid., pp. 91-92.
92 Ibid., p. 105. An account of the revolt can be found in this report at pp. 96-106. See also RIIA Great Britain and Palestine, pp. 88-97.
93 RIIA, op. cit., p. 115.
94 Ibid., pp. 116-118.
95 The Sunday Times (London), 12 April 1959.
96 British Government, Palestine Royal Commission: Report – Cmd. 5479 (1937), pp. 41-42.
97 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
98 Ibid., p. 58.
99 Ibid., p. 104.
100 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
101 Ibid., p. 124.
102 Ibid, p. 370.
103 Ibid., pp. 130-132.
104 Ibid., p. 373.
105 Ibid., pp. 375-376.
106 British Government, Palestine Partition Commission: Report, Cmd. 5854 (1938).
107 Esco Foundation, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 855-856.
108 British Government, Statement of Policy, Cmd. 5893 (1938).
109 Ibid., Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019 (1939).
110 Translated from Pic, Pierre, “Le Régime du Mandat d’après le Traité de Versailles”: Revue générale de Droit International Public, vol. XXX, p. 334.
111 International Court of Justice, “Advisory Opinion regarding the Status of South-West Africa”, ICJ Reports. (1950), p. 132.
112 Wright, Quincy, “Sovereignty of the Mandates” American Journal of International Law, vol. 17 (1923), p. 696.
113 League of Nations, Responsibilities of the League arising out of Article 22 (Mandates), Doc. No. 20/48/161, Geneva, 1920, p. 3.
114 Report to Council on the 5th Extraordinary Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C. 661. 1924 VI, Geneva, 1924, p. 4.
115 Report to the Council on the 17th Extraordinary Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C.355 (1) M.147 (1), 1930, VI, Geneva, 1930, pp. 139-140.
116 Ibid., p. 143.
117 Minutes of the 17th Extraordinary Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C.355 M.147, 1930 (VI), p. 49.
118 Report to the Council on the 32nd Extraordinary Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C.330 M.222, 1937 (VI), Geneva, 1937, pp. 226-228.
119 Ibid., pp. 229-230.
120 Report to the Council on the 34th Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C.216 M.219, 1938, VI, Geneva, 1938, p. 228.
121 Report to the Council on the 36th Session of the PMC, Doc. No. C.170 M.100, 1939, VI, Geneva, 1939, p. 275.
122 British Government, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, Cmd. 3686 (1930), pp. 120, 125-126.
123 RIIA. Great Britain and Palestine, p. 132, fn.
124 British Government, The Political History of Palestine (Memorandum to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 30.
125 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
126 British Government, Palestine: Statement Relating to Acts of Violence, Cmd. 6873 (1946), p. 3.
127 British Government, Survey of Palestine, vol. I, p. 73.
128 Laqueur, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
129 RIIA, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
130 Ibid., p. 139.
131 Ibid., p. 142.
132 British Government, Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, Cmd. 6808 (1946), pp. 26-28.
133 Ibid., p. 34.
134 Ibid., pp. 39-41.
135 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
136 Ibid., pp. 1-10.
137 British Government, The Political History of Palestine, p. 35.
138 Ibid., p. 38.
139 Ibid., p. 39.
140 Ibid., p. 40.
141 Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine – Supplement, Jerusalem (1947), p. 10.
142 Ibid., pp. 17, 23.
143 Abu Lughod, Janet, “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine” in Abu-Lughod, op. cit., p. 153.
144 Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine – Supplement, p. 30.
145 Ruedy, John, “Dynamics of Land Alienation” in Abu-Lughod, op. cit., p. 134.
146 British Government, Palestine Royal Commission – Report, Cmd. 5479 (1937), p. 395.
147 Robert John and Sami Hadawi, op. cit., pp. xiv-xv.
Annexes
Sykes-Picot Agreement – Extract and Map
“Excluded areas” under Hussein-McMahon Correspondence Map
Ottoman Administrative Districts – Map
Article 22 of Covenant of the League of Nations – Text
The Palestine Mandate
Zionist Claims for Palestine – Map
Royal Commission’s Partition Plan “A” – Map
Palestine Partition Commission Plan “B” – Map
Palestine Partition Commission Plan “C” – Map
Annex I – The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916
(Extract)
“It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments –
1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
2. That in the blue area France, and the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.
3. That in the brown area there shall be established in an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.”
1
Annex II – “Excluded areas” under Hussein-McMahon Correspondence Map
2
The areas “reserved” under the Hussein-McMahon correspondence (Source: Jeffries: Palestine – The Reality)
Annex III – Ottoman Administrative Districts – Map
3
Palestine and Syrua in 1915
(Showing Ottoman administrative units)
(Based on maps in Cmd. 5957, 1939)
Annex IV – Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919
Article 22. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the formance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.
In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
Annex V – The Mandate for Palestine, 24 July 1922
“The Council of the League of Nations:
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and
Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and
Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and
Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and
Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and
Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;
Confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:
Article 1
The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.
Article 2
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
Article 3
The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.
Article 4
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.
The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
Article 5
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.
Article 6
The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.
Article 7
The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.
Article 8
The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire shall not be applicable in Palestine.
Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.
Article 9
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Waqfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.
Article 10
Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.
Article 11
The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full powers to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.
The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.
Article 12
The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine, and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.
Article 13
All responsibility in connexion with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.
Article 14
A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.
Article 15
The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.
The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.
Article 16
The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the
enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.
Article 17
The Administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.
Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.
The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.
Article 18
The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.
Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.
Article 19
The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.
Article 20
The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.
Article 21
The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations;…
Article 22
English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.
Article 23
The Administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.
Article 24
The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.
Article 25
In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.
Article 26
The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Article 27
The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.
Article 28
In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.
The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.
DONE AT LONDON the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.”1
1 The Palestine mandate came into force on 29 September 1922.
Annex VI – Zionist Claims for Palestine – Map
6
“Palestine” claimed by World Zionist Organization, 1919
(Source: Alan R. Taylor, in Abu-Lughod, The Transformation of Palestine)
Annex VII – Royal Commission’s Partition Plan “A” – Map
7
PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN A, 1937
(Royal Commission’s Partition Plan, 1937, as elaborated by Palestine Partition Commission, 1938)
(Based on map in Cmd. 5854, 1938)
Annex VIII – Palestine Partition Commission Plan “B” – Map
8
PALESTINE PARTITION PLAN B, 1938
(Proposed by Palestine Partition Commission, 1938)
(Based on map in Cmd. 5854, 1938)
Annex IX – Palestine Partition Commission Plan “C” – Map
10
https://www.un.org/unispal/history/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-i-1917-1947/
Prepared for, and under the guidance of,
the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People
The Origins and Evolution
of the Palestine Problem:
1917-1988
PART II
1947-1977
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the First World War, Palestine was among the several former Ottoman Arab territories which were made mandated territories by the League of Nations. The relevant provisions of the League’s Covenant (Article 22) referred to these territories as
“certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire [which] have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative assistance and advice by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory”.
All but one of these Mandated Territories (categorized as class
“A” Mandates) whose independence was provisionally recognized became fully independent States, as anticipated. The exception was Palestine where, instead of being limited to
“the rendering of administrative assistance and advice” the Mandate had as a primary aim the implementation of the
“Balfour Declaration” issued by the British Government in 1917, conveying that Government’s support for
“the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. This commitment was included in the mandate for Palestine, formally allotted in 1922 to Great Britain by the League of Nations, without having ascertained the wishes of the Palestinian people, as required by the Covenant.
During the 25 years of the Palestine Mandate, from 1922 to 1947, large-scale Jewish immigration from abroad, mainly from Eastern Europe took place, the numbers swelling in the 1930s with the notorious Nazi persecution of Jewry. Over this period the Jewish population of Palestine, composed principally of immigrants, increased from less than 10 per cent in 1917 to over 30 per cent in 1947. Palestinian demands for independence and resistance to Jewish immigration led to a rebellion in 1937, followed by continuing terrorism and violence from both sides during and immediately after the Second World War. Great Britain, as the Mandatory Power, tried to implement various formulas to bring independence to a land ravaged by violence. A partition scheme, a formula for provincial autonomy, a unified independent Palestine were all considered and abandoned, and in 1947, Great Britain in frustration turned the problem over to the United Nations.
I. THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE
The United Nations took up the question of Palestine in February 1947, on the request of Great Britain, the Mandatory Power which had governed Palestine since 1917, first as an occupying Power and then under a mandate from the League of Nations in 1922. By this time all countries in the Middle East formerly under mandates were independent. The only exception was Palestine, a sui generis where the transition to independence had been impeded by violence arising out of the self-contradictory terms of the Mandate. Where in principle it should have provided a transition to independence, the Mandate’s commitment to establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine had created a situation where conflict between Arabs and Jews in the area about the character of the future Palestinian State complicated the process. British attempts to resolve the issue by the partition of Palestine into two independent States or by relinquishing the mandate with the consequent emergence of an independent unified Palestine had failed in the face of the opposition of the Palestinian Arabs to the former plan and of the Zionist movement to the latter. Faced with a situation over which it was losing control, the British Government turned the problem over to the United Nations on the ground that the conflicting obligations assumed under the Mandate were irreconcilable.
The Palestine question in the United Nations
The British Government’s decision in February 1947 to place the Palestine question before the United Nations was followed by several weeks of examining the various alternatives and the difficulties they entailed. For the Security Council to take up the issue could involve the veto. Another appropriate forum was the Trusteeship Council, but this would require a trusteeship agreement with Great Britain in a role similar to that which it was trying to shed. The eventual decision was to move the question in the General Assembly.
Meanwhile, violence continued to spread in Palestine as Zionist terrorist groups, now on the offensive, stepped up their attacks and sabotage. Illegal immigration into Palestine increased sharply. With a regular session several months away, the British Government, under the pressure of violence in Palestine, requested a special session of the General Assembly to consider the appointment of a special committee
“to make recommendations … concerning the future government of Palestine”. 1/
The question of independence for Palestine
The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly convened on 28 April 1947 to consider the question of Palestine, electing Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil as its President. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria had launched a concerted effort to obtain a substantive debate on the issue of independence for Palestine by addressing identical requests that the Assembly place on its agenda an additional item reading:
“The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence”. 2/ The Secretariat had also received requests from the Jewish Agency in Palestine, as well as other Zionist and Jewish organizations, requesting to be heard by the Assembly. Both matters were taken up by the General Committee.
The Arab countries argued forcefully, in support of their request, that the League of Nations having recognized the provisional independence of class
“A” Mandates, the United Nations could not avoid the issue of independence for Palestine. The entire history of Mandated Palestine was recounted, the Balfour Declaration and the Covenant analysed, the various Commission reports cited. The Lebanese delegate declared:
“Moreover, if you do not envisage independence now as a possibility, do you not really prejudge it yourself? Are you not really saying in effect that the United Nations itself – not a certain Power, but the United Nations – is really so afraid of envisaging the ultimate possibility of independence for Palestine that it is not even willing to discuss it in plenary session in this Assembly? I think that is a far more grievous prejudgement of the ultimate issue of this case than if we simply said at the present moment that we shall discuss this question with that ultimate end in view and bring forth all arguments concerning it.
“Surely the United Nations is above any one particular Government or State. Therefore, it cannot only meet the wishes of one Government, or two, or even a combination of Governments. Surely it is so detached and so far above particular Governments as to be able, in its own detachment, to envisage and discuss every possibility, including the possibility of independence.” 3/
With the majority of the permanent members opposed, it became evident that the item proposed by the Arab countries would not succeed. Egypt stated it would not press for a vote, but the Chairman ruled that a vote was mandatory, and the proposal was rejected in the General Committee 4/ and a few days later again in the plenary. 5/ The British request was inscribed in the agenda for the special session.
Palestinian and Zionist representation
The Jewish Agency’s request to be heard was based on the ground that while the Arab States were advocates for the Palestinian case, the Jewish case was unrepresented. This request was pressed in the strongest terms by Poland, claiming a special interest since almost half the Jewish immigrants in Palestine were from Poland, and other East European States. The matter faced complications, since there was no provision for non-governmental organizations to appear before the Assembly, and no precedent. The Secretary-General explained:
“This is not the first time we have had similar requests to be heard in the Assembly in connection with items on the agenda. They have always been turned down by the former President … without consultation with the General Committee because he considered that the administration of the Assembly was in his hands. The question has never been pressed … Representatives of non-governmental organizations have never been heard in the Assembly with regard to items on the agenda.
“I should like to explain this because, if the General Committee recommends that this special session of the Assembly allow a hearing of non-governmental organizations in the Assembly, it will be a change from the practice which we have followed until now …” 6/
Nevertheless the General Assembly directed the First Committee to accept the Jewish Agency’s request to present its case. The Jewish Agency was informed of the decision by a telegram from the President of the General Assembly. The First Committee was also directed to consider
“other communications of a similar character” that had been or might be received by the United Nations.
This action by the Assembly led directly into the question of the request by the Palestinian Arabs to be heard. In keeping with the General Assembly resolution, the Palestinian request was referred to the First Committee and drew immediate protest by telegram from Palestine:
“We have the honour to refer to our letter dated 5 May requesting to be heard on the Palestine problem and to convey to you the following. Our request, which was submitted on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, who constitute the great majority of the population of the country, was sent with other requests to the First Committee for decision, while the request of the Jewish Agency, which represents an alien and imposed minority, was accepted directly by the General Assembly. This is not in keeping with the position and rights of the Arabs of Palestine nor with the principles of justice and democracy. Although the Palestine Arab delegation cannot believe that such was the intention of the honourable members of the General Assembly, yet the fact and implications of the resolution are such that the Palestine Arab delegation, whilst reserving its future attitude, finds no alternative but to withdraw its request for a hearing. At the same time, we wish to put on record before the United Nations that the Arabs have never recognized and will never recognize the mandate over Palestine or any act or body deriving from it. We shall be grateful to Your Excellency if you will convey this communication to the General Assembly.
“The Palestine Arab delegation …” 7/
This Palestinian protest was against the international recognition granted to the Jewish Agency by the Assembly, similar to that accorded to it by the League of Nations, the Palestinian Arabs being relegated to an inferior position in each case. The Arab States also protested, and the matter was settled by the First Committee recommending to the Assembly a resolution reading:
“… the decision of the First Committee to grant a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee gives a correct interpretation of the Assembly’s intentions”. 8/
The Arab Higher Committee then decided to appear before the First Committee.
The discussion on the Special Committee
The two complex questions facing the First Committee, with Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada in the chair, were the composition of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and its terms of reference, with markedly differing approaches reflected in the two major draft resolutions to come under discussion.
The first, from Argentina, proposed a Special Committee of 11 members, consisting of the permanent members of the Security Council, an Arab State and five other States chosen by lot to ensure representation of all regions. The Committee would hear British, Arab and Jewish representatives, and would have
“the widest powers both to record facts and to make recommendations”. 9/ The second, from the United States, proposed a Special Committee of seven “neutral” States, the permanent members of the Security Council as well as the Arab States being excluded. The task of the Committee, which would be authorized “to sit wherever it may consider necessary or desirable for the fulfilment of its tasks”, would be:
“To assemble, analyse, and collate all pertinent data on the question; to receive testimony from interested Governments and from such non-governmental organizations and individuals as the Committee in its discretion may deem appropriate; to study the various issues which are involved and to submit to the next regular session of the General Assembly such proposals for the solution of the problem of Palestine as it may determine to be useful for the effective consideration of the problem by the General Assembly.” 10/
A central question in the discussion on the Special Committee was whether the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe should be linked with the Palestine problem. A European delegate stressed the importance of separating the two:
“… the difficulty of finding a just and satisfactory solution to the Palestine question are increased by the linking together of two problems which are not necessarily interdependent.
“The first problem is the question of the future status of Palestine; the second problem is the question of the homeless Jews in Europe. These two problems are usually linked together in every discussion of the Palestine question. It is taken for granted that the only solution of the humanitarian problem of Jewish homelessness is immigration to Palestine and it is thus dependent upon a solution of the political question of the future status of Palestine.
“It must be manifest to everybody that the only effect of linking together these two problems is to render more difficult the solution of each. It is evident that the appalling tragedy of the homeless Jews in Europe makes it much more urgent to find a solution to the question of Palestine, as long as Palestine is considered to be the only place where Jewish refugees can find a home.
“This problem of Jewish homelessness can only be eased if the Member States will grant Jewish refugees a temporary or a permanent home.” 11/
The Syrian delegate stressed the Arab view on this issue on the following day, when the delegation, making the above statement had changed its position:
“The representative … wishes to connect the question of the displaced persons and refugees in Europe with the question of Palestine. We find that there is no way to connect the two …
“One of the resolutions concerning the refugees and displaced persons in Europe … states clearly that the resettlement of displaced persons should not be undertaken in any Non-Self-Governing Territory without the consent of the population of that Territory, and that resettlement should not be contemplated in any place where friendly relations between States would thereby be disturbed.
“The organization set up to care for refugees is already established, and it is going on with its work. The resettlement or repatriation of the refugees and displaced persons in Europe should be considered by that organization, and not by the Special Committee which is to be established here.
“The question of Palestine is altogether independent and separate from the question of persecuted persons of Europe. The Arabs of Palestine are not responsible in any way for the persecution of the Jews in Europe. That persecution is condemned by the whole civilized world, and the Arabs are among those who sympathize with the persecuted Jews. However, the solution of that problem cannot be said to be a responsibility of Palestine, which is a tiny country and which had taken enough of those refugees and other people since 1920 … Any delegation which wishes to express its sympathy has more room in its country than has Palestine, and has better means of taking in these refugees and helping them”. 12/
On the other hand, the representative of the Jewish Agency, by now participating in United Nations proceedings, insisted that the two questions be linked and that the Special Committee visit Europe:
“The members of the Committee will ask themselves, I am sure, why shiploads of helpless Jewish refugees – men, women, and children who have been through all the hells of Nazi Europe – are being driven away from the shores of the Jewish national home by a Mandatory Government which assumed, as its prime obligation, the task of facilitating Jewish immigration into that country”.
“If it is granted that the Jewish people are in Palestine as of right, then all the implications and corollaries of that premise must be accepted. The foremost is that Jews must be allowed to resettle in Palestine in unlimited numbers, provided only they do not displace or worsen the lot of the existing inhabitants who are also there as of right. If that basic premise is not granted, then there is very little to discuss …” 13/
The United States draft (somewhat amended) was approved after the Argentinian draft was withdrawn, and the mission of the Special Committee was approved in broad terms:
“The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine”. 14/
While avoiding specific reference to the refugee situation in Europe, the Special Committee was authorized to conduct investigations anywhere it considered necessary, thus assuring an indirect linkage of the Jewish refugee issue to the future of Palestine.
During the discussion in the Committee, the Soviet and Polish representatives proposed amendments to its terms of reference requiring it to submit proposals on the question of establishing “the independent democratic State of Palestine”, both amendments being defeated. 15/ In the plenary, however, the Soviet representative referred to the possibility of the partition of Palestine:
“The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration …
“Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem …
“If this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs … then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews …” 16/
The Arab delegations strongly protested the omission of reference to an independent Palestinian State in the terms of reference of the Special Committee:
“… by the stroke of a pen the reference to the independence of Palestine has been in effect removed, the Committee failing even to conform to the spirit of the request of the British Government as embodied in its letter of appeal to the United Nations for a settlement of this problem, we feel indeed that the First Committee has exceeded its powers and was not within its rights when it decided to delete the sentence referring to ‘the future government of Palestine’ and replaced it by a vague and broad reference to ‘the question of Palestine;…’” 17/
The case for the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs had fared badly in the special session. UNSCOP’s charter contained no reference to the termination of the Mandate and independence for Palestine. The issue of Jewish European refugees had been linked with Palestine.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE
The Special Committee held preliminary meetings in New York, electing Justice Emil Sandström of Sweden as Chairman, and reached Palestine in mid-June 1947. The Arab League’s Secretary General had indicated that the League would co-operate, but the Palestinian leadership in the Arab Higher Committee decided against participation, informing the Special Committee by cable:
“… Arab Higher Committee Palestine desire convey to United Nations that after thoroughly studying the deliberations and circumstances under which the Palestine fact-finding Committee was formed and the discussions leading to terms of reference they resolved that Palestine Arabs should abstain from collaboration and desist from appearing before said committee for following main reasons – firstly United Nations refusal adopt natural course of inserting termination Mandate and declaration independence in agenda special United Nations session and in terms of reference secondly failure detach Jewish world refugees from Palestine problem thirdly replacing interests Palestine inhabitants by insertion world religious interests although these are not subject of contention – furthermore Palestine Arabs natural rights are self evident and cannot continue to be subject to investigation but deserve to be recognized on the basis of principles of United Nations Charter.” 18/
The Special Committee Chairman appealed by radio broadcast and later by letter for co-operation from the Arab High Committee which kept to its decision of non-co-operation.
The Jewish case before the Special Committee
Jewish organizations, on the other hand, extended full co-operation, submitting over a hundred documents, some lengthy and detailed, to the Special Committee compared to two brief papers presented by the Arab States. The Jewish Agency appointed two liaison officers with the Special Committee on the latter’s request. The Zionist terrorist groups assured the Special Committee of safety.
The Jewish case was presented by numerous representations over several hearings. Mr. David Ben-Gurion, one of the chief Zionist advocates, charged Great Britain, which, under the “Churchill policy” had built up the “national home”, of undermining Jewish aspirations:
“We are a small, weak, defenceless people, and we know that there can be no security for us, neither as individuals nor as a people, neither in the Diaspora nor in our homeland, even after we become an independent nation in our own State, as long as the whole human family is not united in peace and good will;…
“A great people and the entire civilized world recognized our right to reconstitute our national home here. And now the same Government that was charged with that sacred trust of promoting the Jewish national home has put us into a territorial ghetto;…
“But all this does not change the fundamental fact that the Mandate for Palestine has not been implemented, its primary purpose has not been carried out and was very often obstructed even before the White Paper. The Mandatory in Palestine failed not because Jews and Arabs did not co-operate, but because the Mandatory refused to co-operate with the Mandate …” 19/
Upon being questioned on the Jewish Agency’s position on a partition of Palestine, Ben-Gurion was non-committal:
“… we stand by the attitude we took last year, that we will be ready to consider the question of a Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine, and that we are entitled to Palestine as a whole.” 20/
He also said that if a United Nations decision in favour of Zionist aims provoked violent protest from the Palestinian Arabs, “… we will take care of ourselves.” 21/
Dr. Weizmann, appearing in his personal capacity, was more amenable to accepting partition:
“… if I, personally, came to the conclusion that partition is the best, I did so by a process of elimination. I know that one speaks of a bi-national State; a sort of federal solution; … I do not think that they have advantages of partition which is final, definite, and crystallized. Anything that will leave an uncertainty will leave room for pulling by the two forces. The Jews will want to get something better. The Arabs will want to push us out of what we have. Therefore, I believe although partition means a sort of Solomon’s judgement, it is under the circumstances perhaps the better …” 22/
As was to be expected, the British Government strongly refuted the Zionist allegations against them:
“… The general theme of Mr. Ben-Gurion’s statements is an attack on Britain and a charge of failing to fulfil international pledges. He says … that the Administrations in Palestine and London were biased against the Mandate from the beginning and did everything they could do to obstruct it. The fact that the national home could never have been established without the direct assistance and support that Britain has given to it, with the expenditure of British resources and British lives, apparently requires to be restated, in these simple terms. The denial of this fact, the concealment of the truth and the failure to recognise that there was ever any reason for granting the most extreme Jewish demands in the face of bitter opposition from the inhabitants of the country must appear to all impartial observers as at least a gross self-deception …” 23/
The Palestinian Arab case
Having heard the Zionist position and also the British Government’s views, the Special Committee again urged Palestinian and Arab spokesmen to present their case. The Arab Higher Committee of Palestine repeated its refusal to appear before the Special Committee, commenting that it would present the Palestinian case to the General Assembly. The Arab League states agreed to meet the Special Committee in Lebanon, the only exception being Transjordan, which would meet the Special Committee only in Amman.
The main points of the presentation of the Arab case are summarized in these words:
“… the question of creation of a Jewish State cannot be taken without two other connected problems; that is, the question of immigration and that of foreign subsidies. A Jewish State would, of course, be master of the immigration into Palestine. It might decide that immigration would be without limits and the economic argument, which would be that it is impossible for a very large number of people to live in a very small territory, would become void if the Jewish State can still reckon with foreign financial support. Therefore, with the doors of the country wide open to immigration, and financial support from outside, the Jewish State would become extremely populated. Therefore, it might not be 1 million, but 2, 3, 4 million, since it would not depend on its own economy or its own produc- tion. As soon as it goes beyond a certain limit in numbers, it is no longer a State where Jews can come and be safe but it becomes a bridgehead against the Arab world. This is what we absolutely want to avoid.
“… The destiny of Palestine cannot be decided by outsiders. It is against the Charter. The destiny of Palestine shall be decided by its own people. The people of Palestine shall decide the destiny of Palestine …
“Zionism has no rightful claim on Palestine. In the implementation of their programme, they have exclusively relied on the support of a foreign power régime conducting itself arbitrarily and unjustly. Their forces have been forces of repression.” 24/
The Egyptian delegate expressed a particular concern:
“… the Egyptian Government certainly views with grave concern the establishment of Jewish colonies near the Egyptian frontier. That is only an indication of the first step towards the execution of Jewish ambitions towards Sinai which is already mentioned in the different proclamations, and certainly the Egyptian Government has taken measures against this danger which is getting nearer and nearer to the Egyptian territories;…” 25/
A delegation of the Special Committee visited Amman, and ascertained that Transjordan fully supported the Arab position on the Palestine question.
The Special Committee’s visit to Europe
From Palestine the Special Committee moved to Geneva, from where a sub-committee was sent to investigate refugee camps in Germany and Austria. The sub-committee reported:
“The alternatives to resettlement, namely, repatriation or absorption into the German or Austrian communities were investigated. The prevailing reaction among the persons questioned, many of whom had returned to their former place of residence in order to trace relatives and property, was a refusal to repatriate. The reasons given were based on a fear of growing anti-Semitism … The feeling of anti-Semitism is strong among the native population, especially towards the Jews now living in assembly centres.
“The question arises whether the determination to go to Palestine would change substantially if real prospects of resettlement in other countries were offered. The overwhelming majority of the persons questioned affirmed that they would not consider resettlement in any country except Palestine, declaring that they would rather wait indefinitely until the opportunity to go to Palestine came or attempt illegal passage …
“As a matter of fact, it is probable that the state of mind prevailing in centres is due to a combination of factors which all react upon one another. There is undoubtedly a certain element of propaganda, and there is also an element of self-persuasion … As regards propaganda, some actual evidence was seen in the form of posters and written material at some of the centres. In particular, at one centre a poster was noted with the inscription ‘Palestine – a Jewish State for the Jewish people’ and also a large pictorial design showing Jews from eastern Europe on the march towards Palestine shown as a much larger area than the present geographical limits …” 26/
In a separate note, a member of the Special Committee recorded:
“… It was admitted to us by Mr. Sommerfelt of the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization that considerable propaganda is being carried on by or on behalf of the Jewish Agency in the camps for displaced persons with the object of inducing Jews to immigrate into Palestine, although he found that those staying in these camps as a general rule agree, if they are afforded opportunities, to go to places other than Palestine …” 27/
The Special Committee concluded its three-month investigations by August 1947, and its report summarized the Jewish and Arab cases as follows:
“The Jewish case
“The Jewish case, as herein considered, is mainly the case advanced by the Jewish Agency which, by the terms of the Mandate, has a special status with regard to Jewish interests in Palestine.
“The Jewish case seeks the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In the Jewish case, the issues of the Jewish State and unrestricted immigration are inextricably interwoven. On the one hand, the Jewish State is needed in order to assure a refuge for the Jewish immigrants who are clamoring to come to Palestine from the displaced persons camps and from other places … On the other hand, a Jewish State would have urgent need of Jewish immigrants in order to affect the present great numerical preponderance of Arabs over Jews in Palestine. The Jewish case frankly recognizes the difficulty involved in creating at the present time a Jewish State in all of Palestine in which Jews would, in fact, be only a minority, or in part of Palestine in which, at best, they could immediately have only a slight preponderance. Thus, the Jewish case lays great stress on the right of Jewish immigration, for political as well as humanitarian reasons. Special emphasis is therefore placed on the right of Jews to ‘return’ to Palestine …” 28/
The summary of the Arab case was as follows:
“The Arab case
“The Arab case seeks the immediate creation of an independent Palestine west of the Jordan as an Arab State …
“They postulate the ‘natural’ right of the Arab majority to remain in undisputed possession of the country, since they are and have been for many centuries in possession of the land. This claim of a ‘natural’ right is based on the contention that the Arab connection with Palestine has continued uninterruptedly from early historical times.
“The Arabs also claim ‘acquired’ rights, based on the general promises and pledges officially made to the Arab people in the course of the First World War …
“In the Arab view, these undertakings, taken collectively, provide a firm recognition of Arab political rights in Palestine which, they contend, Great Britain is under a contractual obligation to accept and uphold – an obligation thus far unfulfilled …
“The Arabs have persistently adhered to the position that the Mandate for Palestine, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, is illegal. The Arab States have refused to recognize it as having any validity …” 29/
The Special Committee, however, had been unable to agree on recommendations. A majority of members (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two States that would be politically separate and independent, but would administer a unified economy. Jerusalem would be an international city. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent Palestine as a federated State with Jerusalem as its capital. Australia did not support either proposal.
The only unanimous agreement was on the termination of the Mandate, the principle of independence, and a United Nations role:
“The Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date …
“Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date …
“During the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations …
“The General Assembly (should) undertake the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the dispersed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centres, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem;…” 30/
The justification for the majority plan of partition with economic union was presented as follows:
“The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties …
“The basic conflict in Palestine is a clash of two intense nationalisms. Regardless of the historical origins of the conflict, the rights and wrongs of the promises and counter-promises, and the international intervention incident to the Mandate, there are now in Palestine some 650,000 Jews and some 1,200,000 Arabs who are dissimilar in their ways of living and, for the time being, separated by political interests which render difficult full and effective political co-operation among them, whether voluntary or induced by constitutional arrangements.
“The partition solution provides that finality which is a most urgent need in the solution. Every other proposed solution would tend to induce the two parties to seek modification in their favour by means of persistent pressure. The grant of independence to both States, however, would remove the basis for such efforts.
“Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the actual Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Full political co-operation would be indispensable to the effective functioning of any single-State scheme, such as the federal State proposal, except in those cases which frankly envisage either an Arab or a Jewish-dominated State.
“Partition is the only means available by which political and economic responsibility can be placed squarely on both Arabs and Jews, with the prospective result that, confronted with responsibility for bearing fully the consequences of their own actions, a new and important element of political amelioration would be introduced. In the proposed federal State solution, this factor would be lacking.
“Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary co-operation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State. The creation of a Jewish State under a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this issue from the arena of conflict.
“It is recognized that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition would be lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State …” 31/
The justifications for the minority recommendation of a federal independent State were:
“It is incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.
“It is recognized that Palestine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, that both these peoples have had an historic association with it, and that both play vital roles in the economic and cultural life of the country.
“This being so, the objective is a dynamic solution which will ensure equal rights for both Arabs and Jews in their common State, and which will maintain that economic unity which is indispensable to the life and development of the country.
“The basic assumption underlying the views herein expressed is that the proposal of other members of the Committee for a union under artificial arrangements designed to achieve essential economic and social unity after first creating political and geographical disunity by partition, is impracticable, unworkable, and could not possibly provide for two reasonably viable States …
“It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the international community not to bend every effort in this direction. Support for the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Nations would in itself be an important factor in encouraging co-operation and collaboration between the two peoples, and would contribute significantly to the creation of that atmosphere in which the will to co-operate can be cultivated. In this regard, it is realized that the moral and political prestige of the United Nations is deeply involved …
“While the problem of Jewish immigration is … closely related to the solution of the Palestine question, it cannot be contemplated that Palestine is to be considered in any sense as a means of solving the problem of world Jewry. In direct and effective opposition to any such suggestion are the twin factors of limited area and resources and vigorous and persistent opposition of the Arab people, who constitute the majority population of the country.
“For these reasons, no claim to a right of unlimited immigration of Jews into Palestine, irrespective of time, can be entertained. It follows, therefore, that no basis could exist for any anticipation that the Jews now in Palestine might increase their numbers by means of free mass immigration to such extent that they would become the majority population in Palestine …” 32/
The two plans were placed before the General Assembly in September 1947.
The Special Committee and events in Palestine
During its five weeks in Palestine, the Special Committee was involved in more than official hearings. Almost immediately after its arrival in Jerusalem, the Special Committee was drawn into a case in which a death sentence to three members of the Irgun for terrorist activities was awaiting confirmation by the High Commissioner. An Irgun leader, Mr. Menachem Begin, had warned that the two British sergeants, kidnapped by the Irgun, would be killed as a reprisal if the death sentences were carried out. The Special Committee received a petition from the families of the condemned men, pleading that it intercede. The issue, presenting a dilemma to the Special Committee concerning its competence, was discussed in closed meetings, which resulted in the Special Committee passing a resolution expressing “concern as to the possible unfavourable repercussions that execution of the three death sentences … might have upon the fulfilment of the task (of the Special Committee) …”, and forwarding the letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, informing the families that it would also be forwarded to the Mandatory Power. 33/ The British Government responded that the case was:
“… still sub judice. If the sentences are confirmed by the General Officer Commanding, it will then be open to the High Commissioner for Palestine to exercise, if he thinks fit, the royal prerogative of pardon delegated to him by His Majesty. It is the invariable practice of His Majesty’s Government not to interfere with the High Commissioner’s discretion whether or not to exercise this prerogative;…” 34/
Shortly after the Special Committee left Palestine, the three condemned men were executed, and the two British sergeants killed in reprisal in a wider wave of violence.
Other incidents concerned the illegal immigration that then was at its height. The Special Committee came under considerable pressure from the Jewish Agency to visit the internment camps in Cyprus where illegal immigrants who had been apprehended were held, but decided against such a visit. 33/ One incident involved the vessel Exodus 1947 with 4,500 illegal refugees, intercepted by British vessels and towed into Haifa harbour for trans-shipment. Violence broke out and was witnessed by members of the Special Committee, which noted in its report:
“… There can be no doubt that the enforcement of the White Paper of 1939, subject to the permitted entry since December 1945 to 1,500 Jewish immigrants monthly, has created throughout the Jewish community a deep-seated distrust and resentment against the Mandatory Power. This feeling is most sharply expressed in regard to the Administration’s attempts to prevent the landing of illegal immigrants. During its stay in Palestine, the Committee heard from certain of its members an eyewitness account of the incidents relative to the bringing into the port of Haifa, under British naval escort, of the illegal immigrant ship, Exodus 1947. In this, as in similar incidents, the Committee has noted the persistence of the attempts to bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine irrespective of determined preventive measures on the part of the Administration, and also the far-reaching support which such attempts receive from the Jewish community in Palestine and abroad. The unremitting struggle to admit further Jews into Palestine, irrespective of the quota permitted by the Administration, is a measure of the rift which has developed between the Jewish Agency and the Jewish community, on the one hand, and the administration on the other. In the present state of tension, little practicable basis exists for the discharge by the Jewish Agency of its function under the Mandate of ‘advising and cooperating’ with the Administration in matters affecting the interests of the Jewish community …” 35/
The situation in Palestine in 1947
The Special Committee’s report described the situation prevailing in Palestine during its stay as follows:
The present situation
“The atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many respects the country is living under a semi-military régime. In the streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defences, road blocks, machine-gun posts and constant armoured car patrols are routine measures. In areas of doubtful security, Administration officials and the military forces live within strictly policed security zones and work within fortified and closely-guarded buildings. Freedom of personal movement is liable to severe restriction and the curfew and martial law have become a not uncommon experience. The primary purpose of the Palestine Government, in the circumstances of recurring terrorist attacks, is to maintain what it regards as the essential conditions of public security. Increasing resort has been had to special security measures provided for in the defence emergency regulations. Under these regulations, a person may be detained for an unlimited period, or placed under police supervision for one year, by order of an area military commander; and he may be deported or excluded from Palestine by order of the High Commissioner. Where there are reasons to believe that there are grounds which would justify … detention … or deportation, any person may be arrested without warrant by any member of His Majesty’s Forces or any police officer and detained for not more than seven days, pending further decision by the military commander. The regulations concerning military courts prohibit a form of judicial appeal from or questioning of a sentence or decision of a military court. Under the regulations, widespread arrests have been made; and as of 12 July 1947, 820 persons were being held in detention on security grounds, including 291 in Kenya under Kenya’s 1947 ordinance dealing with the control of detained persons. The detainees were all Jews with the exception of four Arabs. In addition to these, 17,873 illegal immigrants were under detention.
“The attitude of the Administration to the maintenance of public security in present circumstances was stated to the Committee in the following terms:
“The right of any community to use force as a means of gaining its political ends is not admitted in the British Commonwealth. Since the beginning of 1945 the Jews have implicitly claimed this right and have (sic) supported by an organized campaign of lawlessness, murder and sabotage their contention that, whatever other interests might be concerned, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of a Jewish State and free Jewish immigration into Palestine. It is true that large numbers of Jews do not today attempt to defend the crimes that have been committed in the name of these political aspirations. They recognize the damage caused to their good name by these methods in the court of world opinion. Nevertheless, the Jewish community of Palestine still publicly refuses its help to the Administration in suppressing terrorism, on the ground that the Administration’s policy is opposed to Jewish interests. The converse of this attitude is clear, and its result, however much the Jewish leaders themselves may not wish it, has been to give active encouragement to the dissidents and freer scope to their activities …” 35/
The Special Committee’s report also contained a description of how far the Zionist movement had advanced towards its goal of a Jewish state in Palestine:
Development of the national home
“In 1937, the members of the Palestine Royal Commission summed up their impressions thus: ‘Twelve years ago the national home was an experiment, today it is a going concern’. Within the decade since their report was issued, the Jewish population of Palestine has increased from 400,000 to some 625,000. In place of the 203 agricultural settlements containing some 97,000 there are now more than 300 such settlements and small towns with a population of some 140,000. The larger towns and cities of the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) have likewise greatly expanded both in size and amenities …
“Membership in the Jewish community is virtually automatic for all Jews aged 18 or more who have lived in Palestine for at least three months. All adults in the community from the age of 20 participate in voting for the Elected Assembly, from which is formed the Va’ad Leumi (National Council). The Va’ad Leumi maintains, almost exclusively from its own tax revenue and resources, in co-operation with other community organizations, the Jewish school system and a network of public health and social services …
“In the life of the Jewish community, the Jewish Agency occupies a special place in virtue both of its status under article 4 of the Mandate and as a representative organization of world Jewry. Organized in Palestine into some 20 departments corresponding in general to the departments of State in a self-governing country, the Agency concerns itself with every aspect of Jewish economic and social development in Palestine and exercises a decisive influence in major questions of policy and administration, particularly in regard to immigration and agricultural development.
“The Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) is thus a highly organized and closely knit society which, partly on a basis of communal effort, has created a national life distinctive enough to merit the Royal Commission’s title of a State within a State …” 36/
III. THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE
When the second session of the United Nations General Assembly convened in September 1947 it constituted itself as an Ad Hoc Committee to deal with the Palestine question while considering in its normal session the other items on its agenda.
The essential points of the Special Committee on Palestine’s majority and minority plans were as given below:
The majority proposal: Partition with economic union
“Partition and independence – Palestine within its present borders, following a transitional period of two years from 1 September 1947, shall be constituted into an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem …
“Independence shall be granted to each State upon its request only after it has adopted a constitution … has made to the United Nations a declaration containing certain guarantees, and has signed a treaty creating the Economic Union of Palestine and establishing a system of collaboration between the two States and the City of Jerusalem.
“Citizenship – Palestinian citizens, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine, shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident …
“Economic union – A treaty shall be entered into between the two States … The treaty shall be binding at once without ratification. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine …
“Population – The figures given for the distribution of the settled population in the two proposed States … are approximately as follows:
Jews
Arabs and others
Total
The Jewish State
498 000
407 000
905 000
The Arab State
10 000
725 000
735 000
City of Jerusalem
100 000
105 000
205 000
“In addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 (Arab) Bedouins …
“(Jerusalem) – The City of Jerusalem shall be placed under an International Trusteeship System by means of a trusteeship Agreement which shall designate the United Nations as the Administering Authority …” 37/
The minority proposal: A Federal State of Palestine
“The independent State of Palestine – The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence, and an independent federal State of Palestine shall be created following a transitional period not exceeding three years …
“The independent federal State of Palestine shall comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State …
“During the transitional period, a constituent assembly shall be elected by the population of Palestine and shall formulate the constitution of the independent federal State of Palestine …
“The attainment of independence by the independent federal State of Palestine shall be declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations as soon as the authority administering the territory shall have certified to the General Assembly that the constituent assembly referred to in the precedent paragraph has adopted a constitution …
“There shall be a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship, which shall be granted to Arabs, Jews and others.
“Jerusalem – Jerusalem, which shall be the capital of the independent federal State of Palestine, shall comprise, for purposes of local administration two separate municipalities, one of which shall include the Arab sections of the city, including that part of the city within the walls, and the other the areas which are predominantly Jewish.
Jewish immigration into Palestine
The problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine should be dealt with in the following manner:
(a) For a period of three years from the effective date of the beginning of the transitional period provided for in the solution to be applied to Palestine, even if the transitional period should be less, Jewish immigration shall be permitted into the borders of the Jewish State in the proposed independent federal State of Palestine, in such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of that Jewish State, having due regard for the rights of the population then present within that State and for their anticipated natural rate of increase. The authority responsible for executing the transitional arrangements on behalf of the United Nations shall take all measures necessary to safeguard these principles.
(b) For the purpose of appraising objectively the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state in the independent State of Palestine, an international commission shall be established. Its membership shall consist of three representatives designated by the Arabs of Palestine, three representatives designated by the Jews of Palestine, and three representatives designated by the appropriate organ of the United Nations.” 38/
Reactions to the fundamentally differing recommendations made by the Special Committee appeared, along predictable lines, even before the General Assembly met. The Arab League’s Political Committee declared it would strongly resist the partition plan. The Palestine Arab Higher Committee condemned the plan as:
“An excess of injustice to Palestine … a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country … an echo of the influence of zionism …” 39/
The Arab Higher Committee, which had refused to co-operate with the Special Committee decided to fight the Palestinian case in the Assembly.
The Zionist Organization approved of the partition resolution, although objecting the Jewish state had not been allotted enough territory and termed the minority proposals “unacceptable”. 40/ The Zionists also prepared for the Assembly.
Palestine once again faced a historical decision on its future, reminiscent of the League of Nations decision that made it a mandated territory. The question now was even more fundamental – whether Palestine would attain independence as a unified entity or only by partition. The discussions in the United Nations were long and intense, and only the arguments of the major parties need be summarized here. As in all negotiations, informal political agreements reached outside the chambers were decisive in the final outcome.
Although Great Britain had made clear its intention to divest itself of the mandate, its position as the Mandatory Power gave a special significance to its attitude towards the Special Committee’s recommendations. The British representative stated that his Government was in general agreement with the unanimous principles approved by the Special Committee, and would accept any United Nations decision, but that it could not assume any responsibility for its implementation, and would in any event soon withdraw its forces:
“With regard to … Jewish displaced persons, the United Kingdom was of the opinion that the entire problem of displaced persons in Europe, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, was an international responsibility and one demanding urgent attention …
“The United Kingdom Government was ready to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any plan on which agreement was reached by the Arabs and the Jews. If the Assembly were to recommend a policy which was not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it. It would then be necessary to provide for some alternative authority to implement it.” 41/
The representative of the Arab Higher Committee commented on the Special Committee proposals in these words:
“The case of the Arabs of Palestine was based on the principles of international justice; it was that of a people which desired to live in undisturbed possession of the country where Providence and history had placed it. The Arabs of Palestine could not understand why their right to live in freedom and peace, and to develop their country in accordance with their traditions, should be questioned and constantly submitted to investigation …
“The Zionists were conducting an aggressive campaign with the object of securing by force a country which was not theirs by birthright. Thus there was self-defence on one side and, on the other, aggression. The raison d’être of the United Nations was to assist self-defence against aggression …
“The struggle of the Arabs of Palestine against Zionism had nothing in common with anti-Semitism. The Arab world had been one of the rare havens of refuge for the Jews until the atmosphere of neighbourliness had been poisoned by the Balfour Declaration and by the aggressive spirit which the latter had engendered in the Jewish community …
“The solution lay in the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with which the Arabs of Palestine, who constituted the majority were entitled to a free and independent State …
“Regarding the manner and form of independence for Palestine, it was the view of the Arab Higher Committee that that was a matter for the rightful owners of Palestine to decide. Once Palestine was found to be entitled to independence, the United Nations was not legally competent to decide or to impose the constitutional organization of Palestine, since such action would amount to interference with an internal matter of an independent nation.” 42/
The Jewish Agency stated its position as follows:
“While hoping that nations would welcome displaced persons who wished to emigrate to countries other than Palestine, the Jewish Agency considered that it would be unjust to deny the right to go to the Jewish national home to those who wanted to do so.
“Recommendation … to the effect that any solution for Palestine could not be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general, was unintelligible … The Jewish problem in general was none other than the age-old question of Jewish homelessness, for which there was but one solution – that provided for by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate;- the reconstitution of the Jewish national home in Palestine.
“… the plan proposed by the minority of the Special Committee … was unacceptable; though it called them States, it actually made provision only for semi-autonomous cantons or provinces. Palestine would be an Arab State with two Jewish enclaves. The Jews, who would be frozen in the position of a permanent minority in the federal State, would not even have control over their own fiscal policies or immigration; the latter, with many other matters of fundamental importance, would be left in the hands of the Arab majority …” 43/
A lengthy general debate followed in which again the entire history of Palestine was recounted, the Balfour Declaration dissected, the Mandate examined, and the Special Committee’s two plans exhaustively analysed. Some representative views are summarized below:
Great Britain
“… in spite of revolts and terrorism, a national home had been established and a Jewish community of over 600,000 persons had been built up, the Arab population had doubled and social and economic standards had advanced to the advantage of all …
“It had been suggested that the United Kingdom should carry the full responsibility for the administration of Palestine and for enforcing changes proposed by the United Nations during an indefinite transitional period until independence was attained … The United Kingdom would in no case accept responsibility for enforcement, either alone or in the major role.
“… the illegal immigration into Palestine undertaken with the connivance and assistance of some Governments … was a question which aroused bitter feelings in Palestine; proposals for a change in the status quo should not lightly be put forward by those who had no responsibility for the consequences …” 44/
United States
“… the United States delegation supported the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations … and the majority plan which provided for partition and immigration. Certain amendments and modifications would nevertheless have to be made in the majority plan in order to give effect more accurately to the principles on which that plan was based.
“… by admitting the item on the future government of Palestine to its agenda, the Assembly had not undertaken to assume responsibility for the administration of Palestine during its transition to independence. The responsibility for administration still rested with the Mandatory Power. The General Assembly, however, would not fully discharge its obligation if it did not carefully take into account the problem of implementation …” 45/
USSR
“… The essence of the question was the right of self-determination of hundreds of thousands of Jews and Arabs living in Palestine; the right of the Arabs as well as the Jews of Palestine to live in freedom and peace in a State of their own. It was necessary to take into consideration all the sufferings and needs of the Jewish people, whom none of the States of Western Europe has been able to help during their struggle against the Hitlerites and the allies of the Hitlerites for the defence of their rights and their existence.
“The Jewish people were therefore striving to create a State of their own and it would be unjust to deny them that right. The problem was urgent and could not be avoided by plunging back into the darkness of the ages.
“Every people – and that included the Jewish people – had full right to demand that their fate would not depend on the mercy or the good will of a particular State. The Members of the United Nations could help the Jewish people by acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter, which called for the guaranteeing to every people of their right to independence and self-determination …” 46/
Dr. Weizmann appeared, as he had before the Special Committee, in his private capacity. He said:
“… The Mandate had envisaged a far more extensive territory for the Jewish State, eight times larger than that which was not proposed, and, as he had stated before the Special Committee, it was not easy for the Jews to accept such a compromise …
“The idea of giving the Jews a minority status in an Arab State had been rejected by all the committees and by all impartial tribunals … It was not in order to become citizens of an Arab State that the Jews, on the strength of international promises, had made their home in Palestine …
“Thus only one solution remained, namely, the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State, as was proposed in the majority plan …” 47/
A strong exposition of the Palestinian case was as follows:
“The first duty of the United Nations was to prevent aggression. Yet Palestine had suffered from that injustice during the previous 30 years: the United Kingdom had held Palestine by armed force and had compelled the inhabitants to submit to Jewish immigration on a scale which threatened ultimately to convert the Palestinian Arabs into a political minority.
“… The population in Palestine at the end of the First World War had been 93 per cent Arab and 7 per cent Jewish, but the insidious form of aggression … had raised the Jewish population to 33 per cent.
“It had been said that the persecution of the European Jews gave them a claim to unlimited immigration into Palestine. It had also been stated that the Jews themselves passionately desired to go to Palestine and were unwilling to be absorbed into any other country … One asked whether the desire of persecuted Jewry was to be the deciding factor in the situation, and whether the immigration laws of various States should give way to the desire of the displaced persons to enter particular countries or areas. It was questionable whether any other country would be prepared to permit unrestricted immigration for such reasons …
“It had been said that the Jews were determined not to accept the position of a political minority in Palestine, but the unwillingness of a minority in any country to continue to occupy that position was not a valid reason for converting a minority into a majority and a majority into a minority. It would be contended that it was for that very reason that partition had been advanced as a solution; but in examining the majority solution it would be found that in more than half the area of the country the Arabs were to be converted into a minority, in order that the Jewish population might become a politically dominant Jewish State …
“… (in) a letter published in the New York times on 28 September 1947 by Dr. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem … criticizing the majority plan, Dr. Magnes had said that partition would not stop the terrorist activities of Jewish groups, and that having secured partition through terror, they would attempt to secure the rest of the country for the Jews in the same way …” 48/
At the end of the general discussion the Chairman proposed the appointment of two sub-committees to report on the two proposals before the Ad Hoc Committee and a third sub-committee to try to promote conciliation between the Arab and Zionist positions, the last sub-committee to be informal. The Syrian representative proposed another sub-committee:
“… to be composed of jurists which would deal with the question of the competence of the General Assembly to take and enforce a decision, and with the legal aspect of the Mandate. If that Sub-Committee’s report were unsatisfactory, then the question of reference of the whole matter to the International Court of Justice could be discussed …” 49/
The Chairman discouraged this proposal as it would prolong the Committee’s work, and the composition of the two sub-committees was decided as follows:
Sub-Committee No. 1: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, USSR, United States, Hungary, Venezuela.
Sub-Committee No. 2: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.
The two Sub-Committees met for four weeks in late 1947. Sub-Committee 1, after intensive discussions over the date of independence and the form and extent of United Nations control during transition, made the following significant changes in the Special Committee’s majority plan in order to conform to certain decisions insisted upon by Great Britain:
(a) The proposed two-year transition period was drastically reduced. Great Britain would withdraw by 1 August 1948 until which date the British Government would continue to govern Palestine, not being responsible for implementation of any United Nations decisions and retaining full discretion over the extent of co-operation with the United Nations. A two-month transition period would follow, with Palestine being governed by a United Nations Commission (of five members) selected by the General Assembly and responsible to the Security Council. The two States would attain independence on 1 October 1948.
(b) The Arab city of Jaffa, allotted by the Special Committee to the Jewish State, would form an Arab enclave in Jewish territory, and be linked to the Arab State.
The question of the southern half of Palestine, the Negev, the entirety of which had been allotted to the Jewish State by the Special Committee majority plan was also re-examined. A proposal was made to divide it between the Arab and Jewish States. Zionist leaders were particularly anxious that the entire Negev, with its access to the Gulf of Akaba, lie within their control. Weizmann describes how the problem was dealt with:
“There were many tense moments preceding the final decision on November 29, and these had to do not only with the probable votes of the delegates. There was, for instance, the actual territorial division. When this was discussed some of the American delegates felt that the Jews were getting too large a slice of Palestine, and that the Arabs might legitimately raise objections. It was proposed to cut out from the proposed Jewish State a considerable part of the Negev, taking Akaba away from us. Ever since the time of the Balfour Declaration, I had attached great value to Akaba … Akaba is the gate to the Indian Ocean, and constitutes a much shorter route from Palestine to the Far East than via Port Said and the Suez Canal.
“I was somewhat alarmed when I learned, in the second week of November, that the American delegation, in its desire to find a compromise which would be more acceptable to the Arabs, advocated the excision of the southern part of the Negev, including Akaba. After consultation with members of the Jewish Agency Executive, I decided to go to Washington to see President Truman and to put the whole case before him.
“… I pleaded further with the President that if the Egyptians choose to be hostile to the Jewish State, which I hope will not be the case, they can close navigation to us through the Suez Canal when this becomes their property, as it will in a few years. The Iraqis, too, can make it difficult for us to pass through the Persian Gulf. Thus we might be cut off entirely from the Orient … I was extremely happy to find that the President read the map very quickly and very clearly. He promised me that he would communicate at once with the American delegation at Lake Success.” 50/
The reports of the two Sub-Committees were presented to the Ad Hoc Committee on 24 November 1947 in a highly charged atmosphere. The report of Sub-Committee 2 (voted on before the report of Sub-Committee 1) detailed the arguments for a unified Palestine, addressing the legal question of the competence of the United Nations to partition the country:
“A study of Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter leaves no room for doubt that … neither the General Assembly nor any other organ of the United Nations is competent to entertain, still less to recommend or enforce, any solution with regard to a mandated territory …
“… the General Assembly is not competent to recommend, still less to enforce any solution other than the recognition of the independence of Palestine, and that the settlement of the future government of Palestine is a matter solely for the people of Palestine …
“To sum up, the dissolution of the League of Nations, and the consequent removal of the legal basis for the Mandate, and the more recent declarations by the Mandatory of its intention to withdraw from Palestine, open the way for the establishment of an independent government in Palestine by the people of the country, without the intervention either of the United Nations or of any other party …
“The above conclusion is by no means vitiated by the provisions for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. It was not, and could not have been the intention of the framers of the Mandate that the Jewish immigration to Palestine should result in breaking up the political, geographic, and administrative economy of the country. Any other interpretation would amount to a violation of the principles of the Covenant and would nullify one of the main objectives of the Mandate …
“Moreover, partition involves the alienation of territory and the destruction of the integrity of the State of Palestine. The United Nations cannot make a disposition or alienation of territory, nor can it deprive the majority of the people of Palestine of their territory and transfer it to the exclusive use of a minority in the country …” 51/
The report’s first resolution, questioning the legal power of the General Assembly to partition Palestine was rejected. The second, recommending international co-operation to deal with the Jewish refugee problem was rejected too, but the Ad Hoc Committee decided to include the recommendation in its report to the General Assembly. The third, calling for the establishment of an independent unified Palestine was also rejected.
The report of Sub-Committee 1, in substance the amended Special Committee’s majority recommendations for the partition of Palestine, was then voted upon on 25 November 1947. The vote was 25 votes to 13 with 17 abstentions.* Since a two-thirds majority was not required in the Assembly sitting as Ad Hoc Committee, the proposal to partition Palestine was approved and recommended to the General Assembly.
* In favour: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iceland, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.
Abstaining: Argentina, Belgium, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.
Absent: Paraguay, Philippines.
`
IV. THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE
The vote of the General Assembly was to be a final act to endorse formally what it had already decided as the Ad Hoc Committee: the partition of Palestine. To validate that decision in the plenary, however, a two-thirds majority was essential. As the crucial decision approached, the contending spokesmen took the last opportunity to press their arguments, every vote being critical, particularly in view of the relatively large number of abstentions in the final vote in the Ad Hoc Committee:
In presenting the Committee’s report recommending partition, the Rapporteur noted that the informal conciliation group had produced no results since;
“… both parties were confident as to the success of their case before the General Assembly and, therefore … conciliation and agreement between the parties could not be reached.” 52/
The Mandatory’s position
The British Government, its mandate over Palestine now due to expire in a matter of months, restated its position:
“It is with deep regret that my Government recognizes that an acceptable settlement has still not been found. I do not say that in any spirit of criticism. My Government would be the last to minimize the difficulty of the task, as it is the first to appreciate the efforts that have been made. The fact remains that we are obviously confronted with a failure to arrive at a settlement based upon consent. My delegation would have failed in its duty if it had not emphasized from the beginning of the session the consequent need for the General Assembly to consider the situation which is likely to arise upon the removal of the forces which at present ensure law and order in Palestine. Their departure will leave a gap, and it has been the most difficult part of the General Assembly’s task to find means of filling this gap …
“… I am … instructed to repeat explicitly that the United Kingdom Government cannot allow its troops and administration to be used in order to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine …” 53/
The debate on partition
In the general discussion, the States supporting the partition plan argued that it was the best available formula to deal with political realities in Palestine, and to deal with the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe, stressing that they could see no alternative. The States opposing the partition of Palestine questioned the legal competence of the United Nations to take this drastic measure, asserting that it violated the principle of self-determination by denying it to the Palestinian people, and also infringed Article 6 of the Mandate which stipulated that “the rights and position of other (than Jewish) sections of the population are not prejudiced”. These States further charged that interested Powers were using political pressure to gather the votes for the two-thirds majority required. Some excerpts from representative statements are given to convey an impression of the prevailing mood in this critical Assembly.
States supporting the partition plan:
Poland
“… What is the solution we want? The answer is simple. The Arab people of Palestine, as well as the Jewish people of Palestine, want national independence. They want a discontinuation of the Mandate and of the present situation, and the establishment of their national States.
“My delegation and my Government believed for a time, and hoped, that these national aspirations might find their expression in one Palestinian State in which both Arabs and Jews would be equal partners, free to develop their national life. The situation, however, is such that this aim cannot be achieved, at least not at the present stage. We therefore have to establish two States, an Arab State and a Jewish State, to provide for the national aspirations of the two communities which live in Palestine. There is no other way out, and anyone anxious to do justice to the national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs must support this proposal …” 54/
Brazil
“… the matter involves substantial changes in the political status quo of an important region, changes which would radically affect juridical principles and vested interests.
“It is presented to us today, however, as a fait accompli, since the promise contained in the so-called Balfour Declaration and the subsequent creation of a mandate of the League of Nations with the express purpose of constituting a “Jewish national home”, have resulted in the migration into Palestine of considerable numbers of individuals of the Jewish race, who have become permanently established there and have created large interests and have constituted a homeland which has rapidly developed to the point of presenting at this time the characteristics of a State …” 55/
United States
“… the proposal of partition with economic union which we are considering is genuinely a United Nations plan. It has been evolved as a result of a special session of the United Nations and the work of a United Nations Special Committee, in addition to the work of the present session of the General Assembly …
“Much has been said during the course of these debates on the desirability and necessity of presenting to the General Assembly a plan which would command the agreement of both the principal protagonists in this situation. I think there is no delegation here which does not know that no plan has ever been presented, either to this Assembly or to the Mandatory Government during its long years of tenure, or in any other place, which would meet with the acceptance of both the Arabs and the Jews. No such plan has ever been presented, and I do not believe that any such plan will ever be presented. If we are to effect through the United Nations a solution of this problem it cannot be done without the use of the knife. Neither the Jews nor the Arabs will ever be completely satisfied with anything we do, and it is just as well to bear that in mind.
“… It is the sincere belief of the United States delegation that the partition plan recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, with all its imperfections admitted, provides for the people of Palestine in that land the best practicable means at the present time by which these high objectives may be obtained …” 56/
USSR
“… We may ask why it is that the overwhelming majority of the delegations represented in the General Assembly adopted this solution and not another. The only explanation … that can be given is that all the alternative solutions of the Palestinian problem were found to be unworkable and impractical. In stating this, I have in mind the project of creating a single independent Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. The experience gained from the study of the Palestinian question, including the experience of the Special Committee, has shown that Jews and Arabs in Palestine do not wish or are unable to live together. The logical conclusion followed that, if these two peoples that inhabit Palestine, both of which have deeply rooted historical ties with the land, cannot live together within the boundaries of a single State, there is no alternative but to create, in place of one country, two States – an Arab and a Jewish one. It is, in the view of our delegation, the only workable solution …” 57/
States opposing the partition plan:
Philippines
“… The Philippine Government has come to the conclusion that it cannot give its support to any proposal for the political disunion and the territorial dismemberment of Palestine.
We have assessed the legal arguments and found that they are not the decisive factors in shaping a just and practical solution. Whatever the weight we might choose to assign to the arguments of the one side or the other, it is clear to the Philippine Government that the rights conferred by mandatory power, even if subsequently confirmed by an international agreement, do not vitiate the primordial right of a people to determine the political future and to preserve the territorial integrity of its native land.
We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which, not being mandatory under any specific provision of the Charter nor in accordance with its fundamental principles, is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippine Government believes that the United Nations ought not to accept any such responsibility …” 58/
Lebanon
“… To judge by the press reports which reach us regularly every two or three days, I can well imagine to what pressure, to what manoeuvres your sense of justice, equity and democracy has been exposed during the last 36 hours. I can also imagine how you have resisted all these attempts in order to preserve what we hold dearest and most sacred in the United Nations, to keep intact the principles of the Charter, and to safeguard democracy and the democratic methods of our Organization. My friends, think of these democratic methods, of the freedom in voting which is sacred to each of our delegations. If we were to abandon this for the tyrannical system of tackling each delegation in hotel rooms, in bed, in corridors and ante-rooms, to threaten them with economic sanctions or to bribe them with promises in order to compel them to vote one way or another, think of what our Organization would become in the future. Should we be a democratic organization? Should we be an organization worthy of respect in the eyes of the world? At this supreme juncture, I beg you to think for a moment of the far-reaching consequences which might result from such manoeuvres, especially if we yielded to them …” 59/
Colombia
“… The plan of partition was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee by 25 votes to 13 with 17 abstentions. We hear and we read that the same vote in the General Assembly would be one short of the two-thirds majority required by our rules. However, in our view, there is no mistaking the fact that the plan has failed to find the support of 32 delegations. In other words, as it stands, it is really a minority proposal. It will remain a minority proposal in our minds. It will not lose that character even if it succeeds in securing the votes of three or four more delegations; and the scanty strength of the proposal becomes all the more evident if we consider the great international importance of the problem and the distinction that this solution enjoys of having the joint backing of the United States and the USSR. It would seem to all unprejudiced observers that, but for that all-powerful backing, the proposal would never have made its way to the General Assembly. Here it may eventually be adopted, but we submit that reluctant votes, recruited with irrelevant eleventh-hour appeals, will not improve its position in the opinion of the outside world …
“Under the circumstances, we suggest that the General Assembly would be well advised in postponing a decision …” 60/
Pakistan
“… How is Palestine to be independent? What sort of independence? What is the solution that we are invited to endorse and to attempt to carry through? In effect, the proposal before the United Nations General Assembly says that we shall decide – not the people of Palestine, with no provision for the self-determination, no provision for the consent of the governed – what type of independence Palestine shall have. We shall call Palestine independent and sovereign, but Palestine shall belong to us and shall be, not the apple of our many and in different-direction-looking eyes, but shall become the apple of discord between East and West, lest, perchance, the unity which our name so wistfully proclaims may have a chance to establish itself.
“We shall first cut the body of Palestine into three parts of a Jewish State and three parts of an Arab State. We shall then have the Jaffa enclave; and Palestine’s heart, Jerusalem, shall forever be an international city. That is the beginning of the shape Palestine shall have.
“Having cut Palestine up in that manner, we shall then put its bleeding body upon a cross forever. This is not going to be temporary; this is permanent. Palestine shall never belong to its people; it shall always be stretched upon the cross.
“What authority has the United Nations to do this? What legal authority, what juridical authority has it to do this, to make an independent State forever subject to United Nations administration? …
“Our vote today, if it does not endorse partition, does not rule out other solutions. Our vote, if it endorses partition, bars all peaceful solution. Let him who will shoulder that responsibility. My appeal to you is: do not shut out that possibility. The United Nations should seek and strive to unite and bring together rather than to divide and put asunder …” 61/
Eleven delegations had declared support of the partition plan:
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, USSR, United States, Uruguay.
Thirteen delegations had spoken opposing the proposal:
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.
France had taken a non-committal position. Great Britain, as the Mandatory Power, had declared its intention to abstain, as had China and Ethiopia.
After last minute efforts by States opposing the plan to adjourn the Assembly or refer the question to the International Court of Justice, the partition plan was finally voted upon on 29 November 1947. It received 33 votes in favour and 13 against with 10 abstentions:
In favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen.
Abstained: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia. 62/
The Arab States, as well as several others, declared that they would not consider themselves bound by the General Assembly recommendation since they considered that it was contrary to the United Nations Charter. Others voiced apprehension over the future implications of the vote to partition Palestine. An excerpt from a statement conveying the mood of the hour follows:
“A fateful decision has been taken. The die has been cast. In the words of the greatest American, ‘We have striven to do the right as God gives us to see the right’. We did succeed in persuading a sufficient number of our fellow representatives to see the right as we saw it, but they were not permitted to stand by the right as they saw it. Our hearts are sad but our conscience is easy. We would not have it the other way round. …”
“No man can today predict whether the proposal which these two great countries had sponsored and supported will prove beneficient or the contrary in its actual working.
“We much fear that the beneficence, if any, to which partition may lead will be small in comparison to the mischief which it might inaugurate. It totally lacks legal validity. We entertain no sense of grievance against those of our friends and fellow representatives who have been compelled, under heavy pressure, to change sides and to cast their votes in support of a proposal the justice and fairness of which do not commend themselves to them. Our feeling for them is one of sympathy that they should have been placed in a position of such embarrassment between their judgement and conscience, on the one side, and the pressure to which they and their Governments were being subjected on the other.” 63/
The provisions of the Partition resolution
The resolution of the General Assembly to partition Palestine, identified as resolution 181 (II), in effect constituted a recommendation “to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union …”, requesting the Security Council to “undertake the necessary measures as provided in the plan for its implementation …”
Palestine was to be divided into an un-named “Jewish State” and an un-named “Arab State”. Great Britain was to withdraw its presence by 1 August 1948, however making available by 1 February 1948 to the Jewish State an area including a seaport to facilitate “substantial immigration”. During the transitional period beginning in November 1947, the United Nations would progressively take over the administration in the entire territory, to be exercised through a Commission, and power handed over to the two States on the day of independence, not later than 1 October 1948. The two States were to be linked in an economic union.
The territory of Palestine was divided into eight parts. Three were allotted to the Jewish State, three to the Arab State. The seventh, Jaffa, was to form an Arab enclave in Jewish territory (annex I).
The eighth part was to be Jerusalem as a corpus separatum under a special international régime. This was to be administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Council for an initial period of 10 years, at the end of which the scheme would be re-examined by the Council, and “the residents of the city shall then be free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modification of the régime of the City”.
The safeguards for the status of Jerusalem were in the following terms:
“Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.
“In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.
“Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character …”
The rationale for this patchwork territorial division was to ensure that the Jewish State encompassed the maximum number of Jews and reduced to the minimum (estimated about 10,000), those who would be left in the Arab State. But within the boundaries of the Jewish State there would remain a very large number of Palestinian Arabs: 497,000 (including 90,000 Bedouin) against 498,000 Jews. 64/
“The partition resolution contained detailed safeguards to ensure the rights of minorities, including:
“Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
“No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
“The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected …
“The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions …
“The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired …
“No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession …”
Freedom of movement and transit was also to be assured by both States.
The safeguards for the status of Jerusalem and for the right of minorities were to possess the status of constitutional provisions in each State:
“A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence …
“The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them”.
V. THE END OF THE MANDATE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL
The situation in Palestine
The United Nations partition resolution did not provide a solution to the Palestine problem, and violence increased. In protest against the partition of their country, the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee called for a general strike. Palestinian-Jewish clashes proliferated with Jewish paramilitary forces operating more freely as British forces started their withdrawal. Sabotage, attacks on military installations and the capture of British arms by these groups became a major feature of the Palestinian scene, along with a proliferation of Jewish-Arab clashes. With events moving towards a major armed confrontation, Great Britain announced that it would terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, several months before the time envisaged in the United Nations plan.
The Security Council could not take any effective decision after discussing General Assembly resolution 181 (II) (the partition resolution) in December 1947. In March 1948 the United States draft proposal to enable the Council to act on the partition resolution failed, and the Council only called for an end to the violence in Palestine. Under the pressure of rapidly moving developments, the partition resolution did not even reach the stage of routine reference to the Sixth Committee for an examination of its legal effects and implications. The United Nations Commission on Palestine, established by resolution 181 (II), could not move to Jerusalem, and only could hold consultations in New York. The formation of the armed militia, intended to assist the Commission in its functions in Palestine, became impracticable in the face of the accelerated British withdrawal in a deteriorating situation where the casualty toll in the first three months after the approval of the partition resolution was 869 dead and 1,909 injured. 65/
Zionist policies of territorial expansion
As the British Government progressively disengaged from Palestine, and the United Nations was unable to replace it as an effective governing authority, the Zionist movement moved to establish control over the territory of the nascent Jewish State. At the same time the bordering Arab States made clear that they would intervene.
From writings of Zionist leaders, it is evident that Zionist policy was to occupy, during the period of withdrawal, as much territory as possible (including the “West Bank”) beyond the boundaries assigned to the Jewish State by the partition resolution. A comprehensive military plan, called Plan “D” (or Dalet) was described by an Israeli official:
“In March 1948, Haganah High Command prepared a comprehensive operational Plan ‘D’, replacing plans ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ which had governed Haganah strategy in previous years. Zero hour for Plan D was to arrive when British evacuation had reached a point where the Haganah would be reasonably safe from British intervention and when mobilization had progressed to a point where the implementation of a large-scale plan would be feasible. The mission of Haganah was as simple as it was revolutionary: ‘To gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State’”. 66/
Begin writes:
“In the months preceding the Arab invasion, and while the five Arab States (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan) were conducting preparations for concerted aggression, we continued to make sallies into the Arab area. In the early days of 1948, we were explaining to our officers and men, however, that this was not enough. Attacks of this nature carried out by any Jewish forces were indeed of great psychological importance, and their military effect, to the extent that they widened the Arab front and forced the enemies on to the defensive, was not without value. But it was clear to us that even most daring sallies carried out by partisan troops would never be able to decide the issue. Our hope lay in gaining control of territory.
“At the end of January, 1948, at a meeting of the Command of the Irgun in which the Planning Section participated, we outlined four strategic objectives: (1) Jerusalem; (2) Jaffa; (3) the Lydda-Ramleh plain; and (4) the Triangle.
“Setting ourselves these objectives we knew that their achievement would be dependent on many factors but primarily on the strength in men and arms that we would have at our disposal. We consequently decided to treat the plans as ‘alternatives’: we would carry out what we could. As it happened, of the four parts of the strategic plan we executed only the second in full.
“In the first and third parts we were able to record important achievements on the battlefield – but we did not attain decisive victories.
“As for the fourth part, we were never allowed an opportunity even to begin to put the plan into operation. The conquest of Jaffa, however, stands out as an event of first-rate importance in the struggle for Hebrew independence.”
(The “Triangle” is explained as “the generally used name for the Arab-populated area in the centre of western Eretz Yisrael lying roughly in a triangle whose points are the towns of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarim and comprising the bulk of the non-desert area west of Jordan which is now outside the State of Israel”.) 67/
Ben-Gurion writes:
“… Field troops and Palmach in particular were thus deployed and quickly showed the mettle that was soon to animate our army and bring it victory.
“… New Jerusalem was occupied, and the guerrillas were expelled from Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias, Safad while still the Mandatory was present. It needed sagacity and self-control not to fall foul of the British army. The Hagana did its job; until a day or two before the Arab invasion not a settlement was lost, no road cut, although movement was seriously dislocated, despite express assurances of the British to keep the roads safe so long as they remained. Arabs started fleeing from the cities almost as soon as disturbances began in the early days of December 1947. As fighting spread, the exodus was joined by bedouin and fellahin, but not the remotest Jewish homestead was abandoned and nothing a tottering Administration (meaning the British Mandatory) could unkindly do stopped us from reaching our goal on May 14, 1948 in a State made larger and Jewish by the Haganah …” 68/
The first Palestinian exodus
This territorial expansion by the use of force resulted in a large-scale exodus of refugees from the areas of hostilities. Palestinians allege that this was part of a deliberate policy to displace Palestinian Arabs to make room for immigrants, and quote Zionist sources, including Herzl:
“We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country.
“Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly”. 69/
Herzl’s plans in respect of the size of the Jewish State are cited as another item of evidence of this policy. Describing a 1939 meeting with Churchill, Weizmann writes:
“… (I) thanked him for his unceasing interest in Zionist affairs. I said: ‘You have stood at the cradle of the enterprise. I hope you will see it through’. Then I added that after the war we would want to build up a State of three or four million Jews in Palestine. His answer was: ‘Yes, I quite agree with that’.” 70/
Palestinians also charge that the terrorizing of the civilian population through military or psychological means was an integral part of this policy of expelling Palestinians, and again cite Zionist writings:
“… Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country … We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is a Palestine, at least western Palestine (west of the Jordan river) without Arabs … And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries, to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe, should be left … Only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb the millions of our own brethren. There is no other way out;…” 71/
One of the most notorious cases of the terrorizing of civilian population occurred, according to Palestinian and other sources, in April 1948 at Deir Yassin, a village near Jerusalem, situated in territory assigned to the Jewish State by the partition resolution. A former Israeli military governor of Jerusalem writes:
“We suffered a reverse of a different nature on April 9 when combined Etzel and Stern Gang units mounted a deliberate and unprovoked attack on the Arab village of Deir Yassin on the western edge of Jerusalem. There was no reason for the attack. It was a quiet village, which had denied entry to the volunteer Arab units from across the frontier and which had not been involved in any attacks on Jewish areas. The dissident groups chose it for strictly political reasons. It was a deliberate act of terrorism …
“… Women and children had not been given time enough to evacuate the village, although warned to do so by loudspeaker, and there were many of them among the 254 persons reported by the Arab Higher Committee as killed.
“The event was a disaster in every way. The dissidents held the village for two days and then abandoned it. They earned the contempt of most Jews in Jerusalem, and an unequivocal public repudiation by the Jewish Agency. But they gave the Arabs a strong charge against us, and the words ‘Deir Yassin’ were used over and over again both to justify their own atrocities and to persuade Arab villagers to join the mass flight which was now taking place all over Palestine.” 72/
Other Zionist leaders deny the charges, making this a controversial case. Begin writes:
“The enemy propaganda was designed to besmirch our name. In the result it helped us. Panic overwhelmed the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael … the Arabs began to flee in terror, even before they clashed with Jewish forces. Not what happened in Deir Yassin, but what was invented about Deir Yassin, helped to carve the way to our decisive victories on the battlefield. The legend of Deir Yassin helped us in particular in the conquest of Haifa … All the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through Haifa like a knife through butter. The Arabs began fleeing in panic, shouting: ‘Deir Yassin!’” 73/
Whatever the versions of this controversial case, the psychological effect of such incidents was a mass exodus of the civilian population.
The psychological tactics used are described by Yigal Allon:
“I gathered all the Jewish mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages, and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs, that a great Jewish reinforcement has arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all of the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time. And the rumour spread in all the areas of the Huleh that it is time to flee. The flight numbered myriads. The tactic reached its goal completely. The building of the police station at Halsa fell into our hands without a shot. The wide areas were cleaned, the danger was taken away from the transportation routes and we could organize ourselves for the invaders along the borders, without worrying about the rear”. 74/
The terror that spread among the Palestinian population was a crucial factor affecting developments in Palestine. It led to a mass exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries. The number of Palestinian refugees resulting from these hostilities were estimated to number 726,000 75/ by the end of 1949 – half the indigenous population of Palestine. Charges that their flight had been incited by Arab leaders is refuted by a United Nations report noting that the refugees either fled from the war or were expelled:
“As a result of the conflict in Palestine, almost the whole of the Arab population fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation”.
“… an alarming number of persons have been displaced from their homes. Arabs form the vast majority of the refugees in Palestine and the neighbouring countries. The future of these Arab refugees is one of the questions under dispute, the solution of which presents very great difficulties …
“The majority of these refugees have come from territory which, under the Assembly resolution of 29 November, was to be included in the Jewish State. The exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, by rumours concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion …” 76/
The end of the mandate and the birth of Israel
As the hostilities in Palestine escalated, efforts intensified in the United Nations to find ways to stop the violence. A United States proposal to place Palestine under temporary United Nations trusteeship met strong opposition from Zionist leaders, who saw in it a possibility of a reversal of the partition decision. A move to negotiate a truce was similarly opposed. Weizmann describes this stage as follows:
“… In Washington it was already being taken for granted that, in deference to the ‘facts’, a fundamental revision would have to take place, and the November decision, if not actually reversed, deferred – perhaps sine die …
“Under these circumstances I obtained an interview with the President of the United States … The President was sympathetic personally, and still indicated a firm resolve to press forward with partition. I doubt, however, whether he was himself aware of the extent to which his own policy and purpose had been balked by subordinates in the State Department … the United States representative in the Security Council announced the reversal of American policy. He proposed that the implementation of partition be suspended, that a truce be arranged in Palestine, and that a special session of the General Assembly be called in order to approve a trusteeship for Palestine, to take effect when the Mandate ended, i.e., on May 15th. In spite of all the forewarnings, the blow was sudden, bitter and, on the surface, fatal to our long nurtured hopes …
“It had been anticipated that the trusteeship plan would be adopted without difficulty; but within the two months since its proposal, the situation had again altered radically;…
“… When it became clear in the Assembly that the trusteeship plan could not be adopted, another delaying formula was devised – a ‘temporary truce’: both parties were to cease fire, no political decision was to be taken, a limited Jewish immigration was to be permitted for a few months, and in exchange for this transient and dubious security the Jews were to refrain from proclaiming their State in accordance with the November decision …
“On the issue of this truce, as on that of the trusteeship, I was never in a moment’s doubt. It was plain to me that retreat would be fatal. Our only chance now, as in the past, was to create facts, to confront the world with these facts, and to build on their foundation …” 77/
Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948. The departure of the British High Commissioner the next day ceremonially signalled the end of the Mandate.
The declaration establishing the State of Israel traces the route of recent history that had brought it into existence:
“… In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the first Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.
“This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917, and reaffirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connexion between the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its national home.
“The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people – the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe – was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz Yisrael the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations …
“On the 29th November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz Yisrael; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz Yisrael to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.
“This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State …” 78/
During the months preceding the end of the Mandate, Jewish forces had moved to occupy key cities and areas in the territory designated for the Arab State. Ben-Gurion writes that before the Mandate ended:
“… no Jewish settlement, however remote, was entered or seized by the Arabs, while the Haganah … captured many Arab positions and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa and Safad … So, on the day of destiny, that part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs”. 79/
The major part of Jerusalem meant to be internationalized under the partition plan, had also been occupied by Jewish forces.
On the termination of the Mandate, Jewish forces moved to occupy further territory beyond the boundaries specified by the Partition resolution. Irregular units from neighbouring Arab States had already entered Palestine in the final weeks of the Mandate, and now regular forces from these countries crossed into Palestine. The Arab League informed the United Nations Secretary-General by cable of the reasons for the Arab action. After tracing the history of the Palestine question and the efforts of the Arab States to help the Palestinian Arabs to secure their rightful independence, the cable stated:
“Now that the Mandate over Palestine has come to an end, leaving no legally constituted authority behind in order to administer law and order in the country and afford the necessary and adequate protection to life and property, the Arab States declare as follows:
“(a) The right to set up a Government in Palestine pertains to its inhabitants under the principles of self-determination recognized by the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as the United Nations Charter;
“(b) Peace and order have been completely upset in Palestine, and, in consequence of Jewish aggression, approximately over a quarter of a million of the Arab population have been compelled to leave their homes and emigrate to neighbouring Arab countries. The prevailing events in Palestine exposed the concealed aggressive intentions of the Zionists and their imperialistic motives …
“(c) The Mandatory has already announced that on the termination of the Mandate it will no longer be responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine … This leaves Palestine absolutely without any administrative authority …
…
“(e) … The recent disturbances in Palestine further constitute a serious and direct threat to peace and security within the territories of the Arab States themselves. For these reasons, and considering that the security of Palestine is a sacred trust for them, and out of anxiousness to check the further deterioration of the prevailing conditions and to prevent the spread of disorder and lawlessness into the neighbouring Arab lands, and in order to fill the vacuum created by the termination of the Mandate and the failure to replace it by any legally constituted authority, the Arab Governments find themselves compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine.
“The Arab States recognize that the independence and sovereignty of Palestine which was so far subject to the British Mandate has now, with the termination of the Mandate, become established in fact, and maintain that the lawful inhabitants of Palestine are alone competent and entitled to set up an administration in Palestine for the discharge of all governmental functions without any external interference. As soon as that stage is reached for the intervention of the Arab States, which is confined to the restoration of peace and establishment of law and order, shall be put an end to, and the sovereign State of Palestine will be competent in co-operation with the other States members of the Arab League, to take every step for the promotion of the welfare and security of its peoples and territory …” 80/
The fighting between the Arab forces on one hand and what were now Israeli forces on the other escalated into the first Middle East War. The Israeli forces were well manned and well trained, drawing on the Jewish Brigade formed during the Second World War, and on the various armed groups such as the Haganah, the Palmach, and the Irgun. They were well equipped with arms acquired within and without Palestine during the Mandate period. The intervention by the Arab States in support of the “Arab State” in Palestine proved largely ineffective in the face of decisive Israeli military superiority. Within weeks, Israel had occupied most of the territory of Palestine, with the exception of the “West Bank” of the Jordan, held by the Arab Legion from Jordan and the Gaza Strip, held by Egyptian forces (map at annex II.) But for these exceptions, Israel now controlled virtually the entire territory claimed by the Zionist Movement at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as the “Jewish national home”.
VI. PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS – 1948-1967
The United Nations by 1948 was inextricably involved in the Palestine question. It now bore the responsibility for the international commitments to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people which had not been assured during the Mandate, and which now were constrained by the partition resolution. Facing a threat to peace, unprecedented in the two years of the United Nations existence, and which the first two special sessions of the General Assembly had not been able to resolve, the Security Council ordered a cease-fire on 29 May 1948, by which time Israel had consolidated its occupation of Palestinian territory beyond that allotted to it by the partition plan.
Count Bernadotte, appointed United Nations Mediator by the General Assembly on the day the Mandate ended, was dispatched to Palestine to supervise the cease-fire and to “promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine”. He successfully effected a temporary truce and submitted his first suggestions on Palestine, proposing a “Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish”. The plan proposed some territorial adjustment in the borders, return of all refugees, and some limitations on Jewish immigration. 81/ Both sides rejected the plan, Israel particularly objecting to the proposals regarding immigration.
The Bernadotte proposals
As the first truce expired, the Mediator urged another indefinite truce, which was ordered by the Security Council on 15 July. The findings of the Mediator’s mission are summarized from his report:
“The Arab leaders had become greatly concerned and incensed about the mounting distress among the huge number of Arab refugees. They considered the solution of this problem fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine question. I recognized that, in the Arab States, public opinion on the Palestine question was considerably agitated …
“… (the talks) … had made it quite apparent that the Jewish attitude had stiffened in the interval between the two truces, that Jewish demands in the settlement would probably be more ambitious, and that Jewish opinion was less receptive to mediation. A feeling of greater confidence and independence had grown out of Jewish military efforts during the interval between the two truces. Less reliance was placed in the United Nations and there was a growing tendency to criticize its shortcomings with regard to Palestine …” 82/
The Arab States refused an Israeli offer of direct negotiations, transmitted through the Mediator. Bernadotte concluded that his earlier recommendation of a Union was unworkable. He made new recommendations, based on the premise that the Palestinians and Arabs must accept the existence of Israel.
The new plan envisaged an Arab State encompassing Transjordan joined with most of the territory allotted by the partition resolution to the “Arab State” but with far-reaching territorial adjustments that would consolidate Arab territory by including the Negev, while Galilee would be taken over by Israel. Jerusalem would be placed under United Nations administration. 83/
This plan, too, was rejected both by the Arab States (except Jordan) and by Israel. Bernadotte had proposed other measures but, before the United Nations could act on any of his recommendations, he was assassinated by, in the Israeli official view, the Stern Gang, one of several terrorist organizations whose activities had become more open since the end of the Mandate.
The report to the United Nations of the assassination indicated that the attitude of the Israeli Provisional Government had done little to hinder a press campaign against the Mediator and the United Nations “to the effect that the Mediator was arbitrarily opposed to Jewish claims; and that supervision of (the) truce deliberately discriminated against the interest of Israel”. The Stern group’s threat that “the task of the moment is to oust Bernadotte … Blessed be the hand that does it” had not been given any “particular significance” by the Israeli authorities, despite the fact that it emanated from a notoriously violent group. The Israeli Foreign Minister had explained that “the Stern Group … existed within Israel only as a political organization, having disbanded itself as a military organization, and its members were being absorbed into the army as individuals”. Count Bernadotte’s killers had been wearing Israeli army uniforms. The report noted that “the Provisional Government of Israel must assume the full responsibility … for these assassinations …” 84/
The Security Council requested the Israeli Government to investigate the assassination and to submit a report to the Council, but no report was received.
The Armistice agreements and resolution 194 (III)
The Arab hostility, stemming from the partition resolution, to United Nations involvement in the Palestine question, diminished as Israel increased its military strength and consolidated its occupation of Palestinian territory. The Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralphe Bunche, was able to arrange armistice agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the other, which were signed between February and July 1949 (map at annex II).
These agreements specified inter alia that the “armistice between the armed forces [was] an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine”, recognizing “the principle that no military or political advantage should be gained”. The agreements “being dictated exclusively by military, and not political, considerations” did not prejudice the political positions of any of the parties on the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. Thus they gave Israel no legal right to the territories occupied during the 1948 hostilities, beyond the lines specified in the partition resolution.
While in occupation of territories beyond those allotted by the resolution, Israel applied for admission to the United Nations on 29 November 1948. It was criticized in the Security Council for its non-compliance with United Nations resolutions and on 17 December 1948 its application failed, receiving 5 votes in favour, 1 against, with 5 abstentions. 85/
A week earlier, the General Assembly passed another resolution that has become an important document in the Palestine question. Based on the Bernadotte recommendations, resolution 194 (III) (text in annex III) had the following main provisions:
(a) To establish a Conciliation Commission with headquarters at Jerusalem, to continue the functions of the Mediator and the Truce Commission;
(b) To call for Security Council action for the demilitarization of Jerusalem, and for proposals from the Conciliation Commission for a permanent international régime for Jerusalem in view of the distinctive significance for three world religions;
(c) To call for the refugee problem to be dealt with in the following terms:
“… the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible …”
The importance of this resolution derives principally from its specific establishment of the right of peaceful return of the Palestinians to their homes (a right that has been reiterated annually by the General Assembly up to the present time).
The Conciliation Commission and the Lausanne protocols
The Conciliation Commission for Palestine was established in January 1949, with France, Turkey and the United States as members. Although the Arab States had voted against the resolution, and still refused direct negotiations with Israel, they co-operated with the Commission since it offered the only hope of dealing with the return of refugees and of obtaining Israeli withdrawal to the partition lines, including from Jerusalem. Israel, however, in defiance of the United Nations resolutions, moved its capital from Tel Aviv to the western part of Jerusalem in 1950.
The Commission was able to arrange a conference in Lausanne in April 1949, consisting of separate talks with the two sides, since the Arab States consistently rejected direct negotiations with Israel. The Arab States urged that the refugee question, as the most urgent issue, be settled first, but Israel insisted that this be linked to a territorial settlement in a peace treaty. The Commission’s efforts to link the two questions were unsuccessful. On 12 May 1949, two separate protocols were signed by the Arab States and Israel, agreeing to use the partition resolution’s boundaries as a “basis for discussions with the Commission”. This act reiterated the international commitment to establish a Palestinian Arab State on the basis of the partition resolution, but this position was, as reported by the Commission, subjected by Israel to certain reservations, as cited below:
The refugee question:
“… The Arab delegations continue to hold the view that the first step must be acceptance by the Government of Israel of the principle set forth in resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 concerning the repatriation of refugees who wish to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours. The Commission has not succeeded in achieving the acceptance of this principle by the Government of Israel … Israel’s refusal to accept the principle of repatriation is cited by the Arab delegations as the reason for their own reserved and reticent attitude on territorial questions …
Territorial questions:
“The Israel delegation proposed … that the political frontier between Israel and Egypt and Lebanon respectively should be the same as that which separated the latter countries from Palestine under the British Mandate …
“Concerning the political frontier between Israel and the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, the Israel delegation proposed that it should remain the same as that between Transjordan and Palestine under the British Mandate …
“As regards the central area of Palestine at present under Jordan military authority, the Israel delegation proposed that, without entering into the question of the future status of that area, the boundary between it and Israel should follow the present line between Israel and Jordan military forces …
“The Israel delegation declared that Israel had no ambitions as regards the above-mentioned central area of Palestine, and did not wish at present to put forward suggestions as to its disposition. The Israel delegation considered that disposition of that area was a matter which should form the subject of a proposal agreed upon and put forward by the delegations of the Arab States, the Arab inhabitants of the territory and the refugees. Until the future status of that area was settled, Israel would continue to recognize the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom as the de facto military Power.
“Regarding the Jerusalem area, the Israel delegation states that its disposition was a separate question which did not enter into the present proposal.
“… for their part, the Arab delegations made a proposal that the refugees coming from certain areas (including the
“West Bank”) should be enabled to return to their homes forthwith … the Arab delegations have indicated that this proposal bears a territorial aspect, since it envisages the return of refugees to areas designated as Arab territory, and which are in principle to be recognized as Arab territory.
“In regard to the Israel delegation’s proposal concerning Israel’s frontiers with Egypt and Lebanon respectively, including the proposal concerning the Gaza area, the Arab delegations informed the Commission that, in their view, the proposal constituted a flagrant violation of the terms of the Protocol of 12 May 1949 concerning territorial questions, since it was considered that such a proposal involved annexations rather than territorial adjustments envisaged by the Protocol.
“In so far as the above-mentioned proposal of the Arab delegations has a territorial character, the attitude of the Israel delegation is that it could not accept a certain proportionate distribution of territory agreed upon in 1947 as a criterion for a territorial settlement in present circumstances …” 86/
From the Commission’s report* it would seem that Israel now envisaged a Palestinian Arab State limited to the territories occupied by Egypt and Jordan, but this was unacceptable at the time to both the Palestinian Arabs and to the Arab States.
* The Commission’s subsequent efforts to secure the right of peaceful return of the Palestinian Arabs, and to negotiate an international régime for Jerusalem, were inconclusive. It convened another Conference in Paris in 1951, again without result. Although it continued its formal efforts for some years, including attempts to establish an international régime for Jerusalem, it eventually was restricted to routine functions of maintaining lists of refugee properties, owners, blocked bank accounts, etc. … and has not exercised any effective functions in the Palestine issue.
Israel joins the United Nations
On 11 May 1949, one day before the signing of the Lausanne protocols, Israel was admitted to United Nations membership. In a statement to the Political Committee, the Israeli representative declared that his country would observe the principles of the United Nations Charter, and would implement its resolutions. Israel was the only State to have achieved statehood and received territory also through an act of the United Nations. The preamble of the resolution admitting Israel to United Nations membership specifically referred to Israel’s undertakings to implement General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III), the two resolutions that formed the centre of the Palestine issue in the United Nations:
“Having received the report of the Security Council on the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations,
“Noting that in the judgement of the Security Council, Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,
“Noting that the Security Council has recommended to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations,
“Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it ‘unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations’,
“Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions,
The General Assembly,
“Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of the Charter and rule 125 of its rules of procedure,
“1. Decides that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations;
“2. Decides to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.” 87/
The references in the preambular paragraphs to General Assembly resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III), the former having created Israel and the yet non-existent Palestinian Arab State, the latter having preserved the right of return of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours, carried implications of the Israeli acknowledgement of the continuing existence of a Palestinian Arab entity. However, the Palestinian Arab entity itself had not come into existence. That part of its territory occupied by Israel in 1948 was absorbed de facto by Israel by the extension of its laws to apply to those areas as an integral part of Israel. The “Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance” of 22 September 1948 reads:
The Provisional Council of State hereby enacts as follows –
“1. Any law applying to the whole of the State of Israel shall be deemed to apply to the whole of the area including the area of the State of Israel and any part of Palestine which the Minister of Defence has defined by proclamation as being held by the Defence Army of Israel.
“2. Any person or body of persons competent by virtue of a law as aforesaid to hold office or act in the whole of the State of Israel shall be deemed to be competent to hold office or act in the whole of the area including both the area of the State of Israel and any part of Palestine which the Minister of Defence has defined by proclamation as being held by the Defence Army of Israel.
“3. This Ordinance shall have effect retroactively as from the 6th Iyar 5708 (15 May 1948) and all acts done which, but for the provisions of this Ordinance, would be without effect are hereby validated retroactively.” 88/
On 24 April 1950, the West Bank was brought formally under Jordanian control. The Jordanian legislation stated:
“… its reaffirmation of its intent to preserve the full Arab rights in Palestine, to defend those rights by all lawful means in the exercise of its natural rights but without prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine’s just case within the sphere of national aspirations, inter-Arab co-operation and international justice”. 89/
The Palestine issue widened into a broader Arab-Israel conflict, as feared by many who had anticipated the consequences of the establishment of Israel in Palestine against the opposition of the Palestinian Arab majority.
The 1956 Suez war was one outcome of this dispute, although not directly involving the Palestine issue or territory. The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, however, brought immediate and direct repercussions on the Palestine question. Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as well as territories beyond to control far more than the area claimed by the World Zionist Organization in 1919, except for the East Bank of the Jordan (map at annex IV).
The great majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were made refugees – many for the second time, having sought refuge in these areas during the first exodus of 1948. Those that stayed in Israeli occupied territory after 1967 came to form a new category distinct from those within Israel’s pre-1967 borders, who were entitled to Israeli citizenship. This new class was one of a people under foreign military occupation, subject to military rule, its repercussions and its consequences for the suppression of civil liberties and rights.
But both the Palestinians inside Israel’s pre-1967 borders and those in the occupied territories accounted for a minority of the Palestinian people. The majority were now in total exile. In June 1967, of about 2.7 million persons of Palestinian origin, about 1.7 lived in Israel or the occupied territories – about 1 million in the West Bank, 400,000 in the Gaza Strip and 300,000 in the areas controlled by Israel. 90/ As a result of the 1967 war, almost half a million fled their homes, leaving about 900,000 Palestinians in the areas newly occupied by Israel, a total of 1.2 million under Israeli control. 91/ One million five hundred thousand were refugees in exile – in countries other than their own, their homeland under the control of the Jewish State.
VII. PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS – 1967-1977
At the international level, the Palestine question at this point was still being treated as principally a “refugee problem”, with little attention to the Palestinian Arab identity. The wider Arab-Israeli tension remained an unresolved festering problem, the Arab States regarding Israel as an illegitimate State. An uneasy peace had been maintained since 1956 with the help of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and after 1967 peace-keeping responsibilities were assumed by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) and 242 (1967)
Immediately after the cease-fire of June 1967, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 237 (1967) which read:
The Security Council,
…
“Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,
“Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,
“1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;
“2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
…”
Efforts continued to move towards the resolution of the Middle East conflict. After intensive negotiations and discussion of various formulas, the Security Council adopted resolution 242 (1967) on 22 November 1967. The principal provisions of resolution 242 (1967), which has become a basic instrument in all subsequent discussions of a Middle East peace settlement, read:
The Security Council,
“Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
“Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.
“1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity:
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
…”
From the United Nations standpoint, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) was intended to establish a framework for peace in the Middle East. However, it did not explicitly mention Palestine; the only cognizance of the underlying issue of Palestine was in the reference to “the refugee problem”.
Further, on the territorial plane, resolution 242 (1967), by calling on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 war borders, implicitly endorsed Israel’s jurisdiction over the territory occupied by Israel in the 1948 war beyond the lines laid down by the partition resolution.
Syria and Iraq rejected the resolution, while Egypt and Jordan demanded Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the 1967 war as a pre-condition to any negotiations. Israel refused, taking the position that withdrawals, refugees and other issues could only be settled through direct negotiations with the Arab States and the conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty.
The Jarring Mission
Under Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden as Special Representative in another United Nations effort to try and negotiate a Middle East settlement. Ambassador Jarring’s attempts from 1967 to 1970 to promote agreements on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) did not succeed. In 1971, in identical aide-mémoire (annex V) to Egypt and Israel, he proposed that they give simultaneous and reciprocal commitments subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied Egyptian territory to the former border between Egypt and mandated Palestine, and Egypt would give a commitment to enter into a peace treaty with Israel on certain explicit understandings in relation to resolution 242 (1967). Egypt agreed to give the commitment required if Israel would likewise give the commitments covering its own obligations.
The Israeli response, without specific reference to the commitment requested from it, stated that it viewed favourably Egypt’s expression of readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries. Israel stated it would give an undertaking to withdraw its forces to secure recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. The Jarring mission did not produce an agreed basis for discussions, and was suspended in 1972.
The Palestine Liberation Organization
The Jarring negotiations were conducted on the basis of resolution 242 (1967) and thus did not address the fundamental issue of the Palestinian national identity which underlay the conflict in the Middle East. However, one immediate effect of the 1967 war and the expansion of Israel to occupy Palestine in its entirety had been to intensify the militancy in the Palestinians’ struggle to regain their fundamental national rights. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), formed in 1964, adopted a new Covenant in 1968 committing all Palestinians to continue the fight for their rights, claiming that the international community had so far proved unable to discharge the responsibility it had borne for almost half a century. The Covenant termed Israel an illegal State, leading to Israel’s refusal to deal with the PLO. The intensification of the armed struggle by the PLO to reassert the Palestinian national identity and its claim to the inherent right of self-determination increasingly focused world attention on the resolve of the Palestinian people to regain their national rights. The provisions of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 1948, establishing the special status of Jerusalem, and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes if they wished and were prepared to live at peace with their neighbours, or to receive compensation, has been reasserted virtually every year since 1948, with Israel consistently refusing compliance except in the context of an overall settlement. Reference in the United Nations to the national rights of the Palestinians, however, appeared only after over two decades had passed since the partition of Palestine.
United Nations recognition of the Palestinian national identity
In 1969, the General Assembly specifically and formally recognized the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, declaring that the Assembly:
“Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
“Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories,
…
1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine;
2. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel’s refusal to implement the above [United Nations] resolutions;
3. Requests the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.” 92/
The Security Council, however, was dealing with the wider Middle East problem in the framework of its resolution 242 (1967), and the specific issue of Palestinian rights was not addressed by it.
In 1970, the General Assembly, reasserting its previous demands for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, for the observance of the right of return of the refugees, and for the cessation of violations of human rights, advanced to acknowledge the central position of the Palestine issue in the Middle East situation, in the following words:
1. Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Declares that full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” 93/
Resolutions in similar terms were passed in 1971 and 1972 by the General Assembly. In 1973, in a resolution dealing with the situation in Africa, but which could be regarded as implicitly applying to the Middle East also, the General Assembly recognized that armed struggle was a legitimate part of a liberation movement, declaring that the Assembly:
1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all people under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation to self-determination, freedom and independence …;
2. Also reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples’ struggle for liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed struggle;
…
6. Condemns all Governments which do not recognize the right to self-determination and independence of peoples, notably the people of Africa still under colonial domination and the Palestinian people.” 94/*
* A number of delegations expressed reservations about the language referring to armed struggle. The vote in the Third Committee on this paragraph (para. 2) was 82 in favour, 12 against, with 23 abstentions. In the General Assembly, the resolution received 97 votes in favour and 5 against, with 28 abstentions.
The Middle East war of October 1973 was followed by an advance in the status of the PLO when, in October 1974, the Conference of Arab Heads of State and Government held at Rabat passed a resolution endorsing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its own homeland, and recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The acceptance of this resolution by Jordan was of particular significance since from 1948 to 1967 Jordan had administered the West Bank. The resolution stated that the Conference:
“Affirms the right of the Arab Palestinian people to the return of its homeland and its right to self-determination.
“Affirms the right of the Palestinian people to set up an independent national authority under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on any liberated Palestinian land. The Arab countries are resolved to support such an authority once it is established.
“Declares its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization in exercising its national and international responsibilities within the framework of Arab commitments.”
The Palestine question in the United Nations
In September 1974, a large number of States joined to propose that the item “The question of Palestine” be included as a separate item in the General Assembly agenda. On the recommendation of the Assembly’s General Committee the Palestine question reappeared on the Assembly’s agenda for the first time since 1952. In October 1974, by 105 votes in favour to 4 against (and 20 abstentions), the PLO was invited to participate in Assembly proceedings.
The General Assembly,
Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.” 95/
A month later, the Palestinian rights received full recognition in the United Nations when the General Assembly passed the following resolution by 87 votes to 8, with 37 abstentions:
The General Assembly,
“Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,
“Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
“Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,
“Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter,
“Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:
(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;
2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;
3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;
4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
5. Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
6. Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine.” 96/
The Assembly simultaneously conferred on the PLO the status of observer in the Assembly and in other international conferences held under United Nations auspices. 97/ On 13 November 1974, Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO, addressed the General Assembly. In his speech, excerpts from which follow, he directly addressed the question of the terrorist image of the PLO.
“Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence.
“The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise the Americans in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who are in this Assembly hall were considered terrorists …
“Need one remind this Assembly of the numerous resolutions adopted by it condemning Israeli aggressions committed against Arab countries, Israeli violations of human rights and articles of the Geneva Conventions, as well as the resolutions pertaining to the annexation of the city of Jerusalem and its restoration to its former status?
“I am a rebel and freedom is my cause. I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same resistance position as I now occupy and from which I must fight. You once had to convert dreams into reality by your struggle. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dreams into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine’s sacred land …
“In my formal capacity as Chairman of the PLO and leader of the Palestinian revolution I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.
“All along the Palestinian dreamt of return. Neither the Palestinian’s allegiance to Palestine nor his determination to return waned: nothing could persuade him to relinquish his Palestinian identity or to forsake his homeland. The passage of time did not make him forget, as some hoped he would. When our people lost faith in the international community which persisted in ignoring its rights and when it became obvious that the Palestinians would not recuperate one inch of Palestine through exclusively political means, our people had no choice but to resort to armed struggle. Into that struggle it poured its material and human resources. We bravely faced the most vicious acts of Israeli terrorism which were aimed at diverting our struggle and arresting it …
“We offer them the most generous solution, that we might live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine …
“I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty over its own land.
“Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.
“War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.” 98/
The Israeli representative said the following in the course of his reply:
“… it is obvious that the initiators of the discussion of the so-called question of Palestine are concerned primarily not with the realization of the rights of the Palestinians, but with the annulment of the rights of the Jewish people. Israel’s destruction and the denial to the people of Israel of its rights to self-determination and independence are the officially enunciated objectives of the PLO at whose behest the Arab Governments have asked for this debate. By doing so, by initiating the invitation extended to the PLO and by the decisions adopted at the recent Rabat Conference, the Arab Governments have reaffirmed their association with the umbrella organization of the Arab murder squads. This is not surprising. The PLO did not emerge from within the Palestinian community. It is not representative of the Palestinian community. It is a creation of the Arab Governments themselves. It was established at the first summit meeting of the Heads of Arab States in Cairo in 1964 as an instrument for waging terror warfare against Israel. Its Covenant stipulates:
“‘The establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual ties between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities. The Jews are not one people with an independent personality …’
“Support for the PLO’s murderous ideology and sinister objectives is expressed in the United Nations in various terms. References are frequently made to ‘the root problem’ of the Palestinian question, a euphemism for Israel’s statehood. On occasion speakers lash out unabashedly against Israel’s independence, slander it as colonialism, call for its replacement by a second Palestinian Arab State, in addition to Jordan. At times, the terms employed are more general, such as restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, self-determination, and so on. Since the 8 June 1974 Cairo meeting of the PLO and the Rabat Summit Conference the talk is of establishing PLO authority in territories wrested from Israel, making it clear that this would be only a first step towards Israel’s elimination …” 99/
Violation of human rights
The United Nations took up the issue of human rights violations after the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation of the remaining territory in Palestine and parts of bordering Arab countries. In August 1967 the General Assembly endorsed Security Council resolution 237 (1967), calling on Israel to allow the return of refugees and to observe international conventions governing the treatment of civilians in time of war. 100/ The General Assembly in 1968 reasserted the right of the refugees to return to their homes, and established a “Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories”. 101/ Israel has refused to allow the Committee entry into the occupied areas but the Committee, on the basis of reliable evidence from various sources, has monitored developments in those areas and regularly submitted reports to the General Assembly on alleged Israeli violations of human rights. The General Assembly has repeatedly passed resolutions criticizing Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. The resolution passed in 1977, in terms reflecting those passed in preceding years, states that the Assembly:
Condemns the following Israeli policies and practices:
(a) The annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
(b) The establishment of Israeli settlements therein and the transfer of an alien population thereto;
(c) The evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the denial of their right of return;
(d) The confiscation and expropriation of Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
(e) The destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
(f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
(g) The ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
(h) The pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
(i) The interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
(j) The illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories.” 102/
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has also denounced Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories. Excerpts from its resolution of 1977 103/ follow:
The Commission on Human Rights,
“Taking into account that the General Assembly has, in resolution 31/20, recalled its resolution 3376 (XXX), in which it expressed grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards:
“(a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty,
“(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted …
“Greatly alarmed by the continuation of the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by Israel in the occupied Arab territories, particularly the measures aiming at annexation, as well as the continuing establishment of settlers’ colonies, mass destruction of homes, torture and ill-treatment of detainees, expropriation of properties and imposition of discriminatory economic legislation,
1. Expresses its grave anxiety and concern over the deteriorating serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and aggression;
2. Calls upon Israel to take immediate steps for the return of the Palestinians and the other displaced inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories to their homes;
3. Deplores once again Israel’s continued violations, in the occupied Arab territories, of the basic norms of international law and of the relevant international conventions, in particular, Israel’s grave breaches of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, which are considered as war crimes and an affront to humanity, as well as Israel’s persistent defiance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and its continued policy of violating the basic human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories;
…
6. Reaffirms that all such measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition or status of the occupied Arab territories or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are all null and void, and calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem …
…
8. Calls upon Israel to release all Arabs detained or imprisoned as a result of their struggle for self-determination and the liberation of their territories, and to accord to them, pending their release, the protection envisaged in the relevant provisions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and, in this context, requests the Secretary-General to collect all relevant information concerning detainees, such as their number, identity, place and duration of detention, and to make this information available to the Commission at its next session;
9. Further calls upon Israel once more to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to acknowledge and abide by its obligations under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
10. Reiterates its call upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies and practices referred to in the present resolution”.
The decade 1967-1977, during which there were two major conflicts in the Middle East, thus saw a fundamental transformation in the treatment of the Palestine question. From being viewed as a refugee problem, it had been recognized as an important issue involving the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and to national self-determination.
VIII.
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
At its thirtieth session in 1975, the General Assembly requested the Security Council to act to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their rights. The Assembly also called for the participation of the PLO, on an equal footing with other parties, in all negotiations on the Middle East held under United Nations auspices, requesting the Secretary-General to make efforts to secure the invitation of the PLO to the Peace Conference on the Middle East (first convened at Geneva in December 1973). 104/
In another resolution, the General Assembly expressed its concern that:
… no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved,
… the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,
… no progress has been achieved towards:
(a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty;
(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted.” 105/
By the same resolution, the General Assembly established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The original members of the Committee* were:
Afghanistan, Cuba, Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia.
* In 1976 Guyana, Mali and Nigeria joined the Committee.
The following States have been participating as observers in the work of the Committee: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Republic, Mauritania and the Syrian Arab Republic. The PLO, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference also joined the Committee as observers.
Ambassador Médoune Fall of Senegal was the first Chairman of the Committee. The mandate of the Committee was to formulate recommendations for a programme of implementation designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable rights including:
(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;
(c) The inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted.
The Committee, after several meetings during 1976, issued its first report 106/ with the following principal recommendations (text at annex VI):
The right of return
Phase one:
The first phase involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967. The Committee recommends that:
(i) The Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other conditions;
Phase two:
“The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967. The Committee recommends that:
“(i) While the first phase is being implemented, the United Nations in co-operation with the States directly involved, and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the interim representative of the Palestinian entity, should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III);
“(ii) Palestinians not choosing to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation as provided for in resolution 194 (III).
“The right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty
“… The evacuation of the territories occupied by force and in violation of the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a conditio sine qua non for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine …
“(a) A timetable should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal by Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967 …
“(b) The Security Council may need to provide temporary peace-keeping forces in order to facilitate the process of withdrawal;
“(c) Israel should be requested by the Security Council to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during this period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories …
“(d) Israel should also be requested to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva Convention …
“(e) The evacuated territories, … should be taken over by the United Nations, which … will subsequently hand over these evacuated areas to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;
…
“(g) As soon as the independent Palestinian entity has been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and the Palestinian entity, should … make further arrangements for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions …”
Presenting the recommendations to the General Assembly in 1976, the Committee Chairman said, inter alia:
“Never in the history of nations have the actions of an international organization had such a decisive effect on the destiny of a people than those of the United Nations on that of the Palestinian people …
“The question of Palestine, which was introduced on 2 April 1947 to the United Nations by the United Kingdom, has borne and still bears the character of a problem of self-determination, which the United Nations to date has not been able to resolve in a just and, therefore, durable manner.
“As a result, the question has remained before the United Nations in a state of uncertainty ever since the very first days of the Organization, which has devoted more time, discussion and effort to its solution than to any other item without succeeding in bringing about a just and durable solution … This situation does not mean that the United Nations is incapable of promoting a peaceful solution of this question …
“This task must be recognized to be both important and difficult. Important because, for the first time, the United Nations is dealing in a specific manner with the question which lies at the heart of the Middle East conflict. Difficult, because the implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people is the subject of diverging, if not diametrically opposed, interpretations …
“Our Committee, as you will have noted, has based itself, in its work, solely on the relevant decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, whether the matter concerned the refugees, the withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, or the implementation of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people …
“… the mandate of the Committee, [is] neither to resolve the question of the Middle East nor to reaffirm the rights of Israel, but to define ways and means to ensure recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people …” 107/
Earlier, the Committee’s recommendations had been considered by the Security Council, where the Committee Chairman had stated:
“The present world situation requires that the Security Council carefully study the recommendations submitted to it so that a settlement of the question may be found, since as everyone knows, such a settlement is essential for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. We believe that such action is all the more appropriate in that the United Nations must bear a great part of the responsibility for the tragedy which the Arab people of Palestine are now experiencing.
“It is in the interests of the State of Israel as well that a real and lasting peace be established in the Middle East.
“Ruthless, blind and unjust force can build nothing which cannot be destroyed by an even greater force based on justice and law.
“The Israeli leaders have too much imagination and too great a sense of political responsibility not to understand that time is working against them. Unfortunately, we must recognize the fact that they are now beginning to count far too many lost opportunities [The Chairman then quoted M. Mendes-France]
‘When a people wishes to free itself of an occupier although the occupier may be militarily more powerful, it will always be successful. This was the case in Viet Nam, in Algeria, in Madagascar, in Angola. The same will hold for Palestine’”. 108/
The Security Council had debated the Palestine question in the context of the Committee’s reports, and had considered a draft resolution declaring that the Council:
“Affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. 109/
The resolution had received 10 votes in favour, 1 against (United States) and 4 abstentions.* The resolution failed due to the veto. 110/
_____________
* In favour: Benin, China, Guyana, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania
Abstaining: France, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
The Council again took up the Committee’s report in October 1977. The Committee Chairman again emphasized that:
“… [the Committee’s] mandate was not to deal with the Middle East question in its entirety, but, rather, to seek ways and means of implementing the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, the task of our Committee consists, above all, in righting the basic imbalance which has always characterized the various United Nations approaches to the Palestine question. Far from being an advocate of partiality, the Committee has tried to redress that regrettable imbalance and to give the Palestine question its rightful place and its true dimension …” 111/
The Chairman stressed that the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people had been recognized by most countries, adding that:
“Israel’s right to exist is no longer challenged by anyone. But Israel in turn must recognize the legitimate rights of its neighbours. The world is now thirsting for peace and security. Israel has no right to continue to pose constant threats to the very survival of our planet …” 112/
However, the Security Council adjourned the discussion without taking any action, the item remaining on its agenda.
IX. THE STATUS OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY
The Palestine question is now in a state where the inherent and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of a Palestinian entity is receiving steadily widening attention, as are the original factors that led to the creation of the Palestine problem and the underlying issues. They have been outlined in this study and may be recapitulated to place this complex problem in perspective.
In 1917 there existed a Palestinian entity possessing two of the major attributes of a nation – a people rooted for centuries in a defined territory. This entity, along with others, had been part of an empire that disintegrated in the First World War. Palestine was among the entities that the League of Nations recognized as one of those communities “whose existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized”. The Mandate, according to the Covenant of the League of Nations, should have provided administrative guidance designed to facilitate the transition to full independence, but it also required the Mandatory to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home. The indigenous people of Palestine had not been consulted in the framing of this policy.
The implementation of this policy transformed the demographic and land owning patterns in Palestine. Where the Jewish community had constituted about 9 per cent of the population in Palestine in 1917, by 1947 massive immigration had swelled this proportion to about 32 per cent. In 1917, Jewish-owned land had accounted for 2.5 per cent of the total land area of Palestine. By 1947, this had increased to 6.2 per cent.
These changes, as well as other factors and policies, led to a situation in which, instead of achieving independence as a single State, as other mandated territories had, Palestine was partitioned by a United Nations resolution, the Mandatory Power having declared its inability to deal with the conflict that the irreconcilable obligations of the Mandate had created. The partition resolution which was rejected by the Palestinian Arabs as well as by the Arab States, awarded 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine to 32 per cent of its population.
In the 1948 war the new State of Israel expanded to occupy 77 per cent of the territory of Palestine. Israel also occupied the larger part of Jerusalem, meant to be internationalized under the partition resolution. Jordan and Egypt occupied the other parts of the territory assigned by the partition resolution to the Palestinian Arab State which did not come into being. Over half the indigenous Palestinians fled or were expelled, the refugees numbering 726,000 by the end of 1949.
In the 1967 war, Israel occupied the remaining territory of Palestine, until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control. This included the remaining part of Jerusalem, the city being made the Israeli capital. The war brought a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at half a million. By 1970, of an estimated Palestinian population of 3 million, over half, 1.6 million, were in exile, 1 million are in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and 400,000 within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. Israel has refused to comply with the call by the United Nations, repeated virtually annually since 1948, to permit the return of Palestinian refugees who wish to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours and to award compensation to those choosing not to return.
Israel has also failed to comply with that part of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which called on Israel to withdraw from territories it had occupied in the 1967 conflict, on the grounds that withdrawals can be contemplated only in the context of a comprehensive settlement, which includes the other operative paragraph of the resolution namely:
“… respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force”.
Efforts within and without the United Nations for such a settlement of the Middle East dispute have been under way for over a decade and are yet to achieve success. The Middle East dispute which has led to four major wars and to a constant threat to world peace, grew out of the seed of the Palestine issue. The General Assembly since 1969 has repeatedly reiterated this fact, and has emphasized that the Palestine issue can only be resolved when the Palestinian people are assured the exercise of their inherent and inalienable rights of return and national self-determination.
The recognition of the great majority of Member States of the United Nations that the issue of the Palestinian people must be solved if peace is to return to the Middle East is evidenced by the following statements:
In August 1976 the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at Colombo, made the following declaration:
“The Conference believed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can only be established through the solution of the Palestine question, the root cause of the conflict in the region, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions which recognized the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people”. 113/
The Conference detailed these rights as the right of self-determination, the right of return and the right to national independence and the establishment of an independent, sovereign State in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting at Libreville in July 1977, declared:
“… that a just and lasting peace can be attained only on the basis of total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and recognition of the national legitimate right of the Palestinian people to their territory, sovereignty and national independence and their right to self-determination and the creation of an independent State on their national territory.” 114/
The spokesman of the European Economic Community, addressing the General Assembly in September 1977 stated:
“With regard to the situation in the Near East over which the Nine continue to be gravely concerned, we remain convinced, as a matter of principle, that any solution must be based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), as we reaffirmed on 29 June 1977, as well as on the following fundamental principles: first, acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable; secondly, Israel must end its occupation of territories it has held since the 1967 war; thirdly, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of each State in the region must be respected, as well as the right of each State in the region to live in peace with secure and recognized borders; fourthly, the establishment of a just and lasting peace must give due consideration to the rights of the Palestinians.
“The Nine also continue to believe that a solution to the conflict will be possible only if the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact. This would take into account, of course, the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.
“It remains the firm view of the Nine that all aspects of the problem must be taken as a whole.
“They consider that the representatives of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinian people, must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation among all the parties concerned. In the context of an over-all settlement, Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; also the Arab side must be ready to recognize the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.” 115/
On 1 October 1977, a United States-Soviet joint communiqué stated:
“The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence”.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations has been engaged in efforts to promote progress towards a Middle East peace, and also has stressed the place the Palestine issue holds in the dispute.
In a 1976 report on the Palestine question, the Secretary-General noted that the Security Council discussions that year:
“… had emphasized the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem and has reaffirmed the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries …”
The Secretary-General had pointed out these aspects in a letter dated 27 January 1976 to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. 116/
In his report in August 1976 on the work of the United Nations, the Secretary-General stated:
“The Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem has gained increasing attention in efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in that region … I would like to underline once again the fundamental importance of tackling the Palestinian question as an essential element in resolving the Middle East dispute”. 117/
Notes
1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286.
2/ Ibid., documents A/287 to A/291.
3/ Ibid., General Committee, vol. II, 29th meeting, p. 32.
4/ Ibid., 31st meeting, pp. 81-82.
5/ Ibid., Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 71st meeting, p. 60.
6/ Ibid., General Committee, vol. II, 32nd meeting, pp. 92-93.
7/ Ibid., First Committee, vol. III, 46th meeting, p. 8, document A/C.1/145.
8/ Ibid., 50th meeting, p. 104, document A/C.1/155.
9/ Ibid., Annexes, p. 365, document A/C.1/149.
10/ Ibid., Annexes, p. 366, document A/C.1/150.
11/ Ibid., First Committee, vol. III, 48th meeting, pp. 88-91.
12/ Ibid., 52nd meeting, pp. 184-185.
13/ Ibid., 54th meeting, p. 252; 50th meeting, p. 114.
14/ Ibid., 56th meeting, p. 314.
15/ Ibid., 56th meeting, pp. 312-313.
16/ Ibid., Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 77th meeting, pp. 132-134.
17/ Ibid., 78th meeting, p. 145.
18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, document A/364 (Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), vol. II, p. 5.
19/ Ibid., vol. III, pp. 9, 14 and 19.
20/ Ibid., p. 62.
21/ Ibid., p. 56.
22/ Ibid., p. 83.
23/ Ibid., vol. IV, p. 20.
24/ Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 39, 41 and 56.
25/ Ibid., pp. 45 and 46.
26/ Ibid., vol. II, pp. 15 and 16.
27/ Ibid., p. 43.
28/ Ibid., vol. I, pp. 29 and 30.
29/ Ibid., p. 33.
30/ Ibid., pp. 42-44.
31/ Ibid., p. 47.
32/ Ibid., pp. 59 and 64.
33/ Ibid., vol. I, p. 6.
34/ Ibid., vol. II, p. 14.
35/ Ibid., p. 28.
36/ Ibid., pp. 21-22.
37/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, document A/364 (Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine), vol. I, pp. 48-57.
38/ Ibid., pp. 60-64.
39/ The New York Times, 2 September 1947, p. 1.
40/ Palestine Post, 3 September 1947, p. 1.
41/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, 2nd meeting, p. 3.
42/ Ibid., 3rd meeting, pp. 6-11.
43/ Ibid., 4th meeting, pp. 15-19.
44/ Ibid., 15th meeting, pp. 96-98.
45/ Ibid., 11th meeting, pp. 63-64.
46/ Ibid., 12th meeting, pp. 69-70.
47/ Ibid., 18th meeting, pp. 123-124.
48/ Ibid., 7th meeting, pp. 37-39.
49/ Ibid., 19th meeting, p. 129.
50/ Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error (New York, Harper and Bros. 1949), pp. 457-459.
51/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, pp. 276-279.
52/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, 124th meeting, p. 1310.
53/ Ibid., 124th meeting, pp. 1323-1324.
54/ Ibid., 125th meeting, p. 1334.
55/ Ibid., 124th meeting, pp. 1321-1322.
56/ Ibid., 124th meeting, pp. 1325-1328.
57/ Ibid., 125th meeting, p. 1359.
58/ Ibid., 124th meeting, pp. 1313-1314.
59/ Ibid., 125th meeting, p. 1341.
60/ Ibid., 127th meeting, pp. 1396-1399.
61/ Ibid., 126th meeting, pp. 1370 and 1378.
62/ Ibid., 128th meeting, pp. 1424-1425.
63/ Ibid., 128th meeting, p. 1426.
64/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, vol. I, p. 54.
65/ Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Special Supplement No. 2, p. 12.
66/ Lorch, Nathaniel, The Edge of the Sword: Israel’s War of Independence, 1947-1949 (New York, Putnam, 1961), p. 87.
67/ Begin, Menachem, The Revolt (Los Angeles, Nash, 1972), p. 348.
68/ Ben-Gurion, David, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York, The Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 419.
69/ Herzl, Theodor, The Complete Diaries (N.Y. Herzl Press, 1969), vol. I, p. 88.
70/ Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 419.
71/ Weitz, Joseph, Diary, cited in Hirst, David: The Gun and the Olive Branch (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 142.
72/ Joseph, Dov, The Faithful City (N.Y., Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 71-72.
73/ Begin, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
74/ Allon, Yigal, Ha Sepher Ha Palmach, cited in Hirst; op. cit., p. 130.
75/ U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, document A/AC.25/6, p. 19.
76/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11, document A/648 (Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine), part I, sect. 5, paras. 2 and 6. Part III, sect. I, para. 1.
77/ Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 472-476.
78/ Moore, John Norton, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton University Press, 1974), vol. III, pp. 349-350.
79/ Ben-Gurion, op. cit., p. 292.
80/ Moore, op. cit., pp. 356-357.
81/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11, document A/648 (Progress report of the U.N. Mediator on Palestine), part I, sect. III, paras. 5 and 6.
82/ Ibid., paras. 14 and 15.
83/ Ibid., sect. VIII, para. 4.
84/ Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for October 1948, pp. 4-9, document S/1018.
85/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 2, pp. 87-89, document A/945, part III.
86/ Ibid., Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annexes, vol. II, pp. 5-8, document A/927.
87/ General Assembly resolution 273 (III) of 11 May 1949.
88/ Badi, Joseph, Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel (New York, Twayne, 1961), p. 28.
89/ The New York Times, 25 April 1950, p. 14.
90/ Abu-Lughod, Janet, “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine”, in Abu Lughod, Ibrahim: The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 162.
91/ Ibid., p. 163.
92/ General Assembly resolution 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969. Votes: 47 in favour, 22 against, 47 abstentions.
93/ General Assembly resolution 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970. Votes: 47 in favour, 22 against, 50 abstentions.
94/ General Assembly resolution 3070 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973. Votes: 97 in favour, 5 against, 28 abstentions.
95/ General Assembly resolution 3210 (XXIX) of 14 October 1974.
96/ General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974.
97/ General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974. Votes: 95 in favour, 17 against, 19 abstentions.
98/ Document A/PV.2282, pp. 31ff.
99/ Document A/PV.2283, pp. 26-27.
100/ General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. Votes: 116 in fa vour, 0 against, 2 abstentions.
101/ General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968. Votes: 60 in favour, 22 against, 30 abstentions.
102/ General Assembly resolutions 32/91 C of 13 December 1977; votes: 98 in favour, 2 against, 32 abstentions; 3240 A (XXIX) of 29 November 1974; votes: 95 in favour, 4 against, 31 abstentions; 3525 A (XXX) of 15 December 1975; votes: 87 in favour, 7 against, 26 abstentions; 31/106 C of 16 December 1976; votes: 100 in favour, 5 against, 30 abstentions.
103/ Commission on Human Rights resolution 1 (XXXIII) of 15 February 1977. Votes: 23 in favour, 3 against, 6 abstentions. The composition of the Commission in 1977 was: Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugoslavia.
104/ General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.
105/ General Assembly resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.
106/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35, document A/31/35.
107/ Ibid., Plenary Meetings, vol. II, 66th meeting, paras. 2, 4, 6, 13, 27 and 33.
108/ S/PV.1924, p. 26.
109/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1976, document S/12119, p. 73.
110/ S/PV.1938, p. 62.
111/ S/PV.2041, p. 8.
112/ Ibid., p. 11.
113/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, document No. A/31/197, annex I, para. 79.
114/ Ibid., Thirty-second Session, document A/32/160, annex, p. 1.
115/ Ibid., 7th meeting, document A/32/PV.7, p. 22.
116/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, document A/31/271, p. 3.
117/ Ibid., Supplement No. 1A, document A/31/1/Add.1, pp. 3 and 4.
ANNEXES
Annex Page
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI. The Partition Plan – Map
The Armistice Lines, 1949 – Map
General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 – Text
Territories occupied by Israel, June 1967 – Map
The Jarring memorandum – Text
Recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable 173
174
174
178
179
181
ANNEX I
The Partition Plan, 1947
(map)
ANNEX II
The Armistice Lines of 1949
(map)
ANNEX III
United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 (III)
of 11 December 1948
The General Assembly,
Having considered further the situation in Palestine,
1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and
Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:
(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 182;(S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;
4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;
5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council’s resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
7. Resolves that the Holy Places – including Nazareth – religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international régime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory, that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them, and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;
8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem, the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu’fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;
Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;
Instructs the Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;
9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;
10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;
The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
ANNEX IV
Territories occupied by Israel, June 1967
(map)
ANNEX V
Aide-mémoire presented to Israel and the United Arab Republic by
Ambassador Jarring on 8 February 1971
I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock that existed during the first three years of my mission.
I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.
I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings – which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility – is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.
Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitments and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem.
1. Israel
Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:
(a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran;
(c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.
2. United Arab Republic
The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:
(a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
(b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
(c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
(d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;
(e) Non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs.
In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.
ANNEX VI
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES
The question of Palestine is at the heart of the Middle East problem, and, consequently, the Committee stresses its belief that no solution in the Middle East can be envisaged which does not fully take into account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.
The legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homes and property and to achieve self-determination, national independence and sovereignty are endorsed by the Committee in the conviction that the full implementation of these rights will contribute decisively to a comprehensive and final settlement of the Middle East crisis.
The participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing with other parties, on the basis of General Assembly resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3375 (XXX) is indispensable in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations.
The Committee recalls the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and stresses the consequent obligation for complete and speedy evacuation of any territory so occupied.
The Committee considers that it is the duty and the responsibility of all concerned to enable the Palestinians to exercise their inalienable rights.
The Committee recommends an expanded and more influential role by the United Nations and its organs in promoting a just solution to the question of Palestine and in the implementation of such a solution. The Security Council, in particular, should take appropriate action to facilitate the exercise by the Palestinians of their right to return to their homes, lands and property. The Committee, furthermore, urges the Security Council to promote action towards a just solution, taking into account all the powers conferred on it by the Charter of the United Nations.
It is with this perspective in view and on the basis of the numerous resolutions of the United Nations, after due consideration of all the facts, proposals and suggestions advanced in the course of its deliberations, that the Committee submits its recommendations on the modalities for the implementation of the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
II. THE RIGHT OF RETURN
The natural and inalienable right of Palestinians to return to their homes is recognized by resolution 194 (III), which the General Assembly has reaffirmed almost every year since its adoption. This right was also unanimously recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 237 (1967); the time for the urgent implementation of these resolutions is long overdue.
Without prejudice to the right of all Palestinians to return to their homes, lands and property, the Committee considers that the programme of implementation, of the exercise of this right may be carried out in two phases:
Phase one
The first phase involves the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced as a result of the war of June 1967. The Committee recommends that:
(i) The Security Council should request the immediate implementation of its resolution 237 (1967) and that such implementation should not be related to any other condition;
(ii) The resources of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and/or of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, suitably financed and mandated, may be employed to assist in the solution of any logistical problems involved in the resettlement of those returning to their homes. These agencies could also assist, in co-operation with the host countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in the identification of the displaced Palestinians.
Phase two
The second phase deals with the return to their homes of the Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967. The Committee recommends that:
(i) While the first phase is being implemented, the United Nations in co-operation with the States directly involved, and the Palestine Liberation Organization as the interim representative of the Palestinian entity, should proceed to make the necessary arrangements to enable Palestinians displaced between 1948 and 1967 to exercise their right to return to their homes and property, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly General Assembly resolution 194 (III);
(ii) Palestinians not choosing to return to their homes should be paid just and equitable compensation as provided for in resolution 194 (III).
III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY
The Palestinian people has the inherent right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine. The Committee considers that the evacuation of the territories occupied by force and in violation of the principles of the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations is a conditio sine qua non for the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine. The Committee considers, furthermore, that upon the return of the Palestinians to their homes and property and with the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity, the Palestinian people will be able to exercise its rights to self-determination and to decide its form of government without external interference.
The Committee also feels that the United Nations has an historical duty and responsibility to render all assistance necessary to promote the economic development and prosperity of the Palestinian entity.
To these ends, the Committee recommends that:
(a) A timetable should be established by the Security Council for the complete withdrawal by Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967; such withdrawal should be completed no later than 1 June 1977;
(b) The Security Council may need to provide temporary peace-keeping forces in order to facilitate the process of withdrawal;
(c) Israel should be requested by the Security Council to desist from the establishment of new settlements and to withdraw during this period from settlements established since 1967 in the occupied territories. Arab property and all essential services in these areas should be maintained intact;
(d) Israel should also be requested to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12;August;1949, and to declare, pending its speedy withdrawal from these territories, its recognition of the applicability of that Convention;
(e) The evacuated territories, with all property and services intact, should be taken over by the United Nations, which with the co-operation of the League of Arab States, will subsequently hand over these evacuated areas to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;
(f) The United Nations should, if necessary, assist in establishing communications between Gaza and the West Bank;
(g) As soon as the independent Palestinian entity has been established, the United Nations, in co-operation with the States directly involved and the Palestinian entity, should, taking into account General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX), make further arrangements for the full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the resolution of outstanding problems and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, in accordance with all relevant United Nations resolutions;
(h) The United Nations should provide the economic and technical assistance necessary for the consolidation of the Palestinian entity.
ST/SG/SER.F/1
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D442111E70E417E3802564740045A309
By the enclosed Note of April 26, 1963, the Israel Embassy conveyed to the Department a personal message from Israel Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to the President..
The Prime Minister’s message contains the following principal points:
1. Recent Middle East events (inclusion in the April 17 UAR federation declaration of a promise to establish a “military union” to “liberate Palestine”) adversely affect area stability and Israel’s security.
2. Israel is not helpless: in a test of strength it can defeat all three but it is not eager for such a victory.
3. Israel finds it difficult to believe that the United States and the civilized world would acquiesce in such an attempt at “liberation”.
4. Egypt receives Soviet military assistance and, despite these threats to annihilate Israel, large-scale financial aid from the United States and other Western powers. The latter serves “to set the Russian arms in action against Israel”.
5. Most effective in forestalling a disastrous effort at “liberation” would be a United States-USSR joint declaration (a) guaranteeing the territorial integrity and security of all states in the Middle East and (b) promising termination of all assistance to any state which threatens or refuses to recognize the existence of its neighbors. Israel acknowledges uncertainty as to whether the United States would be willing to propose, or the USSR to sign, such a declaration now, but if this suggestion is not feasible “the situation in the Middle East assumes a gravity without parallel”.
6. The Prime Minister expresses a willingness to fly to Washington for discussion with the President without publicity.
7. Israel is appreciative of the Hawk missile, but regrets that in the light of new offensive weapons being prepared by Israel’s neighbors, the Hawk alone is not a deterrent.
The Department will promptly acknowledge receipt of the Israel Embassy’s Note transmitting the message to the President and will prepare a suggested draft reply for the President’s consideration.
B.H.
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
| “I welcome your letter of May 12 and am giving it careful study. |
| “Meanwhile, I have received from Ambassador Barbour a report of his conversation with you on May 14 regarding the arrangements for visiting the Dimona reactor. I should like to add some personal comments on that subject. |
| “I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons. We both recognized this when we talked together two years ago, and I emphasized it again when I met with Mrs. Meir just after Christmas. The dangers in the proliferation of national nuclear weapons systems are so obvious that I am sure I need not repeat them here. |
| “It is because of our preoccupation with this problem that my Government has sought to arrange with you for periodic visits to Dimona. When we spoke together in May 1961 you said that we might make whatever use we wished of the information resulting from the first visit of American scientists to Dimona and that you would agree to further visits by neutrals as well. I had assumed from Mrs. Meir’s comment that there would be no problem between us on this. |
| “We are concerned with the disturbing effects on world stability which would accompany the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel. I cannot imagine that the Arabs would refrain from turning to the Soviet Union for assistance if Israel were to develop a nuclear weapons capability–with all the consequences this would hold. But the problem is much larger than its impact on the Middle East. Development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would almost certainly lead other larger countries, that have so far refrained from such development, to feel that they must follow suit. |
| “As I made clear in my press conference of May 8, we have a deep commitment to the security of Israel. In addition this country supports Israel in a wide variety of other ways which are well known to both of us. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] |
| “I can well appreciate your concern for developments in the UAR. But I see no present or imminent nuclear threat to Israel from there. I am assured that our intelligence on this question is good and that the Egyptians do not presently have any installation comparable to Dimona, nor any facilities potentially capable of nuclear weapons production. But, of course, if you have information that would support a contrary conclusion, I should like to receive it from you through Ambassador Barbour. We have the capacity to check it. |
| “I trust this message will convey the sense of urgency and the perspective in which I view your Government’s early assent to the proposal first put to you by Ambassador Barbour on April 2. |
“Sincerely,
“John F. Kennedy”
Rusk
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